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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the advantages and limitations of applying culture to the 
analysis of violent conflict and peacebuilding, with a particular focus on liberal 
peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. While fully aware of the critique of the concept of 
culture in terms of its uses for the production of difference and „otherness,‟ it also 
seeks to respond to the critique of liberal peacebuilding on the account of its low 
sensitivity towards local culture, which allegedly undermines the peace effort. After 
a careful examination of the terms of discussion about culture enabled by theoretical 
approaches to conflict in Chapter 2, the thesis presents a theoretical framework for 
the analysis of cultural aspects of conflict and peace based on the processes and 
effects of meaning-generation (Chapter 3), developing the conceptual apparatus and 
vocabulary for the subsequent empirical study. Instead of bracketing out the 
recursive nature of cultural theorising, the developed approach embraces the 
recursive dynamics which arise as a result of cultural „embeddedness‟ of the analyst 
and the processes which s/he seeks to elucidate, mirroring similar dynamics in the 
cultural production of meaning and knowledge. The framework of „embedded 
cultural enquiry‟ is then used to analyse the practices of liberal peacebuilding as a 
particular culture, which shapes the interaction of the liberal peace with its „subjects‟ 
and critics as well as framing its reception of the cultural problematic generally 
(Chapter 4). The application of the analytical framework to the case study 
investigates the interaction between the liberal peace and „local culture,‟ offering an 
alternative reading of the conflict and peace process in Sierra Leone (Chapter 5). 
The study concludes that a greater attention to cultural meaning-making offers a 
largely untapped potential for peacebuilding, although any decisions with regard to 
its deployment will inevitably be made from within an inherently biased cultural 
perspective. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
„I will bring peace, everlasting peace! And unity. And uniformity!‟ 
„And imagination, what about that? One thing that led you here, 
imagination? You are killing it dead!‟ 
 
– Doctor Who, Series 2, „The Age of Steel,‟ BBC 
 
 
 
A case for ‘returning culture to peacebuilding’ 
In the post-Cold War period, violent conflict in the Global South has acquired 
unprecedented prominence on the agendas of policy-makers and International 
Relations (IR) scholars alike. Yet, a lay person will usually have heard more about 
interventions by the United Nations peacekeeping forces or NGOs‟ humanitarian 
relief efforts than about the particulars of the conflicts in question. The rapid 
increase in the number and scope of UN peace operations following the end of the 
Cold War, the high visibility of national donor agencies involved in conflict 
management and prevention (such as DfID or USAID), as well as the growing 
number of non-governmental actors engaged in relief, development aid and post-
conflict reconstruction activities in the recent decades all point to the formation of a 
large-scale industry of peace. Despite the absence of centralised coordination, this 
„industry‟ is guided by a shared understanding of both the sources of violent conflict 
and the required remedies as grounded in liberal international theory and ideology 
(Duffield 2001). The prescriptive character of the liberal „order,‟ designed to counter 
the „chaos‟ of post-Cold War conflicts, highlights the ideological dimension of 
„disciplinary liberalism‟ (Debrix 1999). 
 
The domination of liberal approaches to addressing violent conflict has not remained 
uncontested, with the perceived lack of practical alternatives to liberal peace 
(founded as it is on the apparently self-explanatory norms of constitutional 
democracy, human rights, the rule of law and market economy) inviting particular 
controversy. The premise of universal applicability and benignity of liberal peace as 
the raison d’être of the vast array of policies aimed at the developing world has been 
exposed as the major source of misfit between the offered institutional solutions to 
violent conflict and the requirements stemming from diverse conditions on the 
ground (e.g. Richmond and Franks 2006). Despite sharing a number of features, 
such as post-colonial history, repercussions of the Cold War era superpower rivalry, 
or inclusion in transnational shadow economies, the dynamics of contemporary 
violent conflicts make each of them sufficiently different to question the 
standardised terms of involvement associated with liberal peacebuilding.
1
  
                                                 
1
 „Peacebuilding‟ is used here to refer to the entire spectrum of activities aimed at conflict prevention, 
resolution and post-settlement reconstruction – from military peacekeeping interventions to fostering 
civil society to reconciliation and state-building.   
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Already these preliminary notes offer a strong case for „cultural critique‟ of liberal 
peacebuilding, exposing its inability to engage constructively with local cultural 
dynamics and implicit cultural biases of its own approach to conflict and peace (e.g. 
Duffey 2001; Fetherston 2000a, 2000b; Shaw 2005). These biases are exemplified 
by the imperative to end violent conflicts regardless of their underlying dynamics 
and the role that violence may play in the constitution of societies in question 
(Richards 2005a; Brigg 2005). They are also evident in the modernist view of social 
change, which underlies the elevation of development to an unquestioned end of 
interventions, as well as a means to safeguard peace and security through universal 
spread of principles of progressivist rationality (e.g. Duffield 2001; Echavarria 
2007). The inability of liberal peacebuilding to engage with local culture is 
demonstrated by occasional failures to respect the elementary cultural sensitivities 
(Duffey 2001), frequent working at cross-purposes with the established local 
practices of reconciliation and locally-nurtured visions of peace (Kaldor 1999; 
Fetherston 2000a, 2000b; Lederach 1997; Shaw 2005), the lack of ability to 
understand the cultural impact of interventions (Fetherston and Nordstrom 1995) 
and vice versa (Chopra and Hohe 2004), as well as the general trend of substituting 
the existing patterns of social organisation by those consistent with the institutional 
frameworks of liberal peace (Duffield 2001). The tendency of blindness towards the 
cultural problematic in general is underpinned by viewing the problems besetting the 
application of liberal peace as merely „technical‟ and not grounded in a particular 
(cultural) perspective which it represents. And although the problems to be solved 
(e.g. corruption or „bad governance‟) are occasionally put down to culture (Kapoor 
2008: 35-6), the necessity of engaging with it is „superseded‟ by postulating the 
required improvements in equally technical, a-cultural terms. The political 
dimension of culture is all but eliminated by relegating culture to the recreational 
domain  (ibid.: 23; EuropeAid 2007), so that possibilities of its broader, formative 
role in structuring the discursive production of the „others‟ of liberal peace (à la Said 
(1978) or Dunn (2003)) are not even envisaged (Kapoor 2008: 6-7). And although 
the recognition of notable absence of culture from the discourse of liberal 
peacebuilding has reached the circles of its ideologues and practitioners (e.g. WB 
2007b), a return of culture to liberal peace would involve more than a routine 
exercise in „sensitisation,‟ as the following preliminary discussion of the complexity 
of the concept of culture illustrates.  
Culture: Advantages and limitations of the concept 
References to culture are infrequent in peacebuilding policy documents, and when 
they do appear, there is little reflection on the meaning or scope of the concept, as 
though references to „culture of prevention‟ (Annan 2001) or „cultures of violence‟ 
(UNDP 2004) were taken to be self-explanatory. Yet a closer look at „culture‟ 
reveals it as one of the most complex and contentious concepts in social sciences. It 
is almost impossible to delineate what belongs within the realm of culture from that 
which does not: intuitively, „culture‟ calls for a broad understanding that embraces 
„the totality of human and/or social existence‟ (Bauman 1999: 124-5). However, the 
breadth of the concept presents immense analytical difficulties for its users, who are 
often forced to resort to other, less nebulous terms to define and delineate its scope, 
thus disengaging culture into a number of different, not always interchangeable 
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facets (such as, for instance, „social structure,‟ „identity,‟ „ritual‟ etc.). The implicit 
understandings stirred up by invoking „culture‟ are thus likely to differ widely; 
furthermore, the „tactics of evasion‟ where culture is addressed through its disparate 
facets risks losing sight of the overarching concept itself.  
 
While defining culture presents challenges (as illustrated by multiple attempts 
documented by Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952)), successful delineations invoke 
problems of a different kind, if one considers the political and normative 
implications of exclusive definitions of culture (as opposed to „non-culture‟) (cf. 
Jenks 1993: 9). Although such exclusive understandings of culture are largely a 
thing of the past (Avruch 1998: 6), the connotations of „othering‟ and hierarchy still 
accompany the contemporary uses of the term aimed at demarcating boundaries 
between different cultures (Abu-Lughod 1991), even when these are put to the 
service of the „politically correct‟ ideas of respect for cultural rights (e.g. Spivak 
1988). Thinking about culture in terms of cultural difference is also problematic 
because it tends to obscure both variation and diachronic change within the 
delineated cultural „wholes,‟ which bears the danger of reifying difference as well as 
cultural identity. And although the discourse of liberal peacebuilding presents 
cultural diversity as an asset in human development (e.g. UNESCO 2001: Article 1; 
UNDP 2004b; Bezanson and Sagasti 2005), the envisaged solutions to the problem 
of power asymmetry between cultural groups, such as multiculturalism, often rely 
on excessively static and homogeneous portrayals of cultures (cf. Huysmans 2006). 
Arresting cultures in time and space also has problematic power connotations 
because of the preconditions for governing to which this form of „knowing‟ gives 
rise (cf. Foucault 1965, 1977). 
 
„Defining‟ cultures is also challenging because the notion of culture invokes, 
simultaneously, „universality and commonality‟ and „particularity and diversity‟ 
(Blaney and Inayatullah 1998: 64). While this tension is present in any 
characterisation of a particular culture (cf. Connolly 1991), it is clearest in Avruch‟s 
(1998) juxtaposition of two aspects of culture, „local‟ and „generic,‟ where the latter 
refers to „the general potential of human individuals to share certain not genetically 
inherited routines of thinking, feeling, and acting with other individuals with whom 
they are in social contact and/or to the products of that potential‟ (Brumann 1999: 
S6). In post-Arnoldian conceptualisations (Arnold 1882; cf. Avruch 1998: 6), 
„generic‟ culture is viewed as a truly ubiquitous feature of humankind, denoting any 
imaginable design of human cohabitation and interaction with an environment. Both 
the generation of culture as an instrument for countering the instinctually under-
determined character of human condition (Bauman 1999: xii-xiii), and the ensuing 
„meaningful and constructed quality of human existence‟ (Blaney and Inayatullah 
1998: 64), make „culture‟ the most general feature of humanity (cf. White 1959: 17; 
Lowie 1936: 305). One could, of course, argue that such generic „cultural universals‟ 
are not specifically cultural, but rather simply human phenomena (cf. Bauman 1999: 
17; Kapoor 2008: 22-3). But as it is difficult to separate the „human‟ from the 
„cultural,‟ the concept of culture as such can be used to delineate „the boundaries of 
… the human‟ (Bauman 1999: 30). (After all, „human‟ is the professed focus of 
anthropology – a discipline we have come to associate closest with the study of 
culture (cf. Clifford 1986a: 4)). This understanding of culture as „the common 
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domain of the human‟ (Jenks 1993: 9) also marked early anthropological fascination 
with culture – „that realm of human being which marked its ontology off from the 
sphere of the merely natural‟ (ibid.: 8). However, to recognise the generic aspect of 
culture is not synonymous with endorsing universalism, since „the most generic 
element in culture is precisely its dividing, differentiating function‟ (Bauman 1999: 
34). In this light, „generality in culture is a by-product … of mankind not being 
united into a whole; of it being, on the contrary, split into separate units‟ (ibid.). This 
consideration recasts the division into „local‟ and „generic‟ in very different terms, 
drawing attention to the potentially problematic, inevitably divisive effects at the 
very heart of the concept, thus lending evidence to the abovementioned propensity 
for its abuse. 
 
One reaction to the alleged „abuse‟ perpetuated by references to culture – such as 
politicisation, or naturalisation of certain interests and power asymmetries – is to 
discard culture altogether as a usable concept (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1991; Scott 1992, 
2003). However, this suggestion faces immediate difficulties. Tempting though it 
may be to treat any evocation of culture as suspect, there is no way to enforce 
rhetorical abstinence short of universal censorship (which in itself would be even 
more problematic). Furthermore, avoidance of an informed discussion of culture on 
the grounds of its susceptibility to abuse would also be counterproductive, since 
only a profound understanding of dynamics set forth by evoking culture would 
guard against uncritical acceptance of political „givens‟ produced in that way. 
Analytically, „[c]easing to speak of cultures … also entails a cost‟ of underplaying 
observable regularities, which would amount to claiming „that features are 
distributed randomly‟ (Brumann 1999: S7) – a view that could easily be construed 
as politically problematic since it, too, offers limitless possibilities for misuse. 
Ignoring culture could also only be justified if it were possible to achieve a 
perspective utterly untainted by things „cultural.‟ Although the quest for such 
„culture-free, nonsemiotic world‟ (Becker and Mannheim 1995: 238) is unlikely to 
be abandoned – as manifest in the continuing seduction of positivism and 
bureaucratic politics with their self-positioning as an objective „non-perspective‟ 
(Häkli 1996) – it also seems necessary to examine the implications of such 
inevitable cultural grounding for what we can say (or would prefer not to say) about, 
or with the help of, culture. Just as the need for „othering‟ is exposed as discursively 
embedded in the very idea of culture (Abu-Lughod 1991; Scott 1992, 2003), so, it 
seems, is the critical questioning of the self (Vidich and Lyman 2000; Viktorova 
Milne, forthcoming). The notion of culture, in this respect, is a testimony to (self-) 
reflection on the human condition and factors which perpetuate it. 
 
Culture thus emerges as a concept capturing, if not resolving, a series of seemingly 
irreconcilable tensions, such as those between generic and particular, sameness and 
difference, domination and resistance, self-assertion and -doubt, and so on (cf. 
Bauman 1999: xiii). The ambivalence coded into the concept of „culture‟ makes it a 
unique tool for reflecting upon and connecting a wealth of diverse human 
experiences. And although the ambivalence is reflected in the uses to which the 
concept of culture itself can be put, uncovering the possibilities of abuse that the 
concept of culture offers is just as important as investigating how its careful and 
even-handed application can assist with the analysis of conflict and peacebuilding. 
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Methodological issues 
Having established the need for a study of culture in relation to conflict and 
peacebuilding, the question of how to conduct such a study becomes paramount, 
given that culture has something of a „reputation‟ as a difficult and unyielding 
subject. In conventional methodological terms, even conceptualising culture (as 
discussed above) presents a challenge; its operationalisation for the purposes of a 
particular study is even more difficult, considering that the breadth of the concept 
makes it almost impossible to differentiate between „cultural‟ and „non-cultural‟ 
influences, while the likelihood of co-variation in case of limited definitions of 
culture makes it difficult to determine, whether it is culture or something else that 
plays a defining role in conditioning particular aspects of conflict and peace. 
Disengaging culture into concepts and phenomena more amenable to the 
conventional tools of social research (as has been widely practiced in various 
disciplines) can assist with the study of those particular aspects of culture, but 
generalisations on their basis all too easily invite accusations of reductionism. Such 
an approach also perpetuates the perception of culture as an obscure and 
unaccountable influence, to be considered as „an explanation of last resort‟ (Pye 
1991: 504, quoted in Hudson 1997b: 2) when other options have been exhausted. 
The view of culture as the unfathomable residue that is left behind after the more 
specific aspects of human activity have been accounted for, not only risks 
essentialising culture through reifying these „residual‟ differences (Rao and Walton 
2004), but also actively constructs culture as something that is difficult to relate 
systematically to other fields of human activity and to subject to an informed 
academic study (Wuthnow et al. 1983: 3-7). On these grounds, some recent studies 
(e.g. Chabal and Daloz 2006) have argued that it is not only impossible, but also 
counterproductive to seek exhaustive and restrictive definitions of culture, if the 
concept is to preserve its analytical value. 
 
A broad and inclusive approach to culture, however, challenges most of the received 
wisdoms of social science methodology, which operates on the principle of analysis 
(i.e. literally – taking apart, before a synthesis in the name of explanation can be 
attempted). Cultural situatedness of the research subject appears to direct the study 
of culture towards interpretive methodologies; yet the social and even public nature 
(cf. Swidler 1995) of not only most manifestations of culture, but also reflections on 
it, makes interpretation itself a focus of cultural enquiry. Engaging with the issue of 
culture seems to involve the researcher into a „double hermeneutic‟ movement 
particularly compellingly. But, as noted above, observations of culture also warrant 
assumptions of its patterned character (Brumann 1999: S7), which point beyond the 
limited possibilities of generalisation traditionally associated with interpretivism. 
References to intersubjectivity, mutual constitution of culture and its subjects, 
whether in its social constructivist (e.g. Wendt 1992) or structurationist guises (e.g. 
Giddens 1984), although helpful in overcoming the rigidity of conventional 
methodological oppositions, offer little guidance for investigating the exact 
mechanism of intersubjective constitution of culture, or for identifying the exact 
domain of cultural enquiry. Taken seriously, however, „intersubjectivity‟ reinforces 
the notion that an in-depth consideration of culture leads to an engagement with the 
very character of knowledge and the terms and ways of its generation. This means 
that methodology cannot be relied upon to provide uncontroversial answers to 
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questions about culture: far from an external, independent and „disinterested‟ toolkit 
for analysis, it becomes yet another subject for „cultural‟ investigation. This also 
means that such an investigation would have to proceed without the aid of many 
conventional safeguards of academic research, and establish (and interrogate) its 
own parameters as it actively explores the conditions of situated knowing – from 
within the „messy‟ social reality undifferentiated into neat „object‟ and „subject‟ 
categories, first- and second-order discourses, products and producers of knowledge, 
and so on. 
Implications for a cultural enquiry (of conflict and peacebuilding) 
This places the present work at the heart of debates over non-foundational 
epistemologies  and the implications of knowledge not anchored in a timeless and 
abstract departure point (cf. George 1994; Toulmin 1992, 2001). But while 
endorsing the conclusions of anti-foundationalists concerning the heightened sense 
of responsibility for both the theorist and decision-maker in the conditions where the 
ultimate rightness of knowledge cannot be verified, this work also engages with the 
question of why the need for external validation of knowledge and truth seems to be 
so constant across different cultural environments. Investigation of this and other 
identifiable patterns and controversies takes the offered consideration of culture 
beyond mere „interpretation,‟ although there is no possibility to ensure – other than 
by „triangulation‟ with the ideas and conclusions of other (differently situated) 
thinkers – that what this thesis offers is more than just one possible reading of the 
problematic of culture in conflict. In this sense, the present work is suspended 
between a post-structuralist suspicion of any truth claims, and the temptation to 
generalise upon the patterned character of cultural phenomena (cf. Price and Reus-
Smit 1998: 275).  
 
This should not, however, be considered a fatal flaw in the research design, since 
upon closer inspection, most established and well-rehearsed theories and 
methodologies (even Hume‟s empiricism, according to George (1994: 22-4)) are 
founded upon some irreconcilable paradox, a leap of logic incorporated into their 
very structure (cf. Lassman 2005; see also Debrix 1999; Dolan 1991). Curiously, 
any attempts to „iron out‟ such paradoxes, instead of strengthening the theory‟s 
internal consistency, make it even more vulnerable to deconstruction (cf. Debrix 
1999: 40-41). The impossibility of avoiding such „founding paradoxes‟ in the first 
place is reflected in Lotman‟s remark that minimally two differently organised 
channels, code systems, or languages are required to enable the production of 
meaning, communication and cognition generally (1990: 36-37). Theories and 
methodologies, therefore, differ not in whether or not they contain such moments of 
founding inconsistency, but in how they treat their presence. An open endorsement 
of a paradoxical moment, in the case of the present work, not only imposes limits on 
its truth claims, but also enables the offered analytical approach to mirror similar 
inconsistencies and contradictions abundant in its subject-matter, culture (cf. 
Bauman 1999: xiii). While the approximation of the meta-language to its subject 
could be considered a highly unorthodox methodological move, it may yield 
knowledge inaccessible by more conventional means (cf. Feyerabend 1975). In 
particular, instead of offering a „solution‟ to methodological problems associated 
with the study of culture, this thesis will look at these problems as not accidental 
17 
 
undesired effects of engaging with culture, but rather as aspects instrumental for 
understanding the ways in which culture is produced and employed by human 
agents. The situated and recursive character of culture as a research subject is 
captured in the labelling of the offered approach as „embedded cultural enquiry.‟ 
 
Epistemological issues also become relevant in considering how culture „fits‟ (or 
otherwise) within the dominant modes of addressing the problems of conflict and 
peace, especially on the background of the distinction between „policy‟ and 
„politics‟ made by some post-structuralist scholars (e.g. Edkins 1999). While 
„politics‟ is portrayed as the realm of exploring human possibilities, many issues we 
think of as political are presently dealt with by means of administration (i.e. 
„policy‟) rather than politics (ibid.: 1-2; cf. McCormick 1997: 6). This tendency has 
not spared the fields of development and peacebuilding, where all the principled 
dilemmas have presumably been resolved before embarking on interventions (and 
for the subject populations) (Duffield 2001: 50), with problems which do arise in 
their course presented as requiring merely technical solutions. This suggests that the 
a-cultural stance of the liberal peace is not accidental, but tied in with the broader 
patterns of knowledge and action in which it originates. The possibility of critical 
reflection on the realities created through the application of liberal peacebuilding is 
all but removed, with the debates confined to issues of efficiency, which reinforces 
the „technological‟ treatment of peace (cf. Levidow 1998). The narrow parameters of 
knowledge enabled by the „policy‟ mode of engagement with conflict seem 
drastically inadequate even for discussing the genuinely „political‟ questions about 
interventions (e.g. „what kind of peace is being built?‟ (see e.g. Richmond 2005; 
Baker 2006)), let alone for determining a place for culture in approaches to 
peacebuilding. Yet it is through such a restrictive frame that the issues of conflict 
and peace are often considered not only in policy circles, but also in orthodox IR 
theory (Dillon 1996: 4). Questioning the practice of addressing conflict becomes 
inseparable from interrogating the habitual theoretical approaches to (international) 
politics, and the awareness of the role of culture in cementing certain patterns of 
thought and action offers a favourable perspective from which to attempt this.  
Theoretical leanings and methodological choices 
The offered methodological and epistemological considerations largely predetermine 
the theoretical orientation of this thesis towards the approaches capable of keeping 
in sight the broader social grounding of the phenomena investigated in connection 
with conflict and peace. For IR, this limits the usable approaches to critical theory, 
constructivism and post-structuralism, broadly defined – although, as will be shown 
in the next chapter, none of these can offer a readily available analytical toolkit, 
despite significant inroads made into considering the problematic of culture since 
early 1990s (e.g. Lapid and Kratochwil 1996; Hudson 1997a; Jacquin-Berdal et al. 
1998). In conflict studies, approached subsumed under the „fourth generation,‟ or 
„transformative peacebuilding‟ (Richmond 2005; Fetherston 2002b), as well as 
anthropologies of conflict and war (see e.g. Nordstrom and Robben 1995; Schmidt 
and Schröder 2001; Richards 2005b) and studies of culturally-specific conflict 
resolution mechanisms (e.g. Avruch et al. 1991; Brigg and Bleiker, forthcoming), 
offer important insights into the cultural dynamics of violence and peace-making, 
although not quite amount to establishing the parameters for a broader discussion of 
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culture in the context of conflict and peace. This points the direction of research 
towards cultural anthropology, which has been very receptive to the paradoxes and 
controversies associated with the study of culture (e.g. Clifford and Marcus 1986) 
and which has provided, over the years, a constant source of „contraband‟ of culture-
related insights for IR and conflict studies (Greenhouse 1987; Avruch 1998). Upon a 
closer look, however, the origin of the most analytically „fertile‟ ideas about culture 
has to be sought elsewhere, since anthropologists, in turn, borrowed heavily from 
semiotics (as illustrated by Clifford Geertz‟s focus on culture as structures of 
meaning (1973; Chabal and Daloz 2006)). Semiotic enquiries into the organisation 
and generation of meaning also underlie many a post-structuralist take on culture, 
whether based on the linguistic or social functioning of meanings (e.g. Kristeva 
1977, 1986; Barthes 1982; Laclau 2000; cf. Bauman 1999).  
 
It is through linking the insights of cultural semiotics regarding the production and 
contestation of meaning (Lotman 1990; Bauman 1999) to critical theorists‟ and post-
structuralists‟ concerns with the power dimension of social and cultural realities that 
I approach the task of analysing the role of culture in conflict and its resolution. The 
importance of the power dimension of culture is underscored by those advocating 
greater attention to culture as a way of countering the power imbalances between, 
and among, the interveners and local populations in conflict zones (e.g. Duffey 
2001), as well as those warning against the power effects of the discourse on culture 
itself (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1991). A semiotic view of culture as grounded in meaning-
generation seems ultimately compatible with both Foucauldian explorations of the 
links between knowledge and power (e.g. Foucault 1965, 1977) and the critical 
theorists‟ uncovering of alternative realities and conceptualisations eclipsed by the 
hegemony of dominant discourses (e.g. Cox 1981). Furthermore, exploring the 
cultural production and functioning of meaning allows for re-negotiating many of 
the practical dilemmas of studying the social dynamics of power at a more general 
level. For instance, if culture (and not language) is seen as the principal medium of 
communication and ordering of social reality (Bauman 1999), the need to choose 
between discourses vs. practices as the main motors of (re-)production of social 
reality can be superseded by viewing both as particular avenues of cultural 
production of meaning (e.g. Neumann 2002). 
 
This latter point is particularly important, given that the virtual absence of 
identifiable „discourse on culture‟ in liberal peacebuilding significantly cripples the 
analytical value of discourse analysis for the purposes of this study. Although 
culture is now likelier to get mentioned in guideline policy documents of 
peacebuilding agents than in the 1990s (e.g. USAID 2005; UNDP 2003, 2004a; CPR 
2005; EC 2007), its inclusion is often nominal, and connections between culture and 
conflict are not explored in any depth. Even such a focal point of „cultural 
awareness‟ of liberal peacebuilding as gender (cf. Large 2007) is more frequently 
discussed in connection with other matters – for example, economics (WB 2007a), 
or the desire to uphold human rights through supporting upward social mobility of 
women (USAID 2007a). Of course, discursive „silences‟ also present valuable 
material for discourse analysis (e.g. Hansen 2006), but it is difficult to construct 
meaningful interpretations almost exclusively on their basis. Similar limitations 
apply to the analysis of practices of engagement with the issue of culture, since 
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peacebuilding activities are seldom conceptualised as pertaining to culture at all (EU 
2007b). Although other peacebuilding actors seem to recognise the public nature of 
culture in references to, for instance, the „culture of corruption‟ or „violence,‟ 
reflection on what accounts for the perpetuation of such practices (or, indeed, on the 
role that interventions themselves may play in it (cf. Fetherston and Nordstrom 
1995)) remain extremely scarce (e.g. UNDP 2003, 2004a). Therefore, uncovering 
what, on the basis of preliminary explorations, is likely to be a drastically inadequate 
treatment of culture by peacebuilding agents, cannot form the centrepiece of this 
study. 
Approach, aims and ambitions of this research 
In view of the above, the main purpose of this thesis consists in sketching 
alternatives to the dominant mode of engagement with culture – primarily in 
theoretical terms, but also with respect to the parameters of political action. Its prime 
objective is to de-automatise the terms of debate about culture and point out 
pathways for alternative conceptualisations of cultural realities of conflict and peace. 
This would necessitate adopting an inductive approach to identifying cultural 
„material‟ in the context of conflicts and interventions, given that the conceptual 
breadth of „culture‟ is coupled with widely varying „local‟ realisations of generic 
cultural functions (cf. Bauman 1999; Chabal and Daloz 2006). An inductive 
approach would also allow for re-contextualising as cultural that material which on 
the surface of it appears to speak to other domains of human activity, such as 
economics or politics. This is important, given that the exclusion of culture from the 
discourse of liberal peace can be attributed to „disciplinary monopolies‟ which frame 
the engagement of peacebuilding agents with the issues of conflict and peace (Rao 
and Woolcock 2007), leading to situations where even the studies corroborating the 
need to correlate the development priorities with local „value systems‟ (IMF 2005b) 
are not utilised in policy as „cultural‟ knowledge (WB 2007a). 
 
Analysis of the „non-discourse‟ on culture in liberal peacebuilding is thus coupled 
with an investigation of what could be presented as the cultural traits of liberal 
peacebuilding itself, exemplified by the avoidance of an in-depth engagement with 
culture and preference for the more easily identifiable and quantifiable parameters of 
research and action. These traits are more readily subjected to analytical devices of 
discourse and practice analysis, as applied to policy statements and documents, 
peace mission objectives and reports, practices of information gathering, funding 
and subcontracting of local partner organisations, standard operating procedures, 
reports of actual conduct of interventions, and so on. Textual material of this kind, 
produced by or relating to a variety of peacebuilding agents – international 
(principally, the UN and its various bodies), regional (EU, ECOWAS), national 
(DfID, USAID), non-governmental and private – has served as an important, if 
largely uninspiring, source of insight into the „culture of liberal peacebuilding.‟ 
Because of its vast volume (and, as a rule, progressively lower returns from studying 
every subsequent piece of „evidence‟), this material has been complemented with 
interviews conducted with officials and researchers associated with peacebuilding 
actors, to elicit the implicit understandings of culture underpinning peacebuilding 
policies and practices. Secondary literature also constituted a valuable source of 
information on peace operations and key documents establishing their principles, as 
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well as on alternatives to the dominant mode of (dis-)engagement with culture in 
peacebuilding.  
 
Teasing out the possibilities for alternative conceptualisations of the role of culture 
in violent conflict and peace also forms the main rationale for the case study, since it 
is only through demonstrating the wealth of cultural data that conflict analysis can 
yield that the consequences of poor receptivity of liberal peacebuilding towards 
culture can be brought into focus. Sierra Leone has been chosen as the case study 
because of the notoriety of the violence perpetrated by different parties during the 
12-year civil war – violence which was often presented as culturally unintelligible 
and shocking for its victims and witnesses alike (e.g. Richards 1996; HRW 2003). It 
is also a conflict which in many respects goes against expectations formed by post-
Cold War trends, given that mobilisation of ethnic or religious identity was virtually 
absent – despite, seemingly, every precondition for this in a country with about 
sixteen identifiable ethnic groups and three main religions (e.g. HRW 2003: 9). This 
means that investigation of cultural dynamics underlying the articulation of identity 
in the Sierra Leone conflict can proceed with fewer constraints imposed by fixed 
terms of interpretation – which may also be useful for analysing those conflicts 
where the prominence of ethnic or religious dimension is in danger of obscuring 
other cultural issues. In terms of peacebuilding, Sierra Leone is a „typical‟ case in 
that the success of external actors in peace-making has been intermittent, and the 
attempted transformation of the country‟s governance and economy in the traditional 
liberal mould has reportedly left in place many of the factors cited to be responsible 
for the conflict (e.g. ICG 2004). While cultural dynamics of the Sierra Leone war 
may be sufficiently unique to preclude generalisation beyond the immediate 
geographical neighbourhood, the dynamics of interaction between peacebuilding 
actors and the „local‟ culture is likely to be illustrative of wider regularities 
concerning the interveners‟ reaction to and reception of local culture.  
 
Not intended to provide an exhaustive overview of cultural issues relevant for 
conflict and peace, the choice of a single case study rather emphasises the need for 
an in-depth and open-ended engagement with the issue of culture in every particular 
context, regardless of the „comparative value‟ it can yield to illuminate the dynamics 
of other conflicts. Although the spirit of such an enterprise seems to indicate 
extensive field research, time and financial constraints reduced the actual time I 
could spend in the field in Sierra Leone to fourteen days, which does not withstand 
any usual ethnographic criteria (the oxymoron of „blitzkrieg ethnography‟ 
notwithstanding (e.g. Massey 1998)). On the other hand, having to rely extensively 
on other available material, such as research reports and academic publications on 
Sierra Leone‟s conflict, as well as recent ethnographies of different peoples of Sierra 
Leone, has approximated my position to that of many external peacebuilding actors 
who possess limited resources and time to acquaint themselves with the particulars 
of the conflict in question. (In this respect, the presented case study analysis is not 
beyond the reach of a conscientious peacebuilding practitioner intent on acquiring a 
cultural perspective on conflict.) An open approach to what could qualify as 
„cultural data‟ enabled me to take into consideration a wide variety of material, 
including the implications of the dominant patterns of interpreting the conflict as 
practiced in the academic studies (e.g. Richards 1996; Abdullah 2004a; Gberie 
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2005; Keen 2005) on the envisaged policy solutions to the conflict in Sierra Leone. 
Available ethnographic studies, although not directly engaging with the issue of 
conflict, offered important insights into the patterns of meaning-generation and 
dynamics of identification characteristic of Sierra Leone‟s culture(s).  
Thesis structure and research questions 
Presented initial considerations offer grounding for the more specific research 
questions which are explored in this thesis. These questions follow three main 
avenues of enquiry:  
 
(i) Culture as a concept in relation to conflict and peacebuilding. What is it that 
makes culture an analytically awkward but also immensely „fertile‟ and multi-
faceted concept? How does the propensity of culture to „spill over‟ analytical 
boundaries (e.g. between culture as an analytical category and as an object of 
analysis) affect its ability to yield knowledge? What are the cultural dynamics which 
can illuminate the mechanisms of conflictual or peaceful interaction; how is the 
problematic of conflict and peace anchored and framed in culture? How could (or 
should) culture be approached in enquiries into conflict, its causes and dynamics, 
and to what extent and how should it enter the discussion and practice of 
peacebuilding? What can be gained and what could be jeopardised by framing an 
enquiry into conflict and peace in cultural terms? 
 
(ii) Liberal peacebuilding as a culture. What characterises liberal peacebuilding as 
a culture; what cultural traits transcend the „atomism‟ of particular peacebuilding 
agents and their practices? How do these cultural traits condition liberal 
peacebuilding‟s perception of conflict and its own role in addressing it? How does 
that predispose liberal peacebuilding towards particular treatment of culture in its 
own activities and discourses; what accounts for the virtual absence of culture from 
the peacebuilding discourse, and what are the consequences of „silencing‟ culture? 
What preconditions does the „culture of liberal peacebuilding‟ create for its 
interaction with other cultures? And finally, whether and how culture and attention 
to local „sensitivities‟ can be meaningfully included in the policies and practices of 
liberal peacebuilding? 
 
(iii) (Liberal) peacebuilding and ‘local culture.’ How have these preconditions 
translated into the actual interaction of liberal peacebuilding and local culture in the 
case of Sierra Leone? Was the role of culture in Sierra Leone‟s conflict discussed, 
conceptualised, and how? What impact do these conceptualisations have on the 
prospects for peace, reconciliation and recovery? What could be achieved by more 
in-depth conceptualisations of the cultural dimension of Sierra Leone‟s armed 
conflict, its dynamics and resolution? Which alternative pathways for peace (as well 
as understandings of the underlying conflictive issues and their framing) could be 
gleaned from such an analysis? Does culture enter local considerations of conflict 
and visions of peace, and if so, is the a-cultural stance of the liberal peace perceived 
as problematic? What are the implications of this for the „default‟ approach of liberal 
peacebuilding?  
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These questions inform the core issues addressed, respectively, in chapters 3 
(Theoretical Framework: Embedded cultural enquiry), 4 (The Culture of Liberal 
Peacebuilding) and 5 (Peacebuilding and „Local Culture:‟ Cultural dynamics of war 
and peace in Sierra Leone). In addition, to situate the present enquiry, Chapter 2 
(Culture in Conflict and Peacebuilding: Spaces of theoretical investigation) will look 
at the existing terms of debate on culture in conflict and peace literatures, 
acknowledging debts and outlining divergences and disagreements on the way to 
developing my own approach to culture. Chapter 6 (Conclusion) will draw up the 
key issues that arose from the conducted research, discussing, among other things, 
pathways of transformation of the existing peacebuilding frameworks and practices 
in the light of knowledge gained through an „embedded cultural enquiry‟ of 
peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. 
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2. Culture in Conflict and Peacebuilding: Spaces of 
theoretical investigation 
 
 
„… The experts don‟t know everything. Still, where would the 
world be if we were all the same?‟ 
 
– Terry Pratchett, Small Gods 
 
 
As Kevin Avruch (1998) has remarked, whether or not culture is viewed as part of 
conflict resolution very much depends on how conflict itself is conceptualised. This 
also applies to (international) political theory and practice at large, where the space 
allocated to culture has shifted together with the changing understandings of the 
political and international. In this limited overview of existing treatments of culture 
in the academic study of (international) politics, my objective is to investigate 
possible departure points for thinking about culture in the context of conflict and 
peace, and to identify lacunae which my own treatment of culture will need to 
address. In this chapter I also hope to acknowledge the influences which guided my 
enquiries and to outline crucial disagreements with the existing accounts of culture 
within IR and around. Admittedly, the scope of such an overview could be almost 
unlimited according to the breadth of the notion of culture one is willing to entertain: 
As this study leans towards a broad and inclusive treatment of culture, even those 
literatures which employ culture implicitly, or in an auxiliary role, could not be 
excluded on that basis. However, to keep the overview manageable, I restrict it to 
works in the fields of International Relations and conflict studies, also outlining their 
interdisciplinary connections and important contributions of other literatures, 
especially where these link to my own treatment of culture. This chapter is 
subdivided into two parts, the first addressing the overall possibilities of 
approaching culture as abstracted from trends in literature, and the second discussing 
cultural issues that have been raised in relation to conflict and violence. 
I. Possible approaches to culture 
Culture overshadowed 
Despite the general recognition that humans are, to paraphrase a well-known 
expression, cultural animals, there are plenty of approaches across the social 
sciences horizon which do not engage with culture. Although few exclude culture on 
principle, they either turn it epiphenomenal or restrict the analytical usefulness of the 
concept to the point where engaging with it becomes unnecessary. Yet, the 
banishment of culture from the centre-stage of political analysis is never entirely 
successful, as it opens endless opportunities for cultural critique to which these 
approaches (owing to the lack of corresponding vocabulary) cannot adequately 
respond. For instance, the issues of concern in realist-liberal mainstream IR are 
construed either as cultural universals or as problems of existential importance, 
whose urgency effectively overshadows the possible interference of cultural 
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variables – such as security, power, or sovereignty (Black and Avruch 1998; Avruch 
1998: 27-31). Realism, arguably, „offers little appreciation of the role of cultural 
forces in international politics‟ (Ross 1998: 164, referring to Donnelly 1995) for a 
variety of reasons:  
 
First, the assumption of undifferentiated states suppresses any possible differences among 
them, or at least renders differences among states essentially mono-dimensional: states only 
need be distinguished from one another by their relative (i.e. susceptible to an ordinal 
ranking) possession of power. Second, the assumption of rationality in the behaviour of 
states suppresses any considerations of other modes of reasoning and/or decision-making 
imperatives. Third, the assumption (linked inextricably to rationality) of utilities-maximizing 
(e.g. „security‟) imposes, a priori, a single, universalizing metric. (Black and Avruch 1998: 
36) 
 
Realism‟s inattention to culture, and the ideational realm generally, can be traced to 
its reliance on „materialist ontology and empiricist epistemology‟ which drives 
realism to objectify the social world, obscuring its human-made dimensions 
(Williams 1998: 208; cf. George 1994). Although liberalism, by stressing the role of 
„beliefs, values, ideologies and ideas as motors of international affairs,‟ potentially 
opens more space for „subjectivist‟ concerns, it also betrays the promise of greater 
attention to culture by focusing on universalised „presumptions about natural law 
and human nature‟ (Black and Avruch 1998: 36). It is unsurprising, therefore, that 
approaches to conflict informed by such „uniformitarian‟ theoretical thinking display 
very limited sensitivity towards the issue of culture. Even treatments engaging with 
identity expression – an issue which elsewhere is viewed as a cultural phenomenon 
– evade culture by elevating identity into a biologically-derived universal „human 
need‟ (e.g. Burton 1984, 1987; Azar 1986; Väyrynen 2001; Avruch 1998: 89-90).  
 
It could, however, be argued that culture was sidelined not out of neglect but 
because of an understanding of the links between culture and conflict that formed at 
a crucial junction in European history. The exclusion of culture from the realm of 
politics, alongside everything to do with subjective opinion – from theological belief 
to „innatist justifications of social identity‟ (Williams 1998: 213) – can be 
considered a deliberate  move, which, coupled with the adoption of atomistic and 
egalitarian empiricist epistemology, formed a conflict-avoidance strategy spurred by 
the devastating experience of religious wars in the early 16
th
-century (Toulmin 
1992). However, whether the pacifying promise of „transforming social and political 
and ethical practices‟ through establishing more „objective‟ foundations for 
knowledge (Williams 1998: 213) still holds is debatable, given the changes and 
challenges faced by both sides of this equation. At one side, the liberal ideas about 
acceptable and desirable political practice have undergone a considerable 
transformation since the World War I – away from the atomistic „liberal sensibility‟ 
and individual freedom and towards prescriptive visions of global collective 
harmony and corresponding interventionist practices. At the other, the very positivist 
foundations for knowledge, entitled to banish unchecked subjectivity from the realm 
of politics so as to turn it into a deliberately limited field of probable knowledge (see 
Williams 1998: 210-212), have been shown, instead, to dispense with the awareness 
of their own limits and to inflate their inherently partial claims to the status of 
universal and timeless truths (Toulmin 1992; cf. Cox 1981; George 1994; Smith 
1997). Despite its core ambition, the realist-positivist endeavour also, as illustrated 
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by the Cold War ideological contest, failed to dissociate political practice from the 
issue of identity (e.g. Brown 2005: 50; Williams 1998) – a link emphasised, for 
example, by the now discredited post-WWII studies of „national character‟ (see 
Avruch, 1998: 12-16). Moreover, the reluctance to engage responsibly with the issue 
of culture may have contributed to the proliferation of essentialist interpretations of 
identity blamed for aggravating many contemporary conflicts (such as Bosnia) 
(Kaldor 1999; see below). Conscious exclusion of culture from „rational‟ political 
practice does not, it seems, guarantee a liberation from the quagmire of subjectivity 
and related potential for conflict. 
 
A further reason cited for excluding culture from the study of (international) politics 
is that it unfolds within the bounds of a shared culture – of diplomacy, international 
negotiations and so on (cf. Zartmann 1993: 17; Avruch 1998: 42). Whatever cultural 
differences may exist between participants, the international engenders its own 
culture, as captured in the English School‟s concept of international society and the 
practices, norms, and expectations of behaviour it embodies (see e.g. Linklater and 
Suganami 2006). However, to claim that culture is not a relevant variable because it 
influences participants equally is tantamount to neglecting the very foundations of 
the dominant political practice, as well as any instances of dissidence or change. As 
William Connolly convincingly argued, studying the language of politics is not a 
preliminary stage of political analysis, but its very essence (1983). Similarly, the 
study of the „common‟ culture of norm-formation and dissemination, of the ideas of 
anarchy, or the principal distinctions governing the separation of the realms of 
domestic and international political practice (e.g. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; 
Schmidt 1998; Walker 1993) has a role both in extending our understanding of the 
political and in influencing the very conduct of (international) politics. In addition, 
concerns with culture and cultural difference acquired greater relevance as the 
expansion in the substance of „the international‟ in the wake of pluralist and the so-
called „reflectivist‟ IR (Keohane and Nye 1971, 1977; Keohane 1989) brought the 
types of relationships previously not thought of as „international‟ into the orbit of the 
discipline (cf. Steans and Pettiford 2005: 8). 
 
Another relevant issue which emerges from engaging with the terms of supposedly 
universal (international) political practice concerns its particular cultural origins, 
grounded largely in Western European (and, more recently, Euro-Atlantic) political 
history. The understandings of „politics‟ and „the international,‟ defining this 
practice, continue to mould global politics, naturalising world-wide these essentially 
partial and historically-specific experiences (cf. Morgenthau 1946). That such 
fundamentals of the Westphalian international system as territorial 
compartmentalisation and exclusive sovereignty are treated by many as 
unquestioned givens is a testimony to the power invested in this process of cultural 
„reproduction‟ (of the outwardly a-cultural terms of international political practice). 
As noted by its critics, international theory which upholds the worldview informing 
such practice also becomes part and parcel of this regime of cultural hegemony (e.g. 
Smith 1997). Unsurprisingly, the return of the cultural problematic per se often 
appears at odds with the accepted terms of (international) political practice, whether 
in the form of ideas of religious unity defying the principles of secular statecraft, or 
the rise of ethnicity and nationalism in counterweight to „globalisation‟ of the 
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relations „of production and consumption‟ (Blaney and Inayatullah 1998: 62; cf. 
Bull and Watson 1984; Smith 1995). The violent potential of „new‟ or „ malignant‟ 
nationalisms (Kaldor 2004; Luoma-Aho 2002), grounded in the resurgence of 
„politics of identity‟ (Kaldor 1999), has been cited as an impetus for the chaos 
which, in the form of unintelligible violence of the „new wars‟ (ibid.), is threatening 
to engulf the realm of habitual international politics (Kaplan 2000). Culture is thus 
re-entering the scene of political analysis, whether in the form of critique of the 
hegemony of the liberal international order, or as its radical „other.‟  
Implications for a cultural enquiry into liberal peacebuilding 
Despite the encroachment of culture onto the agendas of international politics, the 
liberal take on the problematic of identity in conflict remains distinctly a-cultural, 
since offered solutions revolve around political accommodation – without deeper 
reflection on the nature of the „political,‟ or (cultural) conventions which bind it 
together. Yet, in many recent conflicts, it is precisely the dissolution of the 
„political‟ as a system of conventions which necessitates the recourse to culture as a 
source of both new forms of conventionality and as a repository of power (cf. 
Crawford and Lipschutz 1997; Nordstrom 1994; Viktorova 2005a). As such, culture 
itself – in the form of widely held conventions, ideas of the permissible and 
appropriate, etc. – often becomes a target of violence in contemporary conflicts 
(ibid.). This phenomenon is largely disregarded in liberal recipes for peace, which 
focus on the establishment of political institutions capable of absorbing the 
conflictive dynamics and directing them along the avenues of democratic expression 
of disagreement (Rummel 1996: 21; Miall et al. 1999: 22). Curiously, „democracy‟ 
also emerges as a universal solution to the problem of human aggression, whether 
one sees it in cultural terms or as something which supersedes culture. While for 
evolutionists, who adopt the latter view, democracy offers a solution owing to the 
constraints it places on the profitability of violence, those who see aggression and 
violence as a culturally-constructed „invention‟ emphasise the usefulness of 
democracy for „manipulating structural and psychological aspects of culture in order 
to produce non-violent societies‟ (Ramsbotham et al. 2005: 303-307; see also Pinker 
2002; Ross 1993; Fry and Bjorkqvist 1997). Although this seems to corroborate the 
rationale of the liberal peace, the reasons for limited success of substituting the 
existing patterns of social commonality with the introduced structures of liberal 
democratic governance (cf. Duffield 2001) are not often investigated (although see 
Paris 2004); nor are the consequences of liberalism‟s lack of receptiveness towards 
the „illiberal‟ avenues of expression of identity (Duffield 2001), which leaves the 
new democratic governance structures vulnerable in their face (cf. McCormick 
1997: 126-7).  
 
The issue of culture thus offers a vantage point from which to interrogate both the 
dominant political practice and the intellectual traditions which inform it: the 
banishment of culture from their agendas does not make them impervious to being 
analysed in cultural terms, and itself offers an insight into the kind of culture they 
represent and perpetuate. For instance, the blindness of both political and academic 
paradigms borne of „liberal sensibility‟ (Williams 1998) towards the problematic of 
collective identity can be traced to „methodological individualism,‟ widely adopted 
across the rational choice mainstream IR, which renders any determinants beyond 
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the individual level largely epiphenomenal. The endorsement of individualism as a 
methodological position appears to be more than a transient phase in the cumulative 
quest for rational knowledge, having become „a moral principle underpinning a 
liberal profession‟ (Douglas 2004: 87). This effectively obscures other forms of 
knowledge and sociality which do not fit in the prescribed limits of this dominant 
paradigm, so that instead of engaging with empirical manifestations of different 
forms and grounds of commonality, the implications relevant for the study of, for 
example, the international system are theorised on the basis of abstractions such as 
„the state of nature‟ (see Jahn 2003; see also Chapter 3). The tendency of deriving 
solutions to the plight of underdevelopment and conflict from the latest vogues of 
(abstract) thinking among academics and practitioners, rather than empirically 
determined local needs, follows the same pattern (Duffield 2001; cf. Helander 2005; 
Kapoor 2008: 23-4). Even the practices of „local needs assessment,‟ when the latest 
vogue happens to emphasise their importance, are derived from universalised criteria 
of „needs‟ and follow predetermined formulae of „local‟ information-gathering (see 
Kent 2005; Richards et al. 2004; see also Chapter 5).  
 
This theme of critique of the types and standards of knowledge prioritised by the 
dominant theoretical approaches and the underlying methodologies, epistemologies 
(and, ultimately, ontologies) will form something of a leitmotif throughout this 
work, since, as argued in the Introduction (and as will be further discussed in the 
Theoretical Framework), engagement with the issue of culture is inseparable from 
explicating the process and consequences of production of knowledge. At this point, 
it seems necessary to emphasise that the tendencies outlined above – of excluding 
culture (among other issues) as a relevant concern for the mainstream IR, coupled 
with insufficient attention to its own cultural biases  – have not passed unnoticed by 
its critics. In this sense, „reflectivist‟ IR, inasmuch as it invites critical reflection on 
the limitations and implications of „totalist theorising‟ (Väyrynen 2001) exemplified 
by the mainstream, accords more space to culture. The same is true of approaches to 
conflict inspired by the critical and post-structuralist paradigms (e.g. Richmond 
2002). 
Culture in an auxiliary role: Openings for the reflection on culture 
Although rarely explicitly concerned with the issue of culture, the „reflective‟ IR 
(Keohane 1989) of various strands (constructivist, critical, post-structuralist) has 
helped to problematise the received understanding of culture in various ways. An 
important impetus for this was provided by the questioning of positivist 
methodologies and standards of knowledge, which led to a greater attention to the 
subjective, ideational, and axiological aspects of International Relations. 
Constructivist concerns with identity and norms; the strong institutionalists‟ insights 
regarding the constructed, rather than given, nature of interests; critical theorists‟ 
efforts to unmask the pretence of „neutrality‟ of the dominant political order – to 
name just a few examples – all variously acknowledge the role of culture in shaping 
the political and international.  
 
Awareness of human-made nature of social and political reality (cf. Searle 1995) 
that characterises the „reflective‟ approaches alerts theorists to culturally specific, 
„situated‟ character of theories and their own theorising (with a further possibility of 
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imagining alternative points of departure, depending on the theorist‟s emancipatory 
ambitions) (e.g. Cox 1981: 128; Wendt 1995; Dillon 1996: 2-3; Avruch 1998: 27-
39; Bleiker 1998: 89, 95). More crucially still, the observation that „violence‟ 
committed by uncritical IR theorising is reflected in the increased levels of actual 
violence (e.g. Smith 1997) opens a way for contemplating the cultural mechanisms 
of transposition between the realms of theory and practice. In this sense, critical 
reflection has been instrumental in picturing various strands of IR theory as 
particular cultures – with their own patterns of representation, abstraction, meaning-
making, and corresponding types of political practice (Debrix 1999; Sylvester 2001). 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, most contributions that heralded the „return of culture‟ to 
the agendas of security studies (e.g. Wæver et al. 1993), foreign policy analysis 
(Hudson 1997a), conflict studies (Avruch et al. 1991; Avruch 1998; Black and 
Avruch 1998; Cohen 1998; Rubinstein 1998), or IR at large (e.g. Lapid and 
Kratochwil 1996; Jacquin-Berdal et al. 1998) have their origins in „reflectivist‟ 
theorising. Not all of these literatures are preoccupied with culture directly; mostly 
culture is invoked through challenging what Tarja Väyrynen terms „totalist 
theorising‟ (2001: 4) by emphasising the constructed, constituted character of both 
difference and sameness, and by drawing attention to the processes and mechanisms 
of their articulation (cf. Jahn 2003: 32-4).  
 
„Reflectivist‟ approaches also turned the disciplinary boundaries of IR increasingly 
fuzzy, as both its methods and concerns underlined the connections and overlaps 
with other branches of social science, which also made borrowing and „contraband‟ 
between them more legitimate (as exemplified by the application of sociological or 
anthropological insights about culture and identity to IR (see e.g. Jacquin-Berdal et 
al. 1998)). Another boundary to become blurred was the one between social sciences 
and the meta-level methodological concerns, which were seen to be linked through 
certain disciplinary and epistemological biases inherent in, and reproduced through 
the dominant academic practice (e.g. Appadurai 2001: 9-12). Feminist scholars 
became particularly vocal in exposing the non-neutrality and particularity of IR 
theorising as grounded in specific historical, cultural, and gendered experiences and 
interests (e.g. Tickner 2005). A sustained effort to re-contextualise „modern 
sciences‟ as „just one collection of local knowledge systems among many others‟ 
(Harding 1998: 89, quoted in Sylvester 2001: 541) has attracted attention to other 
„voices in the conversation of mankind‟ (Oakeshott 1962b) – such as art, poetry, and 
aesthetics generally – drawing them into the ambit of IR as not only subjects but 
also avenues of knowledge (Bleiker 2001). The recognition of futility of trying to 
overcome the trappings of individual experiences that shape one‟s approach to 
academic investigation (cf. Toulmin 1992), and of removing the „personal‟ from the 
„scientific,‟ has led to calls to explicate personal motivation and biases and to adopt 
a writing style attuned to the particular subjects of research rather than the traditions 
of impersonal academic discourse (Tickner 2005; Sylvester 2001: 541; Denzin and 
Lincoln 1998; cf. Lyotard 1984). The view of IR as just another avenue of re-
mediation (rather than „objective‟ representation – see Debrix and Weber (2003)) 
was also reflected in a humbler stand of reflective IR on „resolving‟ the political 
issues of the day (as exemplified by Cox‟s very distinction between „problem-
solving‟ and „critical‟ theory (1981)).  
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Reflection on culture in conflict theory 
The „reflectivist‟ intellectual posture created fruitful preconditions for re-examining 
the links between culture and conflict, starting with the rethinking of the social role 
and functions of conflict itself. Rather than viewing it as an inevitable effect of 
power rivalries (as in IR realism) or a deviation from the enlightened norm of social 
harmony (as in liberalism), conflict became reconsidered as an avenue of social 
development, occurring through the clash and competition between different visions 
(and agents) of social and political advancement (e.g. Fetherston and Nordstrom 
1995; Miall et al. 1999). Although this view of conflict challenges some key 
premises of liberalism regarding undesirability of conflict (see e.g. Brown 2005: 21-
2), it is consistent with the competitive nature of both democratic electoral politics 
and liberal economics (Paris 2004). True, most understandings of conflict as a 
means of social betterment focus on its non-violent forms (Fetherston and 
Nordstrom 1995), although some Marxist and structuralist visions of change also 
foresee a role for violent conflict in altering the distribution of power towards more 
equitable relationships (e.g. Galtung 1971; Frank 1969: 402). The very de-
legitimation of violence in the international political practice can be construed as 
evidence of a normative hegemony of a Western value system with its aspiration for 
peace – in contrast to the centrality of other values, such as justice, in competing 
perspectives (Martín 2005; Salem 1993, 1997; cf. Bull 1977). 
 
The ease of transition between non-violent and violent forms of conflict in Galtung‟s 
structuralist paradigm is grounded in the recognition of „indirect‟ forms of violence, 
such as structural, symbolic, or cultural violence, which significantly affect the life 
chances of large proportions of the world‟s population and are comparable in their 
effects with direct physical violence (Galtung 1964, 1990; cf. Duffield 2007). 
Although many have criticised the concept of „structural violence‟ for obscuring the 
distinction between violence and non-violence, which makes the former almost 
indefinable (e.g. Riches 1986a), it is consistent with the critical and Foucauldian 
understandings of „naturalised‟ power asymmetries as capturing the patterns of 
institutionalised violence, thereby removing the need for its actual exercise 
(Foucault 1994; Viktorova 2005a). „Cultural violence‟ is manifested in the 
widespread acceptance of these real-life patterns of inequality as a matter of 
„common sense‟ (Galtung 1990; Geertz 1983: 73-93). Galtung‟s broad view of 
violence is also reflected in his understanding of peace; indeed, references to 
„positive peace,‟ which removes not only occurrences of direct violence (as does 
„negative peace‟ of realism-inspired settlements) but also addresses the underlying 
structures of injustice and inequality, have firmly entered the discourse of liberal 
peace and associated theoretical literature (e.g. UN 2005). (Whether this rhetorical 
commitment does indeed translate into a removal of all aspects of indirect violence 
in the polities subjected to liberal peace transitions will be a matter for discussion in 
subsequent chapters). 
 
The mechanisms of the reverse transition – from violent to non-violent means of 
expression of conflict – form the core concern of the so-called „conflict 
transformation‟ paradigm, which developed as a response to the flawed premises of 
„conflict resolution,‟ shown, on many occasions, simply to recreate the impetus and 
preconditions for conflict, by failing to address local hegemonic discourses and 
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power asymmetries (Fetherston 2000a, b). Conflict „transformation‟ seeks both to 
direct the conflict towards non-violent means of expression and to pursue an 
emancipatory agenda in harnessing the transformative potential of conflict in the 
service of positive social change (ibid.; Lederach 1997). The space for consideration 
of culture in „transformative peacebuilding‟ is created by the recognition of the 
necessarily small-scale, „local‟ grounding of the visions of transformation, even if 
their scope extends nation-wide  (Lederach 1997). This sets transformative 
peacebuilding apart from the liberal peace version of channelling the conflict into 
more „manageable‟ avenues, which relies on national-level democratic state and 
civil society institutions attuned to, and orchestrated in the image of, the 
international liberal order (cf. Richmond 2009a: 559-60). Although not always 
viewed as part of „culture,‟ the ways in which people organise their societies, 
economies or polities not only bear distinct cultural imprints, but also actively 
participate in the reproduction of culture to the extent that people‟s „social 
environment‟ imparts to them „powerful ideas of how to classify and understand 
their world‟ (Hohe 2002a). Understanding this recasts culture as an intrinsic part of 
any peacebuilding intervention. 
 
The „conflict transformation‟ paradigm represents one of the strands of thinking 
subsumed under the tentative heading of „fourth-generation‟ of approaches to 
conflict, which variously interrogate many of the axiomatic premises of the liberal 
peace (which has come to epitomise the „third generation‟ approaches) (Richmond 
2002). Among such assumptions is the representation of the liberal peace as an a-
cultural „technology‟ for the achievement of peace and development. Some of the 
themes explored by the fourth-generation critique have featured above – for 
example, exposure of the cultural „bias‟ contained in attempts to emulate, in post-
conflict environments, the Western models of development and governance („market 
democracy,‟ in Paris‟ terms (2004)). A related point of critique concerns the 
ontologically uneasy coupling within the liberal peace of the realism-inspired and 
force-orientated „conflict management‟ and the track-two-centred „conflict 
resolution‟ (e.g. Burton 1990) approaches to conflict (Richmond 2002; see also 
Ramsbotham et al. 2005). This unease is also replicated in combining the methods 
and objectives of these two generations of approaches – the „negative‟ (to use 
Galtung‟s terminology (1990)) pacification through a return to status quo ante vs. 
„positive,‟ but potentially destabilising, effects of the reformist human security and 
group identity agendas (Burton 1990; Miall et al. 1999: 194; cf. Mansfield and 
Snyder 1995). Far more than cumulatively combining „the best of both worlds,‟ the 
marrying of the hard aspect of peace (or „victor‟s peace,‟ in Richmond‟s framework 
(2005)) to the „soft‟ facets of institutional, constitutional and civil peace, which 
appear to legitimise its unwavering application (ibid.; Richmond 2009a), the liberal 
peace has succeeded in eliminating the spaces for doubt or dissent. Indeed, to 
question some of its principles, such as the universal validity of human rights, may 
invite accusations of complicity with the immoral practices of illiberal regimes 
blamed for conflict (cf. Duffield 2001). The ease with which the instances of 
questioning the dominant paradigm of addressing conflict acquire negative 
connotations accentuates the hegemonic status of liberal peace, raising concerns 
with the violence of cultural „common sense.‟ 
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Limitations and closures in the reflection on culture 
Still – as is perhaps consistent with the „anti-totalist‟ stance of most reflective IR – 
the resurgence of the interest towards culture has not produced any concerted effort 
to unpack the concept or systematically employ it in IR or conflict analysis; or, in 
most cases, even to relate the more specific and „tangible‟ concepts on which the 
reflectivist debates tend to centre (such as identity, discourse, or norms) to the 
underlying totality of „culture.‟ Frequently, the issue of culture is omitted from such 
debates altogether as these more specific concepts (e.g. language) are taken to 
provide sufficient insight into the „ideational‟ realm, rendering references to culture 
superfluous; and where culture does feature, its relationship with language or 
discourse appears to be taken as self-evident and not meriting explanation (see 
Väyrynen 2001: 5). Wendt‟s Social Theory of International Politics (1999) perhaps 
comes closest to elaborating an understanding of culture among the constructivist 
works in IR, but in doing so also demonstrates why culture is not a central concern 
for a constructivist enquiry. Wendt places his interest in culture into the context of a 
quest for „social structures that are systemic but cultural rather than materialist,‟ 
linking the micro and macro-level „through both constitutive and causal effects‟ 
observable „in actual interactions‟ (which, in turn, serve to (re-) produce those 
structures) (Kratochwil 2006: 28). „Wendt argues that the relationship between the 
collective structures of meaning and individual beliefs is one of “supervenience and 
multiple realizability”‟ (Kratochwil 2006: 29; quoting Wendt 1999: 162), which is to 
say that  
 
“culture”, as the shorthand for collective representations, cannot exist or have effects apart 
from the beliefs of individual actors, but is not reducible to them. As in the case of language, 
it exists only insofar as it is used by individual speakers but cannot be conceptualised as the 
“private” possession of each speaker. (Kratochwil 2006: 29) 
 
Although it is difficult to dispute Wendt‟s reasoning, his „capturing‟ of the place of 
culture within the social world serves merely as a stepping stone for determining the 
functions and characteristics of „collective representations,‟ which form his core 
concern. But while it is possible to approach the issue of genesis and maintenance of 
culture through „collective representations,‟ such an approach raises – and largely 
leaves unanswered – the question of who makes up the „collectives‟ that share the 
representations, or what degree of commonality is required for them to be genuinely 
„shared.‟ (This is also true of any approach to culture that defines it through „shared 
meanings,‟ as will be discussed in Chapter 3.) So, pace Wendt, there is a need for a 
consideration of culture which allows for capturing not merely the „collective 
representations,‟ but also the mechanisms of their constitution, and of their 
„boundedness‟ in particular collectives, which invites greater attention to identity-
formation and boundary-drawing as cultural phenomena – a focus which is missing 
from most enquiries into identity yielded by reflectivist scholars (although see 
Neumann 1999). 
 
In other instances, such half-hearted engagement with culture is explained by its 
purportedly subordinate role among other factors ordering the social reality. Thus, 
some reflective IR indirectly underwrites the realist conviction about the primacy of 
power over culture by acknowledging that power (or discourse, as its medium and 
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motor) plays a defining role in the wider social acceptance of one or another 
understanding of culture. The same can be said about the critical theorists‟ 
discussions of the hegemonic status of partial representations of reality as reflecting 
naturalised power asymmetries (Gramsci 1971; Cox 1982: 38; cf. Foucault 1986, 
1994; Smith 1997: 3; cf. Wuthnow et al. 1983: 4). In Neumann‟s (2002) otherwise 
insightful study, culture has little independent conceptual existence aside from being 
conceptualised as a framework for a dynamic interplay between „governmentality‟ 
and „conceptual power‟ – two kinds of power realised, respectively, through the 
avenues of discourses and practices. Although equating culture with power, as 
practiced „by a range of contemporary theorists‟ (Swidler 1995), helps to direct 
attention to the links that may obtain between these two concepts, it also obscures 
culture by narrowing the terms of debate to the functioning of power.  
 
The primacy of power also defines encounters in the international sphere, where „the 
tendency is for the more powerful group simply to impose its norms and procedures 
on the weaker‟ (Cohen 1998: 118), establishing „the dominance relations of some 
cultures or subcultures over others‟ (Nader and Todd 1978: 11, 20-1, 37, quoted in 
Cohen 1998: 118). In situations where culture becomes accentuated, it is easily 
politicised and manipulated, so that the outside interveners become caught up in an 
eternal dilemma as to whose vision and interpretation of a particular culture to 
accept (Sriram 2004; cf. Bauman 1999: xiv), especially in the light of the 
widespread practice of different agents to co-opt „symbols and myths for their own 
purposes‟ (Katzenstein 1997: 50). From this perspective, if culture is to be an object 
of study, the appropriate focus should be on its discursive uses as an instrument of 
„othering‟ and colonial domination (see Abu-Lughod 1991; Scott 1992, 2003; Brigg 
2005), so that optimism regarding the benign effects of greater cultural sensitivity on 
the part of peacebuilding practitioners appears misplaced.  
 
Moreover, problematic power effects accompany the very framing of issues in a 
„cultural‟ vocabulary. References to culture may lead to unfounded valorisation of 
certain practices and understandings owing simply to their labelling as „cultural,‟ 
which readily invokes the connotations of their superior authenticity and organic 
affinity with the communities in question (cf. MacGinty 2008). In contrast, other 
practices, not thought of as „cultural,‟ as well as the instances of social and political 
change may become perceived as artificial, irrelevant, or as a threat to that „culture,‟ 
so that both communities and their culture(s) easily become essentialised. This effect 
has been observed with respect to other related concepts, such as „traditional‟ or 
„indigenous‟ (ibid.: 150), and the binary dynamics it unleashes is manifest in the 
propensity of the internationals to overcompensate for the alleged disregard of local 
cultures by „romanticising‟ the local in those instances where local practices of 
peace-making are taken into account (Richmond 2007a, 2009b). The power 
dimension of „cultural‟ vocabularies is also evident in cases where the postulation of 
an „organic‟ association of practices with a community has adverse effect on its 
fortunes, as demonstrated in Arendt‟s writings on the Holocaust (1967). The 
continued relevance of this problem is illustrated by the debate surrounding the 
interpretations of the Indonesian conflict, where, for example, the invoking of the 
„local traditions involving “men of violence”‟ to explain the „repeated 
materialization of paramilitary militias during moments of extreme political stress‟ 
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may be seen as „playing into the hands of those elites who, in fact, sponsor and 
benefit from‟ the supposed Indonesian „culture of violence‟ (Zinoman and Peluso 
2002: 547; see also Cribb 2002; Collins 2002). 
 
The hijacking of „cultural‟ explanations to forego the responsibility for political 
choices is a very troubling consequence of essentialising culture. Equally damaging 
conceptual violence is committed through the excessive homogenisation of cultural 
entities, or their discrete categorisation, especially where separation between one 
culture and another is axiologically charged (cf. MacGinty 2008: 157). Yet, in some 
perspectives, such violence accompanies any instance of purposive engagement with 
the other, which draws that other into the orbit of the „self‟s‟ cultural domination, 
„digesting‟ its alterity (cf. Critchley 1992: 6) while purporting to emancipate (e.g. 
Spivak 1988, 2004: 567-8). MacGinty‟s examples of the use of indigenous and 
traditional peace-making as part of liberal peace interventions portray exactly this 
type of relationship (2008). Yet, two observations allow for countering the 
pessimism with regard to cultural analysis of conflict and peace. Firstly, given its 
ubiquity and persistence, the human propensity to generalise and homogenise as 
well as to think in terms of discrete categories should be made into a subject of 
cultural analysis (cf. Viktorova 2003), for without understanding its mechanisms, 
the „abuse‟ of culture would be difficult to counter. Secondly, it could be argued that 
the relations of domination are never strictly one-sided (cf. Bhabha 1994; Kapoor 
2008: 7-9); indeed, instances of subversion of the hegemony of liberal peace by 
local actors have been widespread, if insufficient to overthrow its dictate (see 
Chapter 5). Cultural contexts of interactions between local and international actors 
are usually too varied and complex to translate into clear-cut power hierarchies, even 
when structured by a general power asymmetry. 
 
In view of the noted susceptibility of culture to be utilised or participate in power 
dynamics, it seems that the relationship between culture and power merits a more 
informed enquiry before culture is sidelined as a subordinate concept. A focus on 
culture can, in fact, reverse the culture-power „hierarchy‟ through recasting power as 
not a universal (as in realist conceptions) but as a contextualised, localised set of 
relationships and understandings. The symbolism involved in the „mechanics‟ of 
power (Foucault 1994) and even violence (which, as well as signalling a breach of 
conventions of institutionalised violence, gives rise to a different set of conventions 
its own (see Viktorova 2005a)) indicates that power is a cultural phenomenon. 
Therefore, a serious engagement with culture should investigate the relationship 
between culture and power both ways, since the articulation, possession and exercise 
of power cannot be considered without taking into account their cultural context, 
just as the functioning of culture cannot be considered without reference to power, 
order, or hierarchy.  
An explicit focus on culture 
Apart from the treatments which invoke culture only to point it to its rightfully 
„subordinate‟ place, there are a number of approaches across the horizon of IR and 
political science which openly speak of the need to include „culture‟ among their 
analytical toolkit. These approaches can be subdivided into those which seek to 
narrow the scope of applicability of the concept of culture so as to increase its 
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explanatory value in particular enquiries, and those which insist on the broad 
understanding of culture and an open-ended application of the concept across a 
range of contexts. Hijacking Barry Buzan‟s designation of similar trends in security 
studies (e.g. Buzan et al. 1998), I term them „narrowers‟ and ‟wideners‟ for 
convenience. 
The narrowers’ approach to culture 
The „narrowers,‟ as the name suggests, attempt to deal with the analytical messiness 
of culture by narrowing it down to a selection of variables and characteristics, 
which, arguably, helps to establish a clear and even grounding for the study of 
culture, particularly in a comparative perspective. The narrowness of the definition 
of culture is directly correlated with the explanatory power and operational value of 
culture as a concept: in this view, „the more inclusive view of culture is the least 
useful‟ (Hudson 1997b: 7). 
 
Examples of this approach are abundant, and are perhaps iconic of many people‟s 
understandings of what a study of culture in the context of IR and conflict studies 
should involve (see Ward 1998). One of the most prominent trends – constructing 
typologies of cultures based on variables which capture their key characteristics – is 
consistent with the „scientific‟ ambition of predicting how members of a particular 
culture will respond to a range of vital issues (e.g. Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; 
Wildavsky 1987; Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990). The appeal of such 
typologies lies in enabling both a „parsimonious‟ social science and a range of 
practical advice which can be given to decision-makers, since classifications yield 
graspable cultural „types‟ reflecting the patterns of behaviour and mentality, and as 
such can serve as a guide to the inter-cultural interaction and communication. The 
variables underlying classifications are selected on the basis of „permitting and 
constraining effects‟ they exercise „upon the individual‟s choices‟ (Douglas 1982: 
190, quoted in Ward 1998: 212). Douglas and Wildavsky‟s grid-group theory uses 
social cohesion (group) and social hierarchy (grid) as variables, yielding four types 
of cultures: fatalist, hierarchist, egalitarian, and individualist (1982). Although not 
developed with a view to conflict, this classification of cultures (notably, its „fatalist‟ 
type) was used to explain the dynamics of RUF insurgency in Sierra Leone (Fithen 
and Richards 2005). Hofstede (1980) offers another classification, based on four 
dimensions: „individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, and power 
distance,‟ whose application demonstrates „a non-random geographic pattern of 
cultures with respect to such values‟ (Hudson, 1997b: 8). Triandis (1994: 156-79) 
rates cultures according to three dimensions – cultural complexity, cultural 
„tightness‟ and individualism – which in combination form „unique cultural 
proclivities‟ (Hudson 1997b: 8). Hall (1957, 1976) uses a single scale – from low- to 
high-context cultures – depending on how much of the intended message is spelled 
out and how much is expected to be understood implicitly (see Avruch 1998: 64). 
The latter typology has gained some prominence in the analyses of international 
negotiations (ibid.) 
 
Another example of a narrowers‟ approach is to construct a hierarchy of variables 
where culture is the widest and deepest, and becomes invoked when other, more 
immediate and graspable variables (such as „rational‟ foreign policy preferences, or 
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economic interests) fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of, for instance, 
differences in Belgian and Dutch patterns of allocation of development aid 
(Breuning 1997). This approach is particularly symptomatic of what Lucian Pye had 
referred to as the use of culture as an „explanation of last resort‟ (Pye 1991: 504; 
quoted in Hudson 1997b: 2). Although the possibility of invoking culture without 
getting bogged down in the considerations of its complexity has a certain appeal, 
this approach only yields atomistic insights into culture, which offer little help in 
understanding the wider patterns of cultural influence on politics, and allow neither 
for elucidating the functioning of culture as such, nor for determining its role in the 
constitution of the narrower spheres of activity invoked in the more „immediate‟ 
variables. This narrowers‟ approach succeeds in relegating culture, once again, to 
the role of an auxiliary concept. 
 
On the face of it, the limited ambition for cultural insight underlying the narrowers‟ 
approach stems from the recognition of enormous cultural complexity: one can only 
hope to approach the field of culture „piecemeal,‟ and describe those cultural 
characteristics which happen to manifest themselves to the observer, and can 
thereafter be typified and recorded with a view to their use for particular analytical 
purposes. However, this approach reveals manifold problems. Firstly, the limited 
character of the ambition in research is replicated in similarly limited possibilities of 
analysis offered by the resulting „data,‟ since limitations that cultural typologies 
(regardless of their chosen criteria) impose on the possibilities of approaching new 
cultural material may be greater than advantages. Secondly, in characterising 
cultures, the narrowers‟ approach relies on „etic‟ rather than „emic‟ cultural 
categories – meaning that the categories used to describe cultures (such as 
„individualist‟ vs. „collectivist‟) belong to the researchers‟, rather than their cultural 
subjects‟, conceptual universe (Avruch 1998:  60-1). Situatedness within a particular 
culture, as opposed to its external perception, may yield a different set of insights to 
those advanced by, say, the grid-group theory. This renders the narrowers‟ 
typologies much less definitive as tools of cultural understanding and even 
description, since „emic‟ categories, borne of cultural self-analysis, would interfere 
with the neat structure of external classifications. This is not to deny that the 
production of cultural typologies is founded on serious anthropological research – if 
anything, Mary Douglas‟ work clearly reaffirms its importance – but rather to say 
that its formative input is all but hollowed out in the resulting „usable‟ analytic 
categories. 
 
This argument leads to the third – and perhaps most pernicious – issue with the 
„narrowers‟ approach, namely, that the „etic‟ categories developed by the researcher 
are somehow presumed to be external to culture. This represents a wider tendency to 
consider academic and scientific discourses as emanating from a „non-perspective‟ 
(Häkli 1996), a „panopticon‟ of knowledge unbiased by interests, background, 
history, and such like (Foucault 1977). The culturally and historically contingent 
nature of science (cf. Morgenthau 1946; Toulmin 1992, 2001) is concealed behind 
the assumption of universal applicability of categories and corollaries of analysis, 
which is in turn founded on the presumption of neutrality and non-involvement of 
the observer – a position capable of producing unbiased, „objective‟ knowledge. 
Curiously, the argument used to discredit the analytical value of „emic‟ knowledge – 
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the situatedness of the research subjects within their culture – does not usually 
extend to „etic‟ categories of analysis, which are nonetheless indisputably „emic‟ to 
the culture of science and academia. The use of ready typologies, with their inherent 
prioritisation of categories presented as „crucial‟ and „important‟ to an academic 
analyst, automatically postulates a hegemonic relationship between the researcher 
and the research subject. 
 
Of course, this argument could be pursued ad infinitum, by pointing out the 
culturally specific nature of the very division into „emic‟ and „etic‟ categories, and 
noting the hegemonic potential of any single analytical category, let alone language, 
given their proneness to suppress alternative modes of expression. Yet, as noted by 
Mouffe (1993: 14-5), despite their inherent hegemonic tendencies, languages are not 
identical in terms of their treatment of the subject – just as different political 
regimes, albeit founded on the exercise of power, make a perceptible difference to 
the fortunes of people concerned. On a more fundamental level, however, the very 
ubiquity of the noted tendency of all languages – whether those used for cultural 
analysis, or the „subject‟ languages of cultures under scrutiny – to produce, as well 
as mask, power disparities, suggests its importance as a kind of cultural mechanism, 
which could provide an entry point into the study of a diverse range of cultures. A 
comprehensive approach to culture, I argue, should be able to account for both the 
inherent power dimension of culture and the cultural situatedness of the researcher 
and subject, rather than bracketing them out. 
The wideners’ view of culture 
By contrast to the trend of narrowing the study of culture to a set of usable criteria, 
outlined above, the approaches considered here advance a view that limiting the 
terms of engagement with culture is counterproductive for the purposes of 
understanding what culture is all about and how the concept can be employed in 
academic study. „Culture‟ refers to a set of relationships, functions, and realities so 
complex that even seeking to define it comprehensively is futile (Chabal and Daloz 
2006). The sentiment is well captured in Jenks‟ summary: „The concept is at least 
complex and at most so divergent in its various applications as to defy the 
possibility, or indeed necessity, of any singular designation‟ (1993: 1). 
 
Such singular designation is, furthermore, unnecessary: since not only the ideas as to 
what culture is, but also what belongs (or does not belong) to it, will differ from one 
culture to another, the best approach to the study of culture is inductive (Chabal and 
Daloz 2006). Although this is not to say that the study of culture should be reduced 
to unrelated case-specific insights (a spectre that has haunted many a qualitative 
discipline, from anthropology to human geography), an inductive approach to 
culture does involve a degree of suspicion of the habitual analytical categories. 
Writing from the perspective of comparative politics, Chabal and Daloz emphasise 
how the staples of its disciplinary vocabulary, such as „regime‟ or even „state,‟ are 
misleading as categories of comparative analysis because of the local variation in 
meanings and practices masked by their homogenising façade (2006). Even 
„politics,‟ as the overall subject of enquiry, does not guarantee identity of the 
relevant institutions, practices, functions, behaviours or ideas: thus, the role of the 
„invisible‟ realm in structuring the political relations in Africa would seem 
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inconsistent with the secular and rational idea of politics in contemporary Europe 
(ibid.; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Ellis 1999).  
 
The primacy of culture for the „wideners‟ is underlined by the cultural constitution 
of both the instruments of political analysis and politics itself, as a distinct realm of 
practice (Chabal and Daloz 2006): According to Hudson, „things “political” can be 
deconstructed and shown to have their roots in broad systems of shared meaning‟ – 
i.e. culture, according to one of her own definitions (1997b: 10). Crawford and 
Lipschutz (1997) also underwrite this view when demonstrating how, in the absence 
of functioning political institutions, cultural conventions take over their role in that 
they become viewed as the repositories of power, and frequently serve as targets of 
violence in contemporary conflicts (cf. Nordstrom 1994). The overarching position 
of culture also accounts for the interdisciplinarity of the wideners‟ works. Chabal 
and Daloz (2006) build on Geertz‟s cultural anthropology, who, in turn, develops a 
semiotic approach to culture (1973) utilising Weber‟s very interdisciplinary insights 
regarding the human-made nature of the social environment. Zygmunt Bauman‟s 
Culture as Praxis (1999) is equally non-discriminating in its disciplinary leanings, 
offering an account of cultural constitution of any human activity on the basis of 
insights drawn from sociology, anthropology, structural and post-structural 
linguistics, and philosophy. „Unencumbered‟ by the specific interests of IR and 
politics, such broad treatments of culture draw on a wide range of sources of 
thinking on culture, and it would be impossible to review them here (those which 
have been relied upon are further discussed in the Theoretical Framework). There 
are, however, some themes which seem to focus the broad interest in culture, often 
reconnecting it with the problematic of politics and power. 
The foci of the wideners’ approach 
One such common theme in the wideners‟ approach is their focus on meanings, and 
culture as a wider framework in which they are established, organised, articulated, 
negotiated, and contested (Bauman 1999; Chabal and Daloz 2006; Demerath 2002). 
This is the path I follow in the present work (see Chapter 3). However, despite 
numerous inroads made into investigating „culture as shared meanings‟ within and 
outside IR (e.g., Verweij et al. 1998: 2; Cohen 1998: 117; Rubinstein 1998: 190; 
Hudson 1997b; Kluckhohn 1957; Geertz 1973; 1983; d‟Andrade 1984), few studies 
offer easily usable clues for theorising culture from this perspective, the most 
common limitation being the treatment of both meanings and their commonality as 
overly static. The view of culture as enabling communication and mutual 
understanding has a rich academic pedigree, as attested by, for instance, 
Wittgenstein‟s concept of language games (Wittgenstein 1993: section 65; Buckley-
Zistel 2006: 8; Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 108). Yet the formative role of culture in 
establishing (the commonality of) meanings is often absent from such conceptions. 
A more comprehensive perspective would also need to engage with questions such 
as how to reconcile the idea of commonality of culture with the reality of uneven 
„cultural distribution‟ (Hannerz 1992), or the perception of cultural „discontinuity‟ 
and separateness of cultures (e.g. Schlee 2009: 577; Barth 1969) with the empirical 
„fuzziness‟ of boundaries between them (Avruch 1998). Equally important, 
particularly for cultural analysis of conflict, is the issue of mechanisms and 
consequences of cultural mis-understanding, as well as possibilities of cross-cultural 
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communication and learning – an issue by which an approach to culture as „shared 
meanings‟ is easily stomped. A careful consideration of these issues leads to a view 
of meanings not as a passive medium of cultural communication, but as an 
expression of discursive – and recursive – reality-making by its agents, who are 
instrumental in „imagining‟ both cultural communities (cf. Anderson 1991) and 
boundaries between them. Far from being a matter of „technical‟ linguistic interest, 
the issue of meanings as a distinct concern of „cultural‟ enquiry acquires profound 
political connotations.  
 
Approaching meanings through their role in the production of culture allows the 
„wideners‟ to bridge the conventional divide between discourse and practice theory, 
since the genesis of meanings can be cast not only as a linguistic activity, but also as 
an outcome of communal practice which valorises certain qualities, things and 
patterns of action over others (cf. Bauman 1999). Practice theorists have been 
particularly receptive to the idea of exploring the links between practices and 
discourses: for example, Turner argues that linguistic practices are insufficiently 
different from other types of practice to merit radically separate treatment (2001: 
121). Neumann develops a conception of culture relying on both discourses and 
practices as motors of cultural innovation (2002). Prominent scholars of discourse, 
such as Foucault, also acknowledge the need to expand the study of discourse 
towards the conditions of its production and use, which would involve not only the 
sphere of social action (see Neumann 2002: 627; cf. Bourdieu 1990: 32; Rouse 
2001: 191-4; Lynch 2001: 131) but also the inclusion of „meaningful actions … and 
things‟ into the totality of discourse (Schatzki 2001b: 44; Laclau and Mouffe 1985). 
To an extent, the very possibility of distinguishing between discourses and practices 
is called into question through various instances of equating them with culture, 
particularly in its ordering and reality-making functions (see e.g. Väyrynen 2001: 4-
5; Bauman 1999). Certainly, the „rich‟ concepts of discourse and practice both 
incorporate an ideational and social dimension. 
 
This brings the diverse literatures on discourses (e.g. Foucault 2002a; Laclau 2000) 
as well as practices (Bourdieu 1977, 1990; de Certeau 1984) into the orbit of cultural 
enquiry. At the same time as enriching the spectrum of approaches to culture, 
however, these literatures contribute their own debates which feed into the many 
problematic issues already outlined. One of the most puzzling issues with the broad, 
undiscriminating approach to „culture as everything‟ is the logical equivalence 
which is established between concepts, processes and phenomena by virtue of being 
equated with culture. The example of blurring distinctions between discourses and 
practices, and between each of these concepts and culture as a whole, offers a good 
illustration. A similar play of equivalences is unleashed between „meanings‟ and 
„languages.‟ This can be traced to the property of culture not only to manifest itself 
on a variety of levels and scales (from international to individual), but also to 
provide a „dynamic link between levels of analysis‟ (Katzenstein 1997: 47). While 
intuitively indisputable (otherwise there would not be much cause to speak of 
culture as an all-encompassing totality), this view posits the conceptual space of 
culture as organised very differently from the linear logic familiar from the 
Euclidean geometry and associated ideas of rationality. And although wideners‟ 
analyses of culture implicitly underscore such an „impossible‟ conceptual construct, 
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they offer little guidance for accounting of the paradox of nominal equivalences of 
the general and the particular with(in) the totality of culture. This will be another 
formidable challenge for the theoretical framework chapter. 
 
Another problematic issue, which overlaps with the non-linear nature of culture, has 
to do with the ambivalence of culture with regard to the freedom of shaping human 
realities and the constraints that are placed on this freedom by the already 
established structures of meaning and action (Bauman 1999). This problem has 
given rise to a number of different attempts to reconcile what Thévenot terms 
„macrosocial structures and microsocial behaviours‟ (2001: 58), among them 
Giddens‟ structuration theory (1984) and Bourdieu‟s concept of habitus (1977, 
1990). Given the futility of resolving the debate regarding the primacy of either 
agency or structure, the solution is to regard structures as dual, i.e. „both the medium 
and the outcome of the practices which constitute social systems‟ (Giddens 1981: 
27, quoted in Swidler 2001: 78). While this perspective conjures a dynamic picture 
of structures, it still does not accord much role to human agents aside from the initial 
choices which become naturalised in the structures (Bourdieu 1990: 55), and the 
subsequent mediation of the structures‟ reproduction. One of the possible solutions 
to this problem is to isolate different levels at which practices are located; for 
instance, Swidler‟s concept of „anchoring practices‟ (2001) is underpinned by a 
tiered view of the relations between different templates of social action. In this 
sense, a hierarchical relationship could be envisaged between Giddens‟ structures 
and Bourdieu‟s habitus, for Bourdieu‟s concept is better attuned to smaller-scale and 
less formal systems „of structured, structuring dispositions‟ (Bourdieu 1990: 52) 
which represent „chunks‟ of social praxis (Swidler 1998) rather than the entirety of 
culture (which could be associated with Giddens‟ structures). The freedom of choice 
(or variation within the wide albeit not limitless repertoire of practices (cf. de 
Certeau 1984; Neumann 2001)) for human agents would thus be inversely 
proportionate to the „seniority‟ of the structure. Yet, such a view risks eliminating 
the dynamism introduced by recognising the duality of structures in the first place. 
Much more promising, in this regard, is de Certeau‟s (1984) differentiation between 
practices based on their relation to the loci of power – „strategies,‟ which embody 
and project power, and „tactics,‟ which consist in inventive ways to circumvent and 
subvert the strategies while displaying overt compliance. The relation to power also 
determines whether the instances of innovation will be temporary or more durable in 
character (see Viktorova (2005b) for a more detailed discussion of Bourdieu‟s and 
de Certeau‟s practice theories).  
 
To summarise the implications of the wideners‟ view of culture for the present work, 
the complexity of the concept of culture for which it allows also offers unusual 
opportunities for theorising the multi-faceted and -pronged nature of culture. 
Although the introduction of yet other sets of terms (practices, discourses, 
languages, meanings and so on) may complicate the issue of culture even further, it 
also helps unpack the workings of culture at particular junctions. Because of the 
noted play of substitutions and equivalences with and within the concept of culture, 
these terminological distinctions have a less binding character and are less likely to 
become naturalised in the fixed terminologies which dissect „culture‟ into often 
incompatible conceptualisations. The heuristic nature of the terminology applied in 
40 
 
the offered conceptualisation of culture is also emphasised by its mirroring of the 
processes of substitution and establishment of equivalences which epitomise the 
process of cultural meaning-production. Coming back to the purposes of the second 
part of this chapter, the broad perspective on culture also underpins the most fruitful 
of the reviewed applications of culture in conflict and peacebuilding. 
II. Culture in the context of conflict and violence 
Having established the parameters of engagement with culture generally, in this 
section I turn to the question of how culture has been related to the problematic of 
conflict and violence, as well as peace. This concerns, first and foremost, the debates 
on the origins of conflict and violence, the effects which violent conflict has on 
culture, and cultural mechanisms of conflict resolution. In addition, this section 
discusses issues and dilemmas related to the conflictive potential of some of the 
most studied aspects of culture, such as ethnic/national identity and religion. As with 
the above, the following discussion aims to identify departure points for my own 
approach to culture as well as relevant issues which it will have to address. 
Culture: A source or a medium of violence? 
Among questions asked about the role of culture in (violent) conflict, that 
concerning the origins of aggression is perhaps the most fundamental. Does violence 
originate in culture, and, in that case, what is to be made of this „dubious‟ 
connection; or is it among the more „basic‟ propensities of humankind, grounded in 
biological or genetic predispositions (and in that case, how should one conceptualise 
the role of culture in addressing it)?  
 
Responses to these questions vary widely. While evolutionists (e.g. Pinker 2002) 
pinpoint a „natural‟ human propensity for aggression, claiming that it has been 
instrumental in ensuring the evolutionary advantage of our species, their opponents 
tend to question „biological‟ generalisations regarding human nature. In anti-
evolutionists‟ view, the noted propensity for violence is a product of cultural 
nurturing in some societies in the same way that the collective preference for 
peaceful resolution of disputes is in others (e.g. Ross 1993; see also Ramsbotham et 
al. 2005: 305-7). In this reading, the overall level of violence in society is a variable, 
whose value depends on patterns of socialisation, established cultural practices and 
so on. This does not necessarily imply that culture is to blame as some sort of 
„external‟ generator of violence: if anything, culture, in the form of behavioural and 
attitudinal patterns reproduced in communal praxis, is very much an intrinsic part of 
society. However, its influence in not entirely deterministic for the occurrences of 
actual violence: this relationship, as noted by Riches (1986b: 25; cf. Geertz 1973: 
18), is one of opportunity whose realisation hinges on individual choices. But once 
the attention shifts back to the individual, it becomes almost impossible to determine 
whether it is the „natural‟ proclivities, or the endorsement of cultural conditioning, 
that plays a defining part in choosing violence over non-violence; and so the 
question regarding the „origins‟ of violence is re-opened. 
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Still, there may be more fruitful ways of unpacking the cultural problematic in 
relation to violence. However persuasive the „nature‟ argument for the pervasiveness 
of aggression in human societies (although see e.g. Kelly 2000), there is no denying 
a huge variation not only in the overall levels of (acceptance of) violence across 
cultures, but also in the forms that the expression of aggression takes (see Ross 
1993). Clearly, ideas as to what circumstances justify violent responses, what forms 
of violence are acceptable, as well as what measures and actions can de-escalate the 
conflict, directing it along the avenues of non-violent resolution, all belong to the 
domain of cultural „conditioning.‟ Given culture‟s impact on the forms and 
dynamics of conflict, the issue of whether conflict originates in culture or is simply 
mediated by it becomes largely void, for even the presumably „natural‟ aggression in 
animals often takes symbolic, rather than direct, forms  (i.e. when the outcome of a 
confrontation is decided by symbolic demonstrations of force rather than actual 
combat) (e.g. Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1983: 45).  
Violence and non-violence in communal identity and praxis 
The near-ubiquity of violence in human societies could also be explained by the 
advantages that violence offers for the survival of not just the human species, but 
particular communities. Accounts of functional utility of violence in human 
communities are particularly prominent in anthropology, covering a wide range of 
applications from the attainment of day-to-day practical aims to the establishment of 
communities and maintenance of boundaries between them (e.g. Riches 1986b; 
Schröder and Schmidt 2001; Richards 2005b; Girard 1988; Clastres 1994; Malkki 
1995). These themes reverberate in Volkan‟s concept of „chosen trauma‟ (1991) 
used to analyse the political effects of mobilising memories of past violence in the 
service of ethno-nationalist ideologies (1997), and in Kaldor‟s remark that violence 
is the most potent tool for a forcible demarcation of the dividing line between ethnic 
communities (2004).  
 
Although, as noted above, the acceptance of functional usefulness of conflict is 
usually limited to its non-violent forms (e.g. Fetherston and Nordstrom 1995), a 
closer study of different cultures reveals both violent and non-violent conflict as 
cultural „options‟ coexisting in a variety of different settings. In many contemporary 
conflicts, violence is the province of the same social agency and networks which 
also practice non-violent methods of attaining their goals (Richards 2005a). Co-
existence of violence and non-violence is also notable in the liberal peace, which 
combines the dominant „enlightened‟ Western preference for non-violence with the 
recognition of necessity of force to ensure the success of peace interventions (see 
Richmond 2005). The same applies to a number of other broadly Western 
paradigms, from St Augustine‟s deliberations on earthly vs. heavenly peace in De 
civitate Dei (1945) to Marxist and structuralist visions of political change (e.g. 
Galtung 1971; Fanon 1967; Apter 1997: 7). A close study of culture can not only 
reveal which violent and non-violent options are present as latent cultural 
possibilities, but also illuminate the cultural pathways of legitimation which 
determine whether violent or non-violent responses are triggered in one or another 
set of circumstances (cf. Jabri 1996). Thus, relatively high levels of violence in the 
aboriginal communities of Australia have to be gauged against the local 
understandings of the harmfulness of verbal compared to physical abuse and ways of 
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restoring honour and social balance (Brigg 2005). The cultural context of the 
production of violence is also relevant for understanding the origins as well as wider 
social viability of non-violence, as evident in the comparison of the wide appeal of 
the Ghandian paradigm of non-violence (cf. NP 2007a) with highly specific forms 
of non-violent resistance, such as practiced by the Nasa of Colombia (see MacGinty 
2008: 141, referring to Peacework 2004; Spindler 2005). In this sense, stripping 
violence of its privileged analytical status as an „exceptional‟ form of conflict 
(Richards 2005a) becomes a pre-condition of a culturally informed study of conflict 
and its resolution.  
 
Recognition of the cultural grounding of both violence and non-violence has 
attracted attention to the possibility of multiple ways of ethical framing of the issue 
of violence and the varying standards of legitimacy surrounding conflictive 
behaviour. In literature, these themes are reflected in the preoccupation with culture-
specific notions of conflict and methods of conflict resolution, sometimes referred to 
as „enthoconflict theories‟ and „ethnopraxes‟ (Arvuch et al. 1991), manifest in, for 
example, the traditional Belau notions of conflict and pathways of resolution (Black 
1991) and novel sources of conflict triggered by social change among the Dou 
Donggo (Just 1991). Among recent studies, Brigg and Bleiker‟s edited volume 
(forthcoming) offers accounts of a variety of Asian and Oceanic approaches to 
conflict resolution. Other works have focused on the patterns of reproduction of 
certain forms of conflictive behaviour, or „cultures of conflict‟ (see Ross 1993, 
1998), as well as cultural nurturing of peaceful forms of dispute resolution and 
personal fulfilment, or „cultures of peace‟ (see Boulding 2004). Culturally-specific 
methods of conflict resolution have found wider practical resonance in the so-called 
„alternative dispute resolution,‟ or ADR (e.g. Nader and Todd 1978), which in some 
cases became institutionalised as part of formal legal systems, for example in the US 
and New Zealand (MacGinty 2008: 141-2). One of the upshots of enquiries into 
culturally-specific understandings of conflict was the realisation that in many parts 
of the world, the dominant ideas of dispassionate, rational discussion of conflictive 
issues with a view to achieving a decisive resolution simply do not hold. In fact, the 
extensive use of emotional displays, ritual, and story-telling in different cultural 
settings starkly expose the specific cultural origins of the „rational‟ Western-style 
conflict resolution (e.g. Lederach 1991). In contrast, many of the „traditional‟ or 
„indigenous‟ techniques emphasise the importance of ongoing relationships as 
opposed to one-off victories; and see a role for the third parties „as facilitators rather 
that unilateral interveners‟ (MacGinty 2008: 141-2).  
 
These studies form an important precondition for cross-cultural understanding of 
issues related to conflict and peace (e.g. Brigg and Bleiker, forthcoming), as well as 
possibilities of cross-fertilisation between culture-specific conflict resolution 
techniques, including mergers between the liberal peace and traditional or 
indigenous peace-making (MacGinty 2008) and broader cultural orientations which 
they represent. For instance, Schirch (2005) explores the uses of ritual in contexts 
not usually considered susceptible to „cultural‟ reconciliation, and Väyrynen (2001) 
usefully reconceptualises what is happening in the setting of problem-solving 
workshops (usually associated with demonstrably a-cultural „second-generation‟ 
thinking about conflict (e.g. Azar and Burton 1986)) in terms of common frames of 
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reference through which participants define their vision of conflictive issues and 
other life experiences. This shows that ideas about conflict do not form an isolated 
sphere of cultural knowledge, but are entwined with a wide spectrum of social 
experiences – a consideration which becomes particularly important in the context of 
external peace interventions. For example, Duffey (2000) demonstrates how the lack 
of elementary cultural awareness among the interveners undermines the peace effort 
where intervention practices are at odds with the cultural norms of recipient 
societies. The scale of this problem ranges from the chosen means of 
communication with local audiences (e.g. radio vs. print media) to the methods of 
reconciliation (e.g. court procedures vs. healing rituals) to the institutional formats 
promoted as part of post-conflict state-building (ibid.; Shaw 2005; Ferme 1998). In 
contrast, familiarity with local ways of life and perceptions of „common sense‟ can 
offer as yet untapped potential for peaceful transformation: for instance, 
„indigenous‟ authority figures in conflict zones (obscured by the more visible 
dynamics of „warlordism‟) can provide a rallying point for peace activism (Kaldor 
1999), while incorporating local visions of a functioning polity when designing 
governance structures for the post-settlement phase can be crucial for the 
sustainability of the end product (e.g. Lederach 1997). Lederach‟s work (1991, 
1997) also emphasises that ideas about conflict resolution and its desired ends do not 
always exist as readily available cultural wisdom (cf. Just 1991), so that the role of 
the third parties in conflict resolution could be reconceptualised along the lines of 
„eliciting‟ the latent understandings and visions of peace (cf. Buckley-Zistel 2006; 
Viktorova Milne, forthcoming).  
Violence and cultural change  
Another pertinent issue concerns the nature of the relationship between culture and 
violent conflict. The question of whether culture can impose restraint on the exercise 
of violence is topical regardless of whether one considers violence to be grounded in 
culture or not. Those espousing the evolutionist view of „natural‟ human proclivity 
towards aggression tend to answer this question negatively – although this is 
because their excessively narrow view of culture does not include the realm of 
politics, which evolutionsists do credit with providing some restraint on violence 
(see Ramsbotham et al. 2005: 305-6). Those favouring „nurture‟ explanations 
presume culture to exercise both enabling and constraining influence on violence 
(and other types of conflictive behaviour) (cf. Bauman 1999: xii; Douglas 1982: 
190). The reverse consideration – of whether violence has an effect on culture (that 
is, beyond its reproduction through violent practices which form its part) – has been 
at the heart of a divisive debate of immense relevance for peacebuilding. Most often 
this debate has revolved around the issues of „social fabric‟ and „culture(s) of 
violence.‟ 
The ‘social fabric’ 
Although violence can – as discussed above – be viewed as an intrinsic part of 
culture, the notion of its „normalcy‟ is sometimes difficult to accept, particularly 
when violence reaches culturally unprecedented scales, as in many armed conflicts 
of the post-Cold War era. Questions such as what happens to the established cultural 
practices and conventions (the „social fabric‟) under the influence of war violence, 
and what new conventions regulating the use of violence (or „cultures of violence‟) 
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emerge as a result, have elicited a great deal of controversy, in view of contradictory 
interpretations of their effects on the prospects for peace. A widespread assumption 
on the interveners‟ part is that the „social fabric‟ becomes, often irreparably, 
damaged by violent conflict (e.g. WB 2003; EC SL s.a.). Moreover, it is also often 
seen as being „implicated‟ in conflict – both on account of having manifested its 
inability to contain, or „dampen,‟ the conflict (e.g. Paris 2004; see Duffield 2001: 
127-32), and owing to its role in creating conditions which facilitated the recourse to 
violence in the first place. The imbalances of power, affluence, and opportunity 
coded into the social structure are often cited among the causes of conflict (although 
not usually viewed as pertaining to culture and sometimes explicitly dissociated 
from it (e.g. Kapoor 2008: 35-6)), as is the „culture of violence‟ which is taken to 
imply widespread societal acceptance of violent means of dispute resolution (UNDP 
2004: 5). Similar charges of facilitating violence are laid on what is sometimes 
labelled „harmful‟ cultural practices and understandings underpinning them – for 
instance, discriminative „customary law‟ or objectification of women in „exchanges‟ 
to settle grievances – which result in perpetuation of various forms of social 
inequality (e.g. HRW 2003; USAID 2007a; Merry 2003: 58; Richards et al. 2004: 
10). 
 
Critics expose this assumption of „damaged‟ social fabric as legitimising the 
inattention to local culture(s) which is coded into the dominant peacebuilding 
practice of using violent conflict as „an axis of social reordering‟ (Duffield 2001: 13) 
to effect a wholesale reorganisation of societies in accord with the principles of 
liberal democratic governance (Richmond 2006). These principles appear to remove 
the need to address the cultural dimension of conflict and peace, by virtue of 
accommodating any „cultural‟ needs of populations through the provisions of civil 
society, participatory democracy and individual freedoms of expression (cf. Duffield 
2001). However, this view is problematic not only because of its disregard for the 
subject populations‟ own views and desires, but also because frequently, instead of 
„destroying‟ pre-existing cultural practices, violent conflict reinforces them 
(Duffield 2001: 122-5). In the conditions of violent conflict, everyday practices and 
routines, such as journeys to obtain food and water, or any communal activities, 
often become valorised as instances of resistance and peace activism (e.g. 
Nordstrom 1994; Accord 9). Despite its often undeniably damaging effects, war 
violence can also lead to a (re-)discovery of coping and survival strategies which 
reconnect people‟s current experiences to their cultural past, or trigger cultural 
creativity and renewal (e.g. Nordstrom 1994). These cultural developments often 
evade the attention of interveners or get condemned together with other 
manifestations of the conflict, despite sometimes coinciding with the objectives of 
liberal transitions – for instance, towards a greater autonomy of women (Large 
2007). 
 
Ironically, it is precisely the reinforcement of local cultures that is often conductive 
to attempts at their destruction, as they become more prominent as sources of power 
not only for the communities in question but also their adversaries in conflict (cf. 
OECD 2001: 25). In the violence of the „new wars,‟ the targeting of civilians 
becomes a deliberate destabilisation technique (Kaldor 1999; cf. Hoffman 2004), 
which is further „refined‟ by forcible recruitment of civilians into militias and pitting 
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them against their own communities (Nordstrom 1994; HRW 2003). Crawford and 
Lipschutz (1997: 169) suggest that such violent tactics as systematic rape or 
separation of men from women, as witnessed in Bosnia and Croatia, represent an 
attack on the institution of family as the sole remaining repository of cultural 
cohesion and power (cf. Väyrynen 1991; Stiglmayer 1994). Other examples include 
deliberate infliction of grievous bodily harm, which deprives people of the 
possibility to perform their customary social roles; or using the sites associated with 
well-being, safety and peace (such as beauty salons in Yugoslavia, or kitchens in 
Mozambique) for committing heinous acts of violence (Nordstrom 1994). In 
addition to bringing about physical suffering, violence also leaves a long-term 
imprint on the social memories of individuals and communities, resulting in 
lingering trauma (Fetherston 2000b; Nordstrom 2004).  
 
Whether, and in what sense, the effects of violence qualify as „destructive‟ for the 
social fabric is thus an extremely contested issue, which hinges on the adopted 
distinctions between cultural change and destruction, as well as what we consider to 
be instances of cultural adaptation, resilience and capacity for „regeneration.‟ 
Furthermore, this issue also resists generalisation, since whether the conflict triggers 
a recourse to the latent repertoire of cultural practices of survival (e.g. Rackley 
2000), or overwhelms the community with violence of a „novel‟ type that is outside 
the competence of the existing „ethnopraxes‟ (e.g. Uvin and Mironko 2003), can 
only be determined empirically. Despite the often similar-sounding conclusions 
regarding the debilitating effects of violence on the social fabric, the recipes offered 
for its remedy differ tremendously between liberal peacebuilding interventions and 
the scholars advocating a more culturally-sensitive approach (e.g. Nordstrom 2004; 
Fetherston and Nordstrom 1995). For instance, critics justly expose the hidden 
agendas of social healing formats traditionally used in liberal peacebuilding, such as 
truth and reconciliation commissions, whose methods and rhetoric betray their 
orientation towards the production of docile liberal subjects as they advance ideas of 
state-building and national unity and cohesion, and superimpose the external 
interpretations of the causes of conflict onto their „local‟ understandings (e.g. Shaw 
2005; Hoffman 2007). In contrast, culturally-sensitive transformative peacebuilding 
is directed at the immediate personal and community environment, emphasising the 
restoration of long-term relationships and coping strategies attuned to local cultural 
traditions (Shaw 2005; Kelsall 2005; cf. MacGinty 2008). The differences between 
the approaches are evident even in their treatment of trauma: while from the 
perspective of liberal peacebuilding, cultural practices such as communal healing 
ceremonies (e.g. Honwana 2005) are easily dismissed as eschewing proper justice 
procedures (cf. Llamazeres 2005), the medicinal (or psychiatric) approach to trauma 
associated with the liberal peace can be shown effectively to obliterate individual 
and communal agency in post-violence environments (Pupavac 2005, 2007). 
‘Cultures of violence’ 
An issue closely related to „social fabric‟ is that of the „cultures of violence.‟ 
Usually, references to „cultures of violence‟ emphasise the need to go beyond the 
customary approach to conflict, which proceeds by resolving the underlying issues 
that had triggered its outbreak, and leaves unaddressed the „runaway‟ dynamics of 
violence which will have altered and complicated the initial grievances and 
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perceptions of the parties (e.g. Nordstrom 1994, 1995; Feldman 1991; see also 
Chapter 5). Violent conflict – especially on an unprecedented scale, as in the case of 
many post-Cold War conflicts in the Global South – sets in motion dynamics that 
ultimately alter the perceptions of permissible and justified violence, creating 
„cultures of violence‟ (Nordstrom 1994). This process involves a variety of factors 
and manifestations, from reawakening of the latent „culture of militarism‟ as the flip 
side of many peaceful societies (cf. Jabri 1996) or militarisation of existing social 
networks (Hoffman 2007), to the influence of shadow transnational economies 
which create alternative structures of dependency and opportunity, for instance 
through easy availability of arms (e.g. Kaldor 1999; Fetherston 2000). In many 
cases, the changes which violent conflict has introduced to societies are perceived as 
irreversible:  
 
What you must realize about a boy like Atek, … is that he has lost forever the grounding of 
his culture, … cows. Cattle in the Sudan provide the basis of families. Cattle connect parents 
to children. Cattle are pledged in marriage arrangements. Now a boy like Atek thinks that 
the center of culture is guns. It is all turned upside down. (Rosenblatt 1993: 88, quoted in 
Rackley 2000)  
 
Although the references to „cultures of violence‟ allude to their man-made character, 
the challenge of „undoing‟ them faces all the difficulties involved in altering the 
patterns of established practice (cf. Brown 2005: 49): this task requires a profound 
understanding of the cultures in question in order to help orchestrate locally nurtured 
transitions to non-violent cultural repertoire(s) of practices. This is why merely 
substituting the existing „cultures of violence‟ with institutional provisions for 
peaceful, democratic expression of dissent and difference, as attempted in liberal 
peace transitions, leaves its critics deeply sceptical: Without „undoing‟ the cultures 
of violence, lasting peace remains an unlikely prospect (e.g. Nordstrom 1994, 2004), 
and in view of locally established traditions of reconciliation, the promoted fora 
such as TRCs may prove inadequate for this task (cf. Shaw 2005). Although the 
established reconciliation practices are rarely equipped to deal with the particular 
cultures of violence that have emerged as a result of recent conflicts, their 
application often demonstrates genuine cultural creativity, whereby elements of the 
existing cultural repertoire are recombined and complemented with the new ones to 
match the current needs and requirements (e.g. Honwana 2005). The awareness of 
cultural creativity can also be projected into the past, thus recasting what appears to 
be the established and time-venerated practices as responding, initially, to equally 
„unprecedented‟ conditions. Furthermore, just as the emergent „cultures of violence‟ 
are grounded in a broad array of cultural practices and conventions, so the attempts 
at „rescuing‟ the peaceful alternatives invite a broad-based knowledge of the 
culture(s) in question, especially given that the scope of „relevant‟ practices is not 
limited to conflict resolution proper, but includes a wider spectrum of ideas about 
the appropriate forms of governance and authority, communication and exchange, 
and procedures of restoring a balance between the people and their environment 
(MacGinty 2008: 147-8).  
Cultural avenues of conflictive mobilisation 
One of the most visible roles for culture in relation to conflict in the recent decades 
has been in conflictive mobilisation of religious and ethnic identities. Ethnic 
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conflict, in particular, has been in the spotlight of academic and political attention 
since the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, and „ethnicity‟ featured widely in re-
interpretations of many conflicts across the former Third World, as ideological 
motivations for violence receded with the lifting of the Cold War superpower 
rivalry. No longer overlaid by the constraining power of ideology, erstwhile patterns 
of identity and difference appeared to have regained all their divisive strength (e.g. 
Kaldor 1999). This section discusses the place and understandings of culture in 
relation to two main avenues of identity mobilisation – ethnicity (and nationalism) 
and religion. 
Ethnicity and nationalism 
The resurfacing concerns with national identity, in particular, seemed to question the 
long-held view of nationalism as associated with a particular stage in the 
development of modern industrial societies (Hobsbawm 1990; Tilly 1975) and 
reinvigorated the essentialist understandings of culture and identity (e.g. Kaplan 
2000). The „essentialist‟ view pictures national or ethnic identities as innate (i.e. 
grounded in some „natural,‟ biological, or „primordial‟ genetic characteristic), often 
in conjunction with a vision of neatly compartmentalised and mutually exclusive 
territorial ethnic „homelands.‟ The presentation of identities as natural and given 
seemingly acknowledges the defining impact of culture on world affairs (e.g. 
Huntington 1993), but the static view of culture as an ineradicable „thing-in-itself‟ 
(Kaplan 2000; see Richards 2005a: 8-9 for critique) in fact brackets it out, with the 
analysis concentrating on its product – the „irreducible‟ differences which 
necessarily perpetuate ethnic conflict and rivalries. The mistrust of culture as an 
analytical category is often related to such essentialist understandings – as 
exemplified by Bayart‟s suspicion of „culturalism‟ in his Illusion of Cultural Identity 
(2005). Yet, such a view of culture is largely acknowledged to be anachronistic and 
grossly inaccurate, for the „ideal-type‟ ethnic compartmentalisation has very little 
justification in terms of actual realities, which testify to ethnic intermixing and 
„cross-contamination‟ as being essential for both short- and long-term „survival‟ of 
nations (see e.g. Richards 1996; Shaw 2002; Richards et al. 2004), given the crucial 
role that inter-marrying played in cementing peace agreements (Biggs 1960: 25; 
MacGinty 2008: 152). Thus, for all its „biological‟ pretensions, the conception of 
innate ethnicity and its privileged links to a „natural‟ homeland are founded on a 
large dose of myth (see e.g. Mertus (1999) for explorations of the mythological 
aspects of Serbian claims to Kosovo). Furthermore, some studies emphasise the 
inherent heterogeneity of any culture and its dependence on dialogical exchanges 
with other cultures for innovation and development (see e.g. Lotman 1990). Self-
definitions (or -descriptions) in monolithic, clearly delimited terms are always 
secondary, and also second-order, constructions – rather than reflections of primary, 
pristine and „unspoilt‟ ethnic realities (Lotman 1990; Viktorova 2003; cf. de Certeau 
1997). 
 
Contradicting the essentialist premises are a number of views advocating the 
relativity of identity and its (broadly) constructed character. The wide resonance of 
Fredrik Barth‟s research on the constitutive role of boundaries between communities 
in identity formation (1969; cf. Cohen 1969) emphasises not only its situational 
character and multiple facets (e.g. Bleiker 2000: 200-1), but also its belonging in the 
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realm of the „other‟ (Bakhtin 1984: 287-88; Viktorova 2003). Accordingly, it is not 
culture per se, but the specific terms in which self-other relations are articulated, that 
determine the conflictive or conciliatory potential of identity (e.g. Hansen 2006; 
Diez et al. 2006). Because culture is not viewed as innate, but as a product of social 
and political practices of identification, its place in the constructivist conceptions of 
identity appears more modest than in the essentialist ones, but it is also two-fold: 
„culture‟ can be placed among other products of social construction, such as identity 
and difference, and considered in connection with the very processes and 
mechanisms of the production of such collective constructs (e.g. Wendt 1999). In 
the studies of discursive articulation and production of identities, it is possible to 
envisage a similarly two-fold role for culture: although culture certainly features as 
the end-product of discourse, there is also scope for culture when considering the 
„totalising‟ effects of discursive constitution of reality. In this respect, culture 
approximates „language‟ in post-structural conceptualisations, and in some 
interpretations, it is culture, rather than language, that is given the ultimate 
communicative and reality-making functions (see Bauman 1999). This consideration 
is of immense importance in view of the task of elaborating a comprehensive 
approach to culture in the following theoretical chapter. 
 
The idea that ethnic difference does not directly translate into violence has also 
gained acceptance in the „mainstream‟ studies of conflict: thus, Collier (2000) finds 
„that ethnic diversity correlates only weakly with war,‟ being more explosive in 
countries with two or three main ethnic groups rather than with multiple ethnicities 
(Richards 2005a: 10). This draws attention to the fact that ethnic mobilisation is not 
particularly different from other types of political mobilisation (Loisel 2004), and 
that for conflict entrepreneurs, its choice is often determined by its comparative cost-
benefit advantages (Burnham 1996; see also Richards 2005a: 8). What makes 
politicisation of ethnicity potentially explosive is that it „tends to collapse the 
distinction between ethnic identity, on the one hand, and political choices, 
affiliations and loyalties, on the other‟ (Kandeh 1992: 81-2). Another useful 
observation in this regard is that the „centrifugal‟ effects of ethnic polarisation are 
counterbalanced by (much less marked) processes of creolisation, cultural adaptation 
and assimilation (e.g. Richards 1996) – although in itself, cultural approximation 
does not guard against violent conflict, or necessarily make its resolution easier 
(Bangura 2004; cf. Neumann 1999).  
 
Arguably, „ethnicity‟ is a category ill-suited for describing human commonalities in 
some parts of the world: Chabal and Daloz (2006) argue that in Africa, „ethnicity‟ 
used to form but one of many overlapping principles of identification. The emphasis 
on „ethnicity‟ was introduced by the colonial powers and drawn from the European 
experiences of identification rather than from the African terrain (ibid.). One of the 
prime examples of this was the cementing, under the Belgian colonial rule, of the 
difference in affluence between the Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda into an „ethnic‟ 
divide (e.g. Longman 2001: 356). Ellis demonstrates the extent to which „ethnicity‟ 
is a misnomer for characterising the weak political and cultural ties between 
Liberian „tribes‟ – a division which also, in the Liberian case, emerged 
comparatively recently and tentatively, in the „process of interaction between 
national and local politics‟ rather than on the basis of such unifying characteristics 
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as a common language (1999: 31-3; cf. Moran 2006). Instead, in the bulk of Africa, 
kinship (variously defined depending on the purpose) serves as a flexible basis of 
identification and mobilisation (be it political or economic) which cross-cuts the 
„ethnic‟ and even „blood‟ divisions because of the practices of marriage and 
adoption, especially in the context of domestic slavery and its legacy (see Ferme 
2001).  
 
Despite its „constructed‟ nature, ethnicity, undeniably, features as a powerful motor 
in conflict, partly because ethnic belonging seems to offer a security of identification 
on par with few other forms of commonality (save, perhaps, religion) (e.g. Smith 
1995), and partly because it offers plentiful opportunities for manipulation. Both 
these aspects show how much can be gained by placing the issue of identity in a 
broader context of cultural analysis, because an enquiry into the mechanisms of 
cultural meaning-making can illuminate both the specificity of the production of 
identity as the internal space of meaningfulness, and the ways in which boundary-
drawing can be manipulated in accord with certain interests.  
Religion 
The importance of cultural grounding of a particular basis for identification also 
concerns religion, which has lately become more prominent on the agenda of IR 
scholars (e.g. Laustsen and Wæver 2000; Juergensmeyer 2001), although this 
engagement with religion carries a measure of awkwardness, given the explicit 
grounding of the discipline of IR in the secular traditions of statehood. Yet, secular 
character of polities is not a universal norm, and furthermore, some political ideas 
borne of religious traditions, such as umma in Islam, challenge the very concept of 
compartmentalised sovereign statehood. In many societies, religion is part and 
parcel of the social structure, and it can play a defining role in the formation of ideas 
of power and legitimacy, emphasising the constitutive role of culture in the sphere of 
politics (e.g. Hohe 2002a; Chopra and Hohe 2004). Apart from its more visible 
application with regard to, for example, „political Islam,‟ the religious dimension of 
the „political‟ has been cited as an important factor in conflicts across Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and West Africa in particular (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Ellis 1999; Ellis and 
Haar 2004).  
 
Religion‟s further relevance for cultural conflict analysis can be related to its role in 
structuring the deep-seated cultural patterns belonging to a „collective subconscious‟ 
which, often in covert and „undetected‟ ways, direct the more tangible patterns of 
political behaviour (Osiander 2000, referring to Galtung 1996). For instance, Martín 
(2005) traces some controversies in the perception of the role of peacekeeping in 
Western Sahara to Islam‟s preference for justice in contrast to Christianity‟s 
prioritisation of peace. However, religion is not the only factor structuring such 
deeply ingrained and, therefore, unarticulated convictions which govern the 
perceptions of appropriateness and common sense characterising cultural 
communities (cf. Just 1991). Therefore, multiple sources of such deep-seated 
cultural patterns could perhaps be discussed more fruitfully in the broader context of 
cultural analysis rather than religion. This need not entail exclusion of religion, for, 
as many scholars of culture emphasise, inductive cultural analysis should consider 
those aspects of culture which the participants in conflict themselves deem 
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important (Chabal and Daloz 2006). Thus, religion would feature prominently in a 
cultural study of both African politics and wars (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Ellis 1999; 
Ellis and Ter Haar 2004), and in the discussion of Cambodian ideas of social 
opportunity and justice (Ovensen 2005). Other contexts or levels of analysis might, 
in a similar vein, direct attention towards other categories of identification, be it 
class, gender, or race (e.g. Doty 1998).  
 
Consideration of the processes of meaning-generation and reality-making at the core 
of cultural analysis can illuminate the mechanisms of both ethnic and religious 
politicisation – or, conversely, uncover the factors which drive identification away 
from the avenue of ethnicity in particular contexts. The issue of ethnic identity, in 
particular, highlights the importance of cultural mechanisms of identity 
consolidation and fragmentation, crucial in cementing our perception of ethnic and 
cultural „wholes‟ and „legitimate‟ divisions between them. The dynamic of identity-
formation can also affect the acceptance and effectiveness of both locally-nurtured 
and „imported‟ peace-making techniques, given that these often carry an implicit 
identity agenda (see e.g. MacGinty (2008: 145) and Chandler (2000) on the 
internationals‟ „containment‟ of nationalist tendencies in the Bosnian peace process). 
Attention to „micro-effects‟ of cultural identity-formation can offer particular 
insights into peace-making: for instance, Schirch‟s work on ritual in peacebuilding 
highlights its role in re-forging the bases of commonality on different levels, from 
rival leaders to the members of conflicting communities (2005). The use of symbols, 
whose inherent polysemy opens them to a variety of interpretations, as rallying 
points in the expression and (re-)formulation of identity also exposes the broader, 
cultural underpinnings of the identity problematic. The public nature of symbols 
makes them a ready „access point‟ for the analysis of culture (Swidler 1995). These 
considerations corroborate the need for an in-depth exploration of the significational 
dimension underlying both the formation of culture and its functioning, which will 
be offered in the following chapter.  
Conclusions  
As illustrated by the above review of the thinking on culture, it has been sufficiently 
diverse to preclude comfortable „streamlining‟ into a consistent account. 
Furthermore, it would be difficult to piece together a comprehensive approach to the 
study of culture on its basis, given the number of dilemmas and contradictions 
uncovered in relation to almost every intellectual take on culture. Of the reviewed 
approaches, the wideners‟ position comes closest to offering a basis for a treatment 
of culture which could both avoid making early commitments that limit its 
applicability to empirical material, and help address the problematic issues raised in 
the above discussion. The approach developed in the next chapter continues the 
pathway indicated by the works of Bauman (1999) and Chabal and Daloz (2006) 
towards a semiotic perspective on the problematic of culture, with a focus on 
meanings, their generation and their social functioning manifest in the cultural 
„ordering‟ of human affairs. The encroachment onto the territory of semiotics will 
necessitate a recourse to a number of other sources to unpack the processes of 
meaning-generation, notably Yuriy Lotman‟s semiotic theory of culture (e.g. 1990) 
which was not considered above because of the wide coverage it is about to receive 
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in the following chapter. As noted in the Introduction, it is precisely this focus on 
meaning-making and world-ordering that offers grounds for drawing the 
connections between the „cultural sides‟ of diverse spheres of human praxis (see 
Bauman 1999; Demerath 2002; Chabal and Daloz 2006; Hudson 1997b), allowing 
for an open-ended engagement with a wide range of empirical phenomena. It is also 
a focus which enables me to address a variety of pinpointed „problems‟ with existing 
treatments of culture – such as the formation of identity and processes of boundary-
drawing, the power effects of cultural vocabulary or naturalised power asymmetries, 
and the non-linearity of a broad concept of culture – integrating their consideration 
with the approach developed below.  
 
A cultural enquiry has to proceed in full awareness of what Geertz termed the twin 
dangers of reification („to imagine that culture is a self-contained “super-organic” 
reality with forces and purposes of its own‟) and reductionism („to claim that it 
consists in the brute pattern of behavioural events we observe in fact to occur in 
some identifiable community or other‟) (Geertz 1973: 11). One possibility of 
negotiating this narrow strait may lie in acknowledging the human agency through 
which the perpetuation of culture takes place, in line with Bleiker‟s ambition of 
restoring agency in discourse analysis (2000). Although reintroducing the focus on 
agency does not „disable‟ the power of structures – the established patterns of 
cultural praxis – it does emphasise the dependence of these structures on the 
reproduction through human agents, whose (at least partial) awareness of 
participation in this reproduction affects its terms in multiple and complex ways. 
The following is, consequently, an exploration of the dynamics of cultural meaning-
making as seen from a particular position within culture, which also tries to keep 
sight of other cultural agents‟ creative (and competing) input. The label given to the 
offered account of culture – embedded cultural enquiry – is intended to convey both 
the situatedness of this exploration within, and its influence upon, its own material. 
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3. Theoretical Framework: Embedded cultural enquiry 
 
 
„To know about the giggle loop is to become part of the giggle 
loop!‟ 
 
– Coupling, episode 3, series 1, BBC 
 
 
Introduction 
As follows from the discussion of culture in the previous chapter, to devise a 
concise, parsimonious and all-encompassing theoretical framework for the analysis 
of culture in the context of IR and politics is not only extremely difficult, but also 
counterproductive (cf. Chabal and Daloz 2006). If anything, a deeper look into the 
issues and processes associated with culture brings out discontinuities, „ruptures‟ 
and incongruities in our understanding of not only how culture, but the related 
fields, such as the political, operates. Therefore, the value of a theoretical framework 
for cultural analysis of peacebuilding, I would argue, would be not in presenting a 
consistent and coherent picture of culture as it features or should feature in 
connection with peacebuilding, but in its ability to expose these points of rupture 
(see Foucault 2002a) and contradiction in our understanding of culture and its 
workings, and in exploring their implications for conflict and peacebuilding. In 
doing so, this chapter presents a conceptualisation of culture that is both critical in 
highlighting the problematic sides of the concept, and constructive in outlining the 
analytical and functional versatility of „culture‟ (including its problematic aspects). 
The intention is, however, not to gloss over the imperfections of culture in an 
attempt to construct a grand methodological narrative, but rather to draw attention to 
the mechanisms of operation of the „seductive‟ attraction of this concept, which can 
be helpful in unravelling the idealised visions of culture (e.g. EC 2007) and keep in 
check the scope of conclusions and regularities established in this work. 
 
Consequently, the framework offered here does not aim to provide a fail-safe 
inventory of different aspects to consider with regard to culture and its treatment in 
peacebuilding (in general and with regard to individual case studies), as is the 
general trend in policy documents (e.g. EC s.a.; UNDP 2004a), but rather to 
illuminate the complexity of the issue of culture as a starting point for an inductive 
analysis. Nor does the presented consideration of culture offer salvation from the 
„imperfections‟ of peacebuilding in the sense of resolving its dilemmas; rather, the 
ambition is to elucidate the dilemmas and responsibility involved in any event of 
intervention. Hence the labelling of the presented analytical approach as „embedded 
cultural enquiry,‟ since the analysis will always be carried out from a perspective 
that is already unavoidably cultural, stymieing any ambition of reaching a 
„culturally-objective‟ standpoint. Of course, the opinions regarding the degree of 
cultural „determinism‟ this entails vary from the recognition of deep-seated, 
unaccountable influences which „filter‟ one‟s perception of reality (cf. Chabal and 
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Daloz 2006: 71; Kapoor 2008: 21) to the view of cultural conditioning as 
„avoidable‟ (Fetherston and Nordstrom 1995). While resolving this debate is beyond 
the means or objectives of this study, it is helpful in drawing attention to the role 
that cultural self-awareness and reflexivity play in establishing the parameters of 
„the cultural‟ in research and analysis. Despite its potential for bringing out patterns 
and regularities of broader relevance (and notwithstanding the phenomenological 
assumptions of „publicness‟ of mental processes and operations), a cultural enquiry 
is bound to remain an essentially individual enterprise, borne of questioning one‟s 
assumptions and the environment that is impossible to uniformalise in a single 
„usable methodology.‟ Yet to deny its utility on these grounds would be tantamount 
to questioning the very possibility of situated knowledge – which, arguably, is the 
only kind available to us (cf. George 1994; Toulmin 1992, 2001). 
Premises and limitations of embedded cultural enquiry 
It is tempting to follow Chabal and Daloz in their inductive approach to culture and 
concentrate on „the interpretation of meaning‟ – of what „makes sense‟ in a given 
context (2006: 30, 60; cf. Geertz 1973). However, there are certain limitations as to 
what could be achieved with this approach. „Interpretation‟ is an honest term to use 
in that it hints at the individual, „subjective‟ nature of conclusions reached in the 
course of an inductive enquiry (which is not in itself a drawback, according to some 
recent thinking on methodology in IR and social sciences (e.g. Bleiker 2001; 
Sylvester 2001; Tickner 2005; cf. Denzin and Lincoln 2000). What it does not 
convey to the full extent, however, is the unfinished, fluid, and unfixed character of 
meanings themselves (cf. Douglas 2004: 88), which acquire a more stable form not 
least through the process of interpretation (cf. Bauman 1978: 180-95). Neither does 
it make clear that this process of arrival at fixed meanings (as well as its outcome) is 
a political phenomenon as much as it is a semiotic process: the assertion of 
meanings as „real,‟ „solid,‟ and „complete‟ is part of their discursive representation 
(cf. Hansen 2007). Therefore, it seems more appropriate to focus on the processes 
through which meanings are produced – i.e. not (just) the interpretation but 
generation, constitution of meanings – as well as contested. As will be shown 
below, this process may be seen as constitutive of many forms and effects of the 
„operation‟ of culture, and this common „architectonic moment‟ (Bakhtin 
1993[1986], 1994b: 51) unites what may otherwise appear as „disjoint‟ areas of 
relevance to cultural analysis. The advantage of this perspective is also in that it 
allows for illuminating culture‟s inherent relations with power and the political, 
without (as it often happens) eclipsing the relevance of the concept of culture in the 
process. 
 
Needless to say, in exploring these avenues I am not treading an entirely virgin 
terrain. The focus on the production of meaning, naturally, demands engaging with 
works of semioticians that have addressed this aspect in conjunction with an interest 
in culture (such as Lotman, his Tartu-Moscow contemporaries and subsequent 
commentators (e.g. Schönle 2006)), as well as thinkers that have sought to 
demonstrate the application of semiotic and literary insights in the realms of the 
social and political (such as Laclau (e.g. 2000) and many other figures associated 
with the French post-structuralism). In particular, I draw on Lotman‟s notion of 
tropological meaning-generation (1990) coupled with Laclau‟s tropological 
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movement and hegemonic closure (2000; cf. Selg and Ventsel 2008). Among other 
key inspirations, Bauman‟s analysis of „culture as praxis‟ (1999) opened up the 
possibility of approaching culture with a focus on the production of meaning, and 
his analysis of cultural conditioning of human lived realities served as an avenue for 
developing the culture-power nexus below, and for linking the meaning-generation 
problematic to disparate anthropological insights into the cultural ordering of 
violence (such as Bowman 2001).  
 
Apart from bringing together very diverse sources of insight into an interdisciplinary 
framework for analysis, the present work can claim other innovations. That 
individual meanings are mutable and unstable, and contingent upon their 
differentiation from other meanings, is scarcely a novel idea (e.g. de Saussure 1931; 
Barth 1969; Todorov 1998), and the attention of IR scholars has logically been 
focused on the processes by which they acquire stability (such as discursive 
articulation) (e.g. Campbell 1992; Bhabha 1994; Hansen 2006). The larger 
frameworks in which meanings are produced and articulated – such as „language‟ or 
„culture‟ – have also received coverage, but mainly in the light of their stabilising 
effects on meanings (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Bauman 1999)). What is less 
apparent (and what the following discussion will seek to illuminate) is that such 
broader „frameworks of meanings‟ themselves (most topically, culture) can partake 
of the instability usually associated with individual meanings, and are also subject to 
all the vagaries of meaning-making. This is particularly relevant in view of the 
application of the developed framework to the analysis of conflict, which is often 
claimed to have a destabilising effect on culture (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, such 
„isomorphous‟ involvement in meaning-generation (cf. Lotman 1990) collapses the 
neat separation into the „object-language‟ of culture and meta-language of cultural 
theory or critique (which greatly contributes to the notoriety of culture as an 
„inconvenient‟ object for scholarly study (cf. Wuthnow et al. 1984)). As noted by 
Geertz, the attempts to „make sense‟ of their own culture occupy the same discursive 
plane as the „stuff‟ of culture conveyed by the informants, which makes the 
boundary between culture as the „mode of representation and [its] substantive 
content‟ rather ephemeral (1973: 15-6). In this chapter I try to demonstrate that the 
processes and effects of meaning-generation not only occur at every „order of 
discourse‟ (Gunnell 1998) but also account for the noted fusion between them (cf. 
Pechey 1989).  
 
It may appear that a treatment of culture based on the examination of processes and 
effects of meaning-generation constitutes yet another example of „evasion tactics‟ 
described in the Introduction, whereby discussion of culture is reduced to some 
easier definable aspect (e.g. identity) or to a select set of terms that on the face of it 
may even appear tangential to culture. Such a charge would not be totally 
unfounded. However, while the focus on meaning-generation is not the only one 
possible, or most direct, way of approaching a discussion of culture, it is not 
altogether arbitrary, since references to „meanings‟ feature in most definitions of 
culture (see e.g. Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952: 81-90). Yet, meaning-generation can 
(as shown by generations of linguists and semioticians) also be discussed without 
reference to culture (e.g. as a „technical‟ aspect of language). In this sense, the focus 
on meaning-generation offers flexible terms of engagement with the problematic of 
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culture, since it can be placed – heuristically – both within and outside what is 
considered „culture,‟ which provides a useful angle from which to examine the 
problematic of delimitation of culture as such. With respect to the topic of culture, 
such flexibility, coupled with full awareness of the „embedded‟ position of the 
researcher, appears more fruitful than (unattainable) methodological rigour.  
 
In a practical sense, the offered framework has both an advantage and a 
disadvantage with respect to its possible applications. Advantage, because it does 
not in any way restrict the relevant material for analysis, and does not involve its 
implicit pre-selection in the way that general classificatory frameworks do (such as 
Douglas‟ grid-group theory (1970, 2004)). Its disadvantage consists in that the open-
endedness coded into any inductive approach may appear intimidating to less 
critically inclined researchers, and certainly to practitioners attempting „schematic‟ 
conflict analyses with a cultural „twist.‟ However, one of the contentions behind the 
present approach is that cultural analysis of conflict and peacebuilding is fruitless (if 
not counterproductive) if conducted within the confines of pre-conceived categories 
which severely limit what is perceived as the relevant material for study (cf. Chabal 
and Daloz 2006), and that engagement with culture cannot be successfully 
accommodated within the dominant „project-management‟ approach to 
peacebuilding (MacGinty 2003) with its language of „objectives‟ and „milestones‟ 
and proliferation of guidelines, checklists and inventories (e.g. EC s.a.; UNDP 
2004a). An important ambition of this thesis is to provide a framework that would 
not in itself fix the terms of discussion about culture, but would offer tools for 
exposing the means used to „stabilise‟ the debate in accord with one or another set of 
interests.  
Aspects of cultural analysis (of conflict and peacebuilding) 
The aspects of culture formulated below (with a heuristic purpose in mind, rather 
than following „natural‟ analytical distinctions) is an attempt to unpack the logic of 
meaning-generation and world-making, which some analysts (e.g. Bauman 1999; 
Lotman 1990; cf. Demerath 2002) view as the „prime‟ cultural activity. The first 
aspect refers to the isolation and production of particular meanings: „culture as 
signification.‟ The second aspect covers the political dimension of this (i.e. 
emphasising and de-emphasising possibilities, selecting meanings as opposed to de-
selecting and de-legitimising other possibilities of meaning): „culture as politics.‟ 
The third aspect is that of a dynamic relation of the above to the processes and 
effects of change (setting the scene for a discussion of problems such as how to 
conceptualise and evaluate cultural change, the impact of cross-cultural 
communication, amalgamation etc.) and to the expressive dimension of culture: 
„culture as rhetoric.2‟ In a sense, this proposed division into „culture as‟3 is 
                                                 
2
 „Rhetoric‟ here should not be understood narrowly as a reference to the toolkit of literary 
„embellishment,‟ but as a general „tropological‟ property of language and text explored in post-
structuralist and semiotic works (Lotman 1990; Laclau 2000, 2006; Jakobson 1971) that refer to the 
impossibility of „pure‟ meanings and their unproblematic communication, and uncover instead the 
inherent „contagiousness‟ of meanings borne out of tension and „violence‟ of their production. 
3
 Although the tripartite „culture as …‟ classification is reminiscent of Bauman‟s (1999), it does not 
explicitly seek to replicate or enhance it, and focuses mainly on issues raised by Bauman‟s third 
perspective on culture „as praxis‟. 
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somewhat artificial, since each of the above aspects – meaning-making, power, and 
rhetorical „contagiousness‟ – is a necessary prerequisite for the possibility of any of 
the others, so the justification for this sub-division is only in the degree of emphasis. 
Neither does this division strictly follow the areas of application. Contrary to the 
possible initial perception, the first aspect does not strictly refer to the micro-level of 
semiotics: meanings are created, and re-negotiated in daily life, as well as in high 
(and bureaucratic) politics, through a variety of means and avenues, from everyday 
practices and transactions to the separate and „elevated‟ spheres of existence (art, 
philosophy, science, etc.). Similarly, the two other aspects affect both the production 
of micro-level, „linguistic‟ meanings and the social-level discourses and practices. 
The remainder of this section will briefly introduce the issues which fall under the 
outlined three aspects of cultural analysis, while the more in-depth consideration of 
each of these in turn will follow in the subsequent sections of the chapter. 
(i) ‘Culture as signification’ 
This aspect refers to the process of constitution of meaning through selection of 
particular meanings from the wider array of possible meanings and their 
naturalisation as part of „incontestable‟ social reality. Such ‘ordering’ of reality, to 
use Bauman‟s term (1999), occurs on many levels, from the (micro-level) (re-
)production of meanings that make up the „stuff‟ of culture, to the delineation of 
„culture‟ in general (as well as particular „cultures‟) at the macro-pole of this 
continuum. The construction and production of identity – individual and collective – 
also fall under this category. Another way of referring to this aspect of culture would 
be through the problem of definition and delineation, taken broadly. While some 
aspects of this problem, concerning the difficulties of defining the concept of 
culture, have been outlined above, other problematic aspects include difficulties of 
grasping the limitations arising from being immersed in a particular culture, as well 
as the general mechanism of boundary-drawing which, as many theorists claim, is 
one of the fundamental principles of operation of „culture‟ (e.g. Lotman 1992b; 
Bauman 1999). Since the delimitation serves to constitute the „self‟ vis-à-vis 
„other(s),‟ the issue of transgression of the borders of identity and alterity at many 
levels, including inter-cultural communication and understanding, also needs 
considering here, although it is more fully explored in relation to the third, 
„rhetorical‟ aspect of cultural meaning-generation. The ordering/reality-making 
implications of casting the outlined problematic in terms of culture also form the 
subject of discussion in this section, since the isolation of a specifically „cultural‟ 
domain and its delimitation constitute a case of meaning-generation. Although many 
of the noted issues can – and have been – addressed from the perspective of 
discourse analysis (e.g. George 1994; Said 1978; Kapoor 2008), references to 
discourse often have the effect of subsuming the array of underlying significational 
dynamics, rather than explicating them. For this reason, I largely leave „discourse‟ 
out of the conceptual apparatus used here, other than in references to textual 
practices, as in „discourses of liberal peacebuilding.‟  
 
With regard to conflict and peacebuilding, the relevance of the processes and effects 
of meaning-generation is manifold. Although the processes of meaning-generation 
underlie even the traditional terms of discussion of conflict and peace, they are 
seldom explicated (the symbolic-interactionist treatment of conflict and negotiation 
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being one of the rare exceptions (see Väyrynen 2001)). Yet, the very possibility of 
conflict rests on a curious mixture of agreement and disagreement over certain 
meanings and on the expansion and alteration of habitual channels for their 
expression and communication. Peacebuilding, in turn, can be seen not only as a 
vehicle for communicating specific meanings and interpretations, but also as a wider 
framework for their legitimation and stabilisation (and, as such, a culture with the 
accompanying traits and effects of reality-making). Through the inclusion (and 
exclusion) of practices, actors, concepts and ideas in the domain of „liberal peace,‟ 
peacebuilding participates in the „ordering of reality,‟ i.e. enabling some and 
disabling other terms of organising human affairs and articulating their ends. This 
„ordering‟ has very real disciplinary connotations (in the Foucauldian sense), in 
terms of de/legitimising particular types of behaviour, instilling particular sets of 
values (while condemning others), and putting in place the mechanisms enabling 
surveillance and compliance with the established „rules‟ (Kapoor 2008: 19-20, 25-8; 
DfID 2000b: 53).  
 
Meaning-generation offers an interesting vantage point for examining the 
conceptualisations of peacebuilding (i.e. the ends and means of pursuing the liberal 
peace) from „within‟ and „without‟ the dominant discourse, which can help grasp not 
only how particular terms of discussing conflict and peace are enabled or disabled, 
but also how that shapes the construction of liberal actors and the production of 
identities „compatible‟ with liberal peace (e.g. through delegitimising „malignant 
nationalisms‟ (see Luoma-Aho 2002)). Liberal peacebuilding‟s „mute‟ attitude 
towards culture (see Chapter 4), stemming from a self-image of a „technical‟ fix 
which is outside and beyond culture, also presents an interesting issue for 
consideration in connection with meaning-generation: Quite apart from the 
blindness towards its own „cultural‟ characteristics, what liberal peacebuilding 
defines as pertaining to „local culture‟ and what it places outside it can say a great 
deal about liberal peacebuilding itself, from beliefs regarding the possibility (and 
plausibility) of influencing culture to culture‟s place on the conceptual horizon of 
liberal mentality. The reverse relationship (i.e. local reception of liberal 
peacebuilding and understanding of what it tries to achieve) is, of course, also highly 
relevant, as are ideas that local actors may have about the possibility of influencing 
the terms of created peace and interacting with peacebuilding actors. The theoretical 
grounds for analysing these aspects of liberal peacebuilding will be set out in this 
chapter, and applied to the relationship between the liberal peace and „local culture,‟ 
and explicating the „culture‟ of liberal peace itself, in the two chapters to follow 
(respectively, 5 and 4). 
(ii) ‘Culture as politics’ 
Not wholly distinct from the above, this section introduces an explicit emphasis on 
the power dimension of culture and (cultural) constitution of the political, through a 
focus on the selection and naturalisation of meanings and the related dynamics of 
totalisation and fragmentation (observable both on the conceptual plane – as 
separation or fusion of conceptual categories and spaces – and empirically, in the 
dynamics of commonality and societal boundary-drawing). A focus on the power 
dimension of culture highlights the meaning-generation and societal dynamics as 
two interrelated aspects of the cultural „production‟ of reality, albeit taking place at 
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analytically distinct levels (earlier heuristically referred to as „micro-‟ and „macro-
level‟ meaning-production).  
 
The aim of this discussion is to explicate the connections between culture and power 
– the most contentious issue not just with regard to peacebuilding but for IR 
generally. In other words, the idea is to relate the power dimension not just to the 
constitution of knowledge (in the stride of Foucault (1965, 2002a) and Lyotard 
(1984)), but to the very constitution of meaning, thus emphasising the inevitably 
„political‟ nature of culture. Power is involved in – and manifested through – the 
ambivalent nature of cultural ordering of reality, in which world-making is never far 
from world-unmaking, and the opening of some cultural possibilities is coterminous 
with the foreclosing of others. The cultural constitution of the „political‟ as a realm 
„legitimately‟ concerned with power issues in society also forms an important focus 
in this section, as do its particular outcomes (like the role of the „invisible‟ realm in 
African politics (Ellis 1999; Chabal and Daloz 2006)). The redrawing of the 
boundaries of the political by the liberal peace discourse – evident in de-politicising 
many aspects of peacebuilding which are presented as technical rather than political 
issues (cf. Duffield 2001: 50) – also merits attention in this connection. 
 
Needless to say, the issue of what kinds of worlds are created and put out of 
existence by liberal peacebuilding has a great empirical relevance. Liberal 
peacebuilding (as perhaps any approaches to conflict since the development of 
second-generation problem-solving approaches) is often accused of being somewhat 
insensitive to the issue of power: it ignores power asymmetries on the ground, and 
fails to factor them into assessing the impact of interventions (although attempts are 
being made to raise awareness of, if not rectify, this (UN PBC 2007)). Given that 
peacebuilding is also very similarly „indisposed‟ towards culture (i.e. blind to its 
own „culture‟ as well as its impact on cultures with which it interacts), a focus on the 
relationship between culture and power may assist in investigating the reasons for 
such attitudes (or at least their similarity). The power effects of liberal  
peacebuilding also refer to the spectrum of ideas about the permissible forms and 
limits of the „political,‟ and their clashes with local understandings of power (as well 
as among the latter, as manifested, for instance, in a double-handed treatment of the 
involvement of diviners and their „invisible‟ powers in state politics in Sierra Leone, 
which, Shaw claims (2002: 260), has arisen in response to a juxtaposition of 
„backward‟ and „enlightened‟ understandings of politics not least due to the decades 
of Western involvement). On a practical level, the question also refers to the cultural 
consequences (i.e. world-(re-)making involved) of using different kinds of power in 
the interventions. The adverse effects of the military habitus on peace processes is a 
case in point (Fetherston and Nordstrom 1995; Edkins 2003: 204; Echavarria 2007), 
and so is the employment of meaning-generation in the bureaucratic process of state-
building – through the creation of new „vocabularies‟ and introduction of new 
concepts (e.g. accountability, human rights, and the entire language of project-
management in both state and non-state sphere) which engender their own societal 
and power dynamics (e.g. Helander 2005; Kapoor 2008: 27-8). The coupling of 
seemingly „neutral‟ objectives of conflict resolution and reconciliation with 
promoting particular forms of political institutions and interests is also undoubtedly 
an issue worth looking into from the perspective of power dimension of culture; 
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Shaw‟s (2005) analysis of state-building connotations of Sierra Leone‟s TRC is a 
powerful example in this regard. 
(iii) ‘Culture as rhetoric’ 
The section on „culture as rhetoric‟ focuses on the dynamics of encounters and 
exchanges, enabled by what can be referred to as the generally (and inescapably) 
tropological character of meanings. Tropes, the subject matter of rhetoric, have been 
shown in the late-twentieth century literary, semiotic and anthropological studies to 
constitute much more than accessory „embellishments‟ of verbal expression. In fact, 
they have come to be viewed as the necessary prerequisite of expression, both verbal 
and beyond, and instrumental in the generation of any meaning (see e.g. Lotman 
1990: 36-7; Laclau 2000: 232-5; de Man 1996; Clifford 1986b; Pratt 1986).
4
 
Operating through displacement, allusion, substitution and so on, tropes constitute „a 
semantic transposition from a sign in praesentia to a sign in absentia‟ (Schofer and 
Rice 1977, quoted in Lotman 1990: 40), and pinpoint the dynamic aspect of culture 
and the fluid character of meanings. In Lotman‟s terms, tropes emerge at the points 
of „illegitimate‟ rapprochement between (minimally) two „mutually untranslatable 
languages‟ (understood broadly as different types of coding or organisation) which 
are both necessarily present in any situation of signification (Lotman 1990: 2; 36-7; 
Viktorova 2003). Tropes, thus, are the „indissoluble‟ traces of such illegitimate 
translations as well as their means (Lotman 1990: 2). For Laclau, tropes serve as a 
prerequisite of signification as such, through, paradoxically, enabling „closures‟ of 
the essentially differential structure of any discourse (2000, 2006: 114; cf. Selg and 
Ventsel 2008).  
 
This section employs the notions associated with such tropological „anomalies‟ for 
illuminating the situations of unlikely encounters that liberal peacebuilding and 
conflict routinely bring about, but also for explicating the tacit „self-explanatory‟ 
connections between the overarching objective of building „peace‟ and the particular 
institutional formats in which it is framed (see Chapter 5). The notion of rhetoric – 
both as it is employed here, and in the more traditional sense of the expressive 
apparatus of language – can also illuminate the processes of meaning-generation 
unfolding in the tension between the often contradictory simultaneous perceptions of 
the „other.‟ Examples include Bhabha‟s analysis of the „colonial stereotype,‟ which 
is „split‟ in its „enunciation‟ of the qualities of the colonial subject, coupling simple-
mindedness with skilful lying, innocence with rampant sexuality, dependability with 
treachery, and so on (1994: 33, 82; Kapoor 2008: 7). But such rhetorical „double 
inscription‟ (Bhabha 1994: 108) can also be observed in the tension between the 
condemnation of the local culture as a source of conflict (CEDAW 1979; Merry 
2003; Kapoor 2008: 35) and idealisation of the „indigenous‟ peace-making 
(MacGinty 2008; Richmond 2007a), as well as between the ameliorative ambitions 
and hegemonic power practices of the liberal peace itself. As well as enabling the 
generation of meaning, tropological connections also offer insight into its inherent 
instability (cf. Bhabha 1994; Kapoor 2008: 7-8). 
                                                 
4
 James Clifford writes of a „“revival” of rhetoric by a diverse  group of literary and cultural theorists 
(Roland Barthes, Kenneth Burke, Gerard Genette, Michel de Certeau, Hayden White, Paul de Man, 
and Michel Bonjour among them) …‟ (1986b: 100). 
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Inspired by a „rhetorical‟ perspective on encounters such as those between the local 
culture and conflict; conflicts and their international environment; between the 
„local‟ attempts at pacification and liberal peacebuilding; and so on, this section also 
looks at the issues of cultural continuity, dynamism and change, and relates them to 
the problematic of violent conflict and peacebuilding. One lens through which 
cultural change and continuity can be conceptualised is Lotman‟s „culture and 
explosion‟ paradigm (1992a) which emphasises the co-existence of multiple cultural 
„possibles‟ and delves into the questions of what triggers actualisation of one or 
another latent cultural „template‟ (cf. Swidler 1986), and whether cultural 
development advances by means of gradual and imperceptible change, or sudden 
„explosive‟ innovation. Other aspects enabled by a focus on the tropological 
constitution of meaning include approaching the discourse of liberal peacebuilding 
as a particular genre and exploring its constitutive principles and horizons of the 
possible (a theme that resonates with the second, power-related aspect of this 
framework) (cf. Bourdieu 1990: 64). 
 
All in all, issues considered here are among the thorniest problems plaguing both 
cultural analysis of conflict and the discourse and practice of peacebuilding. Liberal 
peacebuilding seems to have immense trouble with conceptualising the change its 
activities effect in local cultures, as well as the changes introduced by violent 
conflict (see Chapter 2). It can also be argued that the liberal peacebuilding 
paradigm experiences difficulties with picturing the path of cultural change more 
generally, as can be gleaned from the dominant ideas of development. These do not 
leave much space for culture, betraying as they do an underlying belief in a linear 
character of development, a sort of „end of history‟ thinking exemplified in the 
uniform ends of development and peacebuilding (cf. Echavarria 2007). The effective 
„othering‟ of violence in liberal peacebuilding (cf. Richards 2005a; Nordstrom 1994) 
also contributes to the silencing of its problematic relationship with culture in the 
discourse of liberal peace (Nordstrom 2004). While on the one hand, this means that 
„cultures of violence‟ remain unaddressed in peacebuilding operations, on the other, 
the poor understanding of constitutive relations between culture and violence may 
lead to wholesale condemnation of entire cultures once these links are suspected, 
which risks disabling their reverse potential – the cultural mechanisms of control 
over violence which could be instrumental for conflict transformation (or „cultures 
of peace‟ (cf. Boulding 2004)). Relatedly, the recognition that cultural change is 
„happening anyway,‟ regardless of the impact of liberal peacebuilding (e.g. Large 
2007), begs a reconsideration of the impact of violent conflict on the pace and 
direction of such change and the question of its normative assessment. While the 
power dimension evident in this, once more, refers back to the section (ii), the 
definition of what constitutes the state of war or peace (cf. Zulaika and Douglass 
1996) also invokes the definitional issues covered in section (i). Even aside from the 
liberal peacebuilding discourse, the relationship between culture and conflict (and 
violence) offers rich „tropological‟ substrate for examination – as does culture-
specific discussion of the possibilities of conflict resolution. 
 
The question of what is achieved by elucidating a common „cultural‟ dimension of 
the diverse issues discussed in this chapter is an important one, and will be 
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instrumental in assessing the possible impact of any discourse on culture in 
connection with peacebuilding. Among the benefits, one can suggest bringing out 
the particular dynamics or conceptual linkages inherent in culture, which allow the 
actors to grasp the common underpinnings of issues encountered in conflict and 
post-conflict peacebuilding. But therein lie also the dangers of naturalising these 
linkages; it is important, therefore, to preserve a sense of incomplete nature of this 
theorising. On the other hand, the question of what is lost by not positioning these 
various issues within a common context of „cultural‟ vocabulary also needs looking 
into. This question will inform the following discussion and direct the investigation 
in the empirical chapters (4 and 5). 
(i) Culture as signification 
Although signification has traditionally been a province of semiotics
5
 and 
linguistics, „meaning-making‟ has also been branded as the prime cultural activity 
(Demerath 2002; Chabal and Daloz 2006; cf. Bauman 1999). In some conceptions of 
culture, even the function of communication in a broad sense is attributed to culture 
rather than to language, which is presented as but one of the domains in which 
cultural „ordering‟ of reality takes place:  
 
we speak of communication whenever there are some limits imposed on what is possible or 
what can happen and what the probability of its occurrence is. We speak of communication 
whenever a set of events is ordered, which means to some extent predictable. If we now go 
from the sociological perspective to structural linguistics and not the other way round, we 
look at the totality of human activity as an endeavour to order, to organize, to make 
predictable and manageable the living space of human beings, and the language discloses 
itself to us as one of the devices developed to serve this over-all aim: a device cut to the 
measure of communication in the narrower sense. Instead of all the culture being a set of 
particularizations of the communicative function embodied in language, the language turns 
into one of the many instruments of the generalized effort of ordering, laboured on by the 
culture as a whole. (Bauman 1999: 74-5) 
 
A certain blurring of boundaries between semiotics and culture studies is also 
evident in the frequent mutual „contraband‟ of respective subject-matters: for 
instance, in Lotman‟s works, discussions pertaining to culture and the genesis of 
meaning are frequently employed for mutual illumination of these issues (e.g. 1990), 
while Geertz uses semiotic categories as a cornerstone in his Interpretation of 
Cultures (1973). Such earlier „transgressions‟ have paved the way for the ones 
attempted in the current framework.  
 
In most post-structuralist accounts,
6
 the issue of signification involves more than 
establishing the principles and mechanisms of correspondence between the signifiers 
                                                 
5
 Here denoting all branches of the preoccupation with „sign systems,‟ including de Saussure‟s 
semiology (1931), Peirce‟s semiotics (1931-58) and their contemporary applications and variations. 
6
 Although semiotic post-structuralism is only one of the existing semiotic schools (grown out of de 
Saussure‟s semiology), its chief competitor – the „pragmatist‟ school based on the works of Charles 
Sanders Peirce – employs similar notions regarding the genesis of meaning by way of irreducible 
non-coincidence between the signifier and signified (Peirce 1931-58; cf. Holquist 1990: 35-6), thus 
also opening up possibilities for interpreting the constitution of meaning in a tropological vein. Post-
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(readily observable as elements of a language) and signified (the ideational plane of 
meaning). While some early „provocative‟ notions, such as de Saussure‟s claim 
regarding the arbitrariness of connections between elements of these two planes, 
were duly honoured by post-structuralists (e.g. Laclau 2000: 234), other dominant 
structuralist ideas, such as the presumption of neat structural arrangement of 
languages into an „alphabet‟ (constituent elements of language) and „grammar‟ (a 
system of rules governing their use) which analytically precede, and „preside‟ over, 
any actual utterances in that language, came under persistent critique (e.g. Derrida 
1976, 1978; Barthes 1982). The primacy of the „language‟ as an abstract 
construction of an all-encompassing system became questioned, and towards late 
1960s-early 1970s the attention shifted to the actual instances, conditions, and 
effects of its use. This focus on „speech‟ (and „writing‟) yielded realisation that the 
meanings invoked by such instances of language use, far from being 
uncontroversially conveyed by (or „accessed‟ through) the plane of signifiers, have 
to be re-negotiated and re-established with each use.  
 
This realisation serves not to disclaim the empirical existence of recurring meanings 
and their means of expression, but rather to question any presumed stability of 
meanings, or the neutrality of signifiers in relation to the conveyed meanings. One 
reason for this lies in the intertextual „residue‟ that the words acquire from their 
earlier uses, and thus in every utterance the speaker has to contend with what 
Bakhtin aptly termed „the word of another‟ (‘chuzhoe slovo’) (Bakhtin 1984; cf. 
Bauman 1978: 170; cf. Lotman 1990: 18-9; Todorov 1998: 10). But the tension of 
negotiating the intended meanings amidst the traces of previous uses is not the only 
issue making the „identification‟ of meanings problematic. An equally tenuous 
problem is connected with the presumption of „meaningfulness‟ as such, since the 
isolation of certain meanings from the infinite (and indiscrete) continuum of 
potential ones cannot proceed without a simultaneous „de-selection‟ of others (cf. 
Holquist 1990: 47-48; Todorov 1998: 82; Kapoor 2008: 21). The resulting (partial) 
repertoire of meanings, nevertheless, assumes the connotations of completeness (cf. 
Doty 1998: 145; Kramsch 2003); thus, substitution and representation play an active 
part already in the constitution of language and its meaningful entities, which 
alludes to the essentially tropological nature of any meaning. Given the widespread 
acceptance among the post-structuralist thinkers of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of 
linguistic relativity – implying that the existing repertoire of meanings defines our 
perception of the world and not vice versa (Sapir 1983; Whorf 1956; Žižek 1989) – 
it is easy to see how the creation of reality through the naming of its constituent 
parts and processes carries the connotations of power (e.g. Laclau 2006; Selg and 
Ventsel 2008). 
‘Ordering’ and meaning-generation 
Analytically, the organisation and generation of meaning can be understood in terms 
of „ordering‟ that, in Bauman‟s view, constitutes the primary function of culture 
(1999: 75, 96). This generic function of ordering human lives arises in response to 
the „under-determined‟ character of the human condition (Bauman 1999: xii-xiii): 
                                                                                                                                         
structuralism has been employed here as a reference point since it shares the focus on signification 
and rhetoric with another central issue of this framework – the problematic of power. 
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Although the natural „determinants‟ specify the means and purposes of human 
activity to some extent, particular ways of going about things are largely left to 
human choice. The „under-determined‟ character of life thus opens „up a space for 
freedom and self-assertion,‟ but – simultaneously – allows „the use of that very 
freedom to limit its scope,‟ since, although ultimately arbitrary, past choices affect 
future preferences and serve to trim the „potentially infinite choices‟ down to „a 
finite, comprehensible and manageable pattern‟ (Bauman 1999: xii-xiii). Although 
the choices made in the conditions of under-determinacy and the resulting patterns 
of practice are seldom immutable or invariable, particular ways of going about 
things become associated with achieving the vital ends of human activity and thus 
invested with value (and meaningfulness) of their own – order „being synonymous 
with the intelligible and meaningful‟ (Bauman 1999: 96; cf. Demerath 2002). This 
process reduces unpredictability and increases the orderliness of human lives 
(Bauman 1999: xiv; cf. Katzenstein 1997: 49), with production of cultural practices 
mirroring, and sometimes converging with, the selection and establishment of 
meanings through what is traditionally labelled „signification.‟ Culture, thus, „fills 
in‟ and organises the space created by the arbitrariness of the human condition, 
allowing us to „make sense‟ of our world(s) (cf. Demerath 2002), so that „all human 
activity is conceived, imagined, and carried out in and amidst symbolic units and 
relations‟ (Friedrich 1989: 298, quoted in Donnan and Wilson 1999: 155). Thus, 
Weber‟s famous insight that „man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he 
himself has spun‟ (quoted in Geertz 1973: 5) has become a starting point for 
approaching culture as „the structures of meaning through which men give shape to 
their experience‟ (Geertz 1973: 312; cf. Chabal and Daloz 2006: 25).  
 
Bauman is not unique in attributing the genesis of culture to the under-determined 
character of human lives. Peter Berger, likewise, maintains that although the human 
species have natural drives, the manner for their realisation is unspecified and 
undirected, owing to the underdeveloped instinctual apparatus which leaves humans 
inherently vulnerable (see Wuthnow et al. 1984: 23-4). Culture thus comes to the aid 
of nature by introducing man-made means and procedures to compensate for the 
instinctual uncertainties of the „functionally incomplete … human nervous system‟ 
(Geertz 2001: 205). The understanding of culture as accumulated wisdom of 
adaptation to given ecological niches, communicated and passed on to future 
generations, is echoed by Triandis (1994) and Lal (1999; cf. Cohen 1998: 117). In 
some instances, the noted freedom of choice offered by culture (Bauman 1999: xii) 
leads to its conceptual juxtaposition with the natural determinants, as well as to a 
symbolic re-appropriation of nature through the ascription of cultural meanings to 
„natural‟ objects and drives (Lotman 1990). Although Bauman‟s (1999) account of 
culture stresses its origins (demonstrating how it came to „fill‟ the gap left by under-
determinacy), his portrayal of the workings of culture is not limited to its initial 
„creation.‟ The genesis of culture is best understood synchronically, as a continuous 
and on-going (re-)„production of culture as being opposed to ambiguity‟ (Demerath 
2002: 220): a „pre-culture‟ stage in the human development is possibly an even 
greater abstraction than „the state of nature‟ in political philosophy.  
 
Given that the very possibility of meaning depends on the irreducible non-
coincidence between the signifier and signified (i.e. to mean anything, a sign must 
65 
 
point beyond its immediate presence), signification reduces things and phenomena 
to one aspect which takes on the representational functions for the whole (Holquist 
1990: 47-8; Todorov 1998: 82). The „inadequacy‟ of representation (which is only 
made possible by a degree of distortion (cf. Doty 1998: 144-5)) thus accompanies 
every instance of human knowledge of the world and self, from signification in the 
strict semiotic sense to the generation of particular visions of human reality. 
Demerath admits as much noting that all „three basic dimensions of cultural 
production through which we make our worlds meaningful‟ – articulation, 
typification and orientation of experience (2002: 208) – are „forms of manipulation‟ 
(ibid.: 214). Story-telling or coming to terms with one‟s experience, for instance, 
also employ this „technique‟ through isolating certain elements from the continuous 
flow of experience and re-connecting them with a view to a discovered „purpose‟ of 
one or another sequence of events (Black 1991: 161). The same mechanism is at 
work in the world of social relations, where it creates the inevitably partial 
descriptions of social reality which naturalise „one set of social relations at the 
expense of others‟ in the „acts of hegemonic representation‟ (Kramsch 2003: 213-4), 
successfully blinding one to the fact of their partiality (George 1994: 9-11; Häkli 
1996). In a similar vein, the particular cultural „choices‟ often come to be seen as 
equivalent, in function and importance, to the (universal) ends they help to achieve, 
standing in for those ends in the „shared construction of reality‟ (Cohen 1998: 117; 
cf. d‟Andrade 1984; Ross 1998: 156). Contrary to Chabal and Daloz‟s ambition of 
excluding values from the cultural study of politics on the grounds that they 
represent a secondary valorisation of the established cultural options (2006), 
„values‟ in this reading become very difficult to dissociate from „meanings,‟ since 
the axiological dimension is invoked by the partial nature of selecting a set of 
meanings and naturalising it as covering the entire spectrum of the meaningful and 
possible. 
 
Roland Barthes has noted that not all cultural conventions serve to signify (1969: 
41): some function rather in a speech act-like capacity of enunciating a certain state 
of affairs which thereby effectively comes into being (Bauman 1999: 71; cf. Austin 
1975). But even the signification „proper,‟ through producing a set of meanings and 
the means for their expression, has a similar performative effect: particular states of 
reality may be seen as being „called into existence‟ through evoking what is 
meaningful in their context (cf. George 1994). This is not necessarily to deny the 
existence of extra-linguistic reality, but to emphasise that „if men define situations as 
real, they are real in their consequences‟ (Thomas and Thomas 1928: 572, quoted in 
Massey 1998), and that the way in which real occurrences are interpreted defines 
how they are addressed by human agents (cf. Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 108; Selg 
and Ventsel 2008). 
 
All that has been said about the cultural construction of meaning is, of course, also 
applicable to the concept of culture and the sphere of meaningfulness it engenders, 
once culture itself becomes an object of analytical scrutiny. And since situations 
usually enable variable terms of discussion, the question of what is imported into a 
discussion if it is cast in a cultural „vocabulary‟ needs to be asked. What does a 
statement about culture introduce into a discussion of conflict and peacebuilding that 
is left untouched by the statements about, say, the economic or political? This is not 
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an idle question, since there is a perceptible trend of presenting culture as a concept 
best left alone in the context of conflict analysis (cf. Scott 2003); and the 
implications of doing so (as well as invoking culture) will be discussed below in 
relation to the power dimension of world-making (ii). Here, however, another 
mirror-effect (where the discussion of the workings of culture, in a tropological 
twist, is turned onto the analysis of culture as an analytical category and an element 
of discourse) needs considering – namely, the issue of definition. 
Definitional dynamics 
One of the greatest problems for the consideration of culture in the context of 
peacebuilding is definitional. It refers not only to the problems encountered on the 
path of defining culture as a concept (i.e. circumscribing what belongs to culture as 
opposed to that which does not), but also to the issue of identifying particular 
cultural entities and drawing boundaries between „different‟ cultures. To complicate 
matters further, the process of isolating things „cultural‟ from the rest largely mirrors 
the pattern of „primary‟ meaning-generation Bauman (1999) associates with culture 
(i.e. its production of the realm of the meaningful), and falls under Lotman‟s notion 
of „secondary‟ self-description of a semiotic system as a deliberate act of 
identification (e.g. 1990). While such deliberateness may be used to recognise the 
cases of „secondary‟ delimitation as opposed to „primary‟ production of meaningful 
entities, its concomitant naturalisation makes it as difficult to „undo‟ as the interests 
and values inherent in „primary‟ cultural meanings (cf. Brown 2005: 49). „Primary‟ 
and „secondary‟ signification, as will be shown on the example of defining 
culture(s), share many essential features which suggests certain isomorphism and 
isofunctionalism (Lotman 1990), and thus legitimately brings the issue of definition 
into the orbit of the meaning-generation problematic. One of the predominant trends 
of defining culture, based on its conceptualisation as „the organisation of meaning‟ 
(cf. Hudson 1997b), bears witness to this. 
 
Definitions of culture as a system of shared meanings (variations of this formulation 
notwithstanding) have consistently cropped up in the anthropological and other 
social science literature for over sixty years (see e.g. Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952; 
Kluckhohn 1957; Geertz 1973, 1983; d‟Andrade 1984; Verweij et al. 1998: 2; 
Cohen 1998: 117; Rubinstein 1998: 190; Brumann 1999; Demerath 2002: 208), to 
refer to the ability of culture both to be learned and communicated and to serve as a 
common framework that makes communication possible. This is also in line with 
Wittgensteinian concept of „language games‟ which expresses the notion that 
understanding can only be made possible through a conventional ascription of 
correspondences between words and meanings, shared by a number of speakers 
(Buckley-Zistel 2006: 8, referring to Wittgenstein 1993, section 65). In recent years, 
anthropologists have come to question the notion of „shared meanings‟ in view of a 
more dynamic understanding of culture as a space of eternal contestation and 
negotiation of meanings (Förster 2006; cf. Ferme 2001). As a parallel development, 
the presumption of cultural coherence and homogeneity that governed earlier 
anthropological studies of the cultural „wholes‟ seems to have given way to a 
recognition that „the sharing of learned traits among humans is never perfect,‟ 
although this does not deny the non-random character of cultural distribution 
(Brumann 1999: S1; cf. Hannerz 1992; Avruch 1998). Scholars of politics and IR, 
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although noted for importing definitions of culture from anthropological literature 
(Greenhouse 1987), have not entirely caught up with these developments (see e.g. 
Verweij et al. 1998; Hohe 2002a; Chabal and Daloz 2006), which makes a case for 
revisiting the assumptions embedded in the understanding of culture as a system of 
shared meanings in view of the offered meaning-generation paradigm. 
 
Ironically, the flaws inherent in the understanding of culture as a system of shared 
meanings duly reflect the most problematic aspect of culture that has become 
prominent in the context of peacebuilding. It relies on the notion of systemicness 
(i.e. inter-related character of meanings where each meaning is defined in relation to 
others) which, according to Bauman (1999), is an obsolete state for contemporary 
cultures, because of their openness and mutual illumination (Bakhtin 1975: 180-81, 
455) as well as „cross-contamination:‟  
 
Even if cultures were once complete systems in which all units were crucial and indispensable 
for the survival of all the others, they most certainly have ceased to be such. (Bauman 1999: 
xliii) 
 
Given the amalgamated, eclectic nature of most „identifiable cultures‟ (Ferguson 
1998: 24), it is surprising that we can still speak of cultures as delimited entities. 
However, the understanding of cultural delimitation as an ongoing process enables 
interpreting cultural change as a continual appropriation, negotiation, and „digestion‟ 
of external cultural influences (as evident in Hohe‟s (2002a) mention of the 
Timorese „subversion‟ of foreign powers through their addition to the traditional 
authority structure). This does not deny the impossibility of approaching „cultures‟ 
in their „pure‟ form, or counter de Certeau‟s observation that in situations where the 
initial „communities‟ have all but dissolved into the state of hybridity and diffusion, 
re-communitarisation is often limiting and violent (1997). Nor does this deprive of 
substance Merry‟s warning that the „[t]hinking about culture as a homogenous, 
integrated, and consensual system‟ is problematic because it means that cultures 
have to be „accepted or criticized as a whole‟ (2003: 56). But it does draw attention 
to the perceived need to re-effect cultural delimitation despite the fact that the 
„“[i]nside” and “outside” have lost much of their once so clear meaning‟ (Bauman 
1999: xxiv). From this perspective, however, the presumption of „natural‟ 
systemicness of cultures gives way to the recognition of „cultural‟ constitution of 
such cultural „wholes,‟ hinting at a multi-storey character of cultural meaning-
making. 
 
Delimiting culture on the basis of shared meanings is also problematic in another 
respect. The empirical reality of cross-cultural communication (however imperfect) 
suggests that at least some meanings are shared across cultures, and also begs the 
question of what makes cross-cultural understanding and „translation‟ possible 
beyond the sphere of „shared meanings‟ proper. Likewise, the self-evidence of 
cultural boundaries following the limits of shared meanings can be questioned from 
within: many scholars have noted the „imperfect‟ cultural distribution of meanings 
within what is conventionally identified as single and „unitary‟ cultures (with some 
meanings being limited to particular „sub-cultures,‟ professional spheres or social 
strata) (e.g. Avruch 1998: 18-9; Brumann 1999: S6). Thus, „objective‟ empirical 
grounds for determining the boundaries of a given culture become increasingly 
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shaky, since cultural boundaries appear to incorporate almost as much difference as 
they exclude. It may be argued that cross-cultural communication is enabled by 
shared cultural elements that, owing to modern cultural hybridity and amalgamation, 
have become truly global in reach (an argument that, as Avruch notes with reference 
to the studies of negotiations, has been used for discrediting the influence of „local‟ 
cultures on the processes of international politics (1998)). However, that still leaves 
one with questions regarding the grounds for interaction between such globalised 
elements of culture and their „local‟ counterparts. Much more promising for 
illuminating the processes of cultural delimitation and cross-cultural communication 
is Lotman‟s insight about identity as a product of arbitrary „self-description‟ that 
elevates certain elements of difference and sameness into the defining features of a 
given culture (1990: 128-38; cf. Barth 1969). The deliberate singling out the corpus 
of „relevant‟ shared meanings to define the „essence‟ of one or another culture, 
although somewhat questionable as an analytical task,
7
 seems to offer empirical 
grounds for cultural self-identification (ibid.; Neumann 1999; Chabal and Daloz 
2006), and it also follows the dynamic of selection and naturalisation of meanings 
discussed above. Crucially, this makes even cultural „discontinuity‟ (Schlee 2009) 
into a product of essentially cultural meaning-making and boundary-drawing. 
 
All this suggests that the problem of defining culture falls prey to the same dynamics 
whereby any other meanings are established and defined through cultural practices 
and processes: in other words, the processes associated with meaning-generation as 
a (primary) cultural act are also manifested in the attempts to isolate the limits of 
„culture‟ as a separate – semiotic or sociological – phenomenon. This also suggests 
that the problematic of isolation of meaning and delimitation as such collapses the 
neat separation into analytically distinct levels (such as object- and meta-level) at 
which academic enquiries into culture are traditionally conducted, placing the 
researcher into the very midst of, and making him/her a party to, meaning-
generation. This positions the embedded cultural enquiry on methodologically 
ambivalent grounds. On the one hand, it is not entirely undirected, since the 
mechanisms of signification provide the „common architectonic moments‟ (Bakhtin 
1993[1986]) in the relational structure of different levels and orders of discourse, 
offering a „legitimate‟ entry point for analysis. But on the other hand, the fact that 
the relations of substitution and representation also „infect‟ the relationship between 
these levels, introduces a degree of unpredictability and „anarchy‟ into cultural 
enquiry, subordinating its course to the dynamics of meaning-generation. Cultural 
enquiry, just as its object, thus becomes party to significational dynamics that, to 
borrow Graham Pechey‟s formulation, make it „deeply metaphorical in the root 
sense of being always “carried over,” always in “translation” from one context to 
another‟ (1989: 40).  
 
                                                 
7
 This much is suggested by the critique of earlier anthropological efforts to „pin down‟ the 
characteristic features of particular cultures, e.g. in Crapanzano‟s (1986) critique of Geertz (1973); or 
de Certeau‟s (1984) critique of Bourdieu (1977; see also Neumann 2002: 634-5). However, there are 
ways to circumvent the hazards of „reifying‟ cultures. One is enabled by a focus on the „local‟ as 
defined through „the socially most significant context[s]‟ (Chabal and Daloz 2006: 124); another – 
through acknowledging the inherently „fuzzy‟ character of cultural boundaries (at conceptual as well 
as empirical levels) (Avruch 1998) – although what this implies for the entities enclosed by such 
fuzzy boundaries is not often speculated about (although see Connolly 2002). 
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Certain isomorphism in the constitution of culture as a whole and its „basic‟ 
elements – meanings – is also replicated in the cultural dynamics of delimitation of 
other, superficially „non-cultural‟ spheres of signification, such as the political, 
social, or economic. This illustrates Katzenstein‟s argument that „culture in the form 
of symbolic systems functions as a dynamic link between levels of analysis‟ (1997: 
47), and offers a sound starting point for a discussion of culture „as politics‟ below 
(ii). In the remainder of this section, the definitional dynamics will be extrapolated 
to the processes of identity-formation. 
(B)ordering and identity 
Despite the common basic functions that culture plays in human collectives (such as 
countering the instinctual under-determinacy of the human species), the realisation 
of these functions takes different routes and forms depending on the particular 
contexts, resulting in different patterns of meanings and social order, which will – in 
each case – be valorised as the unquestionably natural state of affairs. Plurality of 
„cultures‟ thus arises as a result of commonality becoming localised and 
„constructed as the basis of distinctiveness in relation to others‟ (Blaney and 
Inayatullah 1998: 64; cf. Avruch 1998). The distinctions between the spheres of 
local as opposed to generic culture (Avruch 1998) may be observed analytically, 
with a focus on cultural „differences … among societies‟ (Black and Avruch 1998: 
35), or drawn instrumentally, from within a culture – as boundaries of its identity. 
Indeed, the necessity of drawing a line between the self and other appears to be a 
truly universal cultural feature: „the most generic element in culture is precisely its 
dividing, differentiating function‟ (Bauman 1999: 34). In this light, „generality in 
culture is a by-product … of mankind not being united into a whole; of it being, on 
the contrary, split into separate units‟ (ibid.).  
 
Because of the crucial role that culture plays in „enabling identification of “us” and 
“them” around which conflict is organised‟ (Ross 1998: 158), the mechanics of 
separation and unification involved in identity construction warrant a closer 
consideration. Bauman‟s observation that „the role of the rules of exclusion‟ in 
culture pre-conditions the „applicability of all other rules‟ (1999: 99) is well in line 
with the mechanism of meaning-generation discussed above: because the repertoire 
of possible meanings is limitless, the attainment of a sense of sameness is only 
possible „by virtue of strategies which expel the surplus meanings‟ threatening to 
upset its stability (Doty 1998: 145). Identity in this sense is as much a product as it is 
a process of the eternal labour of identification (Lévinas 1996: 25): „cultural 
homogeneity‟ is continually „forced, by conscious effort, upon inherently pluralist 
reality‟ (Bauman 1999: xlii). Such homogeneity also involves a considerable degree 
of simplification, at the meta-level of self-description, of the actual picture of inner 
diversity (Lotman 1990: 128). Identity is also, crucially, a self-imposed limitation: 
the excluded meanings are nothing but part of the subject which is always haunted 
by „the spectre of non-identity‟ with itself (Doty 1998: 144; cf. Fuss 1989: 33-7), so 
that the „partial‟ nature of the subject needs to be concealed and „totalised.‟ The 
internal unity of the subject is thus ultimately conventional, with unification 
belonging to the level of „meta-,‟ or „self-description‟ of the cultural system 
(Lotman 1996: 170-3, 1992b: 16-17; 1990: 128; cf. Luhmann 1995: 10). With this in 
mind, the ordering effort of culture can also be conceptualised as boundary-drawing, 
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which helps to separate the internal space – postulated as structured and meaningful 
– from the chaotic, or differently structured, „outside.‟  
 
Since the sphere of meanings is defined by the sphere of cultural praxis, „not all 
“natural” differences are necessarily and in all circumstances perceived as frontier 
posts‟ (Bauman 1999: 118): whether or not certain features are granted the role of 
„boundary markers of identity‟ (Neumann 1999: 4) – or, in Barth‟s terms, 
„diacritica‟ (1969) – depends on their social meanings in „the communal praxis‟ 
(Bauman 1999: 118). Likewise, the aspects of commonality across cultural 
boundaries may be glossed over in the face of „significant‟ differences. As with 
culture, the very notion of the commonality of praxis is, of course, also 
conventional: in a sense, presenting practices as shared „is a reification, derived from 
performances … accomplished slightly differently in varying conditions and 
circumstances‟ (Barnes 2001: 25; cf. d‟Andrade 1981: 180). If the commonality of 
cultural praxis is a reification, the studies of cultural distribution – the reach of 
commonality – are of relevance for determining the „internal‟ fault-lines within what 
is habitually referred to as a single culture (see Hannerz 1992; cf. Barth 1987: 77). 
With fragmentation and totalisation as inseparable aspects of signification, the 
function of boundary-maintenance is as important for controlling internal diversity 
as it is for keeping the „outside‟ at bay.  
 
Ironically, the reliance of self-identification upon the articulation of non-identity 
with the external „other‟ has to proceed by way of making that „other‟ an element of 
self-awareness, and such „naming‟ of the „other‟ brings the radical alterity back onto 
the plane of sameness as yet another of the internally meaningful elements (Lotman 
1990; Laclau 2000; cf. Selg and Ventsel 2008; Connolly 1991). Every culture, 
Lotman notes, „creates not only its internal organisation, but also its own type of 
external disorganisation,‟ its own „barbarian‟ (1992b: 15). Thus, the ideas of 
(however) radical difference are incorporated into the very identity of culture, which 
assists with translating the extra-systemic difference into the familiar, 
„domesticated‟ terms (Lotman 1992b: 19). The „residual‟ internal difference, which, 
although excluded from the cultural self-description, remains in place and 
undermines the hegemony of the proclaimed „identity,‟ provides the ready means for 
representing as well as mediating the images of the external „radical‟ difference 
(Lotman 1990). Thus, the arbitrary boundaries of identity enable not only separation, 
but also cross-cultural communication and translation by way of such 
representational chains (Lotman 1990: 140; 1992b: 12-4). Translation mechanisms 
also operate in negotiating the internal divisions and differences, and the inevitable 
imperfection of any translation (across the external cultural boundaries or within 
them) generates dynamism that accounts for the bulk of cultural change and 
development (Lotman 1992b: 16-17). In this sense, identity maintenance has a stable 
counterpart in increasing the scope of non-identity with the professed „self-
description,‟ and this ambivalence alone points to a continual character of cultural 
boundary-drawing and identity formation.  
 
Another aspect of ambivalence refers to the possibility of viewing the realm beyond 
the boundaries of one‟s own culture as either composed of other cultures, or 
representing „non-culture‟ – the domain of chaos, disorder and unpredictability (cf. 
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Lotman 1992b; Viktorova 2003: 144). Whether the „outside‟ is recognised as the 
abode of other cultures or not seems to depend on how far the sphere of praxis 
extends beyond the limits of one‟s own culture:  
 
The first and most fundamental distinction accomplished by the human-activity-in-the-world 
is the one between the realm shaped by human praxis and all the rest. … The regions 
inaccessible to praxis, or those forcibly introduced in between praxis-regulated stretches to 
underlie the frontiers of order, are left behind as domains of amorphism, vagueness, chaos. 
(Bauman 1999: 98)  
 
The extension of praxis into the realm of the „outside‟ (through trade, 
communication etc.) leads to a dialogical „enlightenment‟ (Bakhtin 1975) of the 
structured character of the external space and thus to the perception of own culture 
as but one of the possible „systems of references and meanings … heterogeneous in 
relation to each other‟ (de Certeau 1997: 67-8; Bakhtin 1975, 1990b: 514-22; 
Holquist 1990; Viktorova 2003: 150). This heterogeneity, among other things, 
extends to the evolving conceptions of the self and other: for instance, while 
dichotomising is indispensable for the delineation of the self, the nature of the 
relationship between dualistic entities can vary from opposition to complementarity 
(as, for example, in the Chinese philosophical tradition (see Bleiker 1998: 94)). With 
granting of the „cultural status‟ to the „outside,‟ the behaviour of the „barbarians‟ is 
imparted with certain – albeit different – regularity and logic, instead of being 
considered simply irrational or „wrong‟ (Lotman 1992b). Such recognition, in turn, 
directs further praxis, leading to a formation of expectations and „assumptions about 
when, where, and how people in one‟s culture and those in other cultures are likely 
to act in particular ways‟ (Ross 1998: 160). Yet, both possibilities – viewing the 
„outside‟ as a radical antipode („non-culture‟) or as a realm of relative difference – 
are present in the cultural „matrix‟ of possible meanings (Bauman 1999), which 
enables periodic relapses into a „monologic‟ perception of the other (Bakhtin 1975: 
455-7) when the sense of identity is endangered (Harrison 1993; cf. Bowman 2001: 
33; Olsson 2004). This also implies that the understandings of the particularism of 
human collectives or the universality of humankind are themselves culturally 
conditioned and as such can assume different form and content in different cultural 
contexts (e.g. ubuntu (Louw 1996)).  
 
The outlined conceptualisation of cultural boundary-drawing emphasises the 
constructed character of both unity and difference, and helps explain the varied 
character of the outcome of identification (e.g. whether the encountered external 
difference will be accepted as another culture or not, and even whether one‟s own 
unity will be postulated as culture, nation, people, ethnic group, family, and so on, 
with the addition of possible variations in external vs. internal identification). It also 
implies a possibility of dynamic revisions and reversals of „identity,‟ for the 
acceptance of difference as belonging to the inside, or the attempts to „purify‟ the 
basis of own distinctiveness, result in re-drawing the boundaries of (cultural) 
identity. All this obviously imparts a political dimension into the very definition of 
culture (generally and in terms of particular cultures), just as it exposes the politics 
of relations with difference as relevant for the constitution of the meaning of „self‟. 
Indeed, the term „culture‟ itself has a long tradition of being used as a tool for 
delineation and boundary-drawing, from Arnoldian view of culture that either is or 
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is not „possessed‟ (and thus used to separate the „cultured‟ society from the 
uncultured mob) (see Avruch 1998), to the anthropological practice of deploying the 
notion of „culture‟ to negotiate the spaces of otherness (see e.g. Abu-Lughod 1991; 
Scott 2003; cf. Brumann 1999). This consideration connects the problematic of 
cultural bordering to the topic of the following section – the „political‟ dimension of 
culture. 
(ii) Culture as politics 
The involvement of culture in the shaping of one or another sense of reality or 
reinforcing „particular interpretations of the world‟ (Ross 1998: 156) may be 
referred to as its „world-making‟ property (Bauman 1999; cf. Goodman 1978, in 
Geertz 2001: 211). It operates through the mechanisms discussed in the previous 
section: the selection and naturalisation of one set of meanings at the expense of 
other possibilities. This applies both at the stage of „primary‟ production of 
meanings and in the production of larger-scale meaningful units, such as identities 
and particular „cultures.‟ Selection and naturalisation also have a counterpart in 
totalisation, evident in the impression of covering the entire available spectrum of 
meanings that each partial set of meaning creates, and in silencing the possibility of 
alternatives. Totalisation, likewise, operates both at the level of „linguistic‟ 
production of meanings and at the level of group identity, manifest in the drawing of 
boundaries of commonality. Because each partial set of meanings can be totalised, 
totalisation also accompanies the processes of fragmentation in situations where the 
unifying „self-descriptions‟ are drastically revised or fall apart under the pressure to 
exclude the dissenting „otherness.‟ These two pairs of terms – selection and 
naturalisation, and fragmentation and totalisation – although more comfortably 
pertaining, respectively, to the nuclear-level production of meanings and to 
production of more complex meaningful entities, are isomorphous in terms of their 
power effects. These are particularly notable in that the understanding of culture „as 
the shared “common sense,” … “the realm of the given and the undeniable”‟ (Cohen 
1998: 117, quoting Geertz 1983: 73-93) suggests that concealing its arbitrary and 
partial character is inherent in the constitution of culture qua culture. 
 
Cultural „world-making‟ testifies to the ubiquity of power within the realm of 
culture: the constitution of culture is never politically „neutral‟ in that culture itself is 
generated and perpetuated in an endless exercise of power by opening up some 
possibilities and meanings while foreclosing others. As noted by Bourdieu (1990: 
64),  
 
[t]he relation to what is possible is a relation to power; and the sense of the probable future 
is constituted in the prolonged relationship with a world structured according to the 
categories of the possible (for us) and the impossible (for us)  
 
That such world-making is never conceivably a finite act is shown clearly by 
references to non-uniformity in the acceptance of its claims for incontestability – 
whether at the level of individual identities that tend to breach their stated limits (cf. 
Doty 1998), or in the evidence of „unorthodox‟ deviance at the peripheries of areas 
united through self-descriptions (Lotman 1990, 1992b: 16-17, 1996: 178-9; 
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Tynyanov 1976; cf. Viktorova 2003: 155-6). Both the reassertion of identity against 
such constant, if covert, dissidence, as well as its contestation, reveal the power 
dimension of cultural „ordering‟ and „world-making.‟ On a broader scale, any 
articulation of meanings or, indeed, any attempt at their contestation, also carry 
power connotations. 
 
The ambivalent nature of the cultural ordering of reality manifests itself in the 
inseparability of world-making and world-unmaking, since opening some cultural 
possibilities is coterminous with foreclosing others. This ambivalence is coded into 
the very cultural production of meaning which simultaneously invokes the freedom 
of choice on the one hand, and the limitations established by a realisation of that 
freedom on the other (Bauman 1999). „The idea of “culture”,‟ Bauman writes,  
 
served the reconciliation of a whole series of oppositions unnerving due to their ostensible 
incompatibility: those of freedom and necessity, of the voluntary and the constrained, of 
teleological and causal, chosen and determined, random and patterned, contingent and law-
abiding, creative and routine, novel and repetitive; in short, of self-assertion and normative 
regulation. (Bauman 1999: xiii) 
 
„The double-edged – simultaneously “enabling” and “constraining” – character of 
culture‟ (Bauman 1999: xii) is instrumental in demonstrating how the described 
power of shaping human realities can be seen as falling both within and outside 
human grasp. Needless to say, this problem is of utmost relevance for the issue of 
violence, both in the sense discussed above – the indirect, structural violence 
reflected in the construction of particular senses of reality (cf. Galtung 1964, 1969, 
1990) – and in the sense of shaping particular social understandings of violence (e.g. 
what is recognised as violence or dismissed as such; its permissible and prohibited 
forms; ideas of the appropriate contexts for its use, etc. (e.g. Eskola 1987)) that will 
be discussed below in more detail. But equally, this issue is very visible in the 
lasting effects of cultural demarcation of the areas of specific activities and 
conventions. 
Cultural constitution of the political 
As pointed out by Chabal and Daloz, the „political‟ cannot be delineated without 
taking into account the broader realm of culture from which it springs: 
 
culture is not merely an additional dimension of politics that requires attention. It is quite 
simply one of the key fundaments of social life, the matrix within which that which we 
understand as political action takes place. (Chabal and Daloz 2006: 21)  
 
Arguments in favour of a greater role for culture in political analysis call for a 
reconsideration of the relationship between „culture‟ at large and the more 
immediate domains of human activity. This relationship can be conceived in terms 
of constitution and mediation. In the words of Valerie Hudson, „things “political” 
can be deconstructed and shown to have their roots in broad systems of shared 
meaning‟ (1997b: 10). Any instances of the specifically „political‟ meaning-making 
take place within the broader domain of culture, as does the very delineation of „the 
political‟ into a separate realm.  
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The issue of fuzzy boundaries of „the political‟ and its constitution through a broader 
„cultural‟ field has enormous relevance for the study of violent conflict. It is often 
observed that in situations of violent conflict where political institutions are 
weakened or defunct, violence shifts from political targets to cultural ones. Thus, 
rape camps in Bosnia, or the use of places associated with safety and comfort (such 
as kitchens in Mozambique or beauty parlours in Kosovo) for particularly heinous 
acts of violence, have been interpreted as attacks against the underlying cultural 
norms and values which, in the absence of viable political conventions, become the 
only remaining repositories of power (Crawford and Lipschutz 1997; Nordstrom 
1994; Fetherston 2000b). This suggests that political conventions, although 
infinitely more „accessible‟ to researchers, are also the more superficial (and less 
resilient) compared to the broader cultural ones. In situations of violent conflict, the 
layer of broader cultural conventions that is normally hidden beneath the workings 
of „politics‟ (or other more specific areas of conventions) becomes prominent in 
substituting for the „political,‟ and assumes direct relevance for any attempts at 
conflict regulation or research. 
 
Extrapolating the noted relationship between culture and politics, it is possible to 
conceive of culture as accessible through its particular manifestations in the 
specialised fields of human interaction and conventions through which they operate, 
but which at a deeper level plays a formative and constitutive role in the generation 
of these specialised fields, by shaping particular domains of human activity as well 
as mediating between them. Imagining culture as a multi-layered system of 
conventions allows one to escape the unfruitful task of „defining‟ culture (i.e. 
delineating the „cultural‟ from the rest) (cf. Chabal and Daloz 2006: 21) and focus 
instead on the unifying „cultural‟ activity permeating both culture at large and the 
more specific domains of human activity – the generation and organisation of 
meaning. In view of such a multi-layered conceptualisation of culture, power and the 
„political‟ stop being an exclusive attribute of the specialised field of politics, but 
rather all of these concepts become placed in, and informed by, the overarching 
domain of culture.  
 
Although this may appear to elevate culture to a status of undeniable and 
unquestionable ultimate „reality‟ (see Geertz‟s warnings against such treatment 
(1973; 2001)), owing to a fusion of scales and levels of analysis, the means of 
cultural production can also be turned against the dictate of cultural „hegemony‟ in 
the attempts to deconstruct the hidden biases of meaning-generation. In addition, as 
an all-encompassing sphere, culture also contains provisions for its own contestation 
(for example, through its sub-fields – art, literature, etc.), which can successfully 
expose its implicit political „interests.‟ Nor is this to deny the usefulness of „politics‟ 
as a field of human activity (or academic enquiry, for that matter), but rather to 
emphasise that its attributes are far from being alien to the broader framework of 
culture, since the „isolation‟ of politics into a specific field is also culturally 
conditioned. This is highly relevant, given that the majority of peacebuilding efforts 
are directed at the so-called failed states plunged into the anarchy of the „new wars‟ 
(Kaldor 1999) that effectively undermine the system of political conventions, so that 
political communication regresses to the stage of „raw‟ or „naked‟ power, i.e. 
violence (Russell 1986; Foucault 1994). Furthermore, the acknowledgement of 
75 
 
culture as governing the constitution of the more immediate and specific fields of 
interaction is important since (liberal) peacebuilding pursues similar objectives – 
(re-)establishment of politics, economy and society as circumscribed spheres of 
activity with corresponding systems of conventions. In this respect, the operation of 
peacebuilding closely replicates the ordering activity of culture, putting in place the 
realities designed to direct human praxis along particular avenues (and away from 
others, believed to be „implicated‟ in conflict (cf. Duffield 2001: 127-32)). 
 
The notion that politics is difficult to restrict to a particular sphere is not a novel 
phenomenon arising from the experience of post-Cold War violent conflicts. 
Notably, it is reflected in a critical notion of politics as happening „everywhere‟ 
(Weber 2006), or, with respect to particular „local‟ contexts, in the impossibility of 
neatly isolating the sphere of the „political‟ from other societal and cultural 
processes, as is the case in Sub-Saharan Africa (see e.g. Chabal and Daloz 1999; 
Ellis 1999). Allowing for consideration of culture as the broader source of the 
political helps to understand how the seemingly unrelated (if not superficially 
„irrelevant‟) spheres affect the ostensibly political processes (e.g. „the occult‟ for 
African politics (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 2006; cf. Ellis and ter Haar 2004), or 
religious and clan basis of legitimation of authority in Timor Leste (Hohe 2002a, 
2002b)). It also helps illuminate the very processes of sedimentation of the 
„political,‟ exposing the inequalities of access to politics, and the latter‟s elitist 
connotations which are particularly condemning in fragile states and societies, where 
the representational battles may be fought out well before entering the „official‟ 
realm of politics (cf. Richards et al. 2004). A deeper understanding of the 
mechanisms of formation of the political can safeguard interveners against ignoring 
the aspects of power relations that do not fit into a habitual picture of politics, thus 
helping them to avoid mistaking the lack of evidence of local political organisation 
for the lack of interest or stakes in one or another course of action (ibid.). The same 
applies to the delimitation of other „specific‟ spheres such as the economic, and their 
relationship with the „political‟ as well as „pre-political.‟ Some local business 
customs may fall into the „pre-economic‟ category (i.e. something that is not 
considered properly „economic‟ or simply resists effective conceptualisation and 
operationalisation – in parallel to the „occult‟ side of African politics which evades 
most comparativists (Chabal and Daloz 2006, 1999)). However, changes in such 
broadly defined economic sphere may trigger events in other areas of human 
activity, promoting, for instance, mobilisation along group or ethnic lines in 
response to the worsening relative economic conditions and thus affecting not only 
conflict dynamics, but also „political‟ practice. A deeper understanding of cultural 
processes and functions can offer a reference point for interlinking what is 
sometimes perceived as very disparate concerns – for instance, the local acceptance 
of created state institutions, a particular direction or strategy for development, or the 
chances of success of economic restructuring – based on a deeper understanding of 
processes involved in the constitution and contestation of meaning, sources of 
legitimacy and otherwise, practices of power, and so on. 
 
The issue of delimitation of the political is also immensely relevant with regard to 
conflict. The majority of frameworks for conflict analysis, although accepting a 
wider basis of sources of conflict than strictly political (for instance, by venturing 
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into psychological explanations of conflict behaviours or dynamics (e.g. Bartos and 
Wehr 2002) or promoting a socio-biological understanding of „needs‟ (e.g. Azar and 
Burton 1986)), still often unquestioningly accept the primacy of political definitions 
or expressions of interests, as well as political solutions to problems. This effectively 
limits their ability to place conflicts into a wider socio-cultural context which may 
be constitutive of both the specific means and avenues of waging conflict as well as 
of the pursued interests and methods of pacification (cf. Richards 2005a), especially 
when conflicts appear to violate the conventional understandings of politics, as is 
often the case with the „new wars‟ (Kaldor 1999). For this, literatures addressing 
cultural conventions regulating the use of violence and aggression („cultures of 
conflict‟ in Ross‟s (1993, 1998) terms), images and status of violence in culture (e.g. 
Whitehead 2004), the local cultural mechanisms for dealing with conflict and 
violence and indigenous reconciliation techniques („enthopraxes‟ and „ethnoconflict 
theories‟ (Avruch et al. 1991)) become invaluable. The multi-layered structure of 
conventions – from generally cultural to more specific – also offers a novel 
perspective on the opposing views of violence either as responsible for a breakdown 
of a system of conventions, or as putting in place a different order of signification.  
Cultural ‘ordering’ of violence 
Looking at culture „as politics‟ also draws into the orbit of this discussion the issue 
of cultural sanctioning of particular kinds of behaviours and regulating the use of 
violence. Although Riches‟ theory of instrumental and rational value of violence 
(1986b) may not be flawless on other accounts (see Stewart and Strathern 2002), it 
highlights the involvement of communicational and interpretational structures in 
both the performance and perception of violence. Being something that, however 
contentiously and controversially, is „being made sense of‟8 draws violence into the 
ambit of meaning-generation. Together with the more explicit facet of regulating the 
conventions pertaining to violence, this makes violence an explicit subject of 
„culture as politics.‟ 
 
Approaching this matter through the cultural lens elucidates the variety of ways in 
which violence is entwined with the fabric of socio-cultural relations. Admittedly, 
any culture differentiates between certain kinds of violence (cf. Riches 1986b: 9), 
taking some for granted (the naturalised, „hidden‟ violence – whether structural or 
cultural (Galtung 1964, 1990); the discursive „approval‟ of violence (Jabri 1996); 
violent imageries or even physical violence considered perfectly acceptable by a 
society (cf. Brigg 2005)) while condemning others – either actively (e.g. through 
penal codes) or passively, through „unwritten‟ societal norms. Culture „sanctions 
particular ways to pursue individual or group interests and disapproves of others‟ 
(Ross 1998: 161), channelling and „organising‟ violence and aggression (Riches 
1986b: 9); shaping people‟s ideas about what violence is and what it is not (cf. 
Eskola 1987: 22; Cohen 1998) – all this at a level preceding strictly political 
organisation (not to mention statehood).  
 
                                                 
8
 Murer (2008a) points out that although the trauma of violent experiences may be „unavailable for 
description‟ for the person(s) involved, at the communal level such „sense-making‟ takes the path of 
linking the experienced violence to the narratives of past suffering (cf. Schröder and Schmidt 2001). 
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Notably, the conventions regulating the use and perception of violence are not 
immutable. The apparent difficulties that many individuals and societies experience 
in coming to terms with war trauma testifies to the fact that conventions regulating 
violence are not readily „available,‟ but exist in the same kind of dynamic flux as 
any cultural meanings (cf. Bauman 1978: 180-95) and are subject to re-evaluation, 
reinterpretation and revision. In addition, as with other meanings, certain types of 
violence are excluded from the horizon of cultural awareness – either „accidentally‟ 
(so that the culture is largely unprepared to address them), or because they are 
perceived as severe violations of the self-image of a given culture and tabooed as 
culturally „suicidal‟ (e.g. Ross 1998: 162). Breaching and redrawing of the 
boundaries associated with cultural regulation of violence reflects the cultural 
dynamics triggered by new violent experiences. The controversy surrounding such 
boundary dynamics refers to the extent that violence becomes part of the picture of 
the cultural „self:‟ While cultural awareness of certain forms of violence testifies to 
their „internal‟ status, actual violent occurrences more often than not provoke 
societal „identity crises‟ and serve to reassert the identity against the possibility of 
violence (although in these instances the violent other becomes an internal „other‟ – 
both one of „us‟ and yet antagonistic – and, as such, instrumental for the perception 
of the self) (cf. Lotman 1992b). Such purposeful exclusion of the violence of the so-
called „new,‟ „uncivil,‟ or „dirty‟ wars (Kaldor 1999; Snow 1996; Nordstrom 1995) 
from the limits of self-awareness of the Western peace-loving liberal and democratic 
„self‟ is highly visible in the attempts to present war itself as the enemy of the liberal 
peace (Richards 2005a). This has been noted to hamper its ability to engage with 
violence so as to address the underlying local „cultures of violence‟ (Nordstrom 
1994) and not simply to remove the physical conditions of its practicability (as with 
the majority of DDR programmes or peacekeeping interventions designed to keep 
the warring parties apart). This apparent need to exclude violence as detrimental to 
the self-image of liberal peace may help explain the pitiful impact that the critique of 
its cultural bias has made in the discourses and practices of liberal peacebuilding.  
 
Cultural boundaries – both internal and external – expose the meaningful 
oppositions involved in the regulation of direct violence. An important corollary of 
conceptualising culture as a world-ordering activity is that one of the immediate 
concerns of cultural praxis is differentiating between various forms of direct and 
indirect violence and regulating the spheres of their application. Given that total 
exclusion of violence from any cultural order is unthinkable (after all, culture is 
predicated on the exercise of power and thus – at least – indirect forms of violence), 
this concern gives rise to two interrelated issues: firstly, cultural „authorisation‟ of 
violence, and secondly – mediation between its direct and indirect forms. There is, 
of course, „no one-to-one relationship between a given structure and a corresponding 
set of empirical events‟ (Bauman 1999: 52): „the relationship between social 
structure and violence is one of influence and opportunity‟ (Riches 1986b: 25). And 
although it is true that the social structure does not compel violence (ibid.), ideas 
about as well as symbolic „provisions‟ for open violence and war as „a cultural 
possibility‟ (Fetherston and Nordstrom 1995; Jabri 1996) are always readily 
available to interested „human agency‟ for turning them „into violent practices‟ 
(Schröder and Schmidt 2001: 11). While it is debatable whether culture in and of 
itself can be a „cause‟ of conflict (rampantly essentialist explanations 
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notwithstanding), it determines what paths of mobilisation for conflict are likely to 
„work‟ and how, and can also offer an insight into the pathways of de-escalation. 
 
What cultural mechanisms can be seen to play a role in the „ordering‟ of violence? 
Schröder and Schmidt argue that in the cultural imagination, the experiences of 
collective violence are set apart and „clearly marked off in space and time from 
everyday practice‟ as important, meaningful events (Schröder and Schmidt 2001: 7). 
It is these „unique experiences … stored in a society‟s collective memory‟ that serve 
to legitimise new instances of violence, presenting it as a re-enactment of „ideas and 
behavioural models from the past‟ and appealing to the „feelings of social closure 
based on the experience of either superiority or suffering‟ (ibid.: 8; cf. Volkan 
1991). The „memory of former conflicts and past violence‟ is kept „alive in stories 
… glorifying‟ either the group‟s „achievements and benefits‟ or „the perceived 
injustices, losses or suffering‟ (Schröder and Schmidt 2001: 10). Such narratives, 
however, belong to the sphere of everyday practice, and thus the distinction between 
the everyday and extraordinary „events‟ of violence appears more blurred than 
Schröder and Schmidt‟s (2001) account suggests. Moreover, the circular logic 
suggested by the continuity of the patterns of violence and their symbolic meanings 
from the past, through the present and into the future (ibid.: 9), is likely to become 
„contaminated‟ by the influence of the everyday practices which may explicitly 
concern themselves with different matters, but which have a bearing on the ways in 
which people think and talk about conflict and violence (Ross 1993; Bleiker 1998: 
90; Jabri 1996). The very isolation of war into a separate „bubble‟ of human 
existence is questioned the moment that violence becomes a pervasive part of daily 
life, when cultural taboos (such as „do not kill‟) suddenly turn into norms and even 
„musts‟ (cf. BHC SL 2006). The organisation, ordering and sanctioning of ideas and 
forms of violence brings the mythical „meaningful events‟ of violence into the ambit 
of everyday cultural praxis.  
 
The quick transition from violence as a „unique‟ sphere (Schröder and Schmidt 
2001) to a pervasive and ubiquitous feature in the „new wars‟ gives rise to a number 
of interesting questions. For example, is there a difference in participants‟ (and 
victims‟) perception of the violence of the „new wars‟ compared to that conveyed by 
the glorious narratives of the past, and if so, what cultural markers are used to set the 
two apart? Does the experience of direct violence trigger a reassessment of the 
„mythical baggage‟ of past violence as perhaps not so benign for the group identity? 
Or does a contrary process take place, whereby the current violence is put on an 
equal footing with the myths of the past, and then what are the implications for the 
prospects for peace? The latter question is particularly topical with respect to the 
issue of societal healing and reconciliation – processes which also make use of the 
„complicity‟ of culture in regulating violence. Since no form of social organisation 
can be free from some forms of violence (if only by way of excluding it), any 
attempts at restoring „peace‟ are beset with difficulties of choosing between them. 
While it is true that mere restoration of life „as it was‟ before the violent conflict 
would also recreate the conditions in which violence became possible in the first 
place (e.g. Nordstrom 1997, quoted in Buckley-Zistel 2006: 8), a recourse to the 
„trusted‟ procedures of liberal peacebuilding hardly offers a solution either, since it 
not only introduces its own cultural „economy‟ of violence but also does little to 
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engage with the existing local processes of legitimation, which can lead to 
variability in the societal codes of violence where no culturally „sanctioned‟ 
(understood and accepted) response is possible. 
Violence and the dynamics of bordering 
Cultural ordering of violence is closely related to the issue of communal boundary-
drawing discussed above. This is reflected in the distinctions that most cultures (or 
at least those of Ross‟ (1998: 166-7) „differentiating‟ type) develop with regard to 
the kinds of violence permissible in relation to adversaries within one‟s own culture 
as opposed to those from the „outside.‟ Bauman notes that the principles of non-
zero-sum-games are reserved for the relations within the community, whereas with 
„others‟, a „zero-sum-game is what is to be expected as well as desired‟ (1999: 102), 
which leads to radically different cultural economies of violence within the 
community and in its external relations. Social and cultural boundaries are 
elucidated in the conventions regulating the use of violence, which specify, „for 
example, the sorts of weaponry that might be used against particular adversaries‟ 
(Riches 1986: 9):  
 
The famous case is that of the Nuer of southern Sudan, for whom fighting between members 
of the same village is restricted to clubs whilst people from different villages may use 
spears; likewise, with fighting between different tribes there are restrictions against 
molesting women and children, destroying huts and byres and taking captives. This sort of 
ruling is only suspended where the opponents are non-Nuer‟ (Riches 1986: 9, referring to 
Evans-Pritchard 1940: 121, 151) 
 
Most „ethnopraxes‟ (culturally-specific conflict resolution mechanisms) (Avruch et 
al. 1991) are devised for addressing internal violence. Apart from the pragmatic 
interest of maintaining societal integrity (cf. Cohen 1998: 117-8; Schröder and 
Schmidt 2001), the confinement of ethnopraxes to the internal cultural space is 
predicated on the shared understandings and assumptions about conflict and 
violence („ethnoconflict theories,‟ in Avruch and Black‟s terms (1994: 132)). In 
relations with the „outside,‟ „absence of common assumptions makes … conflict 
especially difficult to contain‟ (Ross 1998: 162). In some instances, peaceful 
resolution of disputes with external adversaries may not even be a desired course of 
action. A number of scholars coming from different perspectives and empirical cases 
suggest that violence may be instrumental in maintaining communal identity, and 
not an „accidental failure of an unsuccessful exchange‟ (Clastres 1994: 158; cf. 
Girard 1988; Bowman 2001: 29). Violence may also play a role in strengthening 
cross-communal ties; as noted by Martín, „the war was also an element of cohesion 
among all the tribal groupings of Saharawi society‟ (2005: 14). Curiously, 
understandings of external violence as instrumental and non-objectionable permeate 
some classic IR and strategic thinking (see e.g. Brown (2005) on how in Clausewitz-
inspired realist tradition, war is considered a foreign policy option rather than an 
indication of its failure).  
 
Although the claims regarding the instrumental role of violence in identity 
construction are by no means uncontested, the maintenance of identity, by 
definition, is premised on a differential treatment of in- and out-group members. As 
Stoller (1989) discovered in the course of his ethnographic research among the 
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Songhay of Niger in 1976-77, ethical codes of behaviour (such as the imperative of 
telling the truth) did not extend to outsiders like himself. There are, thus, limitations 
in the extent to which conflict resolution practices devised for application within a 
community can be extended outwith, to the realm of the „other.‟ This is especially 
pertinent in view of the experience of dissolution of the habitual patterns of 
commonality as a result of violent conflict, where children are forced to commit 
atrocities against their families and ethnic boundaries may be redrawn in blood 
(HRW2003; Denov 2006b; Kaldor 2004). Yet, understanding the mechanisms by 
which commonality is constructed and maintained also provides an opening for 
therapeutic influences: Schirch‟s (2005) work on ritual in peacebuilding illuminates 
multiple possibilities of establishing and reaffirming commonality at the heart of 
conflict. Sometimes, discursive and symbolic re-establishment of unity precedes the 
restoration of internal cohesion, as illustrated by the extensive use of communal 
healing rituals across post-Cold War African conflicts (Fetherston and Nordstrom 
1995; Honwana 2005). 
 
The possibility of influencing the dissolution or re-establishment of commonality 
relies on the awareness of the cultural dynamics of selection and totalisation, and of 
the multi-layered structure of conventions. Although violence often has the effect of 
challenging the existing political conventions (especially if directed against the 
incumbent power) and sometimes succeeds in this, the dissolution of the 
conventional realm of politics does not, of course, herald the end of conventionality 
as such, as other layers of conventions become unveiled. It rather exposes the „pre-
political‟ (i.e. generally cultural) origin of the phenomena usually associated with 
politics, and draws attention to different sources of power outside the failed 
institutional arrangements (cf. Arendt 1969, 1986). The „discovery‟ of power 
inherent in the traditional societal structure and values can explain the shifting focus 
of violence away from state institutions to civilians, typical of the „new wars‟ whose 
perpetrators derive their own power from destabilisation and uncertainty (Nordstrom 
1994, 1995; Crawford and Lipschutz 1997: 169; Viktorova 2005a). But equally, 
since cultural conventions are not confined to a single layer or set, the dissolution of 
some elements of the established bases of meaning and practices may open access to 
other, hereto latent areas of the „meaningful.‟ Understanding this aspect of 
signification is as important for envisioning the opportunities for peace as it is for 
analysing the factors that drive violent conflict. This brings the discussion to the last 
aspect of culture theorised in this framework – the dynamic aspect of meaning-
generation underlying the processes of cultural continuity and change, which allows 
for reconciling one of the most fundamental contradictions in any treatment of 
culture: the apparent „fixedness‟ of the cultural (self-)image coupled with the 
incommensurability of its substance.  
(iii) Culture as rhetoric 
Given the universal „currency‟ of delimitation as the basis for the production of 
cultural distinctiveness, the issue that still needs considering is what takes place 
between the entities established as culturally distinct and different, whether at the 
level of individual meanings and their conglomerates, or „composite‟ social entities, 
such as identities or „entire‟ cultures. The problematic of cross-cultural 
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communication in the broadest possible sense can be subsumed under the notion of 
translation, which takes place across a variety of cultural boundary lines, mediating 
between the forms of identity and difference representing different cultural „orders‟ 
or organising principles which, with a view to a terminological affinity, can be 
labelled „languages‟ (Lotman 1990). It is through a recourse to the problematic of 
translation in linguistic and literary theory that the following discussion will 
introduce the aspect of „culture as rhetoric.‟ 
 
The rhetorical dimension of language is invoked by the recognition that translation 
will always, to some extent, be tropological in nature, resorting to indirect 
correspondences embodied by the „trope‟ as a figure of speech. Although the 
internal space of cultural entities is heterogeneous, and that heterogeneity is 
instrumental in representing the external differences for internal „consumption,‟ this 
process can only establish conventional equivalences, by replicating the relation 
with the external „other‟ in the array of possible relations with the internal alterity. 
Tropes emerge at (and represent) the points of intersection between the differently 
organised spaces, texts, or entire cultural „selves.‟ This gives rise to the problematic 
of polyphony and intertextuality, but it also alludes to the instability of the produced 
meanings. The tropological movement of meaning in language and culture 
highlights not only the possibility of „illegitimate‟ rapprochements enabling 
translation, but also exchanges and fusions between different levels and stages of 
meaning-production. The „imperfection‟ of translation is responsible for the genesis 
of „new‟ information, which invites a consideration of the problem of cultural 
change (Lotman 1990). This section engages with the question of dynamics and 
mechanisms of cultural change in relation to the situations of violent conflict and the 
objectives of conflict transformation, and looks at the problematic of tropological 
fusion and transposition of actualised cultural „lexicons,‟ or „templates.‟ The four 
sub-sections cover, respectively, the principle of translation, the effects of 
tropological movement, the issue of cultural „templates,‟ and cultural continuity and 
change. 
Translation 
The problematic of translation arises in connection with the ubiquity of cultural 
delimitation and boundary-drawing, and is applicable to all levels and stages of 
meaning-generation. Translation refers to the manner of negotiating the boundaries 
between multiple spaces of identity and otherness; meaning as such, according to 
Peirce, „may be defined as the translation of a sign into another system of signs‟ 
(1931-58: 127, quoted in Holquist 1990: 50). I have covered the mechanism of 
„translation‟ between different cultures, „languages‟ or semiotic systems as 
conceptualised by Lotman (1990; 1992b; 1996) in greater detail elsewhere 
(Viktorova 2003); here, I will highlight the points that are most relevant in view of 
the problematic of conflict and peacebuilding. 
 
While logically, meaning can be seen as a prerequisite of translation, Lotman (e.g. 
1990) reverses this relationship by presenting the very possibility of meaning as 
hinging on the existence and incomplete intersection of a minimum of two 
irreconcilably different principles of organisation (these may be exemplified by 
different languages, code systems, logics, cultures etc., at a variety of levels). 
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Translation is thus placed at the very heart of meaning-generation. The incomplete, 
or imperfect – owing to the impossibility of establishing fully equivalent 
correspondences between the different principles of organisation – character of 
translation logically leads to a „skewing‟ of the „message‟ as it passes the boundary 
between them. Thus, translation contributes to the creation of new information, 
which adds another dimension to the stipulated volatility of meanings. Lotman‟s 
view of information as a product, in a sense, of mis-translation may give rise to very 
controversial arguments, given the possibility of wilful abuse of this principle. 
However, the contention of his statement seems more reserved: far from fomenting 
the unchecked application of this principle, he sought to direct attention to the fact 
that fully „adequate‟ communication would never produce any new information. 
„We might recall Wittgenstein‟s remark that within logic you cannot say anything 
new,‟ Lotman writes (1990: 14; 36-7), arguing that „mis-translations‟ are a source of 
creative potential both in art and science (1996: 47; cf. Feyerabend 1975). Even in a 
situation of auto-communication (where the message is intended for oneself), new 
information is „imparted‟ into the message by the temporal non-identity of its 
„sender‟ and „receiver‟ (Lotman 1992b). 
 
An important area of application of these ideas is cross-cultural communication 
(broadly defined). Since cultural delimitation is premised on a postulation and 
elevation of one‟s distinctiveness into an organising principle, the existence of a 
„common‟ language for communication with a cultural „other‟ appears to be a 
contradiction in terms. However, it has to be recalled that delimitation is inevitably 
conventional (based as it is on self-description (Lotman 1990)), and it serves to 
obscure not only a measure of external commonality but also internal diversity and 
difference. Translation across „internal‟ boundaries of culture thus can be treated as 
„pilot cases‟ of translation across the external limit, and images of internal otherness 
can step in to represent and mediate the external „other.‟ Thus, a dilemma of 
untranslatability dissolves into a series of incomplete and imperfect translations 
involving both the degrees of internal otherness and external sameness. „Translation‟ 
can also be used to conceptualise the shifts between the latent forms of existence of 
a language, practice, or the social structure and their articulation in individual 
utterance or action. The inevitable innovation introduced to collective „templates of 
action‟ through the instances of their actualisation (cf. Spinosa 2001) serves to 
explain one of the aspects of cultural change. Others will be considered below. 
The tropological movement 
Rhetoric is well-placed to illuminate the ambivalence of the cultural production of 
meaning that arises from contrasting the empirical inaccessibility of culture in any 
other form than through actualised, articulated meanings (alluding to the 
inseparability of the cultural „content‟ and „form‟) with the insight into the processes 
involved in churning out such „finite‟ cultural forms. Although explicitly concerned 
with the expressive dimension of culture, rhetorical analysis can also reveal the 
interests involved in one or another form of cultural production of meaning. With 
reference to the problematic of culture in the context of conflict and peace, rhetoric 
draws attention to what is expressed as pertaining to culture; in what manner it is 
expressed, and what that manner can reveal with respect to various interests at play 
and ways in which these are negotiated. In other words, since the „politics‟ of culture 
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is played out rhetorically, rhetoric can offer an insight into what is involved in the 
making of this politics. However, for approaching this problematic it seems 
necessary to descend by a step and examine the means through which any rhetoric 
operates – the trope. 
 
References to the trope in this work do not pursue the objective of mustering a 
toolkit for rhetorical analysis; rather, the idea is to grasp the generic quality of 
operation demonstrated by any trope, and identify the key features of „tropological‟ 
movement and its place in the problematic of meaning-generation. Alongside their 
attempts to classify tropes according to the poetic devices they employ, literary 
scholars such as Roman Jakobson, Paul de Man, and Gerard Genette have 
pinpointed the tendency whereby the features which distinguish one trope from 
another are also found in other tropes: for instance, the possibility of metaphor is 
enabled by the operation of metonymy, and vice versa (e.g. Ohnuki-Tierney 1991: 
182). Such tropological cross-contamination can also be observed when features 
isolated in an allegory are then noted, „allegorically,‟ to reverberate in other areas of 
the text (and intertext) hitherto not perceived as allegorical (cf. Clifford 1986b). 
Similar effects sometimes plague the concepts employed in theoretical analysis: for 
instance, „violence‟ (Riches 1986b) or „culture‟ (Hudson 1997b) are often perceived 
to „invade‟ the realms so vast that their initial dissipated definitions require a more 
rigorous secondary re-inscription of conceptual boundaries. Analytically, the 
described tropological movement can be conceived of as a different, „secondary‟ 
phase of signification, but in practice it also forms the core of the „primary‟ phase of 
meaning-generation (as was shown in section (i)).  
 
The mechanism of translation discussed above relies on a tropological 
rapprochement of the mutually untranslatable „languages‟ or principles of 
organisation within and across cultures. The trope offers the most convincing 
illustration of the self-referential character of the problematic of meaning-
generation, through a „seamless‟ oscillation between levels at which it occurs. 
Admittedly, even writing about trope involves thinking in „illegitimately‟ 
tropological figures (as attested to by the increased number of quotes in the third 
section of this chapter). Referring to intertextuality of meanings is one way to grasp 
the rhetorical movement whereby meanings are tropologically „carried over‟ from 
one context to another, forging, at times, very heterogeneous links (i.e. not only 
between the texts of similar cultural standing, but across genres, scales and levels of 
analysis) (cf. Pechey 1989). This aspect of rhetorical movement comes to the fore 
when contrasting the processual dimension of the cultural „production‟ of meaning 
with the view of culture as an end-result of such collective practice – i.e. the 
manifestations of cultural activity embodied in social norms, structures, artefacts, 
beliefs etc. In this context, the rhetorical movement crosses over the separation into 
production and product, when the seemingly „finished‟ elements or „chunks‟ of 
cultural „matter‟ re-enter the production process and participate in the creation of 
new meanings. In this light, second-order conceptualisations of culture acquire an 
equal footing with the first-order cultural „material‟ (cf. Geetrz 1973b), and how 
actors speak about culture becomes a source of insight into how culture „works.‟ 
This conclusion will be capitalised upon in the next chapter (4), while for the 
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present, the discussion will focus on another mechanism of cultural dynamics and 
change – the change of „templates.‟ 
Cultural ‘templates’ 
Bauman‟s account of ambivalence regarding the simultaneous enabling and 
constraining effects of culture (1999), hinging on the processes of selection and 
naturalisation of partial repertoires of possible meanings, points to a host of other 
potentialities which culture excludes from any given self-description, but which 
nonetheless remain in place as latent, dormant possibilities that may or may not 
become actualised as a result of redrawing of the cultural boundaries of „self.‟ This 
suggest a possibility of the existence of multiple potential parallel (albeit diverse and 
contradictory) „tracks‟ of cultural development. Furthermore, according to Lotman, 
quite unpredictable „switches‟ between these parallel tracks are possible which, on 
occasions, may redraw cultural boundaries in totally unprecedented ways (1992a). In 
addition to the mechanism of translation as a rapprochement between the elements 
of different languages or organising principles, there is a specific stage or form of 
the dynamic development of semiotic systems – Lotman calls it „explosion‟ – which, 
as it were, removes the boundaries of untranslatability, merging the incompatible 
elements into a unified whole (Lotman 1992a: 40-43). Such „explosion‟ marks the 
peak of indeterminacy in the system‟s development, and it can, on the one hand, be 
regarded as transcendental to the system‟s “normal” state, while, on the other, 
constituting a part of the system‟s own development logic (Lotman 1996: 321). 
„Systemic‟ connotations notwithstanding (see (i)), the concept of „explosion‟ can be 
utilised with respect to dramatic cultural change to refer to the fusion of meaningful 
oppositions and distinctions and the redrawing of divisions in novel ways. Situations 
of violent conflict, often noted to upset habitual patterns of cultural practices, would 
be a logical area of application for this concept. 
 
As with the „primary‟ selection of meanings, which can be revised and amended in 
the process of contestation, so, by way of „tropological‟ extrapolation, is the case 
with the larger „“chunks” of “prefabricated” cultural response‟ (Swidler 1986, 
quoted in Hudson 1997: 7-9) – or the „templates of human strategy‟ (Hudson 1997: 
7-9). Bauman‟s view of culture as „a matrix of possible permutations, a set never 
fully implemented and always far from completion‟ (1999: xxix) is also permissive 
of a large measure of dynamism. The presumption of multiplicity of possible 
cultural templates, including within a single culture, is based on the inherent 
partiality of cultural delimitation and on the dynamics between the actualised and 
latent cultural repertoire, predicated upon the exchange between the central areas 
under the control of „self-description‟ and the largely invisible peripheral areas of 
dissent (see Tynyanov 1976; Viktorova 2003). Needless to say, the establishment of 
equivalence and continuity between the instances of following one or another 
cultural template relies on tropological approximation and translation. 
 
The „rhetorical‟ character of cultural continuity can help illuminate how culture‟s 
inherent mutability coexists with the perception of its longevity and self-identity. 
While the „ways of surviving‟ in an environment are fixed „by social custom‟ (Lal 
1999), both elements of this equation may be subject to change. Environments 
periodically undergo change that will require adaptation of the „ways of surviving;‟ 
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social custom, as a product of cultural ambivalence in terms of the enabling and 
constraining effects on human action and agency, should not be regarded simply as 
cemented once-and-for-all in particular choices, but rather viewed dynamically as a 
tension continually accompanying any cultural „performance‟ or situation of choice. 
As with any cultural forms, the „templates‟ of action are only conventionally 
„readily fashioned:‟ many practice theorists allude to the „improvisational character‟ 
of even „instituted forms of life‟ (Spinosa 2001: 199; see also de Certeau 1984: 21; 
Neumann 2002: 633) in parallel to the recognition of situational (and variable) 
articulation of identity. In addition, the very idea that routinised customs lack 
„novelty‟ can be disputed. Thus, scholars of ritual maintain that ritual behaviour may 
serve to re-actualise meanings of „eternal‟ relevance, thus creating new instances of 
meaning (see Bell 1992; Schirch 2005); semioticians, likewise, emphasise the 
novelty imparted by every act of reading the same text (e.g. Lotman 1990, 1992b). 
Practice scholars also insist that even a limited repertoire of possibilities leaves 
significant (albeit not infinite) room for creative combination and innovation (de 
Certeau 1984; Schatzki et al. 2001). 
 
The understanding of culture as a set of templates for action on the one hand, and the 
recognition of their variable actualisation (i.e. dormant vs. active templates), on the 
other, combine to explain the volatility of culture – the tension between continuity 
and change which can be realised in a variety of forms. The question of utmost 
relevance for the problematic of conflict and peace is not only how the times of 
violent upheaval contribute to (and are enabled by) the switching between the 
alternative cultural templates, but also how these templates may be differentiated in 
terms of the types of conflict behaviours they legitimise and order. The radical shifts 
from the „state of peace‟ to the „state of violence‟ (cf. Zulaika and Douglass 1996) 
can be conceptualised in terms of a change of templates, considering the rapid 
reorientation of cultural codes from peacetime norms to those of war and enmity. It 
is important to emphasise that the „cultures of violence‟ or „conflict‟ do not develop 
„outside‟ culture, and do not necessarily follow a different set of templates „to the 
letter‟ – rather, a creative reinterpretation of the existing cultural forms in the new 
context as well as „invention‟ occurs, contributing to the perception of „volatility.‟ 
What may be concluded from Zulaika and Douglass‟ view of „peace‟ and „war‟ as 
the states established foremost discursively (1996) is not that they are relative and 
arbitrary to the point of illegitimacy of distinguishing between them, but rather that 
each state has a corresponding „baggage‟ of conventions which kick into action once 
one or the other state is convincingly articulated. The patterns and outcomes of 
cultural „interpretation‟ and sense-making will change accordingly, bringing about 
novel and unpredictable repercussions.  
 
The simultaneous presence of several cultural „possibilities‟ in any given culture 
opens the question of the possibility of „manipulation‟ in terms of enhancing the 
chances of actualisation of one or another template. Apart from deconstructing the 
instances of cultural „steering‟ towards violence that may be exercised by conflict 
entrepreneurs, the acknowledgement of this broader repertoire of cultural options 
also bears a promise for culturally-informed conflict transformation, which implies 
retuning from the actualised violent options to the „peaceful,‟ non-violent templates 
which are (or can be – bearing in mind the unfinished character of cultural 
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production) conceptualised by participants as part of their own culture (cf. Lederach 
1997). In this light, it becomes obvious that neither of the predominant trends of 
relating culture to conflict – either idealising (or „romanticising‟ (Richmond 2007a, 
2009b)) culture as the answer to the troubles of conflict, or condemning it as the 
culprit behind the existence of „harmful‟ or violent practices – is particularly fruitful 
for conflict transformation. Rather, cultural pathways into violence need to be 
examined together with those that lead away from it, and only addressing the 
cultural mechanisms through which the recourse to violence is regulated can open a 
route to identify the points at which more peaceful options can be actualised. 
Peacebuilding in its institutionalised form, of course, can also be regarded as an 
attempt to effect a change of templates, combining the reinstatement of templates 
associated with „peacetime‟ behaviours with the creation of new ones to cement the 
cultural „choice‟ in favour of non-violence. However, by engaging with the 
dynamics of cultural change in exceedingly superficial and unconscious manner, it 
usually contributes to the increase in cultural „volatility,‟ putting into place 
additional avenues of meaning-generation (as well as social practices) whose 
outcome is an unknown variable (cf. Large 2007).  
Cultural change and the issue of ‘social fabric’ 
This sub-section revisits some aspects of the debate presented in Chapter 2 
concerning the effects of violent conflict on the „social fabric‟ and cohesion from the 
theoretical perspective elaborated in this chapter. In the light of the ambivalence 
(world-making cum -unmaking) of the cultural production of reality, any outcome of 
„condensation‟ of culture into its „final state‟ can be no more than a construct – a 
product of „self-description.‟ Politically, this aspect is particularly important with 
regard to frequent references to the „destruction‟ of culture (under the influence of 
conflict or globalisation (e.g. Sen 2004)), as well as to the ways in which cultural 
change is evaluated (both from inside and outside). Crucially, such appraisals also 
take place in a cultural context, and the approval or condemnation of changes are 
significant as both cultural and political possibilities. The issue of evaluation of 
cultural change (along the normative and/or axiological axis) is likely to be subject 
to the same „political‟ biases as the production of culture itself – depending on 
which particular interests and rights are seen as „natural‟ (on which there may be 
diverging internal and external perspectives). That, in turn, hinges upon the political 
act of identifying the legitimate agents (or subjects) of that change. 
 
An important implication of the described ambivalence is that in situations where 
culture allegedly gets „damaged‟ or „destroyed‟ by violent conflict, it is both the 
enabling and constraining potential of it that is affected; the resulting loss of cultural 
inhibitions, in turn, may again be ambivalent: whereas it may negate the 
„disallowing‟ of certain types of behaviour (thus possibly legitimising violence), the 
weakening of boundaries may also provoke their creative rethinking and result in 
opening up and enriching the existing repertoire of practices (related, for instance, to 
physical survival, or creation of new senses of reality) beyond the erstwhile cultural 
ambit of the community (Nordstrom 1994). (For example, Förster‟s research (2006) 
demonstrates the emergence of alternative bases of trust and patterns of social 
dependability in situations where violent conflict appears to have destroyed the 
general climate of trust.) In this sense, it is difficult to determine where cultural 
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change and adaptation end, and „destruction‟ begins: the irreversibility of change is a 
poor criterion since it fits most change; and the opinion of the bearers of a given 
culture can also be influenced by their personal sense of loss vs. gain with regard to 
the change. In some cases, temporary compromises with regard to surviving in ways 
perceived as not culturally „appropriate‟ create a gap between the cultural norm and 
actual practice, which also leads to reshaping of the idea of the cultural self. Yet this 
gap could be negotiated differently, either acquiring „positive‟ connotations where 
the actual practice receives cultural legitimation (for instance, through connection to 
earlier cultural norms of however „mythical‟ status, as with the supposed desirability 
of the Biblical „milk and honey‟ that is reiterated in folk and fairy tales (cf. 
Grigorjeva 1998)); or it may be conceptualised as „negative‟ – a state of cultural 
„impurity‟ where the golden age of culture is left behind, and the present is seen as a 
degrading compromise. Although either possibility can be regarded as belonging to 
the ideational level, and partial nature of any interpretation leaves room for 
conflicting appraisals, such interpretations routinely inform specific practices which 
may have a bearing on conflict behaviour (as illustrated by the positions of 
„hardliners‟ in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). The outcome of interpretation would 
also depend on whether the culture can fall back on „emergency strategies‟ in the 
form of established alternative templates for action (e.g. the system of remote farms 
that can be turned into „emergency‟ settlements in rural Sierra Leone (Ferme 2001)), 
as well as the cultural connotations of their deployment. This, in turn, connects to 
the cultural status of survival and the self-image of cultural resilience, as reflected, 
for instance, in the existing cultural narratives of survival (such as the blockade of 
Leningrad during WWII). 
 
Chabal and Daloz (2006) note that the myths of identity – e.g. of common heroic 
descent – are invoked at times of crisis; rather than a product of age-long tradition, 
the „tradition‟ is called into being by the perceived insecurity of identity. This tallies 
well with Bakhtin‟s notion of identity as belonging in the realm of „otherness‟ (i.e. 
of the „self‟ being delimited and defined only through an encounter with „others‟ (cf. 
Barth 1969), while to oneself the „self‟ always appears unbounded and „unfinished‟) 
(Bakhtin 1986: 34, 39-40, 82, 87, 103, 117). Emphasis of some writers on the 
continual, processual character of identity production is reflected it the 
terminological preference for „identification‟ over „identity‟ (Kaiser and Nikiforova 
2006; cf. Lévinas 1996). A consideration of these two factors – the increased 
salience of cultural identity at the times of crisis and the continual character of its 
„production‟ – should allow for reasonable doubt with regard to claims that violent 
conflict inevitably has devastating effects on „the social fabric‟.  
 
Finer aspects of this issue of course depend on the definitions of „social fabric,‟ and 
what is understood as its destruction. To take Bakhtin‟s analogy of identification as 
„consummation‟ further, the act of delineating one‟s identity signals both the 
beginning and an end of one‟s correspondence to oneself: the „identity‟ is fixed in its 
definition while one continues to evolve beyond, and regardless of, one‟s boundaries 
(cf. Viktorova 2003). In this sense, „identity‟ signifies non-identity; a past sameness 
that is fixed in a discursive mode of existence (Hansen 2007). A similar logic 
underlies Lotman‟s self-description which is produced at the expense of non-identity 
with oneself (1990; Doty 1998). Likewise, the momentary non-identity of de-
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familiarisation – one of Heidegger‟s two „modes‟ of experiencing things – is 
postulated as crucial for grasping the essence of the practice, its embedded character, 
its connections with other practices and ideas about one‟s life (see Schatzki et al. 
2001). However, the non-identity required for de-familiarising one‟s view of culture 
as a whole can come with a price of a non-negotiable breach with its essence: to take 
the Heideggerian allegory further, „the “essence of hammer” comes to our attention, 
and so becomes object of cognition, only when the hammer has been broken‟ 
(Bauman 1999: xxiv). With respect to the problematic of cultural change, this again 
suggests endless possibilities of controversy: if every definition of culture signifies a 
breach with its identity, how is it possible to differentiate between a heightened 
awareness of one‟s culture at the time of conflict, and its perceived destruction? It 
appears that the possibility for performing such appraisals hinges on the availability 
of some cultural perspective, and will be directed by the inscribed cultural biases and 
interests: outside of a cultural perspective (whether the same or a different one), any 
talk of the destruction of culture would ring hollow. This relationship also seems to 
apply in reverse, for if the identification via de-familiarisation of human relations 
and beings carries such a problematic „destructive‟ potential, then it must be at the 
very heart of culture as organisation of meanings, since delimitation and non-
identity are involved in every instance of cultural production of meaning.  
 
A further problem in view of such „destructive‟ connotations of the heightened 
awareness of culture is whether cultural re-familiarisation – i.e. the sinking of the 
„social‟ and „cultural‟ back into the unarticulated context of culture as „common 
sense‟ – is possible or desirable. One implication of this problem is that the turning 
of communal identity more salient during reconciliation by no means predefines the 
exact terms of the renewed self-description: the ambivalence coded into the 
processes of identification may result in either acceptance or rejection of people with 
contested identity, such as the former combatants, abductees, their children and so 
on. Re-definition of the boundaries of identity may take a „generous‟ path by making 
people reflect on the deeper principles and bases of their commonality (cf. Just 
1991) enabling inclusive identification; or it may turn to the exclusive delimitation, 
especially in situations where „purity‟ of identity (cf. Malkki 1995) is linked to 
loyalty in terms of mutual protection and survival. Another aspect of this is that the 
allusions to „cultural ruptures‟ also engender their own meaningful fields, and, albeit 
this way of presenting the problem alludes to certain political interests which 
become „naturalised‟ through its discursive currency, such naturalisation also 
implies that meanings and values with which this particular way of „fixing‟ reality is 
invested are perceived as coming under blows when the boundaries that fix it are 
endangered. Thus, the dissolution of meanings, the perception of violation of 
identities of personal and cultural „selves‟ also forms an important aspect of the 
problematic of instability of meanings, although it cannot be dismissed as a „natural‟ 
part of meaning-production process that will happen anyway, because its axiological 
connotations are also drawn into the process of constructing meanings. 
Conclusion 
Building on the understanding of culture as the realm of the meaningful (Geertz 
1973), the offered conceptualisation analysed the processes and mechanisms of 
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signification (or meaning-generation) as the „common architectonic moments‟ 
(Bakhtin 1994b: 51-2; cf. Pechey 1989) which connect the diverse manifestations 
and functions of culture. Although the theoretical framework has disassembled 
meaning-generation into different aspects, this is a heuristic simplification of 
processes which in „real life situations‟ usually perform simultaneously, so that a 
reference to one of the aspects (e.g. „self-description‟) automatically entails the 
presence or functioning of other aspects of meaning-generation. The prime purpose 
of the resulting framework has been to substantiate the terminological framing of the 
subsequent analyses of the „culture of liberal peacebuilding‟ and its relationship with 
the „local‟ culture in the case of Sierra Leone‟s conflict, so as to permit me to refer 
to notions such as „the regime of signification‟ or „rhetorical totalisation of the 
“template” of peace‟ without inviting too much controversy. However, the analytical 
vocabulary was designed with a view to enable its application to other empirical 
cases as well, and therefore its potential limitations require at least a perfunctory 
examination before it is used in empirical analysis.  
 
One of the practical limitations of the offered approach (which is perhaps a feature 
of any critical account) consists in the inconclusive nature of „embedded‟ cultural 
analysis. As demonstrated above, culture cannot be exempted from the domain of 
human interest (as a „thing‟ of supreme and supra-circumstantial value – an 
understanding that is often casually implied in the laments about culture being 
destroyed by violent conflict, or in praising the achievements of a particular culture). 
Yet this should not be read as an invitation to a relativistic cynicism where 
everything is reduced to „mere‟ interest which (e.g. unlike „needs‟ (Burton 1990)) is 
ultimately expendable and negotiable (Chabal and Daloz 2006: 71). On the contrary, 
the examination of meaning-generation serves to demonstrate how interests are tied 
in with the very basic needs of survival (via naturalisation of meanings that 
complement the deficient human instinct apparatus), and these ties are often laid 
bare by situations of conflict in which habitual cultural patterns are disturbed, and 
the meanings (and patterns of signification) are re-negotiated amidst radically 
different circumstances and by different means (and with varying degrees of 
success). These processes (and the fundamental significational „dramas‟ involved in 
them) illustrate the seeming contradiction between the claims about the damaging 
effects of conflict on the social fabric and the stark revelations regarding cultural 
adaptability and resourcefulness (Duffield 2001; Nordstrom 1994; NP 2007a). Both 
views can be politically problematic, since in their upshot they lead either to taking 
local culture for granted (de-problematising what is sometimes referred to as 
„harmful practices,‟ such as the exclusion of women) or to a view that it is 
mouldable and pliable to a point where its precise substance ceases to matter (which, 
in turn, de-problematises the unreserved political and societal reform characteristic 
of the dominant paradigm of peacebuilding interventions). These considerations 
draw any cultural analysis into the midst of dilemmas related to representation, or 
„fixing,‟ of certain cultural images without which a study of culture cannot proceed, 
and illuminate the complicity of the analyst in constructing the object of enquiry. 
While awareness of these dangers will inform the application of the developed 
analytical framework in the following empirical chapters, they do remain an overall 
matter of concern, especially for peacebuilding practice. 
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Since no perspective can be elevated above interest or culture, there is no 
uncontroversial vantage point from which to judge the „righteousness‟ of one or 
another cultural „cause.‟ That conflict can, indeed, unsettle the habitual cultural 
patterns does not necessarily lead to either condemning it as harmful for culture or 
abetting it as an opening for the institution of more liberal and democratic 
governance: While it does create cultural volatility and opportunity for „revision,‟ 
such opportunities should, perhaps, be evaluated in view of the multiplicity of local 
interests and stakes in the direction(s) of change (where cultural and political change 
may well be fused together). Policy-wise, refraining form involvement is perhaps 
not a feasible option, considering both the established „culture‟ of interventionism 
and the more ominous transnational forces that are already shaping conflict 
dynamics (Kaldor 1999). But if uniform allegiance to the liberal-democratic 
dogmata could be made less formalistic (for instance, by reducing the scope of 
bureaucratic procedures directing the development of „civil society‟), peacebuilding 
could open a way for a more balanced, „insider-partial‟ (Lederach 1997) 
involvement. As argued in the next chapter, a greater awareness of „local‟ culture, as 
well as cultural processes and dynamics in general, may provide a necessary impetus 
for unsettling the uniform discourse of the liberal peace. 
 
The above discussion leads to another problematic issue of utmost relevance. Given 
that partiality and interests are so deeply embedded in the social structures and 
invoked regardless of the intentions of the speaker/user, what to make of cases 
where these mechanisms are consciously (ab)used? How does the intentional 
„production‟ of bias affect the underlying processes of signification? And more 
generally, is there a principled difference between the unconscious „use‟ and 
conscious „abuse,‟ given that the boundary between the two is drawn from within 
the selfsame system of conventions that is given life by the inherently biased 
processes of meaning-generation? It can be argued that drawing attention to the 
inherently biased quality of signification may open ways for intentional 
manipulation and thus pave way for „crooked‟ political practice. On the other hand, 
leaving these mechanisms implicit cannot guard anyone against manipulation, for 
only a genuine understanding of cultural mechanisms of meaning-production will 
command a deep awareness of the ambivalence (to do with the power dimension and 
its often incalculable implications) that any discussion about, or involvement with, 
culture will generate. And it is this awareness of manipulability which can help 
counter the abuses of the „dangerous knowledge‟ that a critical examination of 
culture commands, while imposing certain limits on its own „power.‟ 
 
For example, one identifiable recipe for abuse lies in the possibility of casual 
lumping together of diverse parts of the critical argument (about the interrelations 
between power, violence, culture, meaning, boundary-drawing etc.) into easily 
digestible sound bites as a guide for monological policy-making and implementation 
of „truth‟ into practice (cf. Fall 2008) in the approach of liberal peacebuilding. The 
often lamented lack of „practical‟ applicability of critical scholarship becomes a 
contributing factor to the seductiveness of monological simplifications and 
associations, manifested in the contraction of hosts of inherently debatable and 
contentious terms into mythological certainties. Yet, cultural critique offers more 
than a mere possibility of cooptation into the dominant discourse, for it is uniquely 
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positioned to illuminate the rhetorical devices that lead to the fusion of dialogical 
debates into monological axioms. (Keeping an eye out for rhetorical allusions to 
universal solutions and answers, although a simplistic tool, is surprisingly useful, as 
demonstrated in the following chapter.) However, this is where the ambition of the 
critical enterprise meets its limit, because ultimately, the effectiveness of such 
exposure hinges on a wider awareness of dangers and devices of monological 
closure, and this carries an inevitable „missionary‟ component in that the general 
public needs to be „educated‟ in this regard. This premise, in turn, implies presenting 
such „educational effort‟ as universally useful, which would reposition the critical 
thought in the province of „traditional‟ disciplinary knowledge. Yet, this ultimate 
indefensibility of the critical position is its surest safeguard against hegemonic 
closure, and it is in this light that I confess the inherent partiality of the offered 
analytical framework.  
 
As argued in the Introduction, the avoidance of culture in the analyses of social 
processes and phenomena is not an altogether tenable option. Discussion of 
meaning-generation without reference to culture, while technically feasible, would 
fail to communicate its far-reaching effects on the production of reality, both 
semiotically (through the chosen and articulated meanings) and practically (through 
action informed by cultural worldviews and beliefs). Moreover, avoidance of 
engaging with culture, far from a manifestation of a thoroughly a-cultural stance, 
would in itself represent a cultural strategy, affecting the construction of reality and 
generation of meanings. Given the impossibility of avoiding the discussion of 
culture, awareness of the risks outlined above constitutes the only, however 
nebulous, safeguard against analytical and political abuse of the vocabulary of 
cultural analysis. In short, the impossibility of finding a „foolproof‟ way of 
approaching culture is a concomitant effect of the embeddedness of any serious 
cultural enquiry, and to pretend otherwise would imply underestimating the full 
implications of situatedness of the cultural problematic. 
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4. The Culture of Liberal Peacebuilding 
 
 
… in this sorry world, the symbol is the thing. 
 
– Neil Gaiman, American Gods 
 
Introduction 
The culture of liberal peacebuilding as a whole has not been an explicit focus of 
scholarly enquiry, although numerous studies have probed different aspects of this 
issue. Some explicitly concern themselves with culture as institutionalised patterns 
of practice and thought that characterise various aspects of peacebuilding. For 
instance, Kapoor investigates „the culture of development policy‟ based on the 
choice and framing of issues in a succession of development paradigms (2008: 19-
37). Duffey scrutinises the practices and assumptions which structure the 
interactions of different agents within peacekeeping interventions (peacekeepers, aid 
agencies and so on) as well as between them and the recipient populations (2000; 
see also Fetherston and Nordstrom 1995). Others focus on symbols and collective 
rites, which endow peacekeeping (both in terms of individual operations and as a 
general activity) with a sense of continuity and meaningfulness shared by its agents 
(peacekeepers) (Rubinstein 1998). Yet other studies, albeit not necessarily explicitly 
concerned with „culture,‟ through their critique of the liberal peace offer important 
insights into ideas which bolster the liberal approach to peacebuilding and practices 
it engenders (e.g. Fetherston 2002a, b; Richmond 2005; Jabri 2007). These studies 
have served as a major source of inspiration for the analysis attempted in this 
chapter, not only through indicating the trends in the interpretation of liberal 
peacebuilding, but also by helping to illuminate its degree of receptiveness towards 
critique (which is suggestive of certain aspects of the culture of liberal 
peacebuilding). Needless to say, texts produced by various agents of liberal 
peacebuilding (policy documents and statements, reports, and so on) have also been 
instrumental for capturing its cultural „self‟ from the perspective outlined in the 
theoretical framework.  
 
Before attempting an analysis of liberal peacebuilding as a „culture,‟ some caveats 
are needed to justify the very possibility of approaching the issue in such a way. 
„Peacebuilding,‟ whether liberal or not, subsumes a wide range of activities, 
methods and palpable objectives – albeit united in their ambition of creating 
conditions for self-perpetuating sustainable peace. It is also an agenda pursued by a 
variety of actors at very different levels (cf. Barnett et al. 2007). What grounds, 
therefore, can there be not only for unifying these under a single banner of (liberal) 
peacebuilding, but also for conceptualising it as a particular culture, given the 
widespread recognition that the liberal „consensus‟ regarding the causes of violent 
conflict and appropriate remedies (Duffield 2001: 73) in fact masks a considerable 
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degree of „dissensus‟ regarding the immediate aims and means of peacebuilding 
(e.g. Richmond and Franks 2006; MacGinty 2008)?  
 
Some grounds for this, ironically, are provided by the breadth of the concept of 
„peacebuilding,‟ and by the largely unspecified nature of its objective, „peace,‟ 
combined with the general agreement regarding its desirability. This may account 
for „[t]he willingness of so many diverse constituencies with divergent and 
sometimes conflicting interests to rally around peacebuilding‟ (Barnett et al. 2007: 
43-4), and „also suggests that one of the concept‟s talents is to camouflage divisions 
over how to handle the postconflict challenge:‟  
  
In this respect, it functions much like a favored political symbol. Symbols are often highly 
ambiguous. Ambiguity can facilitate collective action because different constituencies can 
support the symbol without necessarily achieving consensus on the substance. (Barnett et al. 
2007: 44) 
 
Furthermore, the lack of agreement among its proponents is usually restricted to the 
question of „how‟ best to implement the liberal peace, not „why‟ or „whether.‟ 
Agreement on these latter points is ensured by the matter-of-factness of its 
objectives and accompanying understandings – a known feature of culture as „the 
realm of the given and the undeniable‟ (Geertz 1983: 73-93, quoted in Cohen 1998: 
117). The aspiration towards the universal observance of human rights, the rule of 
law, democracy and market economy is perceived as self-explanatory, and that its 
implementation may clash with local realities or cultural differences „is not a 
dilemma‟ (UN PBC 2007), but rather a cause for reassurance in the rightness of the 
chosen course of reform, given that local practices are viewed as a deviation from 
the norm. References to these markers of the liberal peace also „streamline‟ the 
rhetoric of peacebuilding agents, strengthening the perception of their uniformity 
despite possible differences of opinion – a process also underpinned by a 
convergence in donor priorities (Llamazares and Levy 2003; Holscheiter 2005). 
Although vast volumes of critique directed at various aspects of liberal 
peacebuilding do serve to expose its internal inconsistencies and contradictions (e.g. 
Smith 2003), they also inadvertently contribute to its representation as a single 
paradigm – whether or not they fall into the trap of „caricaturing‟ the liberal peace 
(MacGinty 2008).  
 
Undeniably, this chapter also engages in „authoring‟ liberal peacebuilding from 
outside, „writing‟ its subject together with its alleged culture (cf. Clifford 1986a). 
Yet exposing the mechanism of such authoring – both external and internal, coming 
from the agents of liberal peacebuilding – is hoped to provide an antidote to 
essentialising the liberal peace (or, indeed, to the flaw of „Occidentalism‟ in 
response to the „Orientalising‟ tendencies of the dominant peacebuilding paradigm 
(cf. Said 1978; Kapoor 2008; Richmond 2009b)). The homogenised picture of 
liberal peacebuilding (both as presented here, and as it features in the bulk of the 
critique) makes use of the cultural mechanism of totalisation of meanings; but 
arguably, so does an internal perspective on the liberal peace. The reality of 
negotiation and contestation of meanings is much more complex, but tends to be 
obscured in the perception of „ready‟ cultural texts. This chapter is trying to preserve 
a „double vision,‟ by presenting a critique of such „finished‟ text as „the culture of 
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liberal peacebuilding‟ while drawing attention to the mechanisms „fixing‟ its 
perception as uniform and uncontroversial, and the incompleteness and 
inconsistencies within its self-description, which may evade its advocates and critics 
alike. Although in doing this, I implicitly underwrite the totalising image of the 
liberal peace, to deny the existence of certain common features in its interpretational 
economy would perhaps constitute an even greater violation of the subject (cf. 
Brumann 1997).  
 
Ironically, one of such identifying features of „the culture of liberal peacebuilding‟ 
concerns the understanding of the place and role of culture in the business of 
furthering peace. The prevalent perception among the agents of liberal peacebuilding 
is that culture, while important, is an auxiliary consideration, which can follow, but 
not precede, the cornerstones of peacebuilding identified as the spread of 
democracy, respect for human rights, good governance and so on (UNDP 2007); for 
a more comprehensive „laundry list‟ of peacebuilding activities, see Barnett et al. 
(2007). The core elements of liberal peace are thus presented as a-cultural (or supra-
cultural) and not as a product of a specific cultural environment and tradition. Yet, 
that they should be fundamental to any well-functioning society is seen as common 
sense – something that is internalised and naturalised as the very „stuff‟ of culture 
(see Chapter 3). At a closer look, the presumption of an a-cultural character of the 
core elements of liberal peace betrays its universalist cultural assumptions (cf. Black 
and Avruch 1998: 36). While in itself, a universalist orientation does not imply 
disregard for culture (in fact, many of the mechanisms of its functioning presented in 
this study are arguably also „universal‟), it makes accounting for cultural difference 
more of a challenge – especially when one‟s own position is seen as beyond or 
above culture. As argued below, the inability of the practitioners of liberal peace to 
view it as a particular culture is largely responsible for the lack of dialogical 
engagement with other cultures, which liberal peacebuilding fails to utilise as a point 
of reference from which to „enlighten‟ its own cultural premises (cf. Bakhtin 1975; 
Chapter 3)).  
 
The argument that the awareness of one‟s own cultural framework is essential for 
understanding one‟s impact on the world (cf. Kapoor 2008: 21) applies to the liberal 
peacebuilding in a doubly negative sense, as neither of these two issues appear to 
draw attention of the majority of its practitioners. Yet, the existence of a specific 
cultural „lens‟ (ibid.; see also Chapter 3) makes liberal peacebuilding susceptible to 
seeing and interpreting the issues of conflict and peace, as well as act upon them, in 
certain ways and not others, which serves to perpetuate this culture through praxis 
(cf. Bauman 1999). The identity of liberal peacebuilding actors is very much 
captured in their understandings of what they do – the set of practices and meanings 
in which their repertoire of actions is framed. In this light, the reluctance to engage 
with critical perspectives on the impact of liberal peace is also telling with regard to 
its „culture,‟ as is the centrality of writing in assessing this impact from the 
perspective of the liberal peace itself (as evident in the proliferation of texts – 
reports, programmes, strategies etc.). 
 
These issues and concerns are discussed throughout this chapter. Part I addresses the 
issue of „culture of liberal peacebuilding‟ from the perspective of meaning-
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generation, exploring the specifics of significational dynamics which characterise 
liberal peacebuilding and the forms of knowledge and action enabled by it, and 
particularly with respect to its framing of the issues of conflict and peace. Part II 
looks at the applications – and implications – of this culture in its dealings with its 
„others‟ – such as the issue of culture itself, the critical perspectives on liberal peace 
and alternative conceptualisations of peacebuilding (e.g. Boege 2006; MacGinty 
2007), and last, but not least, local cultures. In preparation for the case study of 
liberal peacebuilding‟s impact on, and ability to engage with, local culture in 
Chapter 5, this chapter also sets a context for exploring the challenges of 
accommodating the „local‟ in the overarching frameworks of the liberal 
peacebuilding enterprise. 
I. Significational dynamics of liberal peacebuilding 
The ‘monologism’ of the liberal peace 
The meanings evoked by the liberal peace – such as „democracy,‟ „human rights,‟ 
„good governance,‟ „the rule of law,‟ and so on, hinge on very peculiar 
significational dynamics. In one sense, they are clearly juxtaposed with their 
„illiberal‟ counterparts (such as autocratic or corrupt regimes, replete with abuses of 
domestic populations and complicit in economic failure), thus forming a classic 
series of hierarchical binary oppositions characteristic of Derrida‟s logocentrism 
(1976). Yet, simultaneously, the „unworthiness‟ of these illiberal opposites 
communicated through the juxtaposition effectively obviates them as rightful 
counterparts of the liberal peace, which appears to face a lack of governance, of 
development, or civil society (cf. Duffield 2001: 27). This makes the liberal peace 
unfold as the sole „real‟ paradigm, ideally placed to fill the perceived political, 
normative, cultural, and economic vacuum amidst, or in the aftermath of, violent 
conflict. Although the discourse of liberal peacebuilding does invoke the illiberal, 
undemocratic, and undeveloped state of dis-organisation (cf. Lotman 1992b: 15; 
Bauman 1999: 98; Chapter 3; EC 1996b: iii) that it comes across in addressing 
conflict, these references serve to reaffirm its self-positioning as the only practicable 
solution.  
 
Such „obliterative‟ significational dynamic suggests that liberal peacebuilding tends 
towards monologism as the overarching regime of meaning-generation. A concept 
coined by Mikhail Bakhtin, „monologism‟ has a counterpart in „dialogism,‟ which 
reflects the inevitably dualistic, dialectical character of formation and functioning of 
meanings, as though always on the cusp between identity and alterity, the „self‟ and 
„other‟ (Bakhtin 1975, 1984, 1986, 1990b; Holquist 1990; Todorov 1998; Viktorova 
2003). Albeit appearing simpler and more rudimentary, „monologism‟ represents the 
(artificial) reduction of dialogism‟s complexity, belying an effort at streamlining the 
„self‟ and subjugating its constitutive difference (Bakhtin 1975: 455). This, as 
discussed in the theoretical framework, is achieved through the mechanism of self-
description, a „secondary‟ act of signification which establishes and „polices‟ the 
boundaries of identity (Lotman 1990: 128, 1992b: 16-7, 1996: 170-3). In the case of 
liberal peacebuilding, its „self-description‟ is maintained through the numerous 
discursive and institutional practices, comprising programmatic statements and 
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rationalisations of its core assumptions in documents, policy planning and 
implementation, as well as reports and reflections on successes and shortcomings, 
„best practices‟ and „lessons learned.‟ As with any self-description, its dictate is not 
absolute, yet its strength is checked not so much by the existence of contradictory 
significational dynamics as such, as by the challenge of reabsorbing it into the 
unifying totality of self-description. In view of the ability of the liberal peace „to co-
opt as its agents many of those actors that one would expect to champion alternative 
(including traditional and indigenous) modes of peace-making,‟ among them NGOs 
and non-Western international and regional organisations (MacGinty 2008: 143), its 
monological self-description appears exceptionally powerful. 
 
Presenting the realities faced by liberal peacebuilding as lacking in organisation 
(Lotman 1992b: 15; Bauman 1999: 98) makes for an effective bordering strategy: 
unlike capitalist imperialism, the liberal peace has been noted to function on the 
basis of exclusion, not inclusion (Duffield 2001: 4). But, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
any boundary also performs consolidating functions, keeping the liberal peace 
consistent despite its internal heterogeneity, as all the different strands of thinking 
and action appear to fuse together in the face of juxtaposition with the chaos of 
conflict (Debrix 1999: 53-5). Many alternative sources of thinking on conflict and 
peace, which cannot be co-opted into its framework, tend to get dismissed as either 
impractical or complicit in the ills of illiberalism (Duffield 2001: 32-3); while those 
which share its core assumptions (such as development) become part of the overall 
framework of „liberal peace‟ which appears to fill the entire horizon of thinkable 
political practice. The qualifier „liberal‟ becomes bracketed out of „liberal 
peacebuilding‟ not only in the perception of its practitioners and ideologues, but also 
in the ways that the paradigm is presented to its subjects as well as wider audiences, 
betraying its „hegemonic‟ status. Yet the inevitable lack of finality coded into any 
self-description manifests itself in the perceived need to reaffirm the liberal peace as 
not only the sole possible, but also the most benign platform for addressing conflict 
(cf. Mandelbaum 2002; Lal 1999). 
 
The shimmering of ambivalence characteristic of this perceived need for dual 
justification – which, ironically, weakens the effect through internalising a 
contradiction (for surely, one cannot be both the only and the best) – constitutes 
something of a leitmotif of monological signification. Although this appears to 
reaffirm the idea that any meaning relies on a correspondence established between 
two incompatible logics or media (which prompted its characterisation in the 
theoretical framework as „tropological‟), in monologism, the distance between the 
two poles of this correspondence all but disappears, and the tropes „collapse‟ onto 
themselves as their irreducible duality is fused together. As a result, distances 
between the opposites cease to exist; signification becomes reality, and policies and 
practices of the liberal peace – despite the elaborate rhetoric of objectives and 
milestones – are the peace offered to populations in post-conflict environments.9 In 
                                                 
9
 I am deliberately avoiding commitment to Baudrillard‟s concept of simulacrum here (1983), for 
although it can be juxtaposed with representation, both concepts can be subsumed within the 
signification problematic of culture (cf. Debrix 1999). Although Debrix utilises Baudrillard‟s concept 
in his analysis of peacekeeping to great effect, the emphasis I wish to make here is not on the absence 
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a similar vein, as will be discussed below, the liberal peace all but collapses the 
distinctions between policy and action; writing and doing; a positive and negative 
view of culture; as well as (most controversially) peace and conflict themselves. 
Although the contradictions between these are still notable despite their fusion, 
monologism proves very effective at disregarding them: the liberal peace functions 
as „a master signifier that may sometimes silence any thought or discussion of other 
alternatives‟ (Richmond and Franks 2006: 4). 
 
„Monologism‟ implies, quite literally, silencing, or subsuming other voices within 
itself, which is notable in the interaction of liberal peacebuilding with its „others.‟ 
Even in cases where the liberal peace makes use of other approaches to conflict 
(such as traditional or indigenous peace-making), it tends to dominate the exchange; 
furthermore, the „co-opted‟ techniques suffer something of a loss of identity, 
authenticity, and specific social function or niche (MacGinty 2008: 156). But losing 
the ability to discern other „voices‟ also leads to the inability to perceive itself as a 
particular voice, or perspective (cf. Bakhtin 1975: 180-1; 190b: 517). As argued by 
Fetherston, 
 
The extent to which conflict resolution and peacekeeping in both theory and practice are 
fundamentally mis-directed is the extent to which they are unable to make visible the 
political framework within which they are formed… (2000a: 198, quoted in Martín 2005: 
12) 
 
The monological predisposition also contributes to the effacement of internal 
inconsistencies within the liberal peace paradigm – for instance, between the 
elements of classical liberalism and neoconservative ideology (Gowan 2008) – with 
distinctions losing their acuteness in the face of the absolute difference of the 
external other of conflict and its illiberal motors (cf. Laclau 2000). Similar 
approximation can be observed with regard to the array of policies of liberal 
peacebuilding, which fuse the objectives with very different rationale requiring 
different terms of engagement – such as developing civil society, economic 
liberalisation, human rights, reconciliation, and security sector reform – into a single 
„package‟ of liberal democratic governance. Everything becomes the same within 
the liberal peace, and is presumed to submit to the same logic of policy and 
governance. A consequential effect of such uniformalisation of the internal space of 
signification is the inability of liberal peacebuilding to discern the points of 
(in)compatibility between itself and the existing political, economic and social 
practice, making it impossible to fathom the resilience of, say, corruption despite the 
introduction of new institutional formats. Nor does it allow for estimating the degree 
of its own impact, since monologism lacks the semiotic tools necessary to discern all 
but the most radical difference, making it difficult for the liberal peace to zoom in on 
the gradations of its own success and leaving but one viable indicator of failure – the 
relapse into violent conflict.  
 
Of course, despite representing an overarching tendency, the monologism of liberal 
peacebuilding is neither entirely dominant nor uniform, being but a „self-
                                                                                                                                         
of the signified, but on the disappearance of difference and distance between the signifier and 
signified.   
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description,‟ albeit a very powerful one that is also buttressed by its „external‟ 
portrayals. Yet, this tendency is hardly accidental, for many of the core conceptions 
and practices of the liberal peace, as demonstrated throughout the following sections 
of this chapter, consistently erode the spaces of otherness from which its monologue 
could be interrogated. In this regard, liberal peacebuilding could be styled as an heir 
of the colonial discourse, whose monologism renders its subaltern colonial „other‟ 
voiceless, and even instances where it appears to be spoken for by those consciously 
trying to empower it lead only to its continual subjugation within the hegemony of 
the colonial monologue (cf. Spivak 1988; Kapoor 2008: 9). The colonial discourse 
shares another feature of significational dynamics typical of liberal peacebuilding – 
the „shimmering‟ of opposites merged in one, which both cement and unbalance its 
dictate (Bhabha 2004; Kapoor 2008: 7-8). The power of monologism itself can be 
linked to its affinity with the mythological mode of perception which operates 
within the confines of a single „language‟ (Lotman 1990, 1992b; Viktorova 2003). 
The function of myth is to provide the „founding stories‟ which „address the giving 
of being, and hence what is considered most fundamental and existential. Myths are 
answers to questions like: why life, why being, why responsibility‟ (Laustsen and 
Wæver 2000: 717). These themes are very noticeable in the rationalisations that the 
discourse of liberal peacebuilding offers for its policy on issues like conflict, 
poverty, development, security, and so on. The mythological/monological leanings 
of the liberal peace present it as a universe in itself, while simultaneously disabling 
alternative conceptualisations of life, being, and responsibility – as well as peace, 
conflict, power, culture, etc. In the case of the liberal peace, the power of „myth‟ is 
further magnified by the apparent reliance of liberal peacebuilding on a highly 
rational approach to knowledge, which is traditionally juxtaposed with myth 
(Lotman 1990, 1992b; Viktorova 2003). Internalisation of this paradox within the 
„monologue‟ of liberal peacebuilding will be discussed in one of the upcoming 
sections of this chapter. For now, the discussion turns to the merging of another 
opposition – that between peace and conflict (or war). 
The merging of peace and war 
The co-existence of seemingly incompatible significational modalities 
corresponding to peace and war within the same cultural horizon was addressed 
above (Chapter 3) through the concept of cultural „templates.‟ Clearly, the „othering‟ 
of war by way of creating „a dichotomy between war as some kind of inherent “bad” 
… and peace as an ideal “good”‟ (Richards 2005a: 3), points to a separation of the 
templates of war and peace within the culture of liberal peacebuilding. As with the 
„others‟ of underdevelopment and illiberalism, the template of war is negated as a 
radical other to which liberal peacebuilding juxtaposes itself as the only viable 
option, thus positioning the template of war entirely outside the culture of liberal 
peace. Such radical „othering‟ creates a curious twist in its interpretational schemata, 
whereby whatever takes place within the liberal peace is not war by definition (cf. 
Zulaika and Douglass 1996: 13). As a result, the liberal peace loses receptiveness 
towards the manifestations of war within its own domain. Far from signalling 
unwavering pacifism, therefore, the radical exclusion of war „smuggles‟ it back 
inside the template of peace. 
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Peace and war have always been entwined in political practice and thought, with war 
often regarded as the ultimate instrument of peace (St Augustin 1945; Russell 1977). 
The recognition of „the intimate and constitutive relationship between war and 
peace‟ (Jabri 2007: 2) is underscored by the impossibility of their conceptual 
isolation, manifest in the frequent practice of defining them through one another (cf. 
Hobbes 1985: 186; Jabri 1996: 34). Although the early liberal thought in IR sought 
to present war as an unnecessary deviation from politics proper (e.g. Brown 2005: 
21-2, 103), this view of war forms rather an exception in political philosophy and 
practice, which is mostly oriented towards the regulation of war rather than its 
abolition (cf. Jabri 2007: 3; Brown 2005: 103). In addition, violent conflicts of the 
post-Cold War era have powerfully exposed peace and war as poles of a continuum 
rather than mutually exclusive states (e.g. Darby and MacGinty 2000; Richards 
2005b), which is also reflected in the recognition of „inconclusiveness‟ of liberal 
peace interventions with regard to their success in ending wars (e.g. Paris 2004). The 
impression of „inconclusiveness‟ also extends to the attempts at a rhetorical 
banishment of the „other‟ of war (cf. Richards 2005a) from the liberal peacebuilding 
paradigm.  
 
The opposition between peace and war in the discourse of liberal peace is supported 
by presenting violent conflict as dysfunctional, pathological (Jabri 1996) or 
irrational (King 1997: 13) – a failure of governance mechanisms (EC 1996b: iii) and 
a corresponding dissolution of order (Brown 2005: 103). The governance 
arrangement of the liberal peace, with its „built-in quality of peaceful conflict 
resolution‟ (Rummel 1996: 21; Miall et al. 1999: 22), is designed to counter the 
ensuing chaos and reintroduce order and intelligibility. From this perspective, „war‟ 
as a political pursuit can only be envisaged in the context of lack of an appropriate 
framework of governance, and the application of liberal peacebuilding is believed to 
disable the rationale for it. (Accordingly, where this strategy fails, warfare is 
believed to be apolitical – a product of irrationality often institutionalised in 
„cultures of violence.‟) War violence is rationalised as a want of governance 
mechanisms, which sidelines the arguments regarding the utmost „rationality‟ and 
profitability of violent conflict for some actors (Nordstrom 1995) as well as the 
ambivalent role of the illicit transnational economic networks that both help to fund 
violence and support civilian populations at times of crisis (Duffield 2001; Richards 
1996). Such rationalisation is often accompanied by imparting the warring factions 
with political agendas which submit to peaceful accommodation within the 
framework of liberal peacebuilding (Viktorova 2005a). Controversially, the resort to 
violence serves as an entry ticket into political bargaining, vindicating violence as a 
method of achieving political goals in the perception of local populations, given that 
„peace constituencies‟ are frequently left out of the negotiations of political 
settlements (ibid.; Kaldor 1999; Duffey 2000; de Goede 2007). War thus re-enters 
the framework of liberal peacebuilding as the very rationale of its application – both 
as a cue for its deployment in particular situations, and as an overarching raison 
d’être of the liberal peace (cf. Jabri 2006).  
 
Controversially, the radical „othering‟ of war does not eliminate it from the toolkit of 
the liberal peace itself. Despite the noted propensity of the liberal peace to fill the 
entire horizon of thinkable political practice, there is a clear sense in which the 
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ongoing violent conflict precludes its application (Richmond 2009a: 560). The 
conceptual division into „peacekeeping‟ and „post-conflict peacebuilding‟ that 
permeates the policy literature (e.g. UN 2008) – despite the attendant recognition 
that peacebuilding also has a role to play as a set of preventive 
developmental/transformative measures – underpins the perception that not much 
can be done about reforming the target states before the violence subsides. Either 
possible course of action – to effect a forceful pacification with military means, or to 
postpone the intervention until there is a „peace to keep‟ – isolates addressing 
violence into a separate continuum distinct from the array of instruments of liberal 
reform. The two are, nonetheless, integrated in the dependence of liberal 
peacebuilding on „hard‟ military measures, which allow for active „creation‟ of post-
conflict conditions for deployment of peacebuilding missions (cf. Brahimi Report 
2000: viii). The „assumption that basic security can exist a priori to an institutional, 
constitutional, and civil peace‟ thus undermines the claims of liberal peace to 
transcend the framework of „victor‟s peace‟ (Richmond and Franks 2006: 4, 
emphasis in original). Dependence on forceful pacification reintroduces war as an 
inherent part of the cultural self of liberal peace, collapsing clear distinctions 
between war and non-war and, ultimately, peace. This allows for a range of 
approaches and preferences with regard to „forcefulness‟ of the offered solutions 
(e.g. from ECOMOG-style military interventions vs. the UN‟s „soft‟ approach in 
West Africa) to be perceived as pathways towards the same objective of (liberal) 
peacebuilding. But in addition to conveying legitimacy onto military intervention 
(cf. Richmond 2005), the merger between peace and war also produces a reverse 
effect by exposing the offered peace as a hegemonic project implemented from the 
position of power (cf. Martín 2005).  
 
Through negating the conceptual existence of the „template of war,‟ the liberal 
paradigm turns war into an element of the template of liberal peace, echoing St 
Augustin‟s observation regarding the necessity of war for its abolition (cf. Jabri 
2006). This leads to normalisation of war, not only as an instrument of countering 
„worse‟ wars that would otherwise rage unchecked, but also as a global „technology 
of social control‟ (Jabri 2007: 2). Distinguishing between „war‟ as waged by the 
agents of liberal peace and „war‟ as that against which it is waged becomes a matter 
of identity of its agents – something that the „liberal sensibility‟ of the rationalist 
approach to politics and conflict sought to overcome in the first place (Williams 
1998). Such „mythological‟ affixing of properties to their bearers (Lotman 1992b: 
58-63; Viktorova 2003) stops the continual „sliding‟ of signifiers – which 
characterises meaning-generation in open, dialogical conditions (cf. Laustsen and 
Wæver 2000: 727; Chapter 3). This reinforces the monological nature of the liberal 
peace, given that connotations of military emergency serve to stifle debate and 
disagreement (cf. Wæver 1995) not only in the initial phase of ensuring „basic‟ 
security, but also through „re-securitisation‟ of the post-violence liberal state 
(Richmond 2009a: 562). The following passage from Jenny Edkins (2003) brings 
together several strands of arguments pursued in this section and beyond: 
 
Since the rule of law and the police reform are now seen under the light of „multi-
dimensional civilian-military‟ efforts, the military takes over civilian spaces. The effects of 
the militarization of civilian life are devastating for human freedoms. Military language 
which disallows discussion and debates, the codes of behaviour of the soldier as a human 
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without attributes and the threat of using violence against others who do not comply, 
reproduce a state of affairs in which political processes in developing societies are de-
politicized. (2003: 204, quoted in Echavarria 2007: 7) 
 
The fusion of peace and war serves to reaffirm the monological tendencies of the 
culture of liberal peacebuilding, reducing further the available spaces of otherness 
within its paradigm. The „emergency‟ connotations which accompany the 
application of the liberal peace effectively keep in check the potentially destabilising 
effects of „double inscription‟ (Bhabha 1994) discernible in the noted „shimmering 
of ambivalence‟ produced by the merging of opposites. One further instrument 
which holds such ambivalence at bay is the apparent reliance of liberal 
peacebuilding on „rational‟ notions of knowledge and action – although, as 
discussed in the following section, this is also achieved by internalising seemingly 
irreconcilable paradoxes. 
The fusion of rationality and myth 
In Lotman‟s treatment of „myth‟ as a mode of perception and organising principle, it 
is juxtaposed with another such principle variously referred to as a „discrete,‟ 
„historical,‟ or „logical‟ mode of consciousness (e.g. 1990, 1992b; Viktorova 2003). 
Where myth displays tendencies towards iconic and spatial representation, its 
opposite tends towards conventionality and verbal expression; a similar tension is 
notable in their respective inclinations towards a cyclic vs. linear mode of 
organisation, and forging metatextual as opposed to metalanguage-based 
connections (ibidem.). In terms of habitual dichotomies carrying the normative 
charge of „logocentric‟ binaries, „myth‟ is frequently juxtaposed with „rationality,‟ 
which conveys the celebratory connotations of the Enlightenment and poses as the 
unquestionably „real‟ alternative to the fiction of myth. It would be tempting to use 
„rationality‟ as a label for Lotman‟s opposite of „myth‟ – if „rationality‟ did not, on 
many accounts, lean towards the qualifiers of the „mythological‟ pole of this 
continuum.  
 
Investigating the historical origins of modern rationality, Toulmin (1992) portrays it 
as a vehicle for producing „certain‟ knowledge which could counter the destabilising 
effects of the „improvable‟ convictions at the heart of the Thirty Years‟ War. While 
it is usually pictured as a resolute and laudable departure from the parochialism of 
the Middle Ages, Toulmin finds Cartesian reason a very regimented paradigm, 
which compares unfavourably to the openness of the late Renaissance humanism. In 
its quest for eliminating the possibility of human error from the sphere of scientific 
reasoning, rationalism succeeded in all but eliminating the human relevance of 
knowledge achieved with its help, since the rigid definition of standards of 
„scientific‟ knowledge relegated most human pursuits beyond the scope of the 
scientifically „knowable‟ (ibid., Toulmin 2002). Yet, the professed awareness of the 
limits of the scope of scientific knowledge often gave way to negating the relevance 
of other forms of knowledge and activity (cf. George 1994; Chapter 2), with the 
result of elevating the historically bounded achievements of rationality and 
liberalism of the late modern era to the status of a universal wisdom and „good‟ 
(Morgenthau 1946). This reinforces the self-perpetuating and -legitimising 
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tendencies of scientific rationality, moving it closer to monoglossia and monologism 
characteristic of myth.  
 
The relevance of this discussion of the origins of the Enlightenment rationality 
consists in the adoption of its „mythological‟ (McCormick 1997: 91) legacy by the 
liberal peace. The very idea of the possibility of „resolving‟ conflict is based, 
according to Martín, „on the “positivist faith” in science to resolve social problems 
and accommodate all parties through positive sum games and “cake sharing” 
processes‟ (2005: 11; Burton 1990). The rational approach to conflict is presumed to 
command a perspective on the conflictive issues that is unaffected by emotion or 
vested interests of the parties, thus allowing for unbiased resolution. „[A] neutral, 
“objective” approach to conflict assumes a certain neutral and “objective” view of 
the world‟ (Salem 1997: 18, quoted in Martín 2005: 11), and although the perfect 
impartiality admittedly remains an unattainable ideal (e.g. Bercovitch 1996), the 
authority conveyed by the „non-perspective‟ (Häkli 1996) of rationality extends to 
those attempting peacebuilding from its positions. The appeal of the non-perspective 
of science for addressing inherently social problems has been felt throughout the late 
modern era, as pinpointed by Morgenthau‟s critique of putting politics onto a 
scientific basis (1946), Oakeshott‟s scepticism towards the rationalist „politics of the 
felt need‟ (1962a: 4-5), or Habermasian critique of the intrusion of purposive-
rational action into social sciences and corresponding ideas about managing the 
social (see Wuthnow et al. 1984). Perhaps more than other issues, conflict and war 
have attracted explanations in terms of the lack of Enlightenment and rationality 
(Brown 2005: 21-2), positioning the liberal peacebuilding enterprise as a „civilising‟ 
mission premised on the „rational‟ know-how of organising social and political 
affairs (Fetherston 2000b; Martín 2005; Salem 1997; Echavarria 2007). 
 
One repercussion of the Enlightenment rationality in conflict studies is the view of 
human cognition and development as linear and cumulative (Fetherston 2000b). 
They are, furthermore, viewed as interlinked, which accounts for the „problem-
solving‟ assumptions of the dominant approaches to conflict underpinned by the 
advancement of technology and science (ibid.). In the discourse of liberal peace, 
conflict is portrayed as a problem undermining „development,‟ which is thought of 
as a rightful destiny of humankind (cf. Duffield 2001; Esteva 2003; Echavarria 
2007). Conflict is thus „pathologised‟ to legitimise the enactment of a „normalising‟ 
logic of conflict prevention and resolution in order to restore favourable conditions 
for development (Echavarria 2007). However, despite purporting to carry with it the 
Kantian Enlightenment connotations of the liberation of man „from self incurred 
immaturity‟ (Rengger 2000: 144), liberal peacebuilding does not invite freedom of 
rational deliberation and informed decision-making: On the contrary, the non-
perspective of liberal peacebuilding has already determined the nature of peace that 
can best counter the backward-propelling chaos of conflict (cf. Duffield 2001: 50). 
Scientific rationality is thus subsumed within the liberal progressivist teleology, and 
tied in with specific – neoliberal – „forms of social/economic/political organisation‟ 
(Fetherston 2000a: 200). 
 
What are the implications of this for the „culture of liberal peacebuilding‟? For the 
liberal peace, self-positioning on the grounds of scientific rationality limits the scope 
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of applicable academic knowledge to the rational choice social science, which is 
particularly noticeable in what Rao and Woolcock (2007) deplore as a „disciplinary 
monopoly‟ of economics in the policies of the World Bank and other IFIs. This may 
account for highly selective use of conflict theory of which the policies of liberal 
peacebuilding make use, as well as the limited receptivity towards critique. This also 
structures the dominant ideas regarding the kinds of knowledge considered essential 
for peacebuilding, which narrows the space allocated to culture to the point of 
inconsequentiality (cf. Kapoor 2008: 26). Decisions regarding interventions are 
usually made on the basis of „fact-finding‟ missions (Hume 2009), yet the criteria of 
what constitutes relevant „facts‟ are predetermined by the chosen terms of 
engagement and the availability of instruments which could be called upon in the 
framework of intervention. Furthermore, in view of the Foucauldian link between 
knowledge and power, the understanding of conflict as „rational‟ also implies the 
ability to control and subordinate the unruly conflict dynamics. Yet, the deliberately 
limited scope of rationality (which becomes obscured by its mythological self-
perception) means that this control is partial at best: as noted by Duffield, the agents 
of liberal peace are readily oblivious to the continued existence of the illiberal 
economic realities alongside, and despite, the ongoing reforms (2001: 142-4). 
Although this problem is seldom denied outright, the rational view of politics and 
economics appears to lack the capacity to address the issues which so mismatch its 
ideas of knowledge and practice (ibid.; Nordstom 2001). As a result, control is 
simulated rather than effected (cf. Debrix 1999: 20, 85), with the uncontrollable 
dynamics dismissed as irrational, and thus – from the perspective of signification 
hinging on rationality – meaningless and, effectively, non-existent (cf. Bauman 
1999: 98; Chapter 3). This is consistent with Baudrillard‟s remark regarding the 
„imperialism‟ inherent in the practice of „present-day simulators‟ to „try to make the 
real, all the real, coincide with their simulation models‟ (1983: 2, quoted in Debrix 
1999: 22). The only interlocutor that the culture of liberal peace makes it receptive 
towards is thus, effectively, itself (bearing in mind the homogenising effects of myth 
and monologue on its internal diversity) (Lotman 1990; 1992b; Viktorova 2003). 
 
This is also evident in the relationship between the liberal peace and its recipients. 
The implicit superiority of rationality as a paradigm which is projected to triumph 
over its lack structures this relationship as a hierarchical one. Echoes of the colonial 
discourse reverberate in the portrayals of the developing countries as a site of 
backwardness not of their own making (cf. Kapoor 2008), „child-like societies‟ in 
need of direction and supervision (Echavarria 2007). The „pathological‟ 
connotations of conflict give rise to the framing of interventions as therapeutic 
(ibid.), giving rise to a plethora of medicinal metaphors (e.g. the „trauma‟ of conflict; 
the „pathology‟ of violence; post-conflict „recovery,‟ and so on) (cf. Pupavac 2005, 
2007; Luoma-Aho 2002). Although there is no denying that issues of ill-health are 
exacerbated by violent conflict (e.g. PRIDE 2006), the presentation of intervention 
policies as therapeutic is highly problematic, as this tends to erode local agency in 
both conflict and peace (Echavarria 2007; Pupavac 2005, 2007) and carries 
„biopower‟ connotations with respect to the implemented governance solutions 
(Dillon and Reid 2001; Duffield 2007). Referring to the effects of violence in terms 
of medical conditions obscures their origin in (often deliberate) human action, while 
imparting medicinal connotations to the social processes of reconciliation links them 
105 
 
to pre-determined objectives of state- and nation-building under the auspices of 
liberal peacebuilding (Pupavac 2005, 2007; Shaw 2005; Chapter 5). The Western 
belief in medicine and psychotherapy, once again, reveals the power granted to 
science and rationalism as the ultimate guides in social and political affairs (cf. 
Foucault 1965, 1973; Wuthnow et al. 1984: 288-9, 226). Such rational treatment of 
politics (and human affairs at large) effectively eliminates the „poetic‟ as a means of 
exploring „the political possibilities of human being‟ (Dillon 1996: 9; cf. Oakeshott 
1962a, 1962b), while also – as will be argued in the following section – destroying 
the „political‟ itself.  
Liberal peace as a technology 
The (non-) politics of liberal peacebuilding 
Parallel to the critique of a „scientific‟ worldview of liberalism, there is a strand of 
thought exposing its „technicist‟ orientation, from Schmittean critique of 
„technological‟ propensities of the liberal view of politics (McCormick 1997) to the 
more recent post-structuralist observations regarding the technologisation of politics 
manifest in its widespread replacement by „policy‟ and bureaucracy (Edkins 1999: 
1-6). The impact of actors in the international sphere, in particular, is increasingly 
conceptualised in terms of administration rather than political contestation (cf. 
Duffield 2001), and „project management‟ rhetoric and mentality has encroached 
into the domain of peace processes and interventions (e.g. MacGinty 2003). 
 
As noted above, securitisation of the liberal peace in the face of danger of violent 
conflict and related instability shrinks the space available for doubt or interrogation 
of its premises (cf. Wæver 1995): The threat of failing states becoming terrorist 
havens or epicentres of regional instability compels a rapid enactment of measures 
to bolster the defunct economies and governments. Solutions to these problems are 
believed to be well-known, and consist in following the principles of liberal 
democratic governance. Although „liberalism‟ and „democracy‟ appear to be 
pursued in tandem (leading some to brand the essence of liberal peace as „market 
democracy‟ (Paris 2004)), synergy between these two elements of the liberal peace 
is by no means assured. Indeed, a number of analyses suggest a gradual sidelining of 
democracy from the agenda of liberal peacebuilding (Duffield 2001; Baker 2006), 
echoing the conclusions of researchers questioning the inevitability of the coupling 
of liberalism and democracy in the first place (Huntington 1991; Lal 1999; Chan 
2002). The commitment to democracy appears to suffer on two fronts, both as part 
of the package of implemented reforms in recipient societies, and as a feature of the 
liberal peace itself (cf. Doyle 2000). 
 
Democracy, as a regime, presupposes a possibility of open disagreement and 
political contestation. In view of the seriousness of the threat of violent conflict, 
however, the acceptance of the premises of liberal peace by the subject populations 
and governments appears too important to be left to open deliberation (cf. Duffield 
2001). Therefore, the optimal course of reform is prescribed, and „various forms of 
aid conditionality‟ (ibid.: 29-30), used as incentives for its acceptance, far from 
being external to the framework of liberal peace, work as an illustration of the 
universal validity of its economic wisdom (in that the offered incentives are 
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universally economically desirable). In many ways, democratisation has entered the 
reform package in the 1990s as an afterthought, when neoliberal macroeconomic 
transformation had already been underway for a decade (Duffield 2001: 50). But 
instead of adding openness to the promoted reform agenda, the addition of 
democracy served to reinforce the righteousness of its monological dictate, for the 
incontrovertible rationality of the liberal economics was conjoined with the 
undeniable benignity of values embodied in the notions of democratic governance, 
human rights, civic freedoms, and the rule of law. Although, as follows from this 
example, dialogism of „politics‟ is not automatically ensured by the availability of 
democracy, the emphasis on the „technology‟ of governance definitely contributes to 
its erosion. 
 
While few would deny the Western origin of the promoted paradigm of liberal 
democratic governance, its ideologues emphasise the ultimate cultural compatibility 
of its underlying motors (such as rational profit-maximisation) (Lal 1999; cf. Kapoor 
2008: 26). The liberal „bias‟ of the reform and reconstruction agendas is justified by 
the certainty of rational knowledge and vindicated by the historical experiences of 
the developed West (Lal 1999). Liberal peace, from this perspective, is a 
„technology‟ – „a supposedly neutral force‟ (McCormick 1997: 6) which can be put 
in the service of betterment of the fortunes of populations in the post-conflict 
environments. Coupled with securitisation, the presentation of the liberal peace as a 
technology completes the work of „de-politicising‟ the liberal peace: the very 
„“political” character of politics‟ is annulled by „arguing that there is only one 
feasible option, only one interpretation of the current state of affairs‟ (Laustsen and 
Wæver 2000: 727). Such conceptualisation of interventions leaves little space for 
any principled discussion or disagreement; nor is such need envisaged in the 
framework of liberal peacebuilding, since all the necessary mechanisms for a 
„correct‟ conduct of politics are provided as a package of values and institutions of 
the liberal peace. The space for „political‟ debate on peacebuilding gives way to the 
ideological certainty of myth (cf. Laustsen and Waever 2000). 
 
Securitisation of the liberal peace also disables the „political‟ nature of settlements 
achieved within its framework. Although the rhetorical commitment to democracy 
as an end of interventions has not disappeared, there is plentiful evidence that the 
potentially conflictive nature of democratic politics is perceived as problematic 
(Paris 2004). For instance, Kofi Annan speaks of „a politicised ex-combatant 
population‟ among other dangers besetting a DDR programme in Angola (quoted in 
Baker 2006: 39, emphasis added). Examples of drastic censorship of political 
agendas and imagery in the Bosnian peace process (Chandler 2000; MacGinty 2008: 
145) testify to a situation where the limits of „politics‟ are set from without rather 
than within. The monological inclinations of liberal peace have a direct bearing on 
the space it allocates to politics. The prescribed liberal reforms are presented as a-
political, technical solutions to the problems which are identified as stemming from 
the ills of the illiberal „condition,‟ such as „bad governance‟ or disrespect for human 
rights. The banishment of „politics‟ eliminates the slightest possibility of conflict or 
contestation inscribed in that very notion (ibid.; Jabri 2007: 14). The liberal peace 
heralds, to paraphrase Fukuyama, the „end of politics‟ (1992), and politics itself 
becomes viewed as a risk for the success of liberal peace transitions. Yet, similarly 
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to the effects of „othering‟ war, the banishment of politics from the liberal peace 
makes it unable to discern the evidence of politics occurring in the multiple spaces 
of resistance called into being by, among other things, the inflexibility of the liberal 
peace paradigm itself (cf. Richmond 2009a). 
The technology of peace 
The shift in the priorities of liberal peacebuilding actors from democracy to 
„governance‟ (Baker 2006) allocates the authority to the „technical‟ knowledge of 
governing – a knowledge that is arguably lacking in the post-conflict environments. 
The ousting of the „political‟ is noticeable in the diagnoses offered to characterise 
the conditions that led to the outbreak of conflict, for the habitual rhetoric of „bad 
governance‟ and mismanagement places the causes of conflict (along with the 
remedies) along the line of policy and administration, not politics. This offers the 
agents of liberal peacebuilding legitimate grounds for simulating the state and its 
institutions on behalf of subject populations, whose agency supposedly underwrites 
the policies of state- and nation-building orchestrated through strategies and 
programmes, funded projects, donor-overseen commissions, and direct expert 
involvement. Similarly to the monological silencing of the „other‟ which can be 
traced to the colonial discourse, the technological orientation of liberal 
peacebuilding leans on its forerunners in the fields of conflict resolution and 
functionalist political science, which approached the issues of conflict and co-
operation in thoroughly a-political ways (Brown 2005: 121; cf. Burton 1968). The 
combined influence of the various rhetorical devices employed by liberal 
peacebuilding, however, far outstrips the comparatively modest impact these earlier 
paradigms have had. 
 
In addition to the „bureaucratisation‟ of politics that it effects, the sheer scale of the 
institutional machinery of liberal peacebuilding ensures the dissemination of the 
introduced bureaucratic formats as essential for peacebuilding. The liberal peace  
 
is not just a framework, it is also a mechanism for the transmission of Western-specific ideas 
and practices whereby its local agents are not merely compelled to receive, they must also 
transmit. Thus they become facilitators and enforcers of the liberal peace for municipalities, 
communities and individuals further down the political chain. (MacGinty 2008: 144) 
 
The involvement of local actors in the liberal peacebuilding enterprise may appear 
as an opening for a greater sensitivity towards the local context and preference for 
„home-grown‟ solutions to violent conflict. But if anything, local actors display a 
tendency of upward, not downward accommodation, which is particularly noticeable 
in the pre-set agendas of local NGOs which have more to do with the priorities of 
external donors than the situation on the ground (Thompson 2006; cf. Duffield 2001; 
Helander 2005). Similarly, the increased role of regional organisations tasked with 
shouldering a greater „burden of responsibility‟ for peace-making in their respective 
geographic areas (e.g. Council of the EU 1995) is less about diversifying the range 
of approaches to conflict than moulding these organisations into the familiar 
vehicles of liberal peace. The delegation of responsibility is accompanied by 
sizeable delegation of funds (e.g. under European Community assistance schemes 
(EC 2001: 8, 2006: 9)), enabling an almost autonomous functioning of the liberal 
peace in conflict and transition zones. 
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The dominance of „technology‟ is visible both in the way that liberal peacebuilding 
interventions are carried out and in the „perfecting‟ of their instruments on the part 
of the peacebuilding agents. The latter process is driven by the recognition of limited 
success of the policies of liberal peacebuilding, which prompts periodic „seismic‟ 
revisions of its cornerstones. However, it is questionable whether even the most 
fundamental efforts at ameliorating the liberal peace, such as the Brahimi Report 
(2000) or Annan‟s „prevention‟ initiative (2001), produce more than a reshuffle of 
emphases or streamlining of the procedures: as a response to the problems identified 
from the perspective of the liberal peace and for the liberal peace, they prove 
ultimately self-referential. Since the progress on genuinely political issues is often 
impeded by the impasse coded into the very structure of the UN, the attempts at 
feasible reform are often reduced to rewriting the „rulebook‟ (UN PBC 2007).  
 
On the substantive side, the perception that the success of interventions is a matter 
of the correct „technique‟ is conveyed by the popular concept of „best practices,‟ 
which are often „transplanted‟ from mission to mission regardless of the contextual 
requirements (Malan et al. 2002: Ch 8). The tension between the „standard 
components‟ of liberal peacebuilding and the local practices and expectations 
constitutes one of the thorniest issues with regard to the „global‟ ambitions of the 
liberal peace. Instead of carefully examining the points of mis-match as a cue for 
rethinking the approach of the liberal peace, however, compatibility issues are 
regarded as technical problems, with reflection directed at possibilities of 
reconciling the tensions and subordinating the „dissident‟ dynamics (Chopra and 
Hohe 2004). As noted by MacGinty, 
 
the liberal peace is operationalized in highly standardized formats that leave little space for 
alternative approaches to dispute resolution. External peace interventions, under the auspices 
of internationally sponsored peace-keeping, peace-building or reconstruction in 
contemporary civil wars, increasingly follow set templates. At the macro-political and 
programme levels this manifests itself in ceasefire monitoring, formalized peace 
negotiations, Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector 
Reform (SSR), civil society capacity-building, postpeace accord elections, civil service 
reform, good governance, marketization and economic restructuring. … To a large extent, 
Western peace support interventions often follow a formulaic path … It becomes peace from 
IKEA; a flat-pack peace made from standardized components. … off-the-shelf peace 
interventions reflect the accumulated skills and capacities of the intervening parties rather 
than the precise needs of the recipient society. (2008: 144-5) 
 
Despite some evidence of institutional reflection regarding the correctness of policy 
dogmata (UNDP 2007), certain ideas about alleviating the „root causes‟ of conflict 
are remarkably resilient. For instance, despite a general sense of disillusionment 
with structural adjustment policies on account of their role in exacerbating conflict 
potential in the cultural settings where the basic societal security operates by means 
of client-patron networks (e.g. Uvin 1998; UNDP 2007), the EU peacebuilding 
documents still reiterate the need to downsize the civil service to make it more 
competitive with the private sector (EC SL s.a.: 17). Similar resilience characterises 
the belief in the primacy of the material needs which underlies the (by now 
transcended) development paradigm of „basic needs‟ – the assumption that „basic‟ 
human needs are material and that the realisation of spiritual needs is contingent 
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upon their satisfaction (Kapoor 2008: 22-5; cf. Richards et al. 2004). The „profane‟ 
orientation of development policies may appear value-neutral; yet it is indicative of 
the normative dimension of „realities‟ enunciated by the liberal peace. The very 
admission that seemingly „empty‟ (of any prescriptive meaning) institutions of 
liberal democratic governance direct the expression of conflict away from violent 
means to a peaceful accommodation of difference (Rummel 1996: 21; Miall et al. 
1999: 22) testifies to its cultural dimension evident in the restructuring of social 
possibilities and re-coding of constraints upon human behaviour (Bauman 1999; cf. 
Douglas 2004). Thus the rhetoric of „conflict dampeners‟ or „built-in qualities of 
conflict resolution,‟ despite its seeming technicality, is by no means culturally or 
normatively neutral. 
 
„Technology,‟ in the present era, is usually conceptualised a means to an end; yet, 
this is perhaps where the metaphor of „technology‟ starts to unravel, since the „ends‟ 
and „means‟ in liberal peacebuilding are curiously indistinguishable. This is yet 
another manifestation of the disappearing distance between the signifier and the 
signified (as discussed above) in the collapse of signification onto itself. Yet, in this 
case, the tandem of the sign (the technology of liberal peacebuilding) and its 
ultimate referent (peace) acquires two additional overtones. One of these elements is 
the (endless) deferral of the signified, and the other refers to the „staggering‟ of 
indistinct milestones which supposedly herald its arrival. Both these overtones are 
noticeable in the way that liberal peacebuilding agents conceptualise their praxis. 
 
The „praxis‟ of liberal peacebuilding refers not only to the practical output of 
peacebuilding policies, but also the place that conceptualising what it is that liberal 
peacebuilding „does‟ occupies in the self-awareness of its agents. Notwithstanding 
the burgeoning recognition that „doing something‟ is not necessarily always 
preferable to inaction (Yanacopoulos and Hanlon 2006: 9), the mentality behind 
liberal peacebuilding clearly prioritises action (as opposed to contemplation or 
deliberation) (cf. Bleiker 1998). Hence many of the programmatic assumptions of 
liberal peace concern its achievements – the changes implemented as a result of 
interventions. Yet, the scholars of liberal peace often point to its scant track record 
of grand successes (e.g. Paris 2004); and a closer scrutiny of liberal peacebuilding 
operations in the field demonstrates that a great share of efforts is directed at 
supporting its own apparatus – reporting, staff security, policy coordination with 
other peacebuilding agents, and so on. Yet, this apparent paradox seldom comes to 
the attention of liberal peace practitioners, since the impact of peacebuilding 
operations is assessed within a framework almost entirely derived from this modus 
operandi, which disables other perspectives on its successes and failures. This also 
leaves liberal peacebuilding myopic with regard to other possible motors of change 
taking place on the ground, or indications of its direction(s) – which is particularly 
evident in the usual approach to assessing the course of progression of post-violence 
environments towards „peace.‟ 
  
When peace is conceived as (liberal democratic) governance (Richmond 2005; Paris 
2004), the institutional moves towards a „better governance‟ are taken as a legitimate 
substitute of peace, which is postponed and deferred to an unspecified future (cf. 
Echavarria 2007). The immediate concerns of interventions focus on institution- and 
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state-building, and the nature of the peace as their end product is seldom 
conceptualised other than in terms of „self-sustaining‟ or „positive peace.‟ How this 
peace is different from the middle-stage of establishing the mechanisms of 
governance to subordinate the destructive effects of violent conflict, is not 
discussed. For instance, the mid-range efforts of the EU‟s peace operations focus on 
creating „structural stability,‟ whose characteristics are „sustainable economic 
development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures 
and healthy environmental and social conditions, with the capacity to manage 
change without‟ having „to resort to conflict‟ (EC 2001: 10). How this is distinct 
from peace is not specified; in fact, the paper does not elaborate on what „peace‟ is 
supposed to mean at all, referring to it in the context of „peace agreements,‟ „peace 
processes‟ or „consolidation of peace and prevention of future conflicts‟ and, 
occasionally, in combining „peace and stability‟ as objectives of the external policies 
of the EU (EC 2001). Once again, a „technological‟ approach to peace can be seen as 
steering the culture of liberal peacebuilding along the monological path. 
II. Unclosing the monologue? The culture of liberal 
peacebuilding and its ‘others’  
As demonstrated in Part I of this chapter, liberal peacebuilding establishes a 
monological regime of signification, manifest in the collapsing of crucial 
distinctions (such as between war and peace, or between the policies and their 
objectives), mythologisation of the power of rationality, technologisation of peace, 
and reduction of the available spaces of otherness. Monologism accounts for the 
extreme resilience of the liberal peace paradigm, yet, as a closer scrutiny of the 
concepts behind its policies reveals (e.g. Kapoor 2008), this does not make it 
unchanging – although it has the effect of suppressing the perception of non-identity 
between the different stages in its evolution. The task of this part of the chapter is to 
examine the instances of non-identity which emerge across the range of 
manifestations of liberal peacebuilding so as to gauge their impact on its 
monological culture and its potential for change. Such instances are best revealed 
through the interactions between the liberal peace and its „others,‟ from the critique 
of liberal peacebuilding to the very idea of culture in relation to the issues of violent 
conflict, peace and governance. Although the dynamics that such interactions 
unleash on the „mutinous‟ periphery of the monological self-description (see 
Chapter 3) may not be sufficient to overthrow its dictate, it is necessary to examine 
its potential for directing the liberal peace towards a dialogical „unclosure,‟ as well 
as the resistance to change that it meets from the present culture of liberal peace.  
The ‘other(s)’ of culture in liberal peacebuilding 
The first „other‟ of the liberal peace considered here is culture itself – both in terms 
of its conceptualisations and the sets of practices which the liberal peace represents 
and that it comes across in the context of interventions. The „otherness‟ of culture is 
manifested in the scant attention that it receives in the liberal peacebuilding 
discourse, and in that, despite the budding recognition of its importance for the 
matters of conflict and peace among peacebuilding practitioners (CPR 2005; WB 
2007b; EC 2007; USAID 2007b), its treatment bears definite signs of awkwardness 
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(cf. Witharana 2002: 11). Culture is clearly an issue which exposes the 
„insufficiency‟ of the monologue of liberal peacebuilding, directing attention at the 
instability of fused tropes and glossed-over contradictions. Yet the extent of its 
disruptive influence on this monologue requires closer investigation, especially in 
view of the fragmentation of the overall „otherness‟ of culture into separate (and 
more „manageable‟) facets.  
Whose culture? 
Despite occasional references to „culture of [conflict] prevention‟ (Annan 2001; 
OECD 2001), or „culture of consensus‟ (UNDP 2004a) in documents framing a 
liberal approach to peacebuilding, culture is not thought of as pertaining to liberal 
peacebuilding itself. It is acknowledged that the implementation of peacebuilding 
policies can have a „social and cultural impact‟ on the recipient populations, 
affecting „group social attitudes or coping mechanisms‟ (CPR 2005: 22-3). But it is 
also assumed that such effects are unintentional (ibid.: 23), occurring as a result of 
„crossover impact‟ of „projects intended for one sector … on other aspects of the 
community‟ (ibid.: 22), and not as something related to liberal peacebuilding 
approach as a whole. This points to the underlying belief in culture-neutrality of 
liberal peacebuilding, its self-positioning outside culture. Accordingly, the aspects of 
culture recognised in the discourse of liberal peacebuilding pertain – almost 
exclusively – to its local counterparts, and not to itself. 
 
This said, the conception of culture developed in some documents of liberal 
peacebuilding indicates a greater degree of awareness of culture than warranted by 
the unqualified references to „culture of participation,‟ „culture of violence,‟ „culture 
of impunity‟ and so on (e.g. UNDP 2004a). Upon a closer look, even these 
references testify to an implicit understanding of culture in terms of durable patterns 
of behaviour and interpretation. Furthermore, 2007 saw the appearance of a 
document which makes explicit use of the „anthropological‟ understanding of 
culture, as 
 
the basis for a symbolic world of meanings, beliefs, values, traditions which are expressed in 
language, art, religion and myths. As such, it plays a fundamental role in human 
development and in the complex fabric of the identities and habits of individuals and 
communities. (EC 2007) 
 
However, the rhetorical incorporation of cultural complexity has little impact on 
policy, and already the rest of the „Communication on a European agenda for culture 
in a globalising world‟ (EC 2007) reverts to a largely material view of culture (cf. 
IMF 2005a: 54), as testified by an emphasis on the support to „cultural operators‟ 
and artefactual culture (arts), „cultural actors and events‟ (EC 2007: 10). Attention to 
„local culture‟ is taken to mean ensuring „people‟s access to culture and to the means 
of cultural expression‟ (ibid.: 11; EuropeAid 2007), again in the sense of its 
atrefactual production. Incorporation of culture (in this abridged form) into the 
agenda of liberal peace is believed to „strengthen a new cultural pillar of global 
governance and sustainable development‟ (EC 2007: 7). 
 
Upholding a vision of culture compatible with the agenda of liberal peacebuilding 
requires purging the concept of its „uncomfortable‟ ambivalence, as evident in the 
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urgency with which the same document insists on presenting culture in a wholly 
positive light. It speaks of „[i]ntercultural dialogue as one of the main instruments of 
peace and conflict prevention‟ (EC 2007: 7), and of culture as „what brings people 
together, by stirring dialogue and arousing passions, in a way that unites rather than 
divides‟ as well as „promoting an inclusive society‟ and thereby „preventing and 
reducing poverty‟ (ibid.: 2-3, emphasis added). Potentially divisive and problematic 
aspects of culture, to which other European Commission‟s own documents allude 
(e.g. EC s.a.), do not come into consideration – presumably, because it is believed 
that sufficient amounts of funds and diplomatic efforts at institutionalising 
intercultural dialogue (e.g. in the form of „Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean 
Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures‟ (EC 2007: 7)) will alleviate the very 
need for considering them. The „project-management‟ rationality of liberal 
peacebuilding is projected to „streamline‟ culture itself into a predictable and 
controllable phenomenon. 
 
At the same time, many of the elements of an „anthropological‟ understanding of 
culture are being addressed in the policies of the liberal peace, but often without 
reference to culture. For example, an IMF document outlines the need for projects 
aimed at improving the local communities‟ capacity to „identify, prioritize, and plan 
for their needs within their own value systems‟ (IMF 2005b: 112, emphasis added), 
although it does not employ the „cultural‟ vocabulary. Similarly, the World Bank‟s 
studies of „social capital,‟ focusing on issues of economic capability and recovery 
after conflict, have accumulated a lot of knowledge that would also be highly 
relevant in cultural terms. One of its potential contributions could be to the „social 
fabric‟ debate (see Chapters 2 and 3), with some recent research allowing for greater 
optimism with respect to its survival and recovery after violent conflict. Some of the 
criteria these studies use as economic indicators (e.g. voter registration) arguably 
also make sense in political terms – even within the limited ambit of „politics‟ within 
the liberal peace. Contrary to the accepted axiom that violent conflict „is the major 
obstacle to development in the contemporary world‟ (Drèze 2000: 1171), Bellows 
and Miguel found, in their study of post-war recovery in Sierra Leone, that 
 
 a mere three years after the end of the civil war there are no lingering impacts of war 
violence on local socioeconomic conditions. … [the] measures of local community 
mobilization and collective action – including the number of village meetings and the voter 
registration rate – are significantly higher in areas that experienced more war violence, 
conditional on prewar and geographic controls. … if anything areas where there was greater 
violence against civilians during the recent war have arguably better local collective action 
outcomes in the postwar period. These findings obviously speak to the remarkable resilience 
of ordinary Sierra Leoneans. They also echo the claims of other observers of Sierra Leone 
who argue that the war generated far-reaching institutional and social changes, including 
increased political awareness and mobilization. (Bellows and Miguel 2006: 1) 
 
Bellows and Miguel‟s conclusion that „[t]here is … no evidence of lingering adverse 
effects of the violence on local institutional performance‟ (2006: 17) is echoed by 
other scholars of Sierra Leone: „[Sierra Leoneans] have sometimes turned [social 
instability] into a creative, though violent, opportunity to refashion themselves vis-à-
vis their own institutions‟ (Ferme 2001: 228, quoted in Bellows and Miguel 2006: 
18). The narrow focus on institutions notwithstanding, this research suggests a more 
versatile relationship between culture and conflict than acknowledged by the bulk of 
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liberal peace discourse. Yet, as lamented by one researcher associated with the 
World Bank (who wished to remain anonymous), the impact of the researchers‟ 
awareness of culture rarely trickles down to policy, and the little that does is usually 
not the most constructive part of the debates. This is exacerbated by the conceptual 
„isolation‟ of these studies from the cultural problematic and vocabulary, which 
limits the conceptual connections between different areas of policy and praxis.  
Culture as a ‘problem’ 
In policy documents of liberal peacebuilding, culture may participate in the 
definition of the problems, but rarely in solutions, as illustrated by the „European 
Commission Check-list for Root Causes of Conflict‟ (s.a.). Although it is clear that 
the lack of respect for cultural and minority rights or freedoms of identity expression 
is indeed indicative of conflict potential (cf. Azar and Burton 1986), the document 
creates an impression that observing the listed criteria of respect for cultural rights 
automatically takes care of any culture-related problems. True, culture is also 
mentioned in connection with dispute-regulation mechanisms, but in this case, only 
as a potential hindrance in view of the „perpetuation of negative stereotypes or 
mutual suspicions by collective memory and culture‟ (EC s.a.). The foreseen 
reconciliation mechanisms, on the other hand, are limited to „justice commissions,‟ 
while the role of „wisemen, elders, ombudsmen,‟ although considered, is not related 
to the cultural potential for reconciliation (ibid.). The very format of a „check-list‟ 
stands contrary to any prospect of in-depth engagement with culture, betraying a 
belief in a possibility of formulaic solutions following a correct „diagnosis‟ of the 
problem, which invokes the mythological power of rationality in overcoming the 
„disorder‟ of conflict. The check-list criteria also betray their grounding in the 
Western norms of secularism, which may be at odds with the very definition of 
authority and legitimacy in some cultures (e.g. East Timor – see Hohe (2002a)), 
without which the prospect of achieving legitimacy of the state and regime (and with 
it, according to the logic of liberal peacebuilding, a hope of lasting peace) as a result 
of an intervention is questionable. 
 
Presented in this way, culture becomes yet another problematic „force‟ (on par with 
violent conflict itself) which requires disciplining through application of the 
technology of liberal peace. Anticipated problems with culture concern, first and 
foremost, the expression of identity (ethnic or religious), which may take exclusive 
and violent forms, and gender inequality, whose perpetuation is viewed as a product 
of local cultural practices. Although incorporation of the „second-generation‟ 
conflict resolution approaches (cf. Azar and Burton 1986) within its framework had 
ensured liberal peacebuilding‟s attentiveness to the importance of identity 
expression opportunities as a measure of conflict prevention, the dangers carried by 
politicisation of identity have directed the „resolution‟ of this problem away from 
collective formats. Cultural rights and rights of indigenous peoples are viewed as 
part of the human rights agenda (EC 2007), which carries the individualist bias of 
the liberal ideology. The collective dimension appears to be served by relating the 
agenda of „cultural rights‟ to socio-economic opportunities and political rights given 
to identity groups (see Brown 2004: 14), but realisation of these rights is presumed 
to fit within the habitual formats of electoral politics. Furthermore, for all the 
rhetorical valorisation of cultural difference (e.g. UNDP 2004b), the emphasis 
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remains on its controlled expression (cf. Richmond 2009a: 560). As evident from the 
„sanitisation‟ of identity politics in the Bosnian peace process, the permitted 
parameters of difference are prescribed, and the forging of cultural commonalities is 
heavily supervised, being mostly directed into nation-wide moulds (cf. Shaw 2005). 
Few documents acknowledge the cultural nature of policies aimed, for example, at 
gender equality (e.g. USAID 2007a: 3), preserving an a-cultural view of the offered 
governance solutions. Ultimately, the need for special provisions for identity 
expression is projected to fall away with the establishment of liberal democratic 
governance, which automatically takes care of the „respect for difference,‟ whether 
grounded in gender or ethnic identity. Yet, the apparent need to ensure such 
provisions in the immediate term (as evident in the gender policies of liberal 
peacebuilding actors themselves, such as the EU) betrays the uneasy fit between the 
identity problematic and liberal ideology, whose rationalism appears to position it 
above such petty concerns (which tend, therefore, to become sidelined). 
 
One of the few areas where culture may be viewed as part of a „solution‟ to the 
problem of violent conflict concerns the utilisation of local dispute resolution 
methods in reconciliation and „transitional justice‟ (e.g. UNSC 2004). However, this 
issue raises as many problems as it may solve, given the likelihood of the cultural 
mismatch between the local peace-making practices and the universal norms of 
human rights, which liberal peacebuilding agents view as unequivocal and 
uncontroversial (e.g. UN PBC 2007; UNDP 2007). Albeit from a less rigid 
normative perspective, scholars critical towards liberal peacebuilding also point to 
problems with many local cultural practices of conflict resolution and reconciliation 
(e.g. Uvin and Mironko 2003; MacGinty 2007). In particular, 
 
„peacebuilding from below‟ has been criticised as being blind to social justice, when local 
„unjust‟ power structures are strengthened through the engagement of traditional conflict 
resolution mechanisms. Amongst this view the gender critique exposes the term „local 
actors‟ as highly problematic in masquerading inequalities between men and women that are 
obscured by such homogenising labels.‟ (Llamazares 2005: 11) 
 
One could argue that the problem of idealising local peace-making techniques is 
exacerbated by the lack of in-depth knowledge of cultures with which liberal 
peacebuilding interacts, for otherwise the awareness of patterns of local social 
hierarchy and mobility would enable the interveners to see beyond the 
homogenising façade of the „local community‟ by discerning the attributes of power 
and status, opportunity and voice(lessness) (cf. Richards et al. 2004). But instead of 
inspiring enquiry into culture(s), the recognition of the inherent „faults‟ of cultural 
peace-making mechanisms by liberal peacebuilding leads it to disaggregate local 
cultures into „usable‟ and „harmful‟ aspects, without further discussion about how 
the two may be entwined or related from an „insider‟ perspective. For example, a 
USAID conflict analysis guide (2005) identifies patrimonial networks as a 
contributing factor in conflict (due to the exclusion dynamics they may generate), 
but leaves unaddressed a deeper cultural dimension of patrimonialism implicated not 
just in the recurring patterns of societal organisation it produces, but in the 
fundamental worldviews of sociality (cf. Ferme 2001). The resulting impression is 
that patrimonialism is an unfortunate deviation which is „curable‟ through projects 
addressing, for instance, civil society or institutional development (USAID 2005). 
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However, it is doubtful that such projects, however well funded, will make much 
headway in „eradicating‟ patrimonialism, since, as shown in Chapter 5 with regard 
to Sierra Leone, from the local perspective, donor efforts and their very role are 
easily slotted into the existing – patrimonial – interpretational structures (cf. Hohe 
2002a). A similar „superficial‟ understanding characterises the fight against 
corruption (WB 2007a). 
 
 The tendency of splitting culture into „positive‟ and „harmful‟ aspects is 
problematic not because they are ultimately inseparable by way of a „systemic‟ 
relationship (Merry 2003), but rather because the exact terms of the relationship 
between the „desirable‟ and „undesirable‟ elements remain unclear without deeper 
cultural knowledge. Furthermore, any such separation is premised on a particular 
(cultural) perspective with its own set of criteria of harmfulness and utility, which 
obscures the possibility of other scales for determining the functions and ethical 
implications of cultural practices. While both the discourse of liberal peacebuilding 
and its critics may be found wanting on this account, there is a difference between a 
critical „interrogation‟ of local cultural practices (e.g. MacGinty 2008) and judging 
them for compatibility with the normative framework of liberal peace. While the 
former‟s purpose of constructing more equitable cultures, although affected by its 
own cultural premises, lacks prescriptive character, the latter tends to deny the 
cultural terms of such „compatibility tests‟ in the first place. Since the values 
embodied in the liberal peace are positioned above culture, this problem is not 
presented as a matter of cross-cultural compatibility, instead acquiring connotations 
of an objective approval (or otherwise) of particular cultures by an unbiased higher 
authority:  
 
UNICEF‟s Declaration on the Rights of the Child, for example, allows aid agencies to 
present themselves as leading a civilising mission of enlightenment in the South. Whole 
societies can be placed beyond the pale according to how children are treated.‟ (Duffield 
2001: 32) 
 
The supposedly a-cultural grounding of values advanced by the liberal peace 
conveys upon its monologue a universal and impartial sense of legitimacy, removing 
the grounds for questioning its power and underlying interests. 
Towards a dissolution of the monologue on culture? 
Representations of culture that emerge from the above overview demonstrate an 
almost schizophrenic ambivalence, with culture portrayed as both a victim (WB 
2003; UNDP 2004a) and a perpetrator complicit in maintaining the social structures 
of inequality that help foment conflict (e.g. HRW 2003; EC s.a.); an alleged force 
for peace (EC 2007) and as something problematic in this respect (CPR 2005; EC 
s.a.). The majority of the documents, as though attempting to avoid the untenability 
of such ambivalence, gloss over the issue of culture altogether. Ironically, even 
where violent conflict produces a heightened awareness of culture as a result of 
conflict, its discussion is hampered by the peacebuilders‟ considerations of political 
correctness and the assumption of excessive sensitivity of the issue for the local 
communities (Witharana 2002: 11). Although some documents communicate a more 
balanced view of culture – for instance, CPR‟s Peace and Conflict Impact 
Assessment (PCIA) Handbook instructs to consider both the possible impact of 
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„attitudes, systems and structures‟ on violations of economic rights, and the issues of 
trust and confidence between communities (CPR 2005: 22) – the overall treatment 
of culture in the liberal peacebuilding discourse emerges as both atomistic and 
contradictory, sometimes in the documents of the same actor. If such apparent 
contradictions can be taken as evidence that the monologue of liberal peacebuilding 
is struggling with „subjugating‟ culture to its rule, the cumulative impact of the 
unwilling admission of „otherness‟ is hampered by the atomism of these revelations. 
The awareness of the controversies related to culture is also suppressed by the 
monologism of the very language of policy documents, which present the realities of 
conflict and peace in a markedly common-sense, uncontroversial fashion that makes 
them readily susceptible to the application of liberal policy solutions. Given that the 
issue of culture is generally deemed „policy-relevant‟ only with reference to 
particular issues, deeper cultural connections between these issues mostly escape the 
attention of policy makers and practitioners. By way of a self-fulfilling „mono-
logic,‟ the missed relevance of cultural links between various issues pertaining to 
conflict and peace also justifies, for liberal peace practitioners, not reflecting on 
culture in all its complexity.  
 
In this light, it is unsurprising that the full scope of culture‟s ambivalence is 
noticeable across, rather than within, the discourses of individual actors. This is well 
in line with the general trend of reflection on the overall impact of liberal 
peacebuilding falling outside the domain of its own policy framework, being instead 
accomplished by external critique with varying degrees of sympathy for the project 
of liberal peace (e.g. Cousens and Kumar 2001; Paris 2004; Richmond 2005). 
Although liberal peacebuilding actors routinely scrutinise their own field operations 
(as evidenced by the vast volume of reports and the rhetoric of „lessons learned‟), 
there is little reflection, among the policy community, on the impact of the liberal 
peacebuilding enterprise as a whole. For some, this confirms the external 
construction of the liberal peace which exaggerates the degree of actual 
commonality between its agents. Yet, it could also be argued that the presumption of 
shared principles and understandings behind the liberal approach to peacebuilding 
effectively removes the need for mutual interrogation (or even curiosity) on the part 
of its practitioners (although see EPLO 2006). Indeed, the proliferation of 
coordinating bodies and the development of common methodologies for conflict 
analysis (e.g. UNDP 2004a) could be seen as an attempt to counter the default 
practice among liberal peacebuilding actors to engage little with each others‟ 
policies or activities – except where organisations are connected by way of decision-
making hierarchy or financial accountability.  
 
This results, among other things, in the limited possibilities for assessing the impact 
of liberal peacebuilding „from within.‟ Yet the need for such critical introspection on 
the part of the liberal peace cannot be overstated, in view of the apparent 
contradictions between its methods and objectives, which routinely undermine their 
achievement (cf. Smith 2003). For example, the issue of militarism, widely blamed 
for the destruction of local culture and the onset of a „culture of violence‟ (e.g. 
Rosenblatt 1993: 88), is rarely addressed by liberal peacebuilding actors in 
connection with the military ethos of peacekeeping and its role in the formation of 
local ideas of power and political influence (Fetherston and Nordstrom 1995; see 
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also Jabri 1996; Edkins 2003; Ellis 2004; Hoffman 2007). Yet this connection 
suggests that the exercise at „demilitarising the mind,‟ which a DfID document 
professes to be a key element in the success of peacebuilding (2001: 20), should 
start with addressing the culture of liberal peacebuilding itself. Similar disregard for 
the impact of their own methods is notable in the practices of relief agencies in 
South Sudan, which, according to Rackley (2000), may be even more harmful than 
violence for cultural resilience of the recipient communities (manifested in extended 
social networks and „safety nets‟). The difficulties which liberal peacebuilding 
experiences with achieving an internal critical perspective upon its policies and their 
implications are consistent with its monological culture. By purporting to fill the 
entire space of thinkable political practice with respect to conflict and peace, liberal 
peacebuilding disables alternative perspectives from which to illuminate – and 
critically examine – its own fundamental premises. Apart from hampering its 
capacity for self-reflection, this also makes the liberal peace extremely vulnerable to 
the opportunism of local actors versed in its rhetoric, who are able to hijack its 
considerable resources in pursuit of their own agendas (e.g. Helander 2005; 
Richmond and Franks 2007; Richards et al. 2004; see also Chapter 5).  
 
Within the liberal peace itself, the „peripheral‟ dissidence with respect to its 
„monologism‟ is more noticeable among the smaller actors, such as NGOs whose 
staff is closely involved in practical work in a limited number of country cases. Such 
actors tends to highlight the importance of the issue of cultural traditions, including 
assumptions about communication, norms, and codes of interaction between 
themselves and their local beneficiaries, preserving an awareness of potential 
problems and „culture clashes‟ in communication (Large 2007; NP 2007a). For 
smaller actors, cultural awareness of the staff is a high priority; for example, the 
NGO Nonviolent Peaceforce conducts extensive country-related training 
programmes for its peace workers (lasting between 1 and 3 months). The content of 
such training is not prescribed, but left to the discretion of the staff in situ (NP 
2007b). Although larger organisations taking part in liberal peacebuilding also offer 
training to their staff, the issues covered are largely prescribed from above, as with 
the European Commission‟s gender sensitive training for peace missions personnel 
(EC 2001: 25). And although appreciation of the importance of local cultural 
knowledge for the success of peacebuilding missions is increasingly commonplace 
in programmatic documents (e.g. UNSC 2004), it is not often upheld in practice (cf. 
Kent 2005: 38): 
 
Some international NGOs (INGOs) are in effect casual visitors. Senior expatriate staff work 
on short contracts, spend most of their time in the capital, and build up little or no direct 
knowledge of social conditions in the rural communities they serve. Nor is there much 
interest in filling this void. (Richards et al. 2004: 28)  
 
The hierarchical organisation of much of the peacebuilding on the ground, in that the 
initiatives of local actors are often enveloped in „the standard operating procedures 
of large organisations that depend upon the standard operating procedures of other 
large organisations‟ (Kent 2005: 38), effectively limits the potential impact of 
cultural awareness. The same can be said about the scant (albeit hopeful) evidence 
of scrutiny that policies of major liberal peacebuilding actors receive from their 
smaller counterparts (as, for example, with the EPLO drawing attention to the 
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possibility of „very different values, aspirations, needs and approaches to 
governance and to development‟ (2006) in their criticism of the European 
Commission‟s Issues Paper on development cooperation). If anything, the recent 
decade has brought about evidence of further monological consolidation of a liberal 
approach to peacebuilding. Driven by an increasing formalisation of the relations of 
NGOs with their donor governments on the one hand, and a convergence between 
policy priorities of national actors, on the other, this „homogenisation‟ of approaches 
as well as the very „definitions of what constitutes a successful peacebuilding 
process‟ (Llamazares and Levy 2003: 11, 13; Holzscheiter 2005) leaves little space 
for debate within the discourse of liberal peacebuilding. In this respect, total 
exclusion from the networked relations which characterise the liberal peace 
(Duffield 2001), coupled with freedom from its discursive commitments and 
prescriptive agendas, may bear greater promise of changing the approach to 
peacebuilding in real terms (see Appadurai 2004; Boege 2006). Needless to say, this 
conclusion does little for optimism with regard to cultural sensitivity of the liberal 
peace. 
The ‘other’ of the critique of liberal peacebuilding 
Many of the limitations of liberal peacebuilding discussed above appear to be coded 
into its monological mode of perception of itself, the problems at hand, and 
available policy responses. This is reflected in the inability of the liberal peace to 
gain an alternative perspective upon itself that would expose the essentially limited 
nature of its enterprise, and possibility of other – different – understandings, visions, 
and recipes for action. This latter function is apparently fulfilled by critical 
approaches to peacebuilding, including a vast literature focusing specifically on the 
critique of liberal peace. Yet, for all the effect that it is having on its policy 
discourse, the bulk of the critique might just as well not exist. The puzzle of this 
apparent obliviousness of the liberal peace discourse towards an array of approaches 
attacking its core beliefs and foundations deserves investigating, given how much 
the prospect of reforming the dominant approaches to conflict hinges upon its ability 
to be receptive towards critique. Although many of the effects of this rather one-
sided dialogue between the critique and the liberal peace may be explained by the 
latter‟s monological stance, their interaction needs analysing in a greater detail if this 
section is to come up with ways of „unclosing‟ that monologue.  
 
Quite aside from (albeit in keeping with) the „monologism‟ of the liberal peace, the 
differences between its paradigm and the critical approaches to peacebuilding can be 
traced to their respective epistemological and methodological (in Tickner‟s sense of 
the term „methodology‟ (2005)) preferences. The liberal peace operates within a 
„problem-solving‟ economy of „traditional‟ theory, while the nature of critical 
enquiry is by definition never-ending, directed as it is towards questioning the very 
parameters of thought in which „problems‟ are formulated (Cox 1981). This leads to 
the mutual perception of incompatibility between these two bodies of thought and 
practice. The critique of the liberal peace views its „problem-solving‟ ethos as 
limited and misdirected, bound to replicate, in the offered solutions, the very 
problems with which they attempt to grapple. And conversely, the „continuous‟ 
character of critical theorising (cf. Richmond 2009a: 580) is something of an 
anathema for a result-oriented rationalist economy of liberal peacebuilding and 
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development theory, whose „problem-solving‟ ambitions are reinforced by the 
application to a context which seems to compel successful and final (re)solutions 
with particular urgency – violent conflict.10 Even despite the growing evidence that 
its own problem-solving efforts fail, in the end, to achieve the professed objectives 
(e.g. Paris 2004), the alternative in terms of a „sustained scholarly‟ effort (Chabal 
and Daloz 2006: 97) that is difficult to measure in terms of concrete outputs is 
difficult to accept.
11
 From the perspective of liberal peacebuilding, the bulk of 
critical literature appears quite beside the point, little as it does to replace one set of 
„solutions‟ with another (and, presumably, a better one). And although it would be a 
gross exaggeration to claim that the critique goes entirely unnoticed by the policy 
community of the liberal peace, its impact is more pronounced when it addresses 
concrete assumptions and methodologies (e.g. the „tyranny of participation‟ (Cooke 
and Kothari 2004; UNDP 2007), or misdirection of development aid (Uvin 1998; 
UNDP 2007)). In its general implications, however, the critique is far less influential 
– which is perhaps understandable given that these are sufficiently radical to entail a 
fundamental rethinking of the nature of peacebuilding practice (and perhaps its 
demise in the current form). 
A counter-critique? 
Although the encounter with critique appears quite damning for the limited 
„certainties‟ of the liberal peace, there is an element of its dissatisfaction with the 
critical stance generally that is worth investigating, for it has direct relevance for the 
ability of critique to be perceived as offering viable alternatives to the current liberal 
peacebuilding „monologue.‟ It concerns the problematic of action within the critical 
theory and its post-structural elaborations, and in particular, the question of whether 
action can be legitimised outside a „problem-solving‟ interpretational economy.  
 
The apparent inability of the critique to offer alternative practical solutions to the 
perceived „problems‟ has not escaped the attention of scholars within the critical 
camp – even considering the discrepancies between the „traditional‟ and critical 
understandings of what constitutes a problem in need of addressing (e.g. Kapoor 
2008: 14-6). All too often, the effects of critical questioning and „undoing‟ of the 
hegemonic realities are inaccessible for anyone not sharing the premises of critical 
enquiry. Although Connolly‟s point that the study of political discourse is political 
analysis, and not just a prelude to it (1983), stands valid, it is also clear that too 
often, critical scholars operate on the assumption that „because a narrative has been 
read and deconstructed epistemologically and theoretically, “therefore it has been 
displaced politically”‟ (Kapoor 2008: 16, quoting Hall 1996: 249, italics Hall‟s). 
Overall, there seems to be little awareness among critical scholars about how their 
writing is perceived by those whose discourses they endeavour to deconstruct. But it 
seems likely that on the average, policy-makers beset by problems which defy 
simple resolution are not going to favour knowledge which increases the uncertainty 
                                                 
10
 The very title of e.g. „the Results Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF)‟ – Liberia‟s 
reconstruction programme to which international donors had pledged approximately $500 million 
(Kent 2005: 34) – is indicative of this trend. 
11
 One might speculate that the addiction to demonstrable outputs  and quantifiable results accounts 
for the relative neglect of conflict prevention (cf. Brown 2004) as part of the „integrated‟ approach to 
peacebuilding – despite all the official rhetoric in its support (e.g. Annan 2001). 
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of their situation. And even where decision-makers may be receptive to the full 
implications of the critique, it seems that – to use Robert Harris‟ elegant formulation 
– „inertia, the product of always seeing both sides of every question,‟12 undermines 
the very possibility of uncontroversial action. This problematic is succinctly 
captured in Simon Critchley‟s account of Derrida‟s view of politics: 
 
Deconstruction can certainly be employed as a powerful means of political analysis. For 
example, showing how a certain dominant political regime ... is based on a set of 
undecidable presuppositions is an important step in the subversion of the regime‟s 
legitimacy. ... But how is one to account for the move from undecidability to the political 
decision to combat that domination? If deconstruction is the strictest possible determination 
of undecidability in the limitless context of, for the lack of a better word, experience, then 
this entails the suspension of the moment of decisions. Yet decisions have to be taken. But 
how? And in virtue of what? How does one make decisions in an undecidable terrain? 
(Critchley 1992: 199, quoted in Buckley-Zistel 2006: 9-10, emphasis Critchley‟s) 
 
There seems to be a sense in which „action‟ – in terms of political decision-making – 
involves a slide into Habermasian „rational-purposive‟ mode of engagement with the 
world (cf. Wuthnow et al. 1984: 188-9; Critchley 1992: 200). For many critical 
theorists, this effectively limits the repertoire of action borne of critique to its 
perpetuation, since its application in political practice risks „substitution of one 
power with another‟ or „even reappropriation [of critique] by the dominant‟ 
paradigm (Kapoor 2008: 8; cf. Ashley 1989; Rengger and Thirkell-White 2007: 9). 
Yet, bearing in mind the self-designation of critical theory as an approach tasked 
with questioning the parameters within which problems are defined, it may be 
ideally placed to reconceptualise the whole problematic of action, especially in view 
of the narrow understanding of what constitutes politically consequential action, and 
the predominant adversarial and exclusive connotations of political decision-
making. The critical stance could legitimise a very different understanding of action, 
free from the connotations of finality, irreversibility and „non-perspective,‟ one in 
which „problems‟ are not exactly resolved, but discussed from a position enabling 
multiple perspectives and transcended at the level of non-adversarial engagement 
and dialogue (cf. Coker 1997; Buckley-Zistel 2006; Viktorova Milne, forthcoming). 
Although the risk of sliding into the problem-solving mode of action is never 
entirely superseded, the „critical‟ awareness of typical discursive entrapments allows 
for making more informed choices with regard to which (inevitably) empty 
signifiers to employ so as to accommodate the notions of (illusory) commonality and 
responsibility in least harmful ways (cf. Laclau 1989). Albeit these may seem like 
scant practical returns from the overall effort put into critical theorising, they do 
contrast favourably with the „unintended‟ effects of the dominant problem-solving 
„rational‟ type of action, which tends to reproduce the very problems that it 
considers serious enough to necessitate „resolution‟ (see e.g. Campbell 1992; 
Fetherston 2000a). For such „rational‟ paradigms, the lack of realisation of the 
embeddedness of the actor also constitutes an obstacle to grasping the value that 
cultural enquiry could carry for peacebuilding.  
 
 
                                                 
12
 Robert Harris, Enigma (Random House, 1995),  p. 181. 
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The monological ‘retaliation’ of liberal peacebuilding 
Given that seeing oneself as a situated actor also forms a prerequisite for perceiving 
the existence of other points of departure, it is perhaps possible to explain how the 
monologism of the culture of liberal peacebuilding mediates its perception of 
critique. If from an outlook informed by a critical awareness of multiple 
perspectives, the critique of liberal peacebuilding may indeed appear too radical for 
incorporating into the policy „mainstream,‟ then what limits its impact from a 
monological viewpoint is, paradoxically, that it may not be perceived as sufficiently 
different from this mainstream. Lacking the apparatus to differentiate between 
perspectives, voices, and „languages,‟ the monological discourse of liberal 
peacebuilding effectively distorts the distance – theoretical, epistemological, 
ontological – between itself and (however radical) critique. As a result, it distils 
critique into aspects which speak directly to its policies (e.g. how to „improve‟ local 
participation or accountability), simply discarding the radical implications 
„invisible‟ from its position. Various instances of critique thus appear to be „taken on 
board‟ through appending them to the existing repertoire of policies, without major 
reconsideration of the compatibility between these policies and the gist of critical 
arguments. The manner of „including‟ culture in the policy agenda of liberal 
peacebuilding bears all signs of such superficial add-on to the monologue of liberal 
peace – a move which appears to assuage any valid concerns with culture while 
avoiding an in-depth commitment to it.  
 
The pinpointed tendency of monological „digestion‟ of the other of critique (cf. 
Critchley 1992) may explain how the awareness of critique coexists, for the 
practitioners of liberal peacebuilding, with the unwavering belief in the rightness of 
its overall policy course.
13
 It may also explain the occasional incursions of the 
monologue of liberal peace into research displaying an overall critical intent, as in 
the case of Chopra and Hohe‟s (2004) recommendations for bridging the cultural 
gap between organised peacebuilding and local culture. Their suggestion of 
scrutinising local cultural practices with a view to their inclusion and subjugation 
within the liberal peace framework is especially unexpected given that Hohe‟s 
earlier research on East Timor (2002a, b) had demonstrated the extent of the 
incompatibility of Timorese notions of politics and society with the ones introduced 
by the liberal peace, which often results in parallel authority structures instead of 
integration between the two. The liberal peace does, indeed, emerge as „meta-peace‟ 
(MacGinty 2008: 158) from its encounters with critique, replete with paradoxes and 
clashes between its elements, yet continuing undeterred by virtue, it seems, of 
lacking a perspective from which to illuminate its own incongruities. 
Conclusion 
The monologism of liberal peace effectively displaces concerns with culture from 
the peacebuilding agenda. The „disrupting‟ influences of the „others‟ of liberal 
peace, although both notable and noticeable from the critical perspective, seem 
insufficient to rock the certainty of its monologue, which absorbs and disables 
                                                 
13
 As I gleaned from interviews at the UNDP and UN PBC in 2007. 
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difference through its inability to recognise it. Despite its self-reinforcing stability, 
however, the monological culture of liberal peacebuilding is not immutable. And 
although at present, the outlined aspects of its culture work to reinforce one another, 
by themselves, the monological mode of signification, the mythologisation of 
rationality, the securitisation of the liberal peace project, and the resultant 
banishment of politics and technologisation of peace are not invulnerable to a 
dialogical „unclosing.‟ The doubts concern not the possibility of a dialogical 
unclosure but the manner in which it may occur. 
 
Some space for reflection that could bring about such unclosure can be found within 
the established parameters of the monological culture of liberal peacebuilding. For 
example, the high regard for problem-solving rationality, for all its distortion 
through mythological absolutisation, entails a degree of reflection upon the (mis)fit 
between the methods, objectives, and practical outputs of peacebuilding policy and 
reform. Indeed, there is a growing sense of humility among the peacebuilding 
practitioners about the extent of change in (post-)conflict environments that can be 
achieved through the application of liberal policy models (Chandler 2009). Once the 
liberal peace begins to see itself as an inherently limited enterprise, it is but one step 
away from acknowledging other perspectives and approaches to peacebuilding. And 
although it may regard its „illiberal‟ counterparts, such as the reconstruction efforts 
of Hezbollah in Lebanon (MacGinty 2007), or „hybrid‟ political orders of the Pacific 
(Boege et al. 2008), as unacceptable in view of its own core beliefs, this may lead 
liberal peacebuilding to reposition itself as one type of peacebuilding practice among 
others. It may also contribute to the de-coupling of peace from other aims and means 
of liberal reform, such as state-, nation-, and institution-building, the liberalisation of 
economics and politics, and de facto marketisation of the civil society. From there, 
the path of dialogical unclosure may take it to de-mythologise rationality – a 
possibility which resonates with the ambition of many a critical work to rediscover 
the inherently circumscribed – by its very design – nature of scientific rationality 
(Toulmin 1992, 2001; George 1994). That, in turn, may contribute to the recognition 
of other types of knowledge, especially in view of their potential for illuminating the 
irregular, incalculable ramifications of violent conflict with which the problem-
solving rationality of liberal peacebuilding has been struggling (Viktorova Milne, 
forthcoming). And from there, there is only a short distance to reintroducing 
concerns with culture as a framework and vehicle of knowledge production, and to 
reflection over the culturally-situated nature of the liberal peace. 
 
Ultimately, of course, there is no way of ensuring that such dialogical unclosure 
does occur, and that the recognition of the perniciousness of problems such as 
„neopatrimonilaism‟ or „corruption‟ does not, instead, inspire devising yet more 
failsafe ways to eliminate the „immature‟ local agency from the imposed governance 
solutions (such as Paris‟ „institutionalisation before democratisation‟ approach 
(2004)). Similarly, there is every possibility that a greater prominence in liberal 
peacebuilding of aspects pertaining to culture, such as gender, ethnicity, capacity for 
action, or local distribution and workings of power, instead of leading to a serious 
engagement with culture, will result in its co-option by the dominant rationalist 
paradigm. However, this possibility does not entirely justify shying away from 
pinpointing the monological closures, or refusing to exploit the silenced ambiguities, 
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such as in the liberal peacebuilding‟s treatment of culture, on the grounds that this 
will only strengthen its capacity for „unethical‟ digestion of the other (cf. Critchley 
1992: 6). As discussed above (Chapter 2), the relations of domination yield complex 
patterns of dependencies and resistances, and the latter may well be an outcome of 
such surreptitious encroachment of the cultural problematic into the traditional 
domains of liberal peacebuilding – especially given the latter‟s track record in 
submitting to subversion from „within.‟ The steady accumulation of dissident voices 
and dynamics within the monological self-description of liberal peacebuilding is 
bound to have an effect sooner or later – but the difference is on whose terms – the 
liberal peace‟s own, or the dissidents‟, it will take place. 
 
In fact, the recent trend in policy discourses of liberal peacebuilding towards 
uncovering the connections between issues that have, for a long time, been tackled 
separately – such as the wider social implications of development policies, and 
especially their impact on conflict and its avoidance or resolution (UNDP 2004; 
DfID 2002) – creates a definite niche for cultural enquiry as offered in the present 
work, given its emphasis on reconnecting the diverse spheres of human activity and 
experiences through the recognition of their common cultural constitution and role 
in the production and negotiation of meaning. An attempt at such enquiry into the 
conflict and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone is offered in the next chapter. Of course, 
the uncharted, inductive character of „embedded cultural enquiry‟ makes it 
unrecognisable as a conventional attempt at „conflict analysis,‟ yet the issues 
outlined through the lens of cultural constitution of meanings appear very pertinent 
for the understanding of conflict in Sierra Leone and the subsequent efforts at 
pacification. Whether or not such an analysis can yield knowledge which speaks to 
liberal peacebuilding, is another matter. 
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5. Peacebuilding and ‘Local’ Culture: Cultural dynamics 
of war and peace in Sierra Leone 
 
 
Their collecting tins were already full of donations for the poor of 
the city, or at least those sections of the poor who in Mrs Huggs‟ opinion 
were suitably picturesque and not too smelly and could be relied upon to 
say thank you.  
 
– Terry Pratchett, Hogfather 
 
Introduction 
This chapter pursues the twin tasks of assessing the ability of liberal peacebuilding 
to engage with „local‟ culture, and of uncovering a wide spectrum of cultural 
processes which informed and framed the violent conflict and the subsequent peace 
transition in Sierra Leone. Based on the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 
3, I outline the possibilities of approaching the dynamics of Sierra Leone‟s civil war 
from a cultural perspective, and analyse the cultural implications of other 
interpretations of this conflict which had been put forth by academics and 
peacebuilding practitioners. In particular, I try to show how pre-conceived 
conceptual frameworks, in which conflicts and their causes tend to be examined, 
produce explanations which reaffirm the terms of established vocabularies while 
remaining remote from topical local dynamics and their cultural framing in Sierra 
Leone (cf. Jackson 2005: 53-4). Yet, a situation of encounter between different 
cultural „world-making‟ regimes inevitably results in some degree of mutual 
influence and „translation,‟ and opens possibilities for an enhanced awareness of 
one‟s own cultural perspective – something that applies both to the interaction 
between liberal peacebuilding and „local culture,‟ and to the interplay between 
different interpretational regimes within the latter. I attempt to map these instances 
of translation and mutual illumination by examining the local reception of the 
interventions, as well as the perceptions of the war violence and the peace process 
(reconstructed on the basis of case study research, interviews and available recent 
ethnographies). 
 
Given its ubiquity as a discursive if not actual presence, it would be erroneous to 
treat the liberal peace as altogether external to Sierra Leone‟s realities; yet it is 
important to sustain an awareness of realities that are „unmade‟ as a result of its 
application. Sierra Leone features prominently in discourses of peacebuilding 
agencies, being one of the few countries on the agenda of the recently created UN 
Peacebuilding Commission (UN PBC 2007). In Sierra Leone itself, institutional 
frameworks of national, regional and transnational scope proliferate, and even when 
ineffectual in their functions or achievements, they dominate the parlance of actors 
engaging in peacebuilding and set precedents for its possible institutional 
organisation. For example, despite the largely defunct government structures over 
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the last decade in all countries involved, the Mano River Union between Sierra 
Leone, Liberia and Guinea supposedly provides an established framework of 
cooperation on cross-regional issues, thus detracting attention from the everyday 
realities of the border areas which are virtually unregulated, permeable to actors of 
any description and intent, and ultimately marginal (cf. Richards 1996: 42-6, 128-9; 
Jackson 2004: 183-4). Yet such remote areas can also become sites of small-scale 
peacebuilding activities that respond to local needs and visions of peace, not all of 
them institutionalised according to the habitual forms of „civil society initiatives‟ 
(for an example of one that is, see Clifford (s.a.) or Accord 9 on Sulima Fishing 
Community Development Project). In order to gauge the resonance of liberal 
peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, it is important to understand the remits of „local‟ 
relevance of different institutional formats, as well as the connotations that these 
may have in the local context.  
 
At the same time, care must be taken not to reify the „local‟ through investigating 
the (ineffectual) attempts at engaging with it on behalf of international actors, or to 
condone its analytical (as well political and normative) isolation from the 
„international.‟ The idea, rather, is to emphasise the production of the „local‟ that is 
taking place through the interactions between a variety of cultural perspectives, both 
internal and external to Sierra Leone. And while the discussion in this chapter 
highlights the impossibility of arriving at a universal reference point against which 
to measure the „truth‟ or „falsehood‟ of any ideas about conflict, peace, change, and 
their agents, it also demonstrates the totalising effects that any terms of enquiry have 
on the framing of its subject.
 
These reservations, admittedly, also apply to the 
present enquiry, since openness to the possibility of multiple frames of reference for 
interpreting reality does not give the conceptual framework of cultural analysis any 
privileged access to said „reality.‟ However, its awareness of the reality-making 
mechanisms inherent in any attempt to „make sense‟ of the conflict and peace in 
Sierra Leone guards against ignoring its own totalising potential (perhaps to the 
detriment of definitiveness of some conclusions reached below). The terms of the 
adopted theoretical stance, thus, inevitably colour the presentation. They also 
inevitably represent an outsider‟s perspective on Sierra Leone, and cultural 
embeddedness of my own subject position predisposes it towards a dialogue with 
other outsiders‟ attempts at analysing the encounters between Sierra Leone and the 
liberal peace (or the West) rather than an objective, „unbiased‟ examination of these 
encounters themselves. While this is likely to entail „under-representing‟ African 
perspectives on such encounters (as well as those of the liberal peace), the task of 
the following analysis lies more in exploring the possibilities of a culturally 
„receptive‟ outside approach to violent conflict in Africa, than balancing the current 
external approaches with internal views. (While the latter would also constitute a 
valuable aspect of cultural enquiry, its impact would be limited without sketching 
out a way of a „different‟ kind of external perspective on Sierra Leone.) 
 
The chapter omits a separate historical overview of the conflict and interventions, 
weaving the account of events into the narrative of how the conflict has been 
approached by academics and peacebuilding practitioners, seeking to show how the 
very isolation of meaningful events from the bulk of other happenings is predicated 
upon, and serves to reaffirm, a particular perspective on the conflict. Producing a 
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definitive chronological account would also be at odds with the intention of 
emphasising the necessity of in-depth engagement with the case study which is 
likely to uncover tensions, contradictions and inconsistencies upsetting any linear 
presentation of events. Instead, the received accounts are examined side by side with 
alternative perspectives on cultural dynamics yielded by the case study research, 
probing, where possible, the implications of alternative conceptualisations on the 
viability of peace(building) in Sierra Leone.  
 
The chapter is divided into three broadly defined parts. While the first part 
concentrates on the interpretational economies of the templates of peace and war, 
and explores the reasons behind their limited validity in Sierra Leone, the second 
part addresses the wider cultural structures involved in the production and 
stabilisation of particular meanings related to conflict and peace, bringing out the 
contradictions between „local culture‟ and liberal peace. The third part continues the 
analysis of the interaction between these competing cultural logics, focusing on the 
production of Sierra Leone as the subject of conflict transformation and the 
accompanying processes of the „making‟ of peace. 
I. The making of the conflict in Sierra Leone: The 
templates of peace and war 
This part revisits the interpretations of Sierra Leone‟s civil war, its origins and 
dynamics from the perspective of cultural production of meaning, focusing on the 
role of interpretational schemes consolidated by the „templates‟ of war and peace. It 
enquires into the dynamics and peculiarities of meaning-generation corresponding to 
one or another template, as well as the factors contributing to the stabilisation of 
either template as the dominant avenue of sense-making. It also prepares the ground 
for discussing the broader cultural „fields‟ responsible both for stabilising individual 
meanings and validating the templates‟ interpretational schemes. 
 
External agency played a major part in „making sense‟ of what had taken place in 
Sierra Leone, imposing, in the process, its own „realities‟ on the conflict, even when 
naively purporting to present things as „they really are‟ (e.g. Gberie 2005: 11). 
While the evolution of the donor approach to conflict has been noted to follow the 
„vogues‟ in development discourse rather than the actual needs on the ground 
(Duffield 2001), many scholarly studies, even those relying on close-up, 
ethnographic research, also appear to answer at least as much to the topical debates 
within their own fields as to the „puzzling‟ conflict realities (e.g. Richards 1996, cf. 
Richards 2005a). Because the chosen terms of enquiry largely predetermine which 
aspects of the reality on the ground will appear relevant or even visible (in accord 
with Sapir and Whorf‟s idea that we see what our language enables us to see (e.g. 
Whorf 1956)), the studies of Sierra Leone‟s conflict inevitably conceal as much as 
they reveal. In part, this helps explain why the habitual terms of enquiry into conflict 
and violence yield so little „cultural‟ evidence, or why they are not best suited to 
illuminate the „local‟ interpretational schemes, whether pre-dating, or originating in, 
the conflict. 
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Some of the terms in which explanations of the conflict were cast – originating both 
in the general conflict literature and the studies of specifically African, or „Southern‟ 
conflicts – have found their way into the rhetoric of liberal peacebuilding agents. 
But what is perhaps more significant, is how „neutral‟ the explanations in terms of 
„root causes,‟ „violations of human rights,‟ „greed versus grievance,‟ „bad 
governance‟ or „political marginalisation‟ sound to a lay observer. A cultural 
analysis of the representational space of Sierra Leone thus refers to uncovering the 
disparate descriptions of Sierra Leone‟s reality and interactions between them, to 
attempts to superimpose some descriptions over others as the basis for the ensuing 
patterns of practices, as well as to processes which make these descriptions „stick.‟ 
One of the consequences of pre-conceived terms of approaching the conflict in 
Sierra Leone has been the „streamlined‟ and homogenised vision of the „war,‟ in 
which rebel groups and militias feature as counterparts of the international UN 
contingents and national and regional security forces. Yet a focus on the top-level 
dynamics of the war (where the „top‟ is coterminous with military success) (e.g. 
Mortimer 2000) obscures the character of representational links which lead „down‟ 
from this top, reading the assumption of impersonal and bureaucratised hierarchies 
into the „rebel‟ command structures (Hoffman 2007). This downplays the 
importance of the socio-cultural dimension of Sierra Leone‟s conflict (cf. Chabal 
and Daloz 1999) as well as a whole host of peace initiatives that have taken place at 
the societal level, both together with and independently of the official peace 
negotiations (e.g. PRIDE 2006; CR 2006; FAWE SL 2006a, b; Accord 9; SCG SL 
2006). 
 
Ascription of the habitual significational patterns to the dynamics of Sierra Leone‟s 
conflict resulted in its near „illegibility‟ to the outsiders, despite the wide currency of 
its meanings in rural Sierra Leone (cf. Ellis 1999). Thus, in contrast to his own 
argument that there are „social factors feeding the conflict,‟ Paul Richards cites a 
view prevalent among the „diplomatic circles [around 1994] … that the rebel 
movement had been destroyed and the violence was exclusively the work of bandits 
and military splinter groups‟ (1996: xvii). He also quotes Luttwak‟s view that the 
„chaos‟ engulfing Sierra Leone „cannot be described as civil war, inasmuch as the 
contending forces – notably including the “government” – represent nobody but 
themselves‟ (1995, quoted in Richards 1996: xvii). Curiously, this has also been 
claimed of subsequent „governments,‟ such as the 1997-1998 AFRC/RUF 
„interregnum‟ (Gberie 2005: 98), in comparison with which the 1992-1996 NPRC 
junta of young disillusioned army officers (cf. Hirsch 2001: 35) looked positively 
representative, resonating as it did with the sentiments of many „excluded youths.‟ 
The cases of „misreading‟ the local signification schemes also abound in the 
analyses of the peace process. While, for instance, there were good reasons to 
believe that starting a peace process with the staging of elections in 1996 may not 
have been the most considered decision, Malan et al.‟s criticism of it has to do with 
the contravention of the „UN-prescribed pattern of ceasefire, peace agreement, 
disarmament, demobilisation, and then elections‟ (2002: Ch 2) rather than with the 
recognition of the highly contentious cultural baggage of electoral politics in Sierra 
Leone (Ferme 1998). Presenting the conflict itself as „an aberration of the true Sierra 
Leone‟ (Tony Blair, quoted in Gberie 2005: 3) serves as a marker of the inability of 
many traditional approaches to conflict to address the issue of cultural continuities 
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between the states of war and peace, or the extent of their mutual constitution 
(Richards 2005a; Jabri 1996). The following analysis seeks to remedy some of the 
deficiencies of „reading‟ the conflict in Sierra Leone by illuminating the local 
significational patterns as well as their interaction with the introduced 
interpretations. 
The rhetorical unevenness of ‘peace’ and ‘war’ 
Many observers have criticised the international community for taking several years 
to start treating the conflict in Sierra Leone seriously (e.g. Hirsch 2001). Yet this 
uncertain status of the conflict on the radars of the international actors also offers 
important clues to its character. Directing the analysis towards the reasons and 
circumstances behind not only external, but also internal unevenness of the 
acceptance of „the state of war‟ (Zulaika and Douglass 1996) in Sierra Leone can 
help in re-examining the received wisdoms regarding the causes of the conflict, 
together with appropriate remedies, from a perspective informed by attention to 
cultural processes of meaning-generation. 
 
In hindsight, the entire period between 1991 and 2002 was branded as the Sierra 
Leone civil war. Such branding has a homogenising effect on our perception of the 
conflict, and detracts attention from the fact that attempts to end the war by a 
negotiated settlement have interrupted its course since 1996
14
 (some observers also 
point out the RUF peace initiative of 1992 (e.g. Richards 1996) or Strasser‟s appeal 
to the UNSG to intervene with „good offices‟ in 1994 (Gberie 2005: 90)). This 
received periodisation also „consummates‟ (Bakhtin 1990a; Holquist 1990) the array 
of different accounts of war and puts a homogenising touch on their contributions in 
terms of „validity‟ and „truthfulness.‟ It has been remarked that official 
periodisations often represent top-down visions of political history, which may be 
irrelevant for people on the ground (e.g. Tickner 2005; cf. Jackson 2004: 71). While 
the „official,‟ political violence may end, this does not necessarily herald the end of 
all violence which may be more immediate and proximate to the people (Nordstrom 
2004; du Toit 2000; Coker 1997). But even leaving aside the violence that does not 
qualify as „political‟ (and therefore „relevant‟ to the issues of peace and war (cf. 
Ferme 1998)), the official start- and end-dates of war seldom reflect the outer 
margins of war-related dynamics, since contemporary conflicts seem to lack the 
definitive boundaries of the conventional 19
th
 and 20
th
 century wars (cf. Ellis 2004: 
118-9). However, such periodisations may also be inaccurate in their indiscriminate 
branding of everything that happened between certain dates as „war.‟ 
 
For Sierra Leone, this branding obscures what many accounts (sometimes 
inadvertently) portray as the patchy, uneven character of the war, both on the spatial 
and temporal axis. Attempts to advance the rhetorical interpretation of the situation 
as „war‟ have been undertaken by various actors (local and international) at various 
                                                 
14
 The peace agreements, mostly dismissed as „failed‟ in hindsight, create an impressive list: the 1996 
Abidjan accords (between GoSL and RUF, started by NPRC‟s Julius Bio and continued by the 
elected president Kabbah); the 1997 Conakry agreement (between Koroma‟s AFRC junta and 
ECOWAS); the „controversial‟ Lomé peace agreement (brokered by the UK and US and signed by 
President Kabbah and Corporal Sankoh); Abuja I and II Ceasefire Agreements (November 2000 and 
May 2001, respectively) (e.g. Malan et al. 2002).  
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points in the conflict; however, the popular acceptance of the rhetoric of war 
remained uneven. The perception of the war oscillated between distant and 
proximate, advancing in the face of the immediate experiences of violence and 
receding with its growing remoteness. In this sense, the perception of the war in the 
early stages as a marginal, „purely “south-eastern affair”‟ (Gberie 2005: 77-8) is 
symptomatic of the significational pattern at play, as are the examples of sudden 
realisation of the proximity of war following, for example, the RUF onslaughts on 
Koidu (1992), Bo (1994) or Freetown itself (1997, 1999). Encroachment of the 
message of war was also more notable in connection with the „enemy‟ control of the 
country‟s diamond fields. 
 
Some features of Sierra Leone‟s overall significational space can be inferred already 
on the basis of this consideration (others, together with their effect on the dynamics 
of war and peace, will be discussed further in this chapter). The most prominent 
among these are the symbolic importance of the centres, the one-sided flow of 
representation (from centres to periphery) and the weakness of horizontal 
associational ties between the people that points to a fractured character of Sierra 
Leone as an „imagined community‟ (Anderson 1991) and limits the metonymical 
effects of violence on its „audiences‟ (see Allen 1987).  
 
Its effect on witnesses (as opposed to the perspectives of the victim or perpetrator) 
has become a recognised dimension in the analyses of violence (see e.g. Riches 
1986b; Stewart and Strathern 2002). Witnesses may serve not only as interpreters of 
violence (a function that is „unavailable‟ to its immediate victims (see Murer 
2008a)) but also, owing to their shared identity with the victims (be it in terms of 
shared humanity, race, class, ethnicity etc.), as symbolic targets (cf. Allen 1987). 
Verbal and televised accounts of violence can enlarge the latter category to include 
broader communities bound to the victim by representational links. Thus, shared 
identity gives rise to an economy of violence in which individual bodies become 
„metamorphosed into specimens‟ of a broader „category‟ (Malkki 1995: 88, quoted 
in Donnan and Wilson 1999: 138).  
 
For Sierra Leone, such patterns of collective identification linking the victims of war 
violence to the broader „categories‟ of general public are by no means clear cut. A 
theme running through many first-hand and scholarly accounts (e.g. Gberie 2005; 
PRIDE 2006; Jackson 2004) is a variable pattern of association between the victims 
of violence and broader audiences: The people of Sierra Leone do not automatically 
associate themselves with the victims of violence and do not necessarily interpret 
such violence as committed against themselves or the whole country, despite the 
alleged intention of the perpetrators to communicate such „messages‟ (see e.g. 
Richards (1996) for an interpretation of functionality of the RUF violence). Much 
more potent „messages‟ are delivered by the experiences or even expectations of a 
direct attack: the random character of the RUF‟s „hit and run‟ tactics in the rural 
areas – once its ambitions of territorial conquest were thwarted by a series of 
successful offensives (cf. RUF 1995) – often contributed to the exaggeration of its 
actual might, so that the rumours of RUF advances to an area had a disproportionate 
effect on its population (Gberie 2005: 92). However, even such rumour-mongering 
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did not always succeed in mobilising the population: the „suddenness‟ of the RUF‟s 
advances features in many victims‟ accounts (e.g. Jackson 2004: 65). 
 
The particularity of identity dynamics premised on such character of signification is 
reflected in the observations of vertical, rather than horizontal, societal cohesion (cf. 
Chabal and Daloz 1999), and alludes to the weakness of codes which bind Sierra 
Leonean people together as a single and unitary „self,‟ manifest in the perception of 
the lack of „patriotism‟ lamented by some Sierra Leoneans (cf. Jackson 2004; TRC 
2004). This is not to say that Sierra Leone lacks any patterns of collective 
identification, but rather that the noted „anomalies‟ in their functioning can serve as 
opening points in the cultural analysis of Sierra Leone as a broader significational 
field, and its links with the noted unevenness of „war‟ (and „peace‟). Reversing the 
above argument, it can be said that „Sierra Leone‟ does not represent a universal 
reference point for the inhabitants of the country, and that the national-level self-
description is of limited validity. (The same, as will be shown below, can be said of 
its international representations.) Consequently, the war was not in many instances 
perceived as affecting the national level of identification, and instead „happened‟ to 
other forms of unity, predominantly family and locality (which could be 
extrapolated to the regional level). Unlike the conflict in the neighbouring Liberia, 
Sierra Leone‟s war lacked a recognised „ethnic dimension:‟ even ethnicity, however 
politicised in party struggles (see e.g. Kandeh 1992), did not provide a sufficiently 
cohesive „glue‟ for collective representations of war in Sierra Leone.15 At the same 
time, the difficulty of outlining a collective „self‟ is closely connected to the 
impossibility of an effective delineation of the „other‟ in the Sierra Leone conflict 
(cf. Barth 1969; see also Chapter 3), given the widespread practices of abduction and 
forced conscription into the RUF, as well as the RUF‟s tactics of infiltration of 
prospective targets (Gberie 2005).  
 
The patchy character of the internal spread of the message of „war‟ was reflected in 
its uneven perception from the outside, as well as the lateness and half-heartedness 
of international peace missions to Sierra Leone. Indeed, serious international 
involvement
16
 – the brief 1998 UN observer mission (UNOMSIL) notwithstanding – 
only started after the capital city of Freetown came under attack in the 1999 siege by 
the rebel forces and the subsequent shelling by ECOMOG in an attempt to oust them 
(which brought about as many if not more civilian casualties) (Gberie 2005: 131; 
Malan et al. 2002). The UN deployed a successor mission with Chapter VII powers 
(UNAMSIL) in late 1999, but its state and strength reflected the continuing attitude 
of semi-neglect towards the conflict in Sierra Leone:  
 
The UN force arrived in dribs and drabs, and the available troop strength was too low to 
allow a widespread deployment. The lack of commitment by the RUF, the essentially 
peacekeeping nature of the mission, and the need to quickly fill the vacuum left by the 
                                                 
15
 Interestingly, rather essentialist versions of ethnicity sometimes feature in self-identifications by 
Sierra Leoneans (e.g. S.B.‟s „I am not a white man. I am a Kuranko,‟ in response to Jackson‟s (2004: 
180) queries of his behaviour). 
16
 ECOMOG‟s involvement in the peace effort is often dismissed in literature as representing 
Nigeria‟s state interests rather than being a genuinely multilateral peacekeeping intervention (e.g. 
Mortimer 2000), although similar charges of state interest have been levelled against peacekeeping as 
such (e.g. Martín 2005). 
132 
 
withdrawal of a regional intervention force [ECOMOG] contributed immensely to the 
mission‟s predicament. Following the RUF‟s offensive against the peacekeepers in May 
2000, the entire peace process reached an impasse. A bi polar situation persisted, with the 
RUF controlling the north and east of the country and the government of Sierra Leone 
(GoSL) or the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) controlling the west and south. 
(Malan et al. 2002) 
 
The reaction of the international community to the war in Sierra Leone also 
highlighted the role of armed violence as the marker of a noteworthy conflict (Diez 
2003), particularly when its targets were of international importance (symbolic as 
well as material, as illustrated by the shock of the international community at the 
siege of Freetown in 1999). The British military intervention (announced on 7 May 
2000) in response to a mass hostage taking of UNAMSIL peacekeepers by the RUF 
in Makeni and Magburaka seems illustrative of the same logic (see e.g. Malan et al. 
2002: Ch 3).  
 
For liberal peacebuilding, violence has served as an ambivalent attribute of agency 
in conflict: although participation in violence de-legitimises local leadership 
(Duffield 2001), it also serves as a marker of serious intentions and political bearing, 
as demonstrated by negotiations with Somali warlords at the expense of less 
prominent local peace „constituencies‟ (Duffey 2000; cf. Kaldor 1999). To the extent 
that the scholarly and policy communities perceive violence as the criterion of 
agency, the „West‟ is complicit in legitimising the resort to violent means by any 
actors craving for international recognition – or for internal recognition via 
international resonance (cf. Smith 1997: 3; Duffey 2000). In the task of authorising 
the rhetorical validity of the message of „war,‟ the West with its influence on the 
African state-level politics becomes the inevitable higher echelon of authority.  
 
Given this tendency for international attention to follow violence, it is unsurprising 
that various parties to the Sierra Leone conflict used violence as a communication 
channel to spread the message that Sierra Leone was at war, beyond the state 
boundaries. The RUF‟s demands for access to satellite communications are well 
documented, and international hostage-taking seemed to fulfil the aspirations for 
international attention where internal violence failed (Richards 1996, Gberie 2005). 
In 1990-1991, BBC Africa Service broadcasts were the usual medium used by 
Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh to communicate belligerent messages; including 
the broadcast which was used by Sahkoh to announce „the beginning of his 
“people‟s struggle” against Momoh‟s venal regime‟ and, rhetorically, to „conjure‟ 
the RUF into existence (Gberie 2005: 59). If it was not for the broadcast, the 
„official‟ start of the war might have gone unnoticed among the multiple other 
occasions of attacks and lootings of Sierra Leone border villages by the Liberian 
rebel forces (ibid.: 58-9). The ruling NPRC junta also used the occasions of RUF 
violence to attract international attention (ibid.: 90). However, until the RUF became 
a threat to the dominant (internally and externally) self-description of „Sierra Leone‟ 
(cf. Gberie 2005: 3, 87), the „internationals‟ were more inclined to perceive the 
events in Sierra Leone according to Kaplan‟s „new barbarism‟ logic (Richards 1996, 
2005a). 
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The link between violence and the international attention also exposes the 
ambivalent role that Western involvement had historically played in Sierra Leone 
(and the wider West African region). Paul Richards characterises the conflict in 
Sierra Leone as „moored, culturally, in the hybrid Atlantic world of international 
commerce in which, over many years, Europeans and Americans have played a 
prominent and often violent part‟ (1996: xvii). The work of Rosalind Shaw (2002) 
sheds light on the role of transatlantic slave trade in the shaping of social relations 
and power practices of the hinterland Sierra Leone that have continued relevance in 
the present. The long history of violent incursions and conquests, suffered by 
various Sierra Leone peoples as well as conducted by them (ibid., Ferme 2001), also 
helps to uncover the generally ambivalent attitude to violence in Sierra Leone and 
around (see Ellis 1999), where „fear, contempt and admiration go hand in hand in 
the way people speak about those who are truly masters of the art of killing‟ (Bøås 
2001: 718). Thus, the understanding of violence as a marker of agency is also shared 
within Sierra Leone (which was probably reinforced, rather than generated, by the 
practices of colonial rule) (Shaw 2002). 
 
Ironically, it was also the heightened levels of violence around the start of 1999 that 
had brought about „a frantic scramble among West African states, as well as Britain 
and the US, to broker a peace agreement‟ in Sierra Leone (Malan et al. 2002: Ch 2): 
 
The UN Special Representative initiated a series of diplomatic efforts aimed at opening up 
dialogue with the rebels. Negotiations between the Government and the rebels began in May 
1999. With coaxing from the UK and US, a controversial peace agreement was signed by 
President Kabbah and Corporal Sankoh in Lomé, Togo, on 7 July 1999. The Lomé accord 
granted total amnesty to Foday Sankoh and members of the RUF, promised reintegration of 
the RUF into the Sierra Leonean army, assured the RUF several cabinet seats in the 
transitional government, left the RUF in control of the diamond mines and invited Sankoh to 
participate in UN-sponsored elections. (ibid.) 
 
Despite the obvious flaws in the Lomé agreement, the UN was obliged to back it with a 
peacekeeping mission. The Lomé signatories specifically requested the UN Security Council 
to urgently: “…amend the mandate of UNOMSIL to enable it to undertake the tasks 
provided for it in the present Agreement; [and] to authorise the deployment of a peace-
keeping force in Sierra Leone.” (ibid.) 
 
Uneven as the spread of the message of „war‟ had been throughout its course, so was 
the perception of „peace‟ that had come after the 1999 Lomé agreement. The impact 
of the Lomé agreement, widely perceived as a vehicle of peace „forced down on 
people,‟ drafted by „high-level politicians and hand-picked people with western 
education who had no experience of the war‟ (CR 2006; cf. PRIDE 2006), was not 
uniformly convincing. Although for many, civilians and fighters alike, any peace 
was preferable to continued war (cf. Humphreys and Weinstein 2004), underneath 
the war fatigue there was also a noticeable clash of resentments. For many fighters, 
the war had not brought about the desired improvement of their situation. „They 
fought for nothing, and that‟s what they got,‟ as captured in Douglas Farah‟s 
Washington Post article title (1.09.2001), and with respect to income and 
employment their situation remained similar to pre-war conditions (PRIDE 2006). 
But there is also a perception, especially acute among the numerous victims of the 
war, that the RUF had „won‟ and that letting it reap the meagre rewards (such as re-
integration packages), while the victims of their violence had nothing, was 
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symptomatic of continuing war (Jackson 2004: 71). The dilemma of whether „peace‟ 
was coterminous with the destruction or accommodation of the RUF was evident not 
only in the internal differences of opinion – from „ordinary people‟ to the ruling 
circles (e.g. between the president and some of the government ministers (Jackson 
2004: 70)) – but also in the competing agendas of the interveners: while the UN was 
committed to support the peace agreement, the UK displayed preference for a force 
solution to the RUF problem (see Malan et al. 2002).  
The templates of ‘peace’ and ‘war:’ Separate or interconnected? 
The interventions produced a double-track impact: a discourse on the „root causes‟ 
of war together with a series of measures intended to remove them, and a spectrum 
of measures designed to stop the war in its tracks. While the latter was meant to 
remove the consequences of the war, the former was designed to remove the 
conditions in which it could arise. For all the progressiveness of the „root causes‟ 
thinking in conflict theory, it suffers from neglecting cultural factors (see Väyrynen 
2001), and its adoption by the peacebuilding discourse substituted the earlier 
„conflict management‟ paradigm with the management of peace. With the „root 
causes‟ detached from the actual course of war (which is presumed to follow its own 
dynamics premised on the logic of escalation, military strategy, proximate causes 
etc.), the messiness of the conflict gets disentangled into manageable peacebuilding 
„tasks,‟ such as DDR, the fight against corruption, improving governance, 
strengthening civil society etc. That something is missed by divorcing these two 
aspects of conflict is not acknowledged even by all critical scholars of conflict and 
peace.  
 
The current interpretational battles surrounding the academic conceptualisations of 
violent conflict and its relation to peace can be placed into two broad categories. At 
one end of the spectrum, the tendency is to isolate war into a separate social and 
political phenomenon, which removes it from the horizon of peacetime governance 
practices and neatly designates it as the abnormal opposite of peace. At the other, 
continuities are emphasised to stress war and peace as alternative avenues in the 
pursuit of political and social objectives – avenues that spring from largely the same 
social and cultural terrain and involve the same sets of „codes‟ and conventions. 
While the appeal of the first option is in its promise of excluding war from the 
repertoire of social and political action, it is vulnerable in that such a conception of 
„peace‟ is, in fact, incapable of addressing war without a certain loss of self-identity 
(see Chapter 4). The second option, although being open to the charges of 
„normalising‟ war, seems much better equipped to illuminate the pathways of socio-
cultural legitimation of war and certain „choices‟ made to precipitate a wholesale 
reversion to a cultural economy of conflict, as well as the social processes and 
cultural mechanisms behind the opposite movement towards peace (Richards 2005a; 
Jabri 1996).  
 
An insight into the workings of signification offered in the theoretical framework 
allows for a removal of some of the paradoxes of conceptualising the transitions 
between peace and war. While attesting to the continuities postulated by Richards 
(2005a) and others, the mechanism of totalisation of partial meanings also 
contributes to our perception of „war‟ and „peace‟ as absolute and incontestable 
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realities. It is in this sense (that reconciles the gradual nature of change and the 
existence of continuities with the seemingly absolute character of „peace‟ and „war‟) 
that the notion of the switch of templates between „peace‟ and „war‟ is employed 
and explored here. The oscillation between „peace‟ and „war‟ as the broad 
interpretational schemes („templates‟) in the case of Sierra Leone also alludes to 
their close interpenetration. The following discussion will attempt to illuminate the 
logic of switches as well as mergers between them. 
 
The idea that the state of war is a distinct „regime‟ in the functioning of societies has 
been entertained for some time; it is implied, for example, in a well-known quote 
from Hobbes: „For Warre consisteth not in Battel onely, or the act of fighting; but in 
a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battel is sufficiently known … All 
other time is Peace‟ (Hobbes 1985: 185-6). The state of war appears to warrant the 
types of practices and behaviours that are unthinkable in the time of peace (cf. BHC 
SL 2006), but therein also lies a paradox: performing these „unthinkable‟ practices 
during peacetime has an effect of enunciating a switch to the template of war. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, meaning-generation possesses a power dimension manifest 
in its reality-making effects, and this power „spills over‟ into the realm of political 
contest particularly visibly when the meanings articulated are those of peace and war 
(cf. Zulaika and Douglass 1996). Enunciations of war – or peace – may not be 
uncontested (this process effectively shares the nuances outlined by Wæver (1995) 
for the acceptance of speech acts aimed at securitisation), but even as such they are 
significant, especially in the context of cultures treating verbal expression as much 
less arbitrary than customary in the West (Shaw 2005; Jackson 2004: 72). In this 
sense, Taylor‟s pronouncement about Sierra Leone „tasting‟ war, and the 
contemporary peace activists‟ public advocacy of non-violence (e.g. SCG SL 2006), 
despite carrying opposing messages, perform similar rhetorical functions. Relatedly, 
the RUF‟s control over the means of communication in areas held by them, so that 
the local inhabitants had no source of information about the course of the war other 
than what the RUF told them (Gberie 2005: 65), amounts to more than the 
conventional notion of propaganda. Whether or not the enunciation of „war‟ is 
accepted can be gauged from the prevalent type of response: while the state of 
„peace‟ leans towards a limited tolerance of violence and may involve mechanisms 
of symbolic retaliation or settlement (e.g. exchange of goods, women etc.), the state 
of war legitimises violent responses, giving rise to escalatory, rather than 
conciliatory dynamics. Thus, the lynching of rebel attackers by the civilian 
population of Bo in 1994 (Gberie 2005: 87-88) points to the encroachment of the 
template of war, while peace marches into rebel-controlled territories across the 
Mano River Bridge (CR 2006; Accord 9) – an attempt to communicate the readiness 
for a switch to a template of peace. 
 
Some ethnographic studies, for Sierra Leone and elsewhere (e.g. Rackley 2000 for 
Sudan), elucidate the state of war as a distinct cultural register complete with 
survival strategies and resources on which people can draw in times of emergency. 
The historical use of bush farms as emergency settlements or places of refuge 
(Ferme 2001) was still salient during the recent war in Sierra Leone (see Jackson 
2004: 66 – an unaccentuated reference in a story by an amputee). However, the strict 
separation into the templates of peace and war seems not so clear cut: the elements 
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on which the functioning of these templates relies are not mutually exclusive, but 
shared across largely the same cultural repertoire. The „dictate‟ of one or another 
template is imposed rhetorically – not only through the reliance on discursive 
enunciation (Zulaika and Douglass 1996) but also in the sense discussed in Chapter 
3 – through a tropological assertion of the self-description and subjugation of the 
dissenting evidence. This is an important consideration for peace processes, for it is 
not so much the cultural „vocabulary‟ of practices that needs changing (since it is 
shared between the states of peace and war) but rather the modes of their articulation 
and associated interpretational schemes. 
 
The fact that the message of „war‟ has taken so long to root in the entirety of Sierra 
Leone attests to the viability of the template of peace; however, the mechanism of 
this viability needs investigating. Logically, such viability may come at a cost of 
rather high tolerance for violence charactering the state of „peace.‟ Partly, this is 
applicable to Sierra Leone, where in some areas, the levels of „peacetime‟ violence 
are almost unregulated in practice (e.g. domestic violence), although „laws exist 
against such things‟ (FAWE SL 2006a). However, the historical patterns of 
interpenetration of violence and „the everyday‟ in Sierra Leone (Ferme 2001; Shaw 
2002) suggest another mechanism for this resilience. Despite its frequent 
occurrences, and the entrenchment of its memories in the physical landscape of the 
rural Sierra Leone (ibidem.), violence seldom lingered in the active register of the 
social repertoire, which is greatly assisted by the practice of social „amnesia‟ (Shaw 
2005). Regarding the recent war in Sierra Leone, this is reflected in the tension 
between the widespread perception of the restoration of normality, of having come 
to terms with one‟s experiences of violence after the war (see Jackson 2004: 67-9; 
SCG SL 2006; Rigby 2006: 48; GGEM 2006), and a concomitant awareness that the 
violence was not yet sufficiently distant to risk to „even think about it‟ (Jackson 
2004: 72; cf. Shaw 2005). Extensive ethnographic evidence suggests that the 
potential for quick social recovery in Sierra Leone hinges on the instrumental 
character of social forgetting, alongside its superficial character (Ferme 1998, 2001; 
Shaw 2002; Jackson 2004). 
 
Despite being the time when „normal‟ rules and practices are suspended, the state of 
war is not an unregulated territory: it has its own „rules‟ and conventions, some of 
limited/local and some of general relevance; but as implied by the notion of the 
„crimes of war‟ and associated frameworks of criminal prosecution, the admission of 
the possibility of violations of those norms is also a convention of sorts. Frequent 
references to the RUF atrocities as „something beyond the pale‟ (Jackson 2004: 70; 
cf. HRW 2003) point to a violation of the accepted ideas about the kinds of practices 
warranted by a state of war; yet at the same time the state of „war‟ was used 
rhetorically to legitimise the committed atrocities, both on the victims‟ and 
perpetrators‟ part, which served to readjust the conventions. A Human Rights Watch 
report cites a rebel‟s conviction that the atrocities were committed because of the 
war, and would stop at the time of peace, which is what the RUF wanted: „They kept 
saying they were about to stop fighting – that they really want peace and that after 
peace comes, they won‟t do these things any more‟ (HRW 2003: 40). At the same 
time, women „were advised by other female captives to tolerate the abuses, “as it 
was war”‟ (ibid.: 43). Yet, the encroachment of „war‟ into the areas that were, in the 
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collective imagination, reserved for „peacetime‟ uses and interactions, also had an 
effect whereby the template of war preserved its hold over the victims of violence, 
for whom the war was „still not over‟ (Jackson 2004: 71). At the broader societal 
level, the refusal to talk about violence once it had stopped precipitates the exclusion 
of war from the current social reality, reinforcing the message of „peace‟ (cf. Baker 
and May 2006, referring to Shaw 2004). The rhetorical nature of the templates of 
„war‟ and „peace‟ and their origin in the shared repertoire of cultural practices imply 
that while the encroachment of „war‟ to the areas traditionally associated with peace 
intensifies the perception of the ubiquity of war and rapid dwindling of the domain 
of peacetime normalcy, the opposite is also possible, and the resources for „peace‟ 
can be found amidst the dominant templates of war.  
 
The temporal overlap of the templates of peace and war in Sierra Leone draws 
attention to the existence of parallel „economies‟ to which the shared cultural 
repertoire contributed, strengthening the interpretational schemes of both/either 
peace or war. Thus, an important cultural resource such as „forest knowledge‟ was 
used „in … practical and symbolic ways‟ by both government and rebel forces 
(Richards 1996: xvi), as well as the local populations fleeing from the fighting; and 
its ambivalent role in sustaining the dominance of „war‟ and „peace‟ in the recent 
conflict reflected the historical patterns of forest use (cf. Ferme 2001; Shaw 2002). 
Diamonds were another resource notoriously put to ambivalent uses, having come to 
fuel the economy of war (e.g. Bourne 2001) just as they supported peacetime 
shadow cross-border and internal economies (Duffield 2001; Richards 1996). 
Observers also point out the shared social background of the supporters of almost 
every party to Sierra Leone‟s conflict (the RUF, NPRC, CDF, AFRC), and 
particularly the similar susceptibility to revolutionary rhetoric among the RUF and 
NPRC „cadre‟ (see Abdullah 2004b: 4-5). Yet, the common concerns and shared 
social background between e.g. the RUF and CDF combatants produced very 
different types of behaviour during and after the war (SCG SL 2006; Humphreys and 
Weinstein 2004). The ultimate illustration of the reliance of templates not only on 
the common cultural repertoire but also shared social agency is the „sobel‟ 
phenomenon (whereby „soldiers‟ by day turned into rebels by night), which 
institutionalised the merger of the templates of peace and war in Sierra Leone. The 
subdivision of activities by many NGOs into pre- and post-settlement phases 
indirectly underwrites the continuities in the social agency and processes attributed 
to both the states of „war‟ and „peace,‟ as the recipients of aid (in each phase) are 
frequently the same communities and individuals.  
The switch of templates: The ‘antecedent conditions’ and the 
character of violence 
In parallel to the disentanglement of the Sierra Leone conflict into causes and 
consequences among the policy community, the scholarly research tends to treat the 
causes of conflict separately from the dynamics and shape of its day-to-day realities. 
Given the noted trend whereby the targets of violence, in the absence of viable 
political conventions, switch to the cultural sources of power (see Chapter 3; 
Crawford and Lipschutz 1997; Nordstrom 1994), the lack of attempts to examine the 
possible links between the causes of Sierra Leone‟s war and the character of 
violence that perpetuated it is particularly symptomatic of the general tendency to 
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neglect culture in the context of violent conflict. While my intentions are far from 
advancing a direct correlation, it seems inconceivable that the causes of conflict and 
its empirical reality would not share at least some cultural codes and interpretational 
structures which communicate to the victims and perpetrators alike that „this is what 
it is all about‟ (cf. Ellis 2004: 123) – even if interpretational schemes are sometimes 
imposed in an afterthought, as in the explanations advanced for amputations that 
would arguably prevent people from voting in the 2006 elections that undermined 
the RUF agenda (Richards 1996; HRW 2003: 54; Jackson 2004); or Bøås‟ examples 
of the RUF rhetoric paraphrasing the existing social practices – e.g. „Operation Pay 
Yourself‟ (2001).  
 
That the analysis of the „root causes‟ needs correlating with the particular violent 
forms of expression and performance is a matter of debate. In his recent book on 
Sierra Leone, Michael Jackson cites Allen Feldman‟s conviction regarding the 
impossibility of reducing violence „to antecedent conditions, [since] … it always 
“detaches itself from initial contexts and becomes the condition of its own 
reproduction” (Jackson 2004: 216, quoting Feldman 1991: 20). The argument 
certainly has appeal to the extent that it implies acknowledging that „changes in the 
conditions that produce violence do not necessarily end it‟ (Jackson 2005: 54), and 
that „the wartime atmosphere of fear and peril …, as well as the escalating acts of 
vengeance that increasingly characterised the conflict were self-generating 
phenomena which largely eclipsed the grievances and ideologies that originally 
precipitated the armed rebellion‟ (ibid.: 59, emphasis in original). However, to 
follow this argument to the end would mean ignoring the meaning-making in which 
the local people engage in order to reconcile their violent experiences with the 
realities of everyday life, which could be expressed in terms of the „antecedent 
conditions‟ returned to bear on their lives anew. The discursive linking of the 
character of violence and the „root causes‟ occurs even despite the possible logical 
separateness, if only through a tropological (metonymical) association in time, rather 
than contested causal links.  
 
Furthermore, analytically abandoning the character of violence to its own dynamics 
obscures the processes involved in both unleashing and terminating the mentioned 
„conditions of its own reproduction,‟ and places violence in a social vacuum 
impenetrable by the logic of everyday sense-making. While it is often difficult to re-
contextualise traumatic violent experiences (cf. Murer 2008a), and the narratives of 
heroic violence and the everyday may indeed occupy separate niches in the 
communal consciousness (Schröder and Schmidt 2001), the very existence of 
communal praxis that maintains the boundary between „the everyday‟ and the 
„violent‟ alludes to a degree of mutual illumination between the two (by way of 
conscious mutual exclusion through self-description (see Chapter 3)). Even more 
saliently, the violation of this boundary as a cultural possibility is premised upon the 
„secondary‟ separation of the realms of (exceptional) violence and the everyday. 
While this is not to dispute that violence does indeed engender its own „runaway‟ 
dynamics (or „cultures of violence,‟ in now almost common parlance), its 
traumatising and shocking effects can only be perceived on the backdrop of „normal‟ 
interpretational schemes. Both these aspects – the play of meanings governing the 
switch of templates from the „antecedent conditions‟ to violence and back, and the 
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secondary interlinking of violence and root causes of conflict in the effort of „sense-
making‟ – are crucial in what Carolyn Nordstrom terms the „undoing‟ of cultures of 
violence as a precondition for returning to peace (1994, 2004). In addition, focusing 
on violence in separation from the conditions of its „production‟ bears the danger of 
treating war and violence as ahistorical, trans-local phenomena (Hoffman 2007: 645-
6), thus feeding into the „one-size-fits-all‟ approach to explaining conflict and 
building peace, which is clearly contrary to both Feldman‟s (1991) and Jackson‟s 
(2004) intellectual claims.  
 
This discussion may invite charges that I am conflating the „everyday‟ and 
antecedent conditions, as well as the heroic narratives of past violence and the kind 
of violence perceived as „barbaric‟ and beyond the pale. However, these distinctions 
are superseded if one considers the context – the common cultural economy – which 
forms both the background for „antecedent conditions‟ and the canvass for the 
relations and conditions defining the everyday, in which the „seeds of conflict‟ 
(Jackson 2004) were sown and against which the violent performances and their 
effects come to be assessed. (This common cultural economy of Sierra Leone – its 
wider significational field – will be discussed in the next part of this chapter) As to 
conflating the two types of violence, this was also practiced by the parties to the 
Sierra Leone conflict. In parallel with Liberia‟s civil war (see Ellis 2004), 
combatants adopted the names and boasted the attire of known warriors of old, as 
well as popular Western movie characters such as Rambo (Richards 1996), or 
engaged in self-mythologising through the adoption of terrifying names and cross- 
(or, on some occasions, un-) dressing (Ferme 2001; Shaw 2002; Jackson 2004: 155-
6). Appeals to the tradition legitimising certain forms of violence were also evident 
in the reliance of the CDF on the traditional authority of hunters. And although the 
ranks of „hunters‟ have obviously expanded through mass involvement of new 
initiates (with suspicions that in some instances there remained only a nominal 
identification with a lost tradition (Förster 2006; Ferme 2001: 27), for combatants, 
their self-identification as hunters „located their activities within a conceptual field 
of rights, responsibilities, and obligations that predate[d] the war‟ (Hoffman 2007: 
646-7). It is unclear whether with respect to the legitimation of certain practices of 
violence (and counter-violence), the ethnic/tribal grounding constituted a „marked‟ 
difference within the CDF. Although its sub-division into the Kono donsos, the 
Kuranko tamaboros, the Temne gbetis and kapras, the Mende kamajoisia etc. 
(Jackson 2004: 145; Hoffman 2007: 642; cf. Gberie 2005) alludes to distinct 
tribal/ethnic traditions, the accounts of violations committed by the CDF forces in 
the later phases of the war (which led to the controversial indictment of the CDF 
leader, Sam Hinga Norman, by the Special Court of Sierra Leone) sometimes link 
these with the loss of touch with the locality that provided the legitimising 
grounding and constraints upon the „hunters‟ (Richards et al. 2004: 11; although see 
Hoffman 2007: 650-1). 
The ‘antecedent conditions’ 
If the Sierra Leone war of 1991-2002 can be shown to be a rhetorically totalised, 
homogenised image, so apparently can the peace that preceded it. There seems to be 
a stark contrast between the more habitual view of Sierra Leone‟s history as 
relatively untroubled by conflict and violence (e.g. Kelsall 2005: 366; BHC SL 
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2006)
17
 and ethnographic accounts that, even prior to the outbreak of the civil war in 
1991, drew attention to the ways in which violence was inscribed in the rural 
landscape (Ferme 2001) or the memories configuring the everyday (Shaw 2002). 
Such accounts alert one not only to the history of violence but also to the evasion 
(and resistance) that continue to exist as a possibility for the present, almost by way 
of an implicit „expectation‟ of violence. Yet, despite the awareness of violence as 
being deeply ingrained in Sierra Leone‟s „historical imagination,‟ both Ferme (2001) 
and Shaw (2002) describe their perception of the early phases of the war as shocking 
and sudden, unwarranted by the cultural patterns that the two ethnographers 
observed in, respectively, the Mende and Temne parts of Sierra Leone (see also 
Viktorova Milne, forthcoming). 
 
References to a „turbulent history‟ of Sierra Leone mostly concern the years of 
Stevens‟ dictatorship (1968-1986) and one-party rule (1978-1992) (e.g. CGG 2006; 
PRIDE 2006), occasionally extending to the entire post-independence (i.e. since 
1961) era (e.g. Caritas Makeni 2006). Some accounts of the war (e.g. Bøås 2001; 
Gberie 2005) emphasise a gradual endorsement of violence in political practices 
throughout the post-independence era, which culminated during Stevens‟ rule; 
others pinpoint the growth of „revolutionary‟ feelings among Stevens‟ opposition 
(Opala 1994; Rashid 2004). However, even compared to the frequency of violence 
in the post-colonial history of Sierra Leone, the violence unleashed by the RUF in 
1991 was seen by many as unprecedented and „unsanctioned‟ by the country‟s 
history and custom. The previous violent event that both local and international 
observers customarily refer to as the „token‟ example of war in Sierra Leone was the 
nineteenth-century uprising against the penetration of the colonial rule to the rural 
protectorate „hinterlands‟ (BHC SL 2006; Thompson 2006). However, in Ferme‟s 
account, the history of the opposition between the rural Sierra Leone and the „state‟ 
extends well into the 20
th
 century, which is marked by ritual enactments of the 
instances of local resistance (2001). A closer look at the cultural mediation of 
violence thus leads one to question the Sierra Leoneans‟ suppositions like „violence 
was not in our culture‟ (Thompson 2006). But if one focuses on bordering as a 
cultural practice of identity production, it is the possibility of drawing violence into 
or excluding it from within the sense of a cultural self that is crucial – not its 
particular resolutions (the latter, of course, matter for gauging local power 
configurations).
18
 
 
                                                 
17
 Although no one explicitly corroborated the view that post-colonial history of Sierra Leone was 
untroubled by violence, the assumption contained in my question (how do you explain the „sudden‟ 
onset of war in 1991 given that it seemed to have little precedent in the post-independence period) 
was never questioned either. Whether this is down to indifference to how post-colonial history is 
understood by „outsiders,‟ or simply a lack of desire to show initiative, of course, remains an 
unknown, although the „totalising‟ effects of meaning-generation would help explain the extension of 
the image of „peace‟ beyond the area of its immediate relevance. Curiously, Gberie notes that the pre-
independence era, likewise, is often portrayed „as one of near-idyllic peace and prosperity,‟ which 
„was hardly the case‟ (2005: 20). 
18
 As will be shown below, the possibility of excluding violence from the cultural sense of self is 
crucial for both communal and personal reconciliation and transition to the template of peace. In this 
light, the Libyan connection of the RUF insurgency (see e.g. Richards 1996) offers a useful device 
for externalising the violence as something „alien‟ to Sierra Leone, despite the abundance of „local‟ 
violent dynamics manifested in the war. 
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The discrepancy in the perceptions of the pre-1991 Sierra Leone on the spectrum 
from peaceful to violent testifies to the effects of approaching „the empirical‟ with 
pre-defined ideas of what qualifies as violence. The academic literature is complicit 
in this by drawing a distinction between „political‟ violence and other forms of 
violence which are dismissed as politically inconsequential. (There is thus an 
opening for a „cultural‟ interpretation of these biases if we see the cultural as a 
broader sphere beyond and around the „political,‟ which also supports Galtung‟s 
notion of „cultural violence‟ illustrating the legitimation of discriminating attitudes 
or inaction (1990).) Nordstrom (2004) notes this selective noticing of violence when 
writing about the upsurge of domestic violence in post-conflict settings which 
frequently goes unnoticed; it is rarely problematised or connected with the violent 
experiences of the conflict (although see du Toit 2000). Ferme also points out how 
the visibility of physical war violence detracts attention from its symbolic and 
structural forms, „to which Sierra Leoneans have been subjected on an ongoing 
basis‟ (1998: 574, 555-6) and which, in line with Jabri‟s observations regarding the 
discursive legitimation of violence (1996), pave way for real violence, death and 
destruction.  
 
The selective noticing of violence is not, of course, restricted to external 
perspectives on Sierra Leone. One of my interviewees linked people‟s diminished 
ability „to recognise‟ conflict to the consequent failure to apply conflict resolution 
mechanisms at the crucial moments before the war, which led to its outbreak (CR 
2006). The lack of local mediation capacity is also pointed out as one of the 
continual threats in the Peace Consolidation Strategy – a joint GoSL and UN 
document (UN 2006). Various non-governmental organisations have taken up the 
challenge to train „chiefs and community leaders in peace education,‟ including the 
„traditional reconciliation methods‟ (FAWE SL 2006b). This path, however, 
reaffirms the local „biases‟ with regard to what is considered as violence and what is 
regarded with tolerance and complicity; and this is not merely the matter of 
awareness or lack thereof. Rather, as the following quote illustrates, these „biases‟ 
are part and parcel of local culture as „common sense‟ (cf. Chabal and Daloz 2006; 
Geertz 1983): 
 
One parliamentarian who is also a paramount chief passed a law that women should report 
[domestic] violations. At first this produced a high turnout, including complaints about 
slapping by a husband and so on. The complaint procedure requires resolution, so 
godparents get called in, etc. … After a while there was a sharp decrease in complaints – 
women realised that if they report their men, they won‟t have a man in the house! (FAWE SL 
2006a) 
 
Is it possible, in this regard, to claim that some cultures may not have the requisite 
mechanisms to deal with (some types of) conflict, or does this just point to the 
limitations in non-violent options of „peaceful‟ resolution that a culture has devised 
(violence being considered an established, if not necessarily preferred, alternative) 
(cf. Brigg 2005)? Or, in case a conflict is perceived as something that went „out of 
hand,‟ does it take a path that is less culturally codified and thus prone to 
unpredictable turns, as it passes through the areas characterised by cultural „scarcity‟ 
of praxis (as opposed to Bauman‟s concept of „cultural density‟ (1999)), and as 
such, does it speak of arbitrary neglect of certain areas, containing clues regarding 
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local power imbalances? Or is such perceived scarcity of „cultural‟ meanings an 
indicator of a different kind of praxis – of conscious muteness, concealment, and 
cultural „myopia‟? In order to address these issues in the later parts of the chapter, it 
is necessary first to consider the character of violence in the Sierra Leone civil war 
and its relationship with the dominant interpretational patterns in Sierra Leone‟s 
culture. 
The character of violence 
Many early accounts (most ostensibly, Kaplan (1994) and his plentiful audience 
among the policy-makers (see Richards 1996)) dismissed the character of violence 
in the Sierra Leone war as barbaric – although, ironically, for a lay observer, 
Kaplan‟s explanations in terms of environmental degradation and uncontrollable 
population pressures made more sense in view of the actual form that the violence 
took than many subsequent more thought-through and empirically supported 
explanations. However, even Kaplan drew some rudimentary connections to Sierra 
Leone‟s cultural context (his unforgivably static view of culture notwithstanding (cf. 
Ellis 2004: 117-8)), when referring to „old, superstition-riddled, forms of violence‟ 
employed by the RUF (Richards 1996: xvi) – which is more than many subsequent 
accounts have accomplished. 
 
Overall, attempts to explore the connections between the forms of violence and the 
cultural context in which it took place have been extremely scarce. Among the few 
academic studies exploring this issue are Paul Richards‟ (however contested – see 
Bangura 2004) explanation of the RUF violence as a symbolic re-appropriation of 
the country by the excluded youth whose violent tactics were „supposed‟ to terrorise 
the population (1996: xvi; cf. Fithen and Richards 2005), and Morten Bøås‟ 
observation that some of the forms of violence employed by the RUF and AFRC 
echoed, if in reversal, the existing political practices and had „counterparts in other 
cultural practices and mythology in Sierra Leone‟ (2001: 723). David Keen‟s 
descriptions of Stevens‟ era electoral violence committed by APC „militants‟ against 
the opposition candidates and their supporters (2005: 18) are strikingly reminiscent 
of the practices which later, in the RUF‟s case, have shocked outsiders as 
particularly „barbaric:‟ public humiliation in violation of the accepted social taboos, 
public torture and executions, removal of limbs and rape. These practices draw 
attention to what Chabal and Daloz (1999) describe as the untenability of electoral 
loss in patrimonial politics, since finding oneself in opposition results not only in 
destruction of one‟s political and social agency, owing to the inability to support 
one‟s patrimonial clients, but often of life itself – echoing Ellis‟ (1999) explanation 
of the 1989 killing of Liberia‟s Samuel Doe as a methodical and deliberate physical 
and spiritual destruction. 
 
That connections between the seemingly wanton and chaotic acts of violence and the 
underpinning cultural context can be drawn is demonstrated by Stephen Ellis‟ work 
on Liberia, whose civil war had also been dubbed „barbaric‟ (1999; 2004; Ellis and 
Ter Haar 2004). Ellis argues that many aspects of violent imagery and performances 
were much more „legible‟ for people familiar with the local cultural context than 
warranted by customary allusions to the violent practices as „bizarre.‟ The cultural 
patterns used to „make sense‟ of violence in Liberia‟s civil war did not, as such, 
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disappear with the scaling down of violence; for that reason, understanding them 
would be indispensable if any viable peace plans were also to „make sense‟ locally. 
Furthermore, according to Moran, violence constitutes an integral part of the 
Liberian indigenous tradition of „voice, participation, and empowerment, otherwise 
known as “democratic values”,‟ which makes violence ultimately compatible with 
the local peacetime democratic politics, contrary to the usual juxtaposition between 
the two in the West (2006: 6). Thus far, the violence of the Sierra Leone war has 
only sporadically been „read‟ by outsiders (with the extent of „inside‟ readings 
remaining largely unknown), although its cultural connections with a wider West 
African region may suggest certain directions of enquiry in the light of Liberia‟s 
case. Ferme points out that „cultural idioms‟ of violence are shared across the 
victim-perpetrator divide in a number of African conflicts, just as the underlying 
broader „conception[s] of the aesthetics and stylistics of power, the way it operates 
and expands‟ are common for „officialdom and the people‟ (1998: 559, quoting 
Mbembe 1992: 9). The following seeks to identify some of these by contrasting the 
existing explanations of various aspects of the Sierra Leone conflict with the 
interpretation based on the cultural processes of signification. 
 
While a widespread perception of the RUF violence (and to a lesser extent that of 
some other armed factions, e.g. SLA), both locally and internationally, was that it 
was often designed in an outright violation of cultural taboos, Ellis (2004; 1999) 
directs attention to how these perceived acts of „anti-cultural‟ violence were 
themselves grounded in the same cultural context that they were ostensibly 
violating. The targeting of chiefs and elders in the Liberian civil war, for example – 
acts that were often perceived as assaulting the „sacrosanct‟ societal norms and 
which many have taken to herald the passing of African communalism – was aimed 
to dispute their leadership not in its own right but rather to claim superiority based 
on the acquisition of assets associated with the status of elders (see Ellis 1999). Ellis 
notes that the things the young fighters desired – such as wealth and authority – 
were a hallmark of seniority in the Liberian society, and their „prowess‟ in war, in 
the view of the youths, had imparted them with the seniority and adulthood 
necessary for control over such assets (ibid.).  
 
In this light, the assaults upon the figures of traditional authority, such as chiefs, 
religious leaders and elders (Keen 2005: 60; Bellows and Miguel 2006: 5), in the 
Sierra Leone civil war perhaps also warrant explanations beyond the „attacks on‟ 
culture (cf. Crawford and Lipschutz 1997). While such assaults definitely had a 
destabilising effect on societal norms and values, they also testified to the 
pervasiveness of certain cultural connotations of power and influence, and contested 
not so much the authority itself as the control of access to the perks of status. While 
drawing comparisons between Sierra Leone and Liberia may not be seen as 
academically over-adventurous (given the partly overlapping dynamics of the wars 
and cultural proximity of the two countries, especially in their Mande areas (Ferme 
2001; Bøås 2001; Moran 2006)), parallels to this phenomenon can also be found in 
conflicts elsewhere. For instance, while the Khmer Rouge ostensibly „destroyed‟ or 
banned many elements of the Cambodian culture, they also implicitly relied on its 
repertoire to cement the societal practices of their own regime, so that „far from 
revolutionising Cambodian socio-politics, [the Khmer Rouge] actually engaged and 
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manipulated traditional forms of Khmer society to suit its own ideology‟ (Richmond 
and Franks 2006: 23-4; Ovensen 2005).  
 
The remainder of this chapter covers various aspects of the dynamics of signification 
– the production and reproduction of the „individual‟ meanings and the 
interpretational battles between the „local‟ meanings and the ones introduced by the 
internationals, as well as among different versions of the „local.‟ It also addresses 
the production of identity and actorness through various instances of boundary-
drawing in the array of interactions between the local and international, conflict and 
peace, and so on. 
II. Meanings and interpretational structures: The 
‘root causes’ vs. patrimonial meaning-generation 
The patchy character of the templates of peace and war can be taken as a symptom 
of a troubled state of the wider significational fields that usually stabilise the 
templates and associated interpretational patterns. In this sense, the conflict certainly 
does affect culture, exposing its arbitrariness and de-automatising its significational 
functions. This part of the chapter addresses such wider significational fields in the 
context of the conflict and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. Of course, the templates 
of war/peace themselves function as stabilising significational fields, but in 
situations where their „dictate‟ is ineffective, one has to look for the wider context in 
which they are anchored.
19
 In the case of Sierra Leone‟s conflict, it appears that it is 
not the level at which the interpretational patterns perpetuate the messages of 
„peace‟ or „war‟ that is disrupted (partly because historically, the separation between 
them has emerged as thin and incomplete), but the level which isolates these very 
states as separate and distinct. This may account for the perceived intractability of 
many problems which are often presented as the „root causes‟ of the Sierra Leone 
conflict (e.g. the lamentable state of governance, widespread poverty and 
underdevelopment), as well as the suspicion that a „culture of violence‟ has not been 
entirely eradicated by a series of peacebuilding efforts. In addition, this also prompts 
an enquiry into how the template of „peace,‟ instituted and sustained through an 
array of peacebuilding activities of mainly external provenance, dovetails with the 
understandings of peace embedded in the peacetime interpretational structures 
habitual to pre-war Sierra Leone. A consideration of this level of culture can shed a 
different light on the thorny issue of local ownership of peace and institutions of 
peacetime governance. 
The ‘root causes’ of conflict 
Despite its manifold range of actors and activities, liberal peacebuilding in Sierra 
Leone manifests a preoccupation with certain issue areas, such as human rights, 
political accountability and fight against corruption, governance and multi-party 
                                                 
19
 This consideration reintroduces a certain type of „parsimony‟ to cultural analysis, in that broader 
aspects of signification are called upon in situations where the narrower and more immediate levels 
of conventions fail to provide clues. In other conflicts, the dynamics of template switch may be very 
different from the ones in Sierra Leone, and levels at which meanings are stabilised and perpetuated 
may be identified differently.   
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democracy, civil society development etc. These elements of the discourse of liberal 
peace feature extensively in the offered explanations of the civil war as the causal 
factors structurally responsible for its outbreak. The rhetoric of „causes‟ of conflict is 
curiously deterministic: despite the empirical evidence to the contrary (illustrated, 
for instance, by the structurally similar case of Ghana (NAG 2006; WB 2006)) and 
the theoretical efforts to dissociate „structural conditions‟ of violence from their 
actual output (Riches 1986b), the alleged array of „root causes‟ are treated as a 
certain recipe for violent conflict (cf. Duffield 2001). The impression is heightened 
by the determination of donors and their country-based partners to equate 
„peacebuilding‟ with elimination of these „root causes.‟ A cause and effect 
connection established in this way seems to underlie the appropriate course of 
policy: uncover the causes of conflict (normally using a concise inventory (cf. DfID 
2002; UNDP 2003, 2004a; EC s.a.)), eliminate them through the application of the 
liberal „know how‟ of good governance, and peace will ensue. Even the issue of 
reconciliation was presumed to submit to the same logic, although here the 
problematic aspect of causality concerned the alleged therapeutic effects of truth-
telling: „blowing‟ one‟s mind and clearing one‟s chest was presented in the posters 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SL TRC) as a precondition of peace 
descending upon Sierra Leone (Shaw 2005). 
 
Despite the fact that its initial objectives were to do with reconciliation, the SL TRC 
effectively became the official forum colloquially entrusted with the task of 
enquiring into and reporting on the causes of war.
20
 The four volume-report it 
produced (TRC 2004) was extensively relied upon by many peacebuilding agents 
outside and inside Sierra Leone in designing their interventions (e.g. UN 2006). 
Some observers have questioned the applicability of the causal connection between 
obtaining „a clear picture of the past‟ and the facilitation of „genuine healing and 
reconciliation‟ to Sierra Leone‟s traditions of social recovery (Shaw 2005). But the 
conclusions of the TRC that have come to guide the approaches of both local civil 
society and international actors demonstrate an even more striking rhetorical leap. 
Although the day-to-day work of the TRC largely relied on victim, witness and 
perpetrator first-hand accounts of violence (e.g. Kelsall 2005), its conclusions 
regarding the causes of conflict were framed in the habitual (to the educated and 
policy-wise observers) terms of leadership failure, corruption, lack of accountability 
and alienation of the state from its populace (TRC 2004). This rhetorical leap 
illustrates the tendency to exclude the character of war violence from the 
consideration of its causes even when explicitly addressing it. 
                                                 
20
 The objectives listed in the Truth and Reconciliation Act of 2000 are summarised as follows: „to 
create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses … , to address impunity, to respond to 
the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the 
violations and abuses suffered‟ (Shaw 2005). The rhetoric of the TRC report itself (TRC 2004) is 
more confused, with less emphasis being placed on documenting abuses and a growing emphasis on 
enquiring into the causes of conflict and circumstances in which violations became possible. An 
impression of the balance of these tasks can be gleaned from a list of themes for enquiry that the 
Commission had identified „early in its life:‟ the historical antecedents to the conflict; governance; 
military and political history of the conflict; the role of mineral resources and external actors; the 
fates of women, children and youths in the armed conflict; the relationship between the TRC and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone and the „national vision‟ for Sierra Leone (TRC 2004: Introduction).  
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The noted emphasis on causality seems an important basis of liberal peacebuilding 
as a „problem-solving‟ practice; yet this causality is limited not only in that some 
aspects of the conflict were not considered worthy of notice, but also in that 
establishing the TRC as part of a broader discourse of liberal peace largely 
predetermined the terms of its enquiries as well as the findings. The aspired 
causality thus functions in a self-fulfilling capacity. Therefore it is unsurprising that 
the overall tone of TRC‟s conclusions resonated with the more general discursive 
frameworks in which conflict in the Global South, and Africa in particular, came to 
be addressed in the post-Cold War era (e.g. UN 1998; EC 1996; DfID 2001, 2004). 
On the other hand, presenting the conditions of pre-war Sierra Leone as the „root 
causes‟ of conflict can be cast as a rhetorical faux-pas, given how unlikely they are 
to change dramatically in the post-war period. This can be seen as a move 
legitimising a return to violence, based on a mis-reading of „causes‟ or, rather, on a 
preconceived approach to the enquiry into causes of conflict that is predetermined 
by the dominant discourse of peacebuilding. 
 
Thus, in the bulk of policy-related interpretations of the conflict, its „root causes‟ 
were divorced from the immediate violent performances and began to be articulated 
in terms of the illiberal „diagnoses‟ that both legitimised the liberal pathway of 
conflict resolution and put the liberal peacebuilding actors firmly in the frame as 
helpers and abetters of positive transformation (cf. EC SL s.a.: 21). In view of the 
state of Sierra Leone prior to the onset of the war, many of these diagnoses appear 
indisputable: governance was indeed inefficient, welfare and social policies failing 
in both rural and urban areas (cf. Jackson 2004), corruption was rampant 
(exacerbated by a series of coups throughout the 1990s, with each promising reform 
only to fall into its forerunners‟ tracks), civic freedoms at a low ebb and the 
frustration of the impoverished and politically marginalised populace soaring high 
(e.g. ICG 2004). However, even a cursory examination of this logic with respect to 
Sierra Leone‟s case exposes some inconsistencies. Most worryingly from the 
perspective of liberal peacebuilding, the factors listed as the „root causes‟ of the 
Sierra Leone conflict also remain in place post-war. Not only have they „not been 
adequately addressed‟ (ibid.: 9, quoting ICTJ 2004; cf. FoC 2006), but admittedly, 
„since the war, “all our resources have gone toward recreating the conditions that 
caused the conflict”‟ (ICG 2004: 8). This is echoed in the survey of the ex-
combatants‟ assessment of the post-war situation: despite the general improvement, 
particularly in the areas of access to education and medical care (Humphreys and 
Weinstein 2004: 4, 42), 
 
[o]n two fronts, … ex-combatants are less upbeat. These two areas are critical, in part 
because they motivated so many to take up arms in the first place. With respect to 
employment opportunities, more than 50% of respondents think things are about the same or 
worse than before the war. Given that so many were promised jobs as an incentive to fight, a 
failure to deliver on this issue has potentially important consequences in the longer term. … 
A similar pattern is evident in how respondents thought about corruption. More than half 
believe things are about the same or worse than before the war. (ibid.: 42-3; cf. Baker and 
Roy 2006) 
 
While this is casually interpreted as a failure of both the government‟s and the 
internationals‟ efforts to move the country beyond the explosive situation (e.g. IGC 
147 
 
2004; FoC 2006; BBC 2007a), if one considers frequent references to how Sierra 
Leoneans are „easily satisfied‟ and happy with „rice and palm oil‟ (Thompson 2006; 
GGEM 2006; Caritas Makeni 2006), perhaps the situation before the start of the war 
was not quite as explosive as it is made out. At the turn of the decade (1990), the 
freedom of expression was unprecedentedly high, and a return to multi-party 
democracy appeared in sight, since the President Momoh agreed, under the pressure 
of public opinion, to concede the APC‟s one-party „dictatorship‟ (Gberie 2005: 37). 
 
Perhaps more symptomatically, however, the inventory of the „root causes‟ appears 
to have missed an important area. Locally, many remark on how the civil war in 
Sierra Leone was a product of an unhappy convergence of several factors, such as 
the structural factors pinpointed in the liberal „diagnoses,‟ the fluid political situation 
in the neighbouring Liberia as well as the political entrepreneurship of Sankoh and 
Taylor. The „“greedy” Liberian influence‟ was seen by many as a crucial factor, 
since similar structural conditions existed elsewhere without triggering violent 
conflict (e.g. Ghana) (WB 2006; NAG 2006). On its own, the inadequate conduct of 
state affairs was not seen as likely to have triggered the template switch towards the 
state of war; however, the gradual encroachment of violence into the daily running 
of the state during Siaka Stevens‟ rule had a much greater effect in terms of 
legitimising violent responses to political inadequacies (e.g. Gberie 2005; Ero 2003: 
235; Keen 2005: 16-17). In addition to channelling violence through the (essentially 
privatised) state institutions (such as the Internal Security Unit (ISU) infamously 
known in popular parlance as „I Shoot You‟),21 Stevens also „institutionalised‟ the 
reliance on private networks (of mostly drugged „footloose‟ youths) for violent 
intimidation of political opponents and the electorate at large (Keen 2005: 11-19; cf. 
TRC 2004, Vol.2: Ch. 2). While the reliance on private networks, and elusive 
connections of those in power with the agency of violence are a typical feature of 
(neo)patrimonial African politics (Chabal 2005; cf. Ellis 2004), Stevens‟ practices 
introduced particular patterns that would later resurface in the RUF and AFRC 
tactics.  
 
In line with Ellis‟ observation (2004) that local people usually traced the start of 
Liberia‟s civil war not to 1989, but up to two decades further back, some Sierra 
Leoneans also sought to pinpoint past events which had „unleashed‟ the logic of war 
and corresponding interpretational schemes. Some observers cite the circumstances 
of Stevens‟ coming to power – amidst the legalistic objections of the SLPP‟s Albert 
Margai and the coup inspired by him in 1967 – as the first token instance of force 
being used to subordinate the electoral dynamics (e.g. Gberie 2005: 26-7; Hirsch 
2001: 28-9). Others trace it to the N‟dogbowusu22 insurgency – the „bush devil‟ war 
which erupted in Pujehun in 1982 in culmination of a series of violent incidents 
surrounding the electoral practices of Stevens‟ era (Keen 2005; PRIDE 2006). As 
                                                 
21
 Reinterpretations of abbreviations form a regular feature of Sierra Leonean political culture, given 
that people were often powerless to affect the political situation in any other way. Jackson (2004: 
203) cites a graffiti on the campus wall of the Fourah Bay College reinterpreting AFRC as „Another 
F***ing Ruling Council,‟ and the popular criticism of the expenses of organising the 1980 OAU 
summit in Freetown as „OAU today, IOU tomorrow‟ (ibid.: 128). The change of name did not help to 
dissociate the state „security‟ institutions from depreciatory connotations: ISU‟s successor, the 
Special Security Division (SSD), was quickly rebranded as „Siaka Stevens‟ Dogs‟ (Keen 2005: 17). 
22
 Or Ndogboyosoi / Ndorgborwusui in different spellings (see. e.g. Keen 2005: 18, Gberie 2005: 66).  
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Hoffman (2007: 649) and Gberie (2005: 66-7) note, many Sierra Leoneans, 
including the Chief of Staff of the Sierra Leone Army during the NPRC rule, in fact 
regarded the early stages of the RUF rebellion as a continuation of N‟dogbowusu. 
Although that particular view was also contested (ibid.), it is symptomatic of the 
tendency to interpret national-level events through the lens of more localised 
contexts (Hoffman 2007: 648-9; cf. Richards 1996: 91) – a trend which is reflected 
in the more general pathways of meaning-generation in Sierra Leone. 
 
As Chabal and Daloz point out, many concepts that scholars of politics treat as 
universal categories of analysis (such as „government‟ or „public sphere‟) may have 
different meanings depending on the cultural context: for instance, the „state‟ in 
Nigeria invokes a different array of referents and connotations compared to, say, 
Sweden (2006). Therefore, local meanings of the purportedly „universal‟ concepts 
form an important dimension of culturally-informed political analysis (ibid.). This 
consideration is important not only for understanding the local variations in 
„universal‟ categories, but also their potentially ambivalent implications for the 
advancement of peacebuilding objectives expressed through such concepts. For 
example, although it may be tempting to take the fact that local people welcome 
„development‟ as vindicating the correctness of the dominant peacebuilding 
approaches, peacebuilding agents perhaps need to become more aware of how the 
implications of policies may be affected by their „appropriation‟ and absorption into 
the local structures of meaning. Such „variations‟ in the „standard‟ meanings, after 
all, reflect the differences in normative appraisal of the purportedly neutral and 
„technical‟ terms of liberal transitions. They also help unmask the pretences of 
universality of the benign effects of interventions, highlighting the diversity of their 
recipients and agents as well as the patterns of „distribution‟ of their ambivalent 
impacts.  
 
Anthropologist Michael Jackson notes how some concepts that have little real 
substance for the people of rural Sierra Leone – like „development‟ – tend to become 
invested with near-magical potency and almost independent agency (2004: 168-9), 
which detaches them from the original political agendas and causal relationships and 
embeds them in local interpretational economies. The „improved roads would bring 
development, for along these roads would come the benefits of the outside world,‟ 
was the reasoning of Jackson‟s rural respondents (ibid.: 168). Yet, habitual 
indicators of development, such as foreign investment, as well as its agents, are 
frequently treated with suspicion by the savvy locals: one of my respondents 
referred to a common knowledge of the fact that foreign mining companies, such as 
Sierra Rutile, mostly worked under cheap, „exploration‟ licences while in reality 
they had been mining commercially „for years‟ (Caritas Makeni 2006). Local NGO 
workers also exposed the practices of external donors sponsoring local 
„development‟ projects as contributing to the erosion of local ownership and 
capacities: Because of a myriad of technical bureaucratic requirements for 
subcontracting, local companies cannot qualify for contracts, and the development 
funds trickle back to foreign firms and experts who leave after completing the work 
(FoC 2006; cf. WB 2007a). Reasonable nature of these objections to the practices of 
the liberal peacebuilding community, however, masks other underlying grounds for 
criticising the instances of international involvement in Sierra Leone, which are 
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more „cultural‟ in character. For instance, the fast rotation of foreign „experts‟ 
precludes their inclusion in the social networks of patronage which forms an 
important dimension of „local ownership‟ (see below), both socially and with regard 
to the patterns of distribution of material benefits. 
 
Similar dynamics affect, for instance, the concept of democracy. Being a strong 
rhetorical point of reference in local discourses, it cannot be claimed to be a recent 
„introduction‟ by the liberal peacebuilding; in fact, the „unsanctioned‟ (by the UN 
and most international community – see Malan et al. 2002) restoration of multi-party 
democracy in 1996 can be considered the first step in Sierra Leone‟s lengthy peace 
process. Many of my Sierra Leonean respondents asserted that they knew what 
democracy was all about and that they spoke from experience (despite the shaky 
record of the post-independence Sierra Leone in that respect). Democracy as a 
political ideal is in high regard even in the RUF manifesto, featuring prominently in 
its title „Pathways to Democracy‟ (RUF 1995). However, this need not be taken as a 
sign of compatibility with the agenda of liberal peacebuilding. Sierra Leone‟s return 
to a multi-party democracy is sometimes cited as the only change that Kabbah‟s 
SLPP government(s) managed to effect in the past decade, while other indicators of 
„good governance‟ remain almost non-existent (Baker and May 2006). As such, the 
existence of multiple political parties does not signal the disappearance of the „old‟ 
political elite, merely contributing to its continual „recycling‟ from one leading party 
to another (Caritas Makeni 2006; Thompson 2006), which many hold responsible 
for the mismanagement that had led to the war (Baker and May 2006). This system 
was described by an interviewee as being, realistically, a „semi-one-party‟ state in 
which a change of party names did not reflect changes in policy or cadre (CR 2006). 
These remarks underscore Chabal and Daloz‟s (1999) observation that multi-party 
democracy is incompatible with the vertical character of ties of political affinity in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, since electoral loss heralds much greater problems for the 
parties and their supporters than merely a spell in parliamentary opposition. 
 
Ironically, local variations in the standards of „democracy‟ have not been lost on the 
peacebuilding community. According to Baker (2006), the pursuit of „governance‟ 
as the top-priority of liberal peacebuilding interventions has largely sidelined 
democracy from the agenda, since competitiveness that it unleashes has sometimes 
become seen as endangering the fragile post-settlement peace (cf. Paris 2004). 
Although a focus on „elections‟ has also been a long-standing point of critique of 
liberal peacebuilding (especially in the era when peaceful transition to second post-
settlement elections was taken to be the sign of arrival of genuine peace), even that, 
according to Baker (2006), appears to be losing out to governance-dictated priorities 
of having functioning institutions in place (thus seemingly responding to Paris‟s 
insistence on „institutionalisation before democratisation‟ (2004)). The 
dissatisfaction with democracy among the liberal peacebuilding community, Baker 
(2006) suggests, arouse in response to evidence that democratic electoral processes 
in the developing world often brought into power leaders with objectionable 
reputation (dictators, warlords, war criminals etc.) who were, furthermore, reluctant 
to stick to its rules in the event of electoral loss (such as Angola‟s Savimbi). But in 
view of the lasting local popularity of the idea of democracy (as well as its role in 
legitimising the interventions), Baker‟s insight regarding the need to review the 
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flawed indicators of „democracy‟ in the context of peacebuilding interventions 
seems especially pertinent (2006; cf. Chabal and Daloz 2006). At the same time, the 
dependence of functioning „democracy‟ on certain elements of political culture 
which are apparently in deficit in the bulk of Sub-Saharan Africa is also worthy of 
investigation.  
 
Other hallmarks of the post-conflict liberal transformation, such as human rights or 
political accountability, bear greater association with the specifically war-to-peace 
transition in Sierra Leone (I will return to this issue later in the chapter), but 
democracy and development do not have such unequivocal role as „peacetime‟ 
notions, and engender ambivalent connotations with regard to the above discussion 
of the change of templates between „peace‟ and „war.‟  
War and militarism 
Similarities uncovered by comparisons of pre- and post-conflict situation in Sierra 
Leone bring out the question of what had served as the triggers toppling the 
interpretational dynamics towards the template of „war.‟ Apart from the structural 
conditions of state decay (almost consensually believed to account for „ripe‟ 
conditions for violent conflict), two factors are cited as instrumental in unleashing 
the interpretational economy of war – the legitimation of violent avenues for 
political action during Stevens‟ rule, and the conflict entrepreneurship of Taylor and 
Sankoh (Gberie 2005; PRIDE 2006). While the vocabulary of „causes,‟ as shown 
above, engenders its own reality through a focus on particular meanings, the cited 
„additional‟ causes can also be considered through the prism of meaning-generation. 
The articulation of meanings of war and militarism, both by conflict entrepreneurs 
and the wider public, is instrumental in understanding how the conditions in Sierra 
Leone became perceived as „ripe‟ for conflict quite aside from the controversial 
issue of structural „root causes,‟ and how the interpretational schemes legitimising 
violence were put in motion. It also illuminates the production of actorness through 
the medium of such interpretational dynamics, and the patterns of conceptualisations 
of particular personae (individual and collective) in conflict.  
 
Many observers cite the 1992 NPRC coup as the strongest boost for the wide social 
currency of militarism in Sierra Leone (Shaw 2002; Opala 1994) – although that in 
itself did not play a role in fomenting the RUF rebellion which was, by then, already 
ongoing. For the RUF, originating as it did predominantly in the Liberian civil war 
(cf. Gberie 2005), that conflict had certainly provided a blueprint for a likewise 
„conversion‟ of Sierra Leone to the template of war. But the same is true of the 
Sierra Leone government forces, which participated in the ECOMOG peacekeeping 
operation in Liberia in 1990, and the wider public opinion in Sierra Leone, which 
had taken this attempt to thwart Taylor‟s uprising in Liberia as a manifestation of 
Momoh‟s government‟s affinity with the overthrown regime of a „soldier-turned-
politician‟ Samuel Doe (ibid.: 57). Such extension of Sierra Leone‟s interpretational 
field to incorporate the dynamics of war in Liberia made it possible to interpret the 
developments in Sierra Leone itself as pertaining to „war‟ even prior to April 1991, 
which came relatively „painlessly‟ to the Freetown-based observers since most 
cross-border skirmishes were taking place in remote border localities. The „official‟ 
start of the war as announced by Sankoh did not, in this respect, initially change 
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much: from where it „mattered,‟ the RUF rebellion was still perceived as a distant 
threat. However, the circumstances of the official start of war highlighted the 
significance of military symbolism in the interpretational economies, for what made 
Momoh‟s government single out the attacks of 23 March 1991 on Sierra Leone 
border towns of Bomaru and Sienga as the start of the war with the RUF were, 
reportedly, several casualties among the Sierra Leone military (which was not the 
case in numerous earlier attacks) (Gberie 2005: 60). Ironically, this official 
endorsement of the template of war also exposed the lamentable state of Sierra 
Leone‟s army, which was unable to contain the „regional‟ disquiet, thus paving way 
to the 1992 coup masterminded by a group of young army officers (e.g. Richards 
1996). 
 
The NPRC coup was popularly perceived as an adequate response to the 
requirements of the time: not only was it a long-awaited come-down on Momoh‟s 
government‟s corrupt practices (however short-lived that euphoria proved to be), but 
also on its ineptitude at dealing with the RUF insurgency. The NPRC‟s re-capture of 
Koidu (taken by rebel forces in October 1992) towards late December 1992-January 
1993 instilled trust in military solutions and intensified revolutionary feelings among 
the Freetown youths who identified strongly with Strasser and his officers: military 
symbolism reigned in the spontaneous „re-decoration‟ of Freetown by the local 
youths in early 1993 (Opala 1994). „Revolutionary‟ moods and symbolism have 
been a powerful undercurrent legitimising the „force‟ solutions in response to the 
oppression of Stevens‟ rule, and as such, they formed a „cultural repertoire‟ that was 
shared across the divide between the RUF and NPRC supporters and fomented in 
the 1977 and 1985 student uprisings in Sierra Leone (Ibrahim 2004: 4; Rashid 
2004).  
 
Although for many youths, associations with the military remained less than 
nominal, Shaw (2002) remarked that around 1992, the military became a source of 
unprecedented social power, which overlaid previously crucial societal power 
dynamics, upsetting the traditional balance of family relations and roles. Despite the 
declining popular support for NPRC towards the mid-1990s and pressures to 
democratise the style of government (which was seen as the rationale behind the 
quiet internal coup in which Strasser was replaced by Julius Bio), the return to 
electoral politics and 1996 elections, which brought SLPP‟s President Kabbah into 
office, did not dispel these associational dynamics between militarism and power. 
Furthermore, the initial years of the war resulted in the proliferation of actors 
exploiting this association, as well as the blurring of the agency of violence manifest 
in the „sobel‟ phenomenon (Keen 2005; Jackson 2005: 55). The elected president 
Kabbah‟s attempt to sideline the Sierra Leone army, suspect of war violence and 
dubious connections with the RUF, by relying instead on the predominantly 
Nigerian ECOMOG forces, the CDF and the PMC Executive Outcomes, is reported 
as an important motive behind the subsequent alliance between Major Johnny Paul 
Koroma‟s AFRC, which came to oust Kabbah‟s government in 1997, and the RUF 
(Gberie 2005).
23
  
                                                 
23
 Kabbah‟s attempt attests to a dilemma faced by the peacebuilding agents in the aftermath of most 
armed conflicts, which concerns the role and place of the military. While defunct armed forces have 
proved conflict-prone (bearing in mind the downfall of the APC regime in 1992 and the frustration of 
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If the interpretational currency of militarism contributed to the „making‟ of actors 
who had taken up the orchestration of war, the reverse is also true: the articulation of 
meanings of war can be traced to certain conflict entrepreneurs. Among Sierra 
Leoneans, Charles Taylor is widely perceived as a conduit of meanings of war. The 
association is rhetorically traced to his address in an infamous BBC broadcast about 
how „Sierra Leone would taste the bitterness of war‟24 and culminated in what my 
Sierra Leonean host referred to as the extreme feelings of apprehension and fear 
which gripped the country when Taylor was brought into Sierra Leone in 2006 for 
trial by the Special Court. (The fears of possible instabilities triggered by the 
presence of this personification of war – albeit phrased in more instrumental terms – 
were widely shared by the Court officials, who promptly transferred Taylor to await 
trial in the Hague.) In contrast, Foday Sankoh‟s masterminding of the RUF was cast 
(reportedly by himself) in the spirit of martyrdom, according to one of my 
respondents who, otherwise critical of the RUF, did not appear to dispute the 
interpretation: 
 
Sankoh said that being sufficiently old, he had decided to take lead of a group of people that 
wanted to redress injustices, end APC‟s one-party rule, nepotism and the impossibility to 
come to power peacefully – in other words, that he had assumed the role of a scapegoat. 
(Anonymous interviewee) 
 
With respect to the noted association of power with militarism, it is interesting to 
note that many observers questioned Sankoh‟s leadership of the RUF precisely on 
the grounds of his doubtful credentials as a military figure. Gberie points out other 
psychological characteristics (like a somewhat grotesque sense of injustice and 
entitlement) that fuelled Sankoh‟s determination to upkeep the violent struggle. This 
duality is also noticeable in the rank-and-file fighters‟ accounts: while wielding arms 
and military power was reported as empowering, fighters also pointed out their 
contentment with the practices of redistribution in the RUF camps where everyone 
was welcome to the looted goods according to need (see e.g. Richards 1996; Bøås 
2001: 716). Crucially, both these aspects – the agency of force and (potentially 
destructive) power on the one hand, and the source of life sustenance – come 
together in a patrimonial „father-figure‟ (an image which permeates the RUF 
fighters‟ accounts of their attitude to „Pappy‟ Sankoh) (see Richards 1996; Jackson 
2005: 60). 
 
The association of weaponry and violence with the potency to effect political 
influence perhaps explains the entrenchment of the template of war in Sierra 
Leone‟s society. Another factor explaining the preference many actors have felt for 
war as the organisational mode of the everyday has to do with forms of life-
                                                                                                                                         
the military that led to AFRC coup in 1997), there is the reverse danger that well-trained and 
organised military may hijack the image of authority from the weak state institutions, thus harbouring 
a possibility of a return to military rule (e.g. Malan et al. 2002: Ch 8). At the same time, downplaying 
the role of the military may create a situation where it is not the prime bearer of the agency of 
organised violence, which is equally problematic (Ellis 2004). Although various DDR programmes 
are geared towards „ordering‟ the domain of organised force, they have a patchy record in terms of 
achieving genuine social „conversion‟ to the template of peace (cf. Hoffman 2007). 
24
 See e.g. http://allafrica.com/stories/200804020534.html?page=2 (accessed August 2008). 
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sustenance specific to the economies of war. With an almost comical predictability, 
a succession of armed groups in control of diamond fields were caught at unawares, 
„busy mining diamonds,‟ at the time of enemy strikes (examples include 
SLA/NPRC, ECOMOG) (see Gberie 2005). There are also clear indications that 
where civil defence interfered with the access to diamond fields, it was often 
sabotaged through collusion between rival forces such as the RUF and SLA (Keen 
2005). However, what is seldom considered in connection with advancing „greed‟ as 
a „universal‟ motive for conflict (cf. Collier 2000), is that the „greed‟ of Sierra Leone 
diamond-miners is also enveloped in local connotations and meanings as well as in 
the social networks and structures in which its pursuit takes place, and that it 
becomes a resource perpetuating these structures even as it may change some of 
their aspects. The chief danger lies not so much in the fact that illegal diamond-
mining perpetuates the economies of war, but in that these economies of war are 
ultimately compatible with some aspects of the template of peace (cf. Keen 2005; 
Hoffman 2007; see also Bangura (2004) for critique of Richards‟ (1996) suggested 
avenues of pacification precisely on these grounds). As such, the image of diamond 
wealth as a lucrative and hassle-free pathway to success had a wide currency even 
before the war (Shaw 2002), and resonated well with „fantasies of improving one‟s 
fortunes through supernatural means‟ as a way of countering the „acute scarcity and 
entrenched inequalities‟ of Sierra Leonean society (Jackson 2005: 66). Yet, it 
seldom brought higher revenues than agriculture – at least to diggers themselves, 
who form the bottom of a client-patron chain stretching to licence-holders and 
traders at the upper end (e.g. Richards 1996). It is often argued that war-time 
mining, just as looting and extortion, brought its practitioners very few material 
gains: as Humphreys and Weinstein note in their survey of Sierra Leone ex-
combatants, „the interests of most fighters, particularly those in the RUF, remained 
focused on basic needs – access to security, food, and education – and not on … 
control of lucrative resources‟ (2004: 3). Despite persistent rumours of mind-
boggling sums in the war instigators‟ off-shore bank accounts (Gberie 2005), rank-
and-file RUF and SLA/AFRC fighters „did not get any profit out of the war and 
ended up poorer than they were‟ (GGEM 2006). It appears that the war had not 
significantly altered the social connotations of diamond-mining: despite its lucrative 
image, diamond-mining fulfils the same role of the backdrop of social and financial 
opportunities as returning to the village and „making a farm‟ (cf. Ferme 2001; Shaw 
2002). 
 
If the origins of the war were sought in the instances of legitimation of violence in 
the political practices of the past, then its continuing relevance is expressed through 
the notion of „empowerment of mobilization‟ (Richards et al. 2004: 38). A study of 
child soldiers in Sierra Leone‟s conflict (Denov 2006b) elucidates the power and 
identity dynamics engendered by the war, and the sense of empowerment brought 
about by the socialisation into the „cultures of violence‟ among the forcibly 
conscripted children of either sex. „Excluded youth‟ features prominently in many 
explanations of both the Sierra Leone conflict and the volatility of the post-
settlement situation in the country (Richards 1996; Bøås 2001). However, in order to 
consider its role in cementing the template of war, the mechanism of this „exclusion‟ 
needs to be elucidated. This mechanism, as I demonstrate below, forms part of the 
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wider significational field which informs all other instances of meaning-generation 
discussed above.  
The wider context of meaning-generation: Patrimonialism as a 
significational field 
Having looked at significant areas of production of new and re-interpretation of the 
existing meanings in the Sierra Leone conflict, it seems necessary to turn to the 
broader interpretational fields responsible for the cultural ordering of Sierra Leonean 
society and polity – the wider cultural frameworks which stabilise „individual‟ 
meanings and processes of meaning-generation but which can themselves display all 
signs of re-invention and instability (see Chapter 3). For Sierra Leone (alongside 
other societies in Sub-Saharan Africa (Chabal and Daloz 1999)), one such 
framework of utmost relevance seems to be (neo)patrimonialism. This section 
examines its role in the processes of generation and stabilisation of meanings, as 
well as the dynamics which affect this broader significational field itself. 
 
Neopartimonialism, labelled so to distinguish it from pre-state forms of patrimonial 
relations (Chabal and Daloz 1999) and to emphasise the interpenetration of the 
essentially private patron-client networks with the „official‟ legal-rational 
bureaucratic state structures (Erdmann and Engel 2007; Bøås 2001: 700), is often 
brought up in attempts to explain the peculiar character of African political culture 
(ibidem.; Richards 1996). It is also summarily blamed for the impossibility of 
isolating the public and private spheres of the African state, which tends to be 
viewed as under-bureaucratised and under-institutionalised (Chabal and Daloz 1999; 
Bøås 2001; Taylor 2006). Some studies allude to the wider, pre-political (strictly 
speaking) character of (neo)patrimonialism as one of the reasons for the blurred 
boundaries of „the political‟ as such in the African context (Chabal and Daloz 1999). 
Despite such frequent references and the wide currency of the concept of 
(neo)patrimonialism in political analyses, they do not quite convey the degree to 
which the entire societal fabric of Sierra Leone is organised around client-patron 
relationships (see Hoffman (2007: 651) as a rare example). Mariane Ferme remarks 
that it is inconceivable for the people in Sierra Leone to see human relationships 
outside the norm of „being for someone‟ (2001: 110, emphasis added; cf. Jackson 
2004: 30-1, 37); even „strangers,‟ as transpires from Jackson‟s experiences in Sierra 
Leone, are necessarily „someone‟s‟: „S. B. told me not to worry about this; he would 
take care of everything; I was his stranger, his brother, his friend‟ (2004: 202, 
emphasis added). A closer look thus reveals partimonialism as the broader cultural 
field from which not only „the political,‟ but also „the social,‟ springs (cf. Hudson 
1997b; Chapter 3), and it constitutes precisely a case of Weberian „webs of 
significance‟ that are spun to enable, and to reflect the patterns of, all social 
interactions in the Sierra Leonean society (see Chabal and Daloz 2006). Hence the 
earlier references to the culture of (neo)patrimonialism as the wider significational 
field which orders, and helps to stabilise, individual instances of meaning-
generation. The remainder of this section will examine the characteristics of this 
„culture‟ of neopatrimonialism and its effects on the meanings and interpretations 
which had become central for the conflict and peace in Sierra Leone.  
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Ordering the specific connections in „patrimonial‟ meaning-generation is the 
centrality of the place, or locality, which, in turn, is related to the belief that the 
foundations of power are grounded in the invisible world (Chabal and Daloz 1999; 
Ellis 1999). The „place‟ functions as a mediator between that realm, inhabited by 
spirits and ancestors, and the reality of the „here and now,‟ with its corresponding 
human relations ordered, to a large extent, by the ties of kinship. Combined, the 
categories of place and kin produce a strong emphasis on one‟s origins (and only 
through their medium to the ethnic/tribal dimension of identity) (Chabal and Daloz 
2006), which is linked to a place in the social hierarchy (Jackson 2004). Kinship is 
taken as providing legitimacy for claims to ownership of a place, be it political (see 
the following quote), or material: Shaw (2002) comments on the practice of 
assessing the legitimacy of claims to land on the basis of local ancestry (often forged 
and rewritten), with place names supposedly bearing witness to that.
25
 The following 
extract from an SLPP politician S.B. Marah‟s pledge to his voters illustrates the 
patrimonial logic of legitimacy and belonging: 
 
„… I have heard people say that Kabala is not my constituency. … In fact, I don‟t belong to 
any one constituency. Everywhere is the same for me. All people are the same to me. If you 
interviewed people in this crowd you would find that one out of ten is a relative of mine. A 
brother, a sister, an aunt, an uncle, a grandchild, a cousin. Even among the Limba I have 
relatives. I am connected everywhere.‟ (Jackson 2004: 27) 
 
While locality in neopatrimonialism serves as a source of legitimacy, it also compels 
obligation to one‟s community which, through its ties to the locality‟s invisible 
forces, preserves the checks on its political patron. Accountability in such a system 
has personalised, rather than abstract, character, which generates a different set of 
notions (compared to those used in the West) of what is legal, licit, legitimate, or 
criminal and „corrupt‟ (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Koechlin 2006). References like the 
one made in a BBC news report (2007b) to „the mentality and culture of corruption 
that are so deeply ingrained in Sierra Leonean society‟ still fail to see their wider 
social context: In patrimonial networks, loyalty and support are traded for access to 
resources and protection (cf. Jackson 2004: 47), and conspicuous consumption is a 
way for patrons to advertise their status and credibility, because their success and 
wealth is expected to trickle down to clients (Ellis 1999; cf. Bayart 1993: xvii).  
 
This relationship is not altogether permissive for the patrons: the ambivalence of 
power and wealth in the Sierra Leonean culture is underscored by the pervasiveness 
of the idiom of „eating‟ which reflects the perceived abuses of power (Chabal and 
Daloz 1999; Ellis 1999; Ferme 2001; Shaw 2002; Jackson 2004; Bayart 1993). This 
is particularly visible in the ambivalent connotations surrounding diamond-wealth, 
the imagery of the invisible city (the „Place of Witches‟) and various terms of 
association between wealth and witchcraft (Shaw 2002: 201-223). The existence of 
                                                 
25
 This is not so say that „place‟ and „kin‟ cannot be manipulated, but rather to underlie their 
centrality in the manipulations which do occur. My Sierra Leonean host once remarked that rural 
settlements often bear the names of their founders. However, in view of the practice of proliferation 
of settlements converted from bush farms (Ferme 2001), such patterns are bound to become 
confused. Hence the frequent occurrence of competing ownership claims: land disputes between 
individuals and border disputes between chiefdoms are among the commonest forms of conflict in 
Sierra Leone (CR 2006). 
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societal norms stipulating when and how much wealth is acceptable and when it 
becomes synonymous with the „eating‟ of others reflects what Jackson calls the 
„subtle reciprocities‟ in the relationship between patrons and clients (2004: 47; cf. 
Fanthorpe 1998), but it also alludes to the generally „treacherous‟ character of power 
in Sierra Leone‟s patrimonialism. Patronage can, on occasions, take more out of the 
patrons than earn them in return (cf. Shaw 2002); the very subtlety and rhetorical 
articulation of the norms regulating the balance in the relations of patronage make 
patrons vulnerable to accusations of abuse. The noted ambivalence of power, its 
association with both opportunity and danger, has a very real sense for Sierra 
Leone‟s power figures, and their keenness to dissociate themselves from practices 
considered „corrupt‟ in the eyes of the locals is understandable: „you have never 
heard it said that S. B. Marah is corrupt. I don‟t eat people‟s money‟ (Jackson 2004: 
27). 
 
In parallel to Sierra Leone, Ellis (1999: Ch. 7) discusses the ambivalent attitudes 
towards wealth accumulation in Liberia. On the one hand, he notes a disillusionment 
with politics generally, because it seemingly dictates practices contrary to the ideas 
of genuine democratic representation, so that regardless of who is in power, the 
outcome is inegalitarian neopatrimonialism prone to under-development and 
embezzling of donor funds, of which very little trickles down to the needy. On the 
other hand, there is a cultural expectation for politicians to engage in such activities 
and to boast the gains of their term in the office in later years, to the extent that 
people who fail to „misuse‟ their public position are ridiculed (Ellis 1999). Perhaps 
this can go some way towards explaining the dynamics of Sierra Leone‟s political 
elite, which, despite the impact of the war and greater openings for other 
democratically elected forces, seems to regurgitate and „recycle‟ the same limited 
group of people (Thompson 2006). 
A ‘crisis’ of patrimonialism? 
The primacy of (neo)patrimonialism as the wider interpretational field over the 
habitual categories of political analysis such as the state, civil society and so on, is 
manifest in the absorption of all areas of life, including what some have come to 
interpret as a rebellion against it, into the interpretational economy of client-patron 
ties.  
 
The origins of the RUF rebellion are sometimes traced to a „crisis‟ of patrimonialism 
(Richards 1996; Bøås 2001; cf. Bangura 2004), stemming from the shrinking of the 
public sphere as a result of the controversial policies of structural adjustment 
initiated by Sierra Leone‟s government under the pressure of the IMF‟s and World 
Bank‟s loan conditionality. The declining opportunities for patrimonial 
redistribution of „impersonal‟ public goods resulted in the shrinking of the 
patrimonial networks, producing, at the bottom of the social hierarchy, a volatile 
„class‟ of people excluded from such networks altogether (e.g. Richards 1996). This 
„excluded youth‟ is believed to have provided a fertile recruitment ground for the 
RUF as well as a number of other political entrepreneurs of the 1990s, from NPRC 
to the CDF and AFRC (Richards 1996; Poulton and Ayissi 2000). Regardless of the 
particulars of the motives for, and forms of, youth revolt – ranging from the 
revolutionary feelings surrounding the NPRC coup (Opala 1994) and pan-African 
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underpinnings of student protests (e.g. Bangura 2004) to the transatlantic imagery of 
the RUF (cf. Richards 1996; Jackson 2004) – its roots could be traced to the 
underprivileged situation of Sierra Leone‟s younger generation (cf. Humphreys and 
Weinstein 2004: 4). The decade of war, however, did little to dispel this social 
dynamic, since one „lost generation‟ seems to have predetermined another – that of 
war victims in a broad sense (Clifford s.a.; Bøås 2001: 719). 
 
Crucially, the expansion of the class of „youth,‟ with this status attributed according 
to social standing rather than age alone (Richards et al. 2004), can itself be identified 
as a symptom of Sierra Leone‟s conflict: The decline in patrimonial redistribution, 
slowing down the rotation of status and accompanying assets, produced much larger 
numbers of relatively rightless „youths‟ than the existing social infrastructure could 
sustain. The expansion of the class of „youths‟ was greatly assisted by the addition 
of small-scale diamond-digging (around 1980 when de Beers abandoned the 
commercial mining of Sierra Leone‟s diamonds as unpromising (see Smillie et al. 
2000)) to the traditional repertoire of „marginal‟ occupations, such as urban under-
employment (cf. Opala 1994) and seasonal agricultural work. The growing numbers 
of migrating „youths‟ put the rural practices of integrating „strangers‟ into the local 
social and production networks under severe strain, especially given that diamond-
diggers seldom had „plans to settle‟ (Richards 1996: 130, 129-33; Jackson 2004). On 
the other hand, awareness of the increased social volatility meant that settled 
strangers were left in a social „limbo‟ for longer and struggled to leave the status of 
„youths,‟ which contributed to their discontent with the patrimonial system, as well 
as to the fear of semi-autonomous strangers on the part of villagers (Richards et al. 
2004). As a result of weakened ties with particular local communities, strangers 
often returned to the lifestyle of trying their luck in diamond pits (ibid.). In view of 
this social volatility, combined with the role-models derived from the exposure to 
Western media and films (ibid.; Jackson 2004), explanations of the RUF rebellion as 
being brought on by the tide of modernity constrained by the decline of 
patrimonialism (Richards 1996) appear almost inevitable; yet, they are flawed on 
many accounts.  
 
In terms of social relations, patrimonialism, rooted in the organisation of production 
dictated by rice farming – i.e. short-term labour-intensive harvesting which requires 
mobilisation of the extended networks of dependants, or „wealth-in-people‟ (Shaw 
2002) – is portrayed as impinging upon modernisation, with its values embedded in 
the modern (urban) lifestyle and those that underpin the chances of success in the 
modern world – education, political and business opportunity etc. (Richards 1996; 
Fithen and Richards 2005). However, this tension is at best ambivalent. The sphere 
of „modernity‟ is as entwined with the neopatrimonial networks in Sierra Leone as is 
rural life (cf. Erdmann and Engel 2007; Chabal 2005), and assets associated with 
modernity can be seen in an ambivalent light, both as crucial resources, access to 
which is mediated by patrimonial relations, and as a platform that can command the 
possibility of bypassing the dictate of these relations (which is especially manifest in 
the history of student protests (Rashid 2004)). The tension apparent in the self-
images of the „lowly‟ rural lifestyle versus „enlightened‟ urbanism is also 
ambivalent. Although the freedom of detachment from the „village‟ is usually 
commensurate with one‟s power position in the patrimonial system (many chiefs 
158 
 
choose to live in towns rather than in their rural chiefdoms), village still remains the 
place where, if one fails to achieve urban success, one can land back on one‟s feet – 
to go back to the country and „make a farm‟ (cf. Ferme 2001; Shaw 2002). But as 
discussed above, village is not only the default place of powerlessness: it also forms 
the basis of the patrimonial networks whose origin in rural areas connects the „big 
men‟ in town to their ancestral lands, kin and the „invisible‟ forces specific to 
locality (see Chabal and Daloz 1999). Similar interconnections defying a simplistic 
dichotomy of „town‟ vs. „village‟ are exposed in references to the support base of the 
main Sierra Leone political parties – (mainly rural) areas of south and east for SLPP, 
and north for APC.  
 
However, the widespread perception that the functioning of patrimonialism is 
organised around the top-down linkages along the oppositions between urban and 
rural, traditional and modern etc., betrays an important aspect of „patrimonial‟ 
meaning-generation – namely, the possibility of arbitrary and temporary separation 
of the urban „signifiers‟ from the rural „signifieds‟ coded into this type of 
representation.
26
 And it is in this context that I propose a re-reading of the RUF‟s 
controversial relationship with patrimonialism. Above, I have commented on the 
tenuous character of the interpretation of the RUF violence as an attack „against 
culture;‟ here, I turn to the issue that allows for a further discussion of this point – 
namely, the role of initiation in cementing the RUF‟s solidarity in the Sierra Leone 
conflict.  
 
The use of initiation and forms of commonality associated with „forest sodalities‟ (or 
„secret societies‟) (Richards et al. 2004) by the RUF is often seen as evidence of the 
RUF‟s hijacking of the patrimonial authority and diverting allegiances away from it 
(Richards 1996). While this may indeed be so, this issue is not explored 
systematically with reference to the broader context of social relations ordered by 
patrimonialism. My argument is two-pronged: firstly, the use of initiation by the 
RUF was perceived as affecting patrimonialism so strongly precisely because of the 
role that initiation and secret societies play in its own maintenance (and so the use of 
initiation by the RUF not only undermines, but also – indirectly – underwrites 
patrimonial values); and secondly, the initiation was used by the RUF to create the 
types of commonality ultimately compatible with the crucial features of 
patrimonialism, if not its specific version that had evolved in the Sierra Leonean 
society.  
 
On the first point, while sodalities – most prominently, for Sierra Leone, 
Poro/Wunde (for men) and Sande/Bundu (for women) – supplement the vertical 
character of patrimonial relations with a horizontal aspect of social solidarity, these 
aspects are by no means antithetic. True, one‟s position in Poro or Sande may not be 
in a direct correspondence with the everyday patrimonial hierarchy, but the status 
and roles in the two are often interconnected: for instance, as Richards et al. note, 
„[c]ompound heads (kulokoisia) in Kamajei chiefdom (Moyamba District) are only 
recognized as such where they are members of Wunde‟ (2004: 9). Keen notes the 
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 While the possibility of such separation is a recognised mechanism of representation (from de 
Saussure‟s semiology to post-structuralism), the degree to which this principle organises the social 
reality is a variable, whose value seems very high in Sierra Leone‟s case. 
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role of Poro in the power struggles around the onset of Stevens‟ rule, when its 
alleged intimidation of the „strangers‟ that had moved into the southern and eastern 
diamond-digging areas served as a pretext for APC‟s crackdown on this stronghold 
of SLPP (2005: 17). The interconnectedness of sodalities with the patrimonial 
organisation of social relations is also manifest in the „chiefly‟ connections of the 
CDF, which in the later stages of the war became an additional incentive for the 
RUF violence (e.g. Richards 1996: 181-2). Although the function of Poro or Sande 
initiation as admission into „adult life,‟ with a corresponding conditioning in social 
„literacy,‟ has a direct role in the maintenance of patrimonial order (e.g. Jackson 
2004: 157), its relation to the internal organisation of sodalities is more complex. 
While some aspects of sodalities‟ internal hierarchy also reflect the patrimonial 
principles, such as respect for elders, others may be seen as harbouring far greater 
flexibility compared to the conventional image of patrimonialism – the ritual 
inversion of the passage of human life, and the „dramatic negation of hierarchy and 
distinction‟ during initiations being a case in point (Jackson 2004: 157, 160). (This 
flexibility is embodied in the mabↄle – the female member of the Poro which 
functions as the third element disrupting the binary gender dichotomy (see Ferme 
2001: 20).
27
) Arguably, the perceived clash between the relative „permissiveness‟ of 
sodalities and the rigidity of patrimonialism can be put down to misinterpretation of 
the latter‟s inflexibility: on occasions, person‟s moral qualities can override the 
limitations of status (Jackson 2004: 47)
28
 – although, as Jackson‟s example 
demonstrates, such superior moral qualities still tend to be significant in the context 
of patrimonial values (loyalty and self-sacrifice for the patron), and so are the 
rewards (elevation of the status of the lineage). However, flexibility as such does not 
undermine the viability of patrimonialism: as argued in Chapter 3, the potential of a 
wider repertoire of social possibilities than is apparent on the surface is part and 
parcel of any culture.  
 
On the second point, while the use of initiation by the RUF „to create its own 
distinctive social world of captive young people‟ (Richards et al. 2004: 9) can be 
seen as directed against the forms of commonality associated with patrimonialism 
(as demonstrated by violence aimed not only at traditional authority figures in rural 
Sierra Leone, but also traditional institutions, such as the conventions surrounding 
family life (e.g. Gberie 2005: 65; HRW 2004)), this is not the same as announcing 
its success in overthrowing the „dictate‟ of patrimonialism.29 True, the carnivalesque 
reversal of the habitual order of things often tended to continue beyond the initiation 
as such, producing the specific state of anti-order in which the „excluded youths‟ of 
the RUF felt all-powerful (see Jackson 2005: 60-63). But to probe this issue further, 
                                                 
27
 According to Ferme, mabↄlesia introduce to Poro the balancing feminine elements, such as the 
„cooling capacities historically linked to female mediators in wartime‟, or splattering medicines over 
„the “hot-hearted” Gobo – the Poro masquerade … at the end of male initiations‟ (2001: 78). 
28
 Jackson refers to „the myth of Saramba, … a warrior chief of great renown, whose jealous half-
brothers decided to waylay and murder him.‟ Saramba is saved by his „humble finaba, Musa Kule,‟ 
who, dressed in chief‟s clothes, „rode the chief‟s horse … where the ambush had been laid‟ and so 
was killed in his place. „In recognition of his sacrifice Saramba declared that from that day henceforth 
his descendants and Musa Kule‟s should be considered equals‟ (Jackson 2004: 47). 
29
 Although this aspect is not illuminated by ethnographic studies of Sierra Leone which I have come 
across, studying cultural connotations of captivity and abduction in Sierra Leone may shed more light 
on the cultural grounding of the RUF „conscription‟ practices. 
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one needs to look closer at the type of commonality established through such violent 
rites of initiation. On the one hand, there is evidence that the RUF attempted to put 
in place an altogether different type of horizontal commonality, governed by 
budding egalitarianism illustrated by free and equitable redistribution of looted 
goods (Richards 1996: 54, 59, 161) and rotation of roles in the command structure 
(Fithen and Richards 2005). On the other hand, this egalitarianism seems eminently 
compatible with the elements of patrimonial ties of loyalty and reverence established 
between the rank-and-file fighters and their superiors: Jackson cites, for instance, the 
practice of adoption of the abducted children by rebel leaders, „who were regarded 
as fathers, and called Pappy or Pa‟ (2004: 159), while Richards (1996) points out 
that this reverence was metaphorically extended to the „father‟ of the entire 
movement, Foday Sankoh, to whom RUF fighters also referred as „Pa‟ (Jackson 
2005: 60).  
 
The reliance of the RUF‟s „alternative‟ social organisation on certain aspects of 
patrimonial relations underlines the pervasiveness of patronage in Sierra Leonean 
culture, which appears to be the default way of resource distribution and 
organisation of loyalty (this is indirectly acknowledged by a remark in Sierra 
Leone‟s Truth and Reconciliation Commission‟s report that in the wake of the 
conflict, loyalties had „became captive to different systems of patronage‟) (TRC 
2004, Vol. 2, Ch. 2: 64). The tendency of initiation and the dynamics of sodalities to 
produce socially (read patrimonially) acceptable type of horizontal association is 
illustrated by the urban odelay societies, which started off as criminal gangs using 
initiation and ritual masquerades to bind its members together, and eventually 
evolved into a semblance of social clubs (Opala 1994). Whether the RUF‟s 
„innovatory‟ cultural activism would have evolved into similarly „acceptable‟ forms 
is difficult to speculate, especially given that the explosion in the violent repertoire 
in the later stages of the war (see e.g. Gberie 2005: 125-9) took place amidst the 
diminishing likelihood of any longer-term self-sustaining cultural economy.  
 
As such, the RUF‟s controversial use of initiation did not succeed in discrediting the 
role of sodalities in reproducing the social relations of patrimonialism, since they 
were the principal resource for organising community defence from as early as 1994 
(e.g. Jackson 2005: 54): „by origin at least, kamajo militia units represented a revival 
of an older local patrimonial power, untrammelled by state interference‟ (Richards 
1996: 182). According to Richards et al., community defence was organised  
 
first through invocation of Poro, and then (perhaps in recognition that many RUF captives 
were Poro members) through a new, syncretic association, based on the initiation practices 
of the Manding hunters‟ guilds. New secrets were created to bond CDF fighters and to guard 
against infiltration. (2004: 9) 
 
Such „frivolous‟ adaptation of the established forms of sodality was not, as such, 
specific to the war: as Mariane Ferme notes, the nature, or the pedigree, of the 
„secret‟ that binds the sodality together is less important than the fact of secrecy 
itself (2001). In the light of the patrimonial symbolic economy of rural-urban 
dependency, the infamous targeting of rural communities by the RUF „makes sense‟ 
as an attack against the roots of the system in which they felt denied an opening, and 
because of the patrimonial association of the CDF, local resistance corroborated, in 
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the eyes of the rebels, the locals‟ complicity with this system (cf. Jackson 2004: 
passim.).  
 
The important role that the bush or forest play in initiations (as the space of 
otherness to which the initiates are exposed as a token of their impending adulthood 
(e.g. Ferme 2001; Shaw 2002; GGEM 2006)), as well as the prominence of the 
forest in the RUF‟s rhetoric and praxis (see e.g. Richards 1996; RUF 1995), raise 
another issue for consideration. Patrimonialism, in conjunction with forest sodalities, 
regulates access to the forest, not only through the ownership of land but, more 
importantly, through the symbolic knowledge of dangers and opportunities that it 
harbours (evil and friendly spirits, resources, wildlife etc.) (Ferme 2001; Shaw 
2002). In this light, the RUF‟s tribute to the forest in their 1995 manifesto can be 
read not only as a reference to providing a „safe haven‟ during the critical years of 
the rebellion, when the RUF pronounced itself almost defeated by the combined 
onslaught of early CDF, SLA and Executive Outcomes (RUF 1995). Crucially, in 
their extensive reliance on the forest for survival, the RUF also circumvented the 
„traditional‟ pathways of access to forest knowledge, bypassing the symbolic 
trappings of patrimonial authority in this matter. Furthermore, the strategic use in 
combat to which the RUF had put their forest knowledge allowed them to become 
one of the forces of danger unaccounted for in the patrimonial forest „wisdom,‟ and 
so defy the „traditional‟ forest knowledge together with its corresponding social 
system. 
 
Other aspects of the RUF violence that can be seen as „compatible‟ with the 
patrimonial symbolic code are alluded to in numerous „dramaturgical‟ explanations. 
Thus, Richards describes Sierra Leone‟s war as having „a global range of symbolic 
and dramaturgical reference‟ (1996: xvii) – a characterisation echoed in Gberie‟s 
observation of the war as being „marked by an utter craving for drama‟ (2005: 2). 
Such „dramaturgical‟ explanations of violence appear less contrived if one considers 
the „showy,‟ performance-oriented character of African public as well as, to a large 
extent, private life, with role-playing as the centrepiece of social conventions 
(Jackson 2004: 134-9). In contrast to the European enlightenment tradition that 
conditions us to seek the truth „deep within the soul of the individual,‟ for Sierra 
Leoneans, the quest for self-knowledge is superseded by a drive „to find a place in 
the world‟ that would bring honour to one‟s lineage (Jackson 2004: 88, 137). The 
„place in the world‟ is acted out through social performances befitting it; so in a 
variety of settings, from family to politics, certain role models corresponding to 
power hierarchies are played out, with youngsters meeting the public castigations of 
the „big men‟ with displays of meekness, while in private, satirising „them behind 
their backs, opposing power with cunning‟ (ibid.: 136-7).  
The ‘crisis of patrimonialism’ reconsidered 
To reconsider Richards‟s (1996) interpretation, perhaps the underlying logic of the 
conflict can be described not as a rebellion of modernity against the obsolete 
trappings of patrimonialism, but as a revolt against what was perceived as the 
restricted access to modernity via (and not necessarily despite) patrimonialism – a 
controversial attempt to renegotiate patrimonialism, which had relied on patrimonial 
cultural codes in order to ostensibly undermine its very foundations. This, in itself, is 
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not unprecedented (cf. Ovensen 2005; Richmond and Franks 2006); indeed, bearing 
in mind the dynamics of meaning-generation (see Chapter 3), it can be safely argued 
that patrimonialism which the RUF sought to oppose had evolved over, and 
incorporates, a series of previous radical contestations (cf. Edkins 1999: 4-5). In a 
milder form, such renegotiation of patrimonialism is apparent in that fighters on all 
sides were able to build their own networks of supporters based on resources 
accumulated through, or simply turned relevant by, the war (see Hoffman 2007: 
655). Despite the decline in the state-level patrimonial system of redistribution, with 
which the notion of „crisis‟ of patrimonialism is associated, the status of 
patrimonialism as the default way of organising social relations and a matrix for 
everyday sense-making has not been diminished during the war, and remains central 
to organising local affairs in its aftermath (ibid.: 653).  
 
Despite the pervasiveness of patrimonialism as a cultural „code system,‟ there is also 
evidence that its significational matrix had, on occasions, been „misread‟ by the 
RUF.
30
 For the original RUF cadre, being effectively left out of the interwoven webs 
of relationships „of patronage or clientship‟ (Ferme 2001: 106) contributed to a 
possibility of such „misreading.‟ (This „opaqueness‟ of the actual logic of 
patrimonial relations works both ways, since people falling outside the patronage 
system, such as single women or unintegrated „strangers,‟ appear undefinable in its 
context (ibid.: 110)). In his analysis of Sierra Leone‟s conflict, Richards (1996) 
advances an instrumental interpretation of the RUF violence, although he is forced 
to conclude that in many instances its effects were grossly miscalculated, resulting 
in the widespread terrorising of the RUF‟s professed beneficiaries. Such 
„miscalculations‟ noted by Richards (and his numerous critics) could be seen as 
stemming from the misreading of representational structures: the failure of the RUF 
to hammer home the „message‟ of war in its early years can be attributed to its 
untenable reading of the representational connections between the victims of 
violence and „the rest.‟ Because of the RUF‟s projection of stronger representational 
links between clients and patrons than there is cause to suggest, the associations that 
would open the larger „body‟ of Sierra Leone to the repercussions of individual acts 
of violence in many cases did not hold – in stark contrast, for example, to the 
representational dynamics which accounted for the massive impact of the „left‟ 
terrorism in the 1970s Europe (Allen 1987). As noted above, patrimonialism makes 
full use of the possibility of „one-sided‟ representation, in which the „upward‟ 
movement can be arbitrarily disavowed, and the ties of horizontal identification have 
limited scope. While this might have been clear to the „clients‟ of patrimonial 
networks, most RUF members, arguably, comprised the „surplus‟ that could not be 
accommodated into the shrinking patrimonial structures (Richards 1996: 35-6), and 
this deprivation from patrimonial „belonging‟ may have made them overestimate its 
practical value. While this point remains a speculation, there is little doubt that the 
RUF attacks „on patrimonialism‟ certainly highlighted the symbolic value of 
patrimonial networks. 
                                                 
30
 Literature on practices emphasises the possibility of „right‟ and „wrong‟ uses of practices as an 
important aspect of practice theory (see Schatzki et al. 2001). In contrast, the more habitual analytical 
framework of discourse analysis seems to lack this distinction: on the one hand, discourse is 
considered uniformly „wrong‟ as a „lie‟ (cf. de Certeau 1984: 67; Neumann 2002: 632-3); on the 
other, discursive agents are not usually interrogated on their mastery in deploying its powers. 
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Amidst the evidence of „misreading,‟ there are also elements of the RUF tactics that 
suggest some awareness of the one-sidedness of representation. The case in point is 
RUF‟s craving for international attention. In Richards‟ view (as already noted), this 
is down to the conflict being „moored, culturally, in the hybrid Atlantic world of 
international commerce‟ and partaking in „the media flows and cultural 
hybridizations that make up globalized modernity‟ (1996: xvii). A focus on 
patrimonial-style meaning-generation, on the other hand, would suggest that the 
patrimonial logic (to which the RUF has been shown to submit despite challenging 
it) presents the West as the ultimate patron (cf. Jackson 2005: 66-7). The „local‟ 
patrons did not only control access to goods of local significance; they also limited 
the access „further up‟ and „outwards.‟ From this perspective, the RUF violence 
could be construed as a way of attracting the West‟s attention (cf. Sankoh‟s 
statements about how the RUF took hostages „for their own protection in a chaotic 
country‟ (Richards 1996: 16)) in an ambivalent reference to its pacifying power and 
past violent presence in the region (ibid.: xvii).  
 
With respect to the RUF‟s „misreading‟ of patrimonialism, Richards‟ corrections of 
his initial thesis (see the 1998 Postscript to his 1996 book) – from the RUF as a 
movement of „organic intellectuals‟ to that of youths governed by a „primary school‟ 
logic (advancing a simplistic picture of the world that submits to arithmetic 
calculations) – is illuminating, and finds certain parallels in Ferme‟s characterisation 
of the hollowing out of hunters‟ knowledge as the CDF ranks expanded to 
incorporate a generation of younger people with a grudge against the RUF. The high 
visibility of „magic objects, clothes and rituals,‟ noted in many observers‟ reports, 
Ferme argues, „points to their superficiality, in a context where the combatants‟ 
youthfulness argues against their having deep interpretive powers‟ (2001: 27). 
Ironically, the diminishing need for „deep interpretive powers‟ is underscored by the 
dominant peacebuilding approach, which provides ready frameworks for 
interpretations which largely predetermine the outcomes of interpretive processes. 
And while youthfulness (of status, if not always age) was a feature of most factions 
in the conflict (cf. Jackson 2005: 57), it now also defines a large proportion of 
peacebuilding agents within Sierra Leone,
31
 which suggests the continuing 
circumvention – and renegotiation – of the traditional patrimonial restrictions of 
access to power, in which the „social‟ age played a crucial role (cf. Ellis 1999, 
Jackson 2005: 42). 
 
As Jenny Edkins notes in her discussion of „the political,‟ that which at first sight 
appears an unquestioned continuity can be seen, at a closer look, to proceed by a 
series of interruptions arising at points where the imperative of making „impossible‟ 
choices, not „guaranteed by law, technology, or custom,‟ unleashes ultimate 
unpredictability, until a decision made erases the very memory of it, so that 
retrospectively, the law appears „merely to have been followed‟ (1999: 4-5, referring 
to Derrida 1992). The continuity between patrimonialism and the instances of its 
contestation appear to be of a similar kind – indeed, because culture does not form a 
rigid corpus of rules, but can rather be conceptualised as a „matrix of possible 
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 Of my interviewees from the local peacebuilding NGOs, the majority were in their late twenties to 
mid-thirties. 
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permutations‟ (Bauman 1999: xxix, see also Chapter 3), every instance of day-to-
day cultural activity reaffirms the elusive cultural „whole‟ just as it appears to 
question its very role in defining the available choices. While ever-present as the 
backdrop of daily meaning-making, patrimonialism is also highly elusive as a 
„guide‟ to interpretation: its influence can rather be detected retrospectively, as yet 
another instance of meaning-generation appears to reaffirm its validity. Yet 
predicting the course that interpretive activity would take within this wider 
interpretational field is an ungrateful business, just as trying to sketch out the 
direction of transformation of patrimonialism itself. Instead, the following part of 
this chapter will concentrate on analysing the instances of interaction between the 
interpretational field of patrimonialism and other interpretational schemes 
introduced by peacebuilding, as they affect the production of meanings, actors, and 
Sierra Leone itself. 
III. The making of Sierra Leone: Peacetime 
representational struggles 
This part of the chapter addresses the representational dynamics at play in „the 
making of Sierra Leone‟ as the subject and object of peaceful transformation. The 
mechanisms of bordering and identification, discussed in the theoretical framework, 
are instrumental in illuminating the dynamics of actorness in the interactions 
between the local and the international. The significational context, or „culture‟ of 
Sierra Leone, as outlined in the previous parts, serves as the basis for enquiries into 
the particularities of representational dynamics engendered by the international 
peacebuilding interventions, and their interactions and clashes with the local visions 
of needs and objectives of conflict transformation. In other words, this part of the 
chapter illuminates questions like: „What happens in the interaction between the 
internationals and locals?‟; „How is the local „made,‟ both in its „indigenous‟ and 
„international‟ interfaces?‟; „Which representational dynamics are put in place in the 
interaction of liberal peacebuilding with the „local,‟ and how this reflects in the 
different levels and bases of identity in Sierra Leone?‟ This section also elucidates 
further the workings of meaning-generation in the Sierra Leonean context, since the 
generation of „new‟ meanings around peacebuilding is particularly visible; and 
engages with the expressive aspect of Sierra Leonean culture by looking at what 
avenues of expression of meanings are accepted and „work,‟ and which are disabled 
by the dominant cultural orientation, much to the detriment of the conventional 
liberal peacebuilding approaches. 
Peacebuilding and ‘local’ culture 
Frequently, discussions of peacebuilding rely on a juxtaposition of „peacebuilding 
from above‟ and „peacebuilding from below,‟ with the corresponding connotations 
of external orchestration of institutionalised peace opposed to „indigenous‟ bottom-
up peace initiatives (e.g. Ledearch 1997; Cawthra and Luckham 2003; Chopra and 
Hohe 2004). Tempting though it may be to use this juxtaposition as a normative 
basis for division into „culturally-sensitive‟ and compatible avenues for pacification 
in Sierra Leone versus the culturally unsound and introduced agendas of liberal 
peace, such a move would be suspect both on empirical and analytical grounds.  
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In Sierra Leone, it is difficult to tell „peacebuilding from above‟ from „peacebuilding 
from below‟: in a sense, the „local‟ nature of peacebuilding actors is „compromised‟ 
through any involvement in organised peacebuilding and association with liberal 
peacebuilding discourse, which normally form the precondition of visibility of peace 
initiatives to the „liberal‟ public eye. Thus it is easier to pinpoint ways in which the 
bulk of peacebuilding initiatives in Sierra Leone do not satisfy the criteria of a 
genuinely „bottom-up‟ process than those in which they do. At the same time, local 
agency can only emerge as „local‟ on the backdrop of other scales of reference, 
particularly the international, which neatly „slots‟ it into a pre-conceived structure of 
interaction rehearsed through the encounters between the liberal peace and its „local‟ 
counterparts elsewhere. While the precise identity of the interlocutors as well as the 
terms of their interaction are only fixed in, and through, the situation of encounter 
(see Chapter 3), it is also incontestable that the image of the „other‟ frequently 
predates actual encounters and serves to colour their course (see e.g. Jahn 2003: 34, 
referring to Inayatullah and Blaney 1996). This is noticeable in the reception of the 
internationals as potential patrons by the local peacebuilding activists in Sierra 
Leone, as well as in the liberal peacebuilding actors‟ moulding of local agency into 
predictable and manageable formats.   
 
Such „production‟ of the local through its exposure to the international is, of course, 
by no means exclusive to the present phase of post-conflict peacebuilding. The 
centuries of what, in the situation of contested boundaries and multiple (and 
mutable) unities, could tenuously be referred to as „external‟ involvement in Sierra 
Leone, have served to fashion the different guises of its „localness‟ over time (e.g. 
Ferme 2001; Shaw 2002; Jackson 2004). In a similar vein, current „local‟ actors are 
not a pre-existing given, but have emerged through a series of different encounters – 
whether with the „other‟ of war and violence unleashed by the RUF, or the other of 
„strategic complexes of liberal peace‟ (Duffield 2001: 13, 44-74), as a result of 
financial and social opportunity structures created by international interventions 
(Helander 2005). However, bearing in mind Lotman‟s idea (1992, see also Chapter 
3) that the cultural „outside‟ can be perceived as either lacking organisation or 
organised in different, incompatible ways, it is unsurprising that many elements of 
„local‟ organisation falling outside the recognition by agents of liberal peace 
scrutinising the local terrain for possible partners or subcontractors tend to remain 
invisible. An example of „lack of organisation‟ perception can be seen in the 
admission of the staff conducting „needs assessment‟ in rural Sierra Leone that „civil 
society was very weak, there were no organisations, so it was difficult to talk to 
people on the ground because it was unclear whose opinions were representative‟ 
(UN 2006). References to „harmful‟ cultural practices frequently invoked across the 
political and academic spectrum exemplify a perception of different, incompatible 
organisation. Equally, it would be naive to expect Sierra Leoneans to share the view 
of liberal peacebuilding with its practitioners, without refashioning its elements and 
discourses in accord with local understandings of need, legitimacy and propriety, 
which highlight and transform some of its aspects while rendering others invisible – 
or irrelevant – to the local eye. It is in this framework of interactions between 
different self-other constellations enabling partial mutual „legibility‟ and 
reinterpretation, rather than simply „selves‟ and „others‟ (cf. Holquist 1990), that the 
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emergence of new types of actors and corresponding sources of power in Sierra 
Leonean society needs to be assessed. 
 
By the same token, the very privileging of the „local‟ scale of peacebuilding needs to 
be questioned with reference to the context of academic and policy-related 
discourses. In this regard, the use of the concept of the „local‟ as a criterion of a 
genuinely sensitive engagement on the interveners‟ part dovetails with the sustained 
expectation of its analytical – and ethical – value in scholarly literature, exemplified 
by Toulmin‟s „local and timely‟ knowledge (1992, 2001) and Chabal and Daloz‟s 
insistence on focusing on „what “makes sense”‟ locally in the study of politics 
(2006: 30). „Local,‟ in this context, refers not „to the smallest relevant geographical 
or territorial unit but, much more important, to the socially most significant context‟ 
(ibid.: 124). Thus, delimiting the local scale becomes an issue of „understanding 
how people define themselves in relation to the various communities with which 
they interact within the circles of identity that matter to them‟ (ibid.: 125). No longer 
an abstract or „a geographic construct,‟ „localness‟ becomes defined by the 
„proximity and directness of impact‟ (Kent 2005: 35), uncovered through „the study 
of meaning, of what makes sense to the people concerned‟ (Chabal and Daloz 2006: 
60).  
 
Although the present study largely shares the sentiment behind this understanding, it 
also enables to foreshadow the dangers of hijacking the category of the „local‟ by the 
discourse of liberal peace as a means of legitimising interventions without any 
radical revision of their substance: the appropriation of meanings is, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, a widespread power practice informing any cultural activity of meaning-
making. Even as an analytical category, the „local‟ is open to this avenue of 
manipulation, for short of descending to the individual level, any attempts at 
delimiting the socially significant contexts will involve a degree of violence to the 
inherent diversity on the ground. (Thus, ironically, it is possible to detect „our‟ 
categories at work even in identifying the specifically „voiceless,‟ „powerless‟ 
groups in rural Sierra Leone, such as „nursing mothers‟ (e.g. Richards et al. 2004), 
while local ideas of power and powerlessness may be less rigidly connected to 
gender or family role than expected.
32) Thus, rather than approaching the „local‟ as a 
category which vindicates some forms of intervention and peacebuilding while 
condemning others, this section attempts to outline the proliferation of various 
„locals‟ in the interaction between different formats, levels and scales of engagement 
with the conflict and peace in Sierra Leone. 
‘Local culture(s)’ and cultural change 
It may be argued that since peacebuilding aims to address collective structures (state 
institutions, political norms etc.), the terms of relationship between the 
intersubjective level of human relations, representations etc., and the subjective, is 
none of its concern. However, within the liberal peace itself, this relationship is 
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 The taken-for-granted character of gender relations is illustrated by Richards et al.‟s (2004) 
example of a development project in Kabala in support of women-entrepreneurs: „Women, it was 
assumed, would be more likely to use their income to support their families, but some women began 
to behave like men, reportedly abandoning children and divorcing husbands in favor of younger 
boyfriends‟ (Richards et al. 2004: 28). 
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sufficiently articulated: certain personal norms and beliefs are seen as being 
compatible (or incompatible) with the wider institutional structures at the collective 
level and are seen as their legitimation (for instance, individual liberty and 
democracy have become coupled in this way). In addition, the individualist ethos of 
liberalism fits poorly with the group-level of articulation of interests and identities, 
which turns the bulk of social processes in collectivist-oriented societies politically 
irrelevant for liberal peacebuilding. But because the liberal peace is presumed to be 
outside culture – a „technical‟ optimisation of „good governance,‟ not a genuinely 
„political‟ matter open to contestation and debate regarding its effects on recipient 
societies vis-à-vis illiberal alternatives – neither the features of personal norms vs. 
collective institutions, nor the structures of mutual legitimation between them, are 
seen in cultural terms. The situation in „recipient‟ societies, however, is viewed 
differently. The term „culture‟ often designates collective-level structures and 
practices (e.g. „culture of corruption‟ or „impunity‟), and it is sometimes 
acknowledged that these practices are reproduced through individual participation 
and acceptance of them; yet these are viewed as „deviations‟ which are somehow 
distinct from „local culture‟ proper. Thus, it is presumed that collective structures 
can be altered, and deviant „harmful‟ cultural practices (such as those implicated in 
perpetuating gender inequality) weeded out without interfering with this „genuine‟ 
local culture. Although differentiating between „beneficial‟ vs. „harmful‟ aspects of 
culture may be less damaging than a wholesale condemnation of local culture on the 
grounds that it legitimises „harmful‟ practices, both these possibilities demonstrate a 
striking lack of reflection on what links collective structures of culture and their 
articulation and (re-)production at the individual level.  
 
The leap from the (inter-)individual level to that of the collective, intersubjective 
structures is always tropological (see Chapter 3), and the question of how the 
correspondence between political and societal structures on the one hand, and 
individual norms, beliefs, or values, on the other, is conceptualised or imagined, 
becomes an issue of meaning-generation (and, thus, cultural „practice‟). Recognising 
that the individual-level articulation ultimately holds the key as to whether the 
collective structures are perceived as legitimate, empowering, accessible, 
compatible, and so on (Murer 2008b), it also has to be remembered that any culture 
is by definition (at least Bauman‟s (1999) or Douglas‟ (2004)) ambivalent with 
regard to its enabling and constraining effects on individual freedom and creativity. 
Also, as discussed in Chapter 3, the cultural repertoire actualised in societal 
practices does not cover the entire potential of a given culture: depending on one‟s 
position with regard to the dominant cultural self-description, different variations on, 
and changes in, the current practices are seen as more or less compatible with the 
established cultural codes. Furthermore, far from automatic acceptance of the tenets 
of their culture, people actively reflect on their cultural experiences and norms, 
being able to (re-)assess their cultural „baggage‟ in creative ways (Just 1991; 
Viktorova Milne, forthcoming). This is not to say that collective structures readily 
present themselves to deliberate transformation, since in reassessing the structures of 
meaning, people partake in meaning-generation which these structures help to 
sustain (cf. Critchley 1992), which makes only some of their aspects accessible to 
observation and reassessment at any given time. Yet the futility of attempts to jump 
„outside‟ culture does not make cultural self-awareness and -analysis altogether 
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unfruitful, and its additional value may lie in demonstrating the possibility of 
„partial‟ solutions to peacebuilding dilemmas as opposed to radical, wholesale 
transformation – an insight which may be applicable to the transformation of 
peacebuilding agendas as well as its expectations of reform in recipient societies. 
This would, by necessity, rely on an acknowledgement of liberal peacebuilding as 
culture, and on a consideration of its naturalised biases which, as argued in Chapter 
3, make up the „stuff‟ of culture (see Chapter 4 for an analysis of „culture of liberal 
peacebuilding‟). That, in turn, would postulate the problematic of liberal 
peacebuilding‟s impact on the culture(s) of Sierra Leone as one of cultural encounter 
– a situation of „explosion‟ of perspectives from which to illuminate the trappings of 
both one‟s own and another‟s culture (cf. Bakhtin 1975: 80-81, 455). 
 
The experiences of war can also provide a supplementary perspective on culture, as 
violent conflict sometimes has the effect of accentuating cultural practices which 
may have been perceived as „neutral‟ and „invisible‟ before (e.g. Nordstrom 1994, 
Duffield 2001); indeed, conflict transforms the very state of peace into a marked 
cultural register. Henry notes that „violence, warfare, fear, and terror are ... social 
phenomena in that the social rationalities that previously structured peoples‟ lives 
may now become magnified, questioned, or altered‟ (2006: 380, referring to 
Mbembe and Roitman 1995). Crisis situations in general „expose ... the inner 
workings of a society and illuminate the basic values and assumptions which inform 
its actions‟ (Waller 1988: 74, quoted in Rackley 2000). Sometimes the practices of 
everyday life become re-assessed as elements (and symbols) of „peacetime‟ and re-
enacted with a view to such symbolism (see Nordstrom 1994 for examples), 
although this also makes them vulnerable to the agents of war violence who, by 
explicitly targeting these associations, re-inscribe the opposing interpretational 
dynamics into the sites and symbols of peace (ibid.; Crawford and Lipschutz 1997). 
At other points, conflict exposes the wealth of coping strategies devised under 
similar conditions in the past (e.g. Ferme 2001), or actualises „latent forms of 
knowledge, ones preserved and perpetuated through the institutions of identity to 
which … [people] belong, though perhaps not manifest in quotidian life‟ (Rackley 
2000). While it is arguable, in the light of the above discussion, whether the conflict 
in Sierra Leone was „destructive‟ of culture,33 it certainly explicated the social 
meanings and roles of certain cultural practices at the same time as it exposed them 
as vulnerable and arbitrary. In this sense, the conflict, while profoundly shaking the 
habitual world of the cultural „common sense,‟ also offered possibilities for cultural 
introspection and revision of the cultural baggage which is usually taken for granted.  
The making of Sierra Leone: Levels and scales of identification 
The „international‟ involvement in Sierra Leone works to produce local agency on a 
variety of levels and scales. Although, as will be shown below, institutional formats 
play an important part in framing the processes of identification in Sierra Leone, the 
very preference for some levels of identification communicated by liberal 
                                                 
33
 The debate on whether the articulated state of cultural practices is uncharacteristic for their 
„normal‟ functioning is by no means easily resolved: while the element of de-institutionalisation 
involved in re-assessing the purposes, functions and effects of a practice may be considered necessary 
for its informed use, such surge of awareness can also correspond with a sense of unavailability of the 
habitual function  (see Schatzki et al. 2001). 
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peacebuilding structures the understanding of such processes in terms of, for 
example, „national‟ reconciliation and revival. Although the „local‟ scale serves as 
an important reference point in peacebuilding discourses, they also place this „local‟ 
within the framework of accepted Westphalian hierarchies, subordinating both 
micro- and macro-regional dynamics to a state-centred blueprint of „national‟ 
institutional formats. For instance, while the value of „localness‟ and internal 
diversity within Sierra Leone is recognised in INGOs‟ preferences for local mission 
staff (Thompson 2006) and covering the entire country with a network of local 
offices, the resulting networks also serve as a tool to bind the „nation‟ together, and 
de-centralisation of power, although high on the donor agendas, is carefully 
channelled into the avenues „proper‟ to a functioning national polity (such as the 
resuscitated district councils which are presumed to balance the patrimonial powers 
of chiefdom structure (UN 2006)). 
 
The differences between the local meanings and connotations of „the state‟ and their 
liberal peace counterparts lead to a curious situation where promotion of „liberal‟ 
formats of governance also helps to further certain „undesired‟ features of 
neopatrimonial cultural economy just as it attempts to combat others. It has been 
noted that the state in the African context has an ambivalent nature: on the one hand, 
it is rarely perceived as a genuine conduit of the interests of the populace and is 
presented by critics as a mere façade of patrimonial politics as well as its instrument 
(through the patron-client networks of access to public office and state benefits) (e.g. 
Bøås 2001: 700). On the other, the state certainly channels external legitimacy (for 
donors, foreign government and IOs), which nonetheless can effectively get 
subordinated to the selfsame patrimonial dynamics (e.g. when access to donor funds 
is provided in return for political support). Furthermore, it is also recognised by 
liberal peacebuilding actors themselves (e.g. UNDP 2007) that the exclusive nature 
of African state politics (cf. Chabal and Daloz 1999) often leaves both political 
opposition and societal actors without sufficient access to political decision-making, 
and therefore the reliance of the peacebuilding community on governments endorses 
the fiction of their representativeness (WB 2006; UN 2006). A „strong‟ state, thus, 
bears internal political risks; yet a weak state is considered an international threat 
due to its vulnerability to transnational crime and terrorist networks.  
 
As a solution to this perceived dilemma, the government is strengthened through 
such „fabrication‟ of legitimacy while at the same time, attempts are made to 
improve governance practices through the back door – for instance, by insisting on 
an increased role for parliamentary opposition, or participation of NGOs and civil 
society actors in policy consultations (UN PBC 2007; UNDP 2007). Curiously, this 
leads to some – albeit indirect – engagement with cultural assumptions about the 
nature of power. According to my UN PBC interviewee, the example of Burundi 
demonstrates that the involvement of expatriates – the „enlightened‟ people 
„troubled by abuses and lack of the rule of law‟ in Burundian politics – has brought 
about an attempt to change „the view of power as absolute, since they can see what 
would happen to them if they were to lose power one day‟ (UN PBC 2007). This 
indicates an attempt to rethink the „common sense‟ idea of power in view of a 
changing context of patrimonial African politics. However, at the time of the 
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interview (March 2007) there were no indications that a similar reassessment was 
taking place in Sierra Leone (UN PBC 2007). 
 
Strengthening the state of Sierra Leone also raises the issue of the character of its 
sovereignty, which invokes connotations of artificialness captured in Jackson‟s 
study of African „quasi-states‟ (1990). Given the Schmittean overtones34 of the 
rhetoric of exception which envelopes both scholarly and policy-related discussions 
of Africa (see Ferme 1998: 557-8), the externalisation of sovereignty by means of 
highlighting the exceptionality of Africa‟s intractable political and development 
problems points to a continuation of the fictional character of Sierra Leone‟s 
„sovereign equality‟ (Reno 2000: 303). Unsurprisingly, this fiction of sovereignty is 
also external in its orientation, with access to the avenues of international „actorness‟ 
becoming a powerful resource in internal political struggles – something highlighted 
by the RUF‟s craving for international attention for vindication of the seriousness of 
its rebellion. The reliance of political recognition on external, rather than internal 
(bottom-up, social contract-based) sources of legitimacy can only serve to highlight 
the perception of Sierra Leone‟s state power as being „anti-people‟ (Poulton and 
Ayissi 2000: 101). 
 
In this regard, the continuities which enable to interpret the given case study as that 
of „Sierra Leone‟ also need to be questioned, on the grounds that this underwrites 
the state-centric practice of identifying political – and, it could be argued, cultural 
(cf. Bourdieu 1977) – entities. In the context of such an approach, any smaller-scale 
cultural diversity (and especially of the kind that also transgresses political 
boundaries) is perceived as potentially explosive (cf. Chapter 2, on ethnicity). It is 
assumed that any boundaries of identity should, by default, either gravitate towards 
the political boundaries of the state (through nation-building), or, if that is 
impossible, seek to mould the state boundaries according to the resilient ethnic ones 
(via secessionism, irredentism or other pathways to self-determination). However, 
there is little in the present case study to support these assumptions. 
 
With regard to Sub-Saharan Africa, Chabal and Daloz point out that the division of 
the continent according to „ethnicity‟ has been remarkably flawed: ethnic identity 
very seldom constituted a locally significant basis of communal identification. 
Instead, kin and locality provided the most prominent expression of identity-
production (1999: 58; 2006: 112-5). In West Africa, many societal practices (such as 
secret societies) are shared across what is considered „ethnic‟ and national 
boundaries, and in many cases even multiple linguistic barriers are not impenetrable, 
given the mutual intelligibility, for instance, of many languages of the Mane group 
(see Richards 1996: 68-9; Bangura 2004; Jackson 2004; Ferme 2001; Shaw 2002). 
Furthermore, boundaries based on kin and locality are not exclusive, since the 
migration flows triggered by regional conquests and the slave trade resulted in 
elaborate practices of „assimilation‟ of newcomers. Nor are these boundaries 
uncompromisingly „inclusive,‟ since the ambivalence of such assimilations is upheld 
by a variety of internal divisions within the society and even family (such as the 
                                                 
34
 Cf. this extract from Schmitt: „Sovereign is he who decides on the exception. ... the exception is to 
be understood to refer to a general concept in the theory of the state, and not merely to a construct 
applied to any emergency decree or state of siege‟ (1985 [1922]: 5). 
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perception of wives as the potential „fifth column‟ (cf. Shaw 2002), or power 
inequalities of the family structure captured in the idiom of „plundering cousins‟ 
(Ferme 2001)). At the local (village and chiefdom) level, mixed ethnic origins often 
go hand-in-hand with the unquestioned recognition of local belonging and 
authenticity of the claims to local land and lineage, of people whose ancestors were 
known to have arrived from outside (e.g. Fanthorpe 1998). Both people, and certain 
practices, could be identified as, for example, Limba, or Temne, not by virtue of 
their origin within the „ethnic‟ community, but through their adoption – as Shaw has 
demonstrated for Temne divination techniques (2002) and Fanthorpe for Biriwa 
Konteh chiefly lineage (1998).  
 
These considerations add another dimension to the furthering of the „nation‟ as a 
reference point in the liberal peace approach to reconciliation. The emphasis on 
„national‟-scale reconciliation, discernible as an underlying motive behind the Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Shaw 2005), may be presented as 
something that ensures the success of the „technical fix‟ of creating a viable state 
which, through taking good care of its citizens, will automatically guard against a 
relapse into violence in the future. Yet, this surreptitious furthering of one level of 
commonality may be detrimental to others, which have featured far more 
prominently both in the violent phase of the conflict and in subsequent 
reconciliation. Various studies have pointed out reconciliation in Sierra Leone 
happening on a much smaller scale – village, community, and family (Shaw 2005; 
Jackson 2004; Clifford s.a.; cf. Honwana 2005), with healing rituals restoring 
commonality at those levels where it was perceived to be violated during the war. 
While the „nation‟ remains an abstract point of reference for many, especially rural, 
Sierra Leoneans, kin and locality offer more tangible forms of commonality, so that 
local-scale reconciliation practices not only reconnect the person to his/her 
immediate social network, but also invoke the connotations of the power of the 
place, with its „endemic‟ supernatural forces, such as spirits and ancestors (cf. 
Chabal and Daloz 1999). (Baker and May, for instance, cite a practice of asking God 
and the ancestors to give the child a „cool heart‟ (2006: 231) as part of the healing 
rituals oriented at child combatants.)  
 
However, for numerous people „uprooted‟ by the conflict, the national scale of 
reconciliation may prove surprisingly relevant. This concerns the ex-combatants 
who would not return to their home areas for fear of prosecution or shame, young 
abductees who cannot remember where they came from, and illegitimate children of 
rebel commanders whom their mothers abandoned because of their „origin‟ in the 
conflict (FAWE SL 2006a). The „national‟ as the reference point for identification 
may be more relevant for those people who find themselves outside the traditional 
community-level circles of identity. Yet this may not be an unproblematic solution: 
as pointed out in Ursula Beimann‟s documentary Performing the Border, national-
level identification, which „rescues‟ those experiencing identity crisis in the US-
Mexican borderlands, comes with a price. By changing the terms of personal 
responsibility and affiliation, it also shifts the normative connections to local people 
and communities, resulting, in extreme cases, in the revision of accepted taboos, 
which Beimann links to the proliferation of serial killers in border areas. For Sierra 
Leoneans uprooted by the war, the promotion of the national level as the one with 
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which not only themselves, but also war-like activities and sentiments should be 
legitimately associated (in a perfectly acceptable spirit of patriotism), also serves to 
devalue the role of community-based identification, both as the object of past war 
crimes (i.e. something important to other fellow countrymen and -women) and as a 
source of social belonging and cultural grounding (i.e. something potentially 
beneficial to themselves). In addition, consolidation of the „national‟ level of 
identification is not uncontroversial in view of Sierra Leone‟s political past. 
Although the conflict did not per se exacerbate the ethnic divides, the return to 
„peacetime politics‟ with APC and SLPP as the main political forces reinstated 
ethnically-based party politics,
35
 introducing an ethnic dimension to the radical 
exclusionary dynamics which characterise the electoral loss in patrimonialism (see 
above; Chabal and Daloz 1999; cf. Ferme 1998: 556-7; Kandeh 1992). 
 
Some features of this case study do highlight the national and ethnic scales of 
identity – not because these dividing lines are located in the intrinsically „right‟ 
places, but because they are reproduced in practices that develop around (and owing 
to) any instance of boundary-drawing. Thus, the conflict was mainly contained 
within the state borders of Sierra Leone (spillovers of refugees and armed factions 
between Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea notwithstanding); and there were some 
instances of polarisation of Sierra Leonean politics along the Temne (north) and 
Mende (south and east) lines (see Kandeh 1992). In addition, the state formed the 
ultimate stake in the conflict for many parties (as evident in the succession of coups 
as well as the RUF rhetoric), and it also served as a reference point in the 
discussions of the causes of conflict and the required solutions (to do with (mis-) 
government at the state level). But many other conflict dynamics depart from this 
dual state/ ethnicity scheme (whether that alludes to state weakness as a diagnosis 
for the conflict in the first place, or helps explain the reasons for the said weakness, 
is a matter of another debate). Many of the conflict dynamics (both „positive‟ and 
„negative‟) were regional, and although the elites in the capital city of Freetown 
were criticised for not treating the RUF insurgency as a matter of national priority, 
the occasions were the conflict appeared to engulf the imagined space of the entire 
state (e.g. due to RUF-inspired rumour-mongering) were also perceived as very 
troubling. Another way in which the conflict fell short of the expected divides is 
exposed by a consideration of the functional orientation of Sierra Leone‟s 
borderlands towards Liberia rather than Sierra Leone itself, for reasons of better 
developed infrastructure and shorter travel times to Monrovia compared even with 
Bo (not to mention Freetown) (see e.g. Richards 1996).  
 
Ethnographic studies of different peoples and parts of Sierra Leone confirm the 
„local‟ dimension of politics – in terms of relevance to the people concerned (Chabal 
and Daloz 2006: 124-5) – as falling far below the national scale privileged in the 
peacebuilding interventions.
36
 Chiefdom-level politics remains, for many, the upper 
                                                 
35
 The „ethnic‟ connotations of the main political parties are underscored even by the appeals to 
overcome such links: see the Cocorioko Forum exchange „My People From The North And 
Freetown, Come To The SLPP‟ at http://www.hwforums.com/2179/messages/96117.html, 
http://www.hwforums.com/2179/messages/96074.html, etc., accessed 12 February 2009. 
36
 This is not, as could be implied, due to the explicit focus of ethnographies on the communal, sub-
state level of identification, since the inclusion of local communities in wider frames of reference, as 
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limit of political relevance (cf. Fanthorpe 1998, 2005), despite the Freetown 
connections of many families or the local connections of national-level politicians 
(Jackson 2004). In Hoffman‟s words, „chiefdom politics serves as the rubric for 
understanding even national events,‟ and the „narratives of national healing, 
accountability, or intervention are always subject to more localized reinterpretation‟ 
(2007: 648). While this contributes to the preservation of vertical ties with the 
capital, a sense of horizontal unity with the rest of the localities in Sierra Leone 
cannot be presumed to follow automatically. Localised interpretational frames are 
predominantly historical in orientation (Fanthorpe 1998), linking contemporary 
events to the symbols of the „past‟ (Ferme 1998), bolstering local- rather than 
national-level continuities in the process. Writing in 1998, Fanthorpe remarks how 
even contemporary politics in Limba Biriwa country remained „orientated towards 
powerful pre-colonial personalities and their putative relationships.‟ In view of these 
interpretational strategies, „national‟ politics in Sierra Leone can be harnessed to 
promote diachronic, but not necessarily synchronic continuity. 
 
It also has to be remembered that the recent trend towards national unification in the 
policies of outside actors has to contend with the effects of very much the opposite 
tendencies fostered throughout the duration of colonial involvement in Sierra Leone 
(Fanthorpe 1998, Keen 2005: 9-12). The British colonial government, with its 
reliance on the inflated power of chiefs (ibid.), channelled much of the internal 
conflict potential into the internal struggles between rival ruling houses competing 
for chieftaincy, exacerbating a „generalist‟ conflict culture (cf. Ross 1993, 1998) in 
many hinterland chiefdoms, with the internal divides serving as a much more 
powerful factor in conflict than any common „external‟ threats. This generalist 
conflict culture was further reaffirmed during the APC one-party rule, when 
chiefdom-level power struggles for electoral representation often „reproduced pre-
existing factional opposition between ruling families‟ (Ferme 1998: 566). The 
emphasis on the national level of identification, therefore, may not produce a 
renewed sense of a Sierra Leonean „self‟ in opposition to external otherness, but 
merely heighten the scope of the internal divisive potential of a generalist conflict 
culture. 
Institutional governance formats and local meanings 
While the existence of universal norms and rights (such as human rights) is itself 
frequently disputed (e.g. by state parties at the UN viewing them as a „Northern‟ 
imposition and a surreptitious attempt to disempower differently-minded actors (e.g. 
UN PBC 2007), as well as by critical scholars arguing against their sweeping 
application), the practice of coupling the regard for such norms with certain 
institutional formats, which the West perceives as purely „instrumental‟ and neutral 
but which may not be viewed as such from a local perspective, is perhaps even more 
controversial (see e.g. Shaw 2005). In a similar vein, apparently neutral, technical 
institutional formats of state governance and its „habitual‟ mechanisms of control 
over the population may be enveloped in meanings which make them anything but 
„neutral‟ in the eyes of Sierra Leoneans.  
                                                                                                                                         
well as the local connotations and currency of Sierra Leone-wide political and cultural symbolism, 
form an important aspect of ethnographic studies (see e.g. Ferme 2001; Shaw 2002).  
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Institutional formats 
It has become almost customary nowadays to expose the mechanisms of colonial 
governance as disciplining the local populations, and to welcome the evidence of 
local resistance and subversion of colonial „governmentalities.‟ In the light of near 
universal acceptance of the critique of colonialism, the reluctance to problematise 
the biases carried by liberal peacebuilding and associated institutional formats is 
especially notable. Yet evidence of both is abundant throughout the history of Sierra 
Leone, from the „Hut Tax War‟ of 1898 in response to the strengthening of the 
British colonial control over the hinterland „Protectorate‟ (Keen 2005), to the 
manipulation of communications, particularly the railway, as a means of state 
presence and control (Ferme 2001), to the rural ambivalent attitudes towards the 
state in the post-independence era (Ferme 1998). The relationship of rural Sierra 
Leone with the formats and instruments of state governance has never been 
untroubled: 
 
Rural Sierra Leoneans have historically experienced violence in connection with the 
purportedly technical, ordinary procedures of state integration and control (taxes, elections, 
the census, and so on), and hence continue to see these domains as highly contentious 
sources of social disruption and inequity. This experience has been strengthened by the post-
independence politics of single-party rule, and by the punitive and apparently arbitrary 
economy of development. (Ferme 1998: 574) 
 
In this context, „neutral‟ instruments of administration also developed ominous 
connotations: 
 
Given the ambiguity of the state‟s use of numbers – sometimes to benefit, other times to 
benefit from its citizens – many rural Sierra Leoneans saw counting and defining as 
contentious issues. To them, these were not technical procedures for neutrally recording 
statistical information to be used by a bureaucratic apparatus, but rather political acts aimed 
at exposing and controlling people, in ways that inevitably led to violence. (Ferme 2008: 
565, emphasis in original) 
 
The connection with violence is particularly salient in the dynamics of electoral 
politics – not simply because of the excesses of Stevens‟ era (see Keen 2005: 18), 
but as embedded in the very notion of open competition with clear winners and 
losers, as opposed to the fiction of consensus established through more traditional 
rural decision-making formats (Ferme 1998: 556-7). „[T]he reduction of complex 
political relations to a matter of votes‟ neither resolved the underlying conflicts nor 
helped to keep them in check: in fact, „the vote outcome marked less the end of 
strategic manoeuvering for political office, than its continuation through other 
events‟ (ibid.: 565). Yet, „[t]he vote count established winners and losers, a 
relationship expressed through the idiom of consumption (winners „ate‟ losers ...), 
which turned losing the ballot from „an inevitable element of power-sharing in the 
democratic process‟ into a sign of „fundamental physical and social weaknesses‟ 
(ibid.: 565-6, 570). It is unsurprising, in this light, that the peace process in Sierra 
Leone began with the staging of elections, as the RUF‟s electoral loss would have 
signalled the destruction of the political and social agency of the movement. This 
could also shed light on the seemingly disproportionate violent response to the 
elections by the RUF: many observers have noted the correspondence of the first 
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wave of mass amputations with the 1996 election period (e.g. Sierra Leone Web 
1999; Butcher 2002).  
 
However, unambiguous division into „winners‟ and „losers‟ fits uneasily with the 
predominant cultural orientation of Sierra Leone towards consensus, however 
fictional, borne out of recognition of overlapping networks of kin and patronage (cf. 
Ferme 1998). The primacy of social networks in determining people‟s (often many-
pronged) allegiances lead some to conclude that there are no „independent voters,‟ 
„no independent electorate‟ in Sierra Leone (WB 2006). To hijack Mary Kaldor‟s 
terminology, in Sierra Leone‟s cultural context the „politics of interest‟ cannot be 
pursued in isolation from the „politics of identity‟ (1999). The „violence of numbers‟ 
is thus met by „countervailing strategies of appropriation, which limit the violent 
effects of imported ideals of liberal democratic politics‟ (Ferme 1998: 574). These 
include „strategically manipulating public and covert politics, and ... subverting the 
significance – and the very outcome – of elections‟ (ibid.: 575). The skilful 
manipulation of the spheres of public and private negotiations also forms part of the 
traditional rural decision-making formats, such as the Mende practice of „hanging 
heads‟ (ibid.: 566, 571). Awareness of the potentially devastating effects of the 
„winner takes all‟ mentality of patrimonial politics often resulted in subversion of 
the open electoral procedures by such local formats of consensus-building: locally, 
as Ferme observes with reference to Wunde chiefdom, „efforts were made to have 
candidates run unopposed‟ (1998: 566). Although consensus-building clearly 
appeals to the idea of genuinely „“African” political forms‟ (ibid.: 567), its 
„autocratic potential‟ is exemplified by the 1978 referendum which de jure 
established the APC one-party rule (ibid.; Ferme 1999). Furthermore, the 
corresponding „logic of power was seen as one of dissimulation,‟ and „[i]ndividual 
success in politics was predicated on the management of ambiguity‟ (Ferme 1998: 
569). Ambiguity and non-finality of decisions, as a consequence of contradictory 
messages issued in a variety of private and public settings, make it difficult to view 
the consensus-building mechanisms as morally „superior‟ compared to the 
exclusionary competitiveness unleashed by electoral politics, since both are 
implicated in the „invisible,‟ structural violence of the everyday (Ferme 1998, 1999). 
Rather, the point is to emphasise the interpenetration of the respective logics, with 
dissimulation penetrating the electoral politics, while the language of „winning‟ and 
„losing‟ encroached on ostensibly apolitical spheres, such as local courts (Ferme 
1998; cf. Erdmann and Engel 2007). 
 
By and large, ambiguity remains an important feature of various institutional and 
legal arrangements in post-war Sierra Leone. Many observers point out the lack of 
clarity plaguing power division at the local level between the chiefs and the 
recreated local councils. As pointed out by one interviewee, 
 
Under the Chiefdom Administrative Act the chiefs were in control of development projects 
and all tax proceeds. Now the ... legislation bestows the same powers onto local councils! ... 
The chiefs still collect taxes, but the local councils are expected to implement all 
development projects with the maximum 40% of tax revenue that reaches them. The 
situation is unlikely to change just now since the ruling party needs the chiefs‟ votes in the 
2007 election. (NAG 2006; cf. UN 2006) 
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A similar ambiguity obtains in the legal sphere, where legal dualism – a co-existence 
of two radically different systems of law, with civil law applied in Freetown and the 
Western Area, and a host of regional variations upon the „customary law‟ elsewhere 
– perceptibly limits any „enlightening‟ effects of interventions. Customary law, in 
particular, resists any systematic transformation owing to its largely unarticulated 
nature, but has attracted a lot of negative publicity, exposed as discriminatory 
towards women and leaving too much to the discretion of undemocratic „traditional 
authorities‟ – a point on which local and international observers invariably converge 
(e.g. Alterman et al. s.a.; UN 2006; GGEM 2006; Thompson 2006). Yet, about 80% 
of court cases are still adjudicated by traditional courts (UN 2006), where local 
„consensus‟ premised on the existing power imbalances makes the outcomes of law 
suits largely predictable. In many more cases, smaller-scale „consensus-building‟ is 
utilised to settle matters without even appealing to courts (cf. Ferme 1998, 1999; 
Alterman et al. s.a.). 
 
Customary societal institutions have recently received an increased scholarly 
attention, especially in the context of studies of „hybrid‟ political forms (e.g. Boege 
2006; Boege et al. 2008) which emerge on the interface between the liberal peace (or 
the liberal international order, more generally) and the „traditional‟ political forms 
and frameworks. In many cases, „customary‟ practices become equated with „local 
culture,‟ which is perhaps understandable give the comparatively „alien‟ character of 
practices and institutions introduced by liberal peacebuilding in the „local‟ eyes. 
However, this issue is far more complex. Hasty associations of the „customary‟ with 
„local culture‟ often ignore the possibility of contestation carried by the legacy of 
many „customary‟ formats. Often these represent either institutionalised domination 
of some local power centre or interest, or earlier introductions, sometimes as remote 
from the „indigenous‟ culture as the liberal peace itself, perhaps reflecting the 
outsiders‟ vision of the „local culture‟ rather than a genuinely local view (as in the 
case of colonial power structures extended into the hinterland). Of course, many 
customary institutions have become part of local culture by way of their 
accommodation within local praxis and common sense, as well as, on occasions, 
through their subversion and/or introduction of „indigenous‟ local elements to the 
proceedings. Yet they gravitate towards „traditional‟ rather than „indigenous‟ 
register of local practices (see MacGinty 2008). In and of itself, the designation of 
practices as „customary‟ says little about their cultural authenticity, relegating the 
debate instead towards the dynamics of cultural appropriation and contestation in 
each empirical case, with those in Sierra Leone‟s context enabling particular 
ambiguity in their reading. Because of the limited scope of this research, I have tried 
to steer clear of many contentious „customary‟ practices, limiting the enquiry to 
those which are most crucial in the interface between the „local‟ and the liberal 
peace. 
Policy rhetoric and ‘economy’ 
In addition to the habitual institutional formats of liberal democracy, the very 
language in which the technical recommendations of liberal peacebuilding are 
expressed faces challenges from local interpretational structures. Sierra Leonean 
peacebuilding activists remark that the legalistic and formal policy language of 
peacebuilding documents, for instance in the field of human rights, makes it 
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„impossible for a lay person to relate to, and needs to be translated into familiar 
terms and images, told with the help of traditional stories (e.g. “why is elephant the 
bully?”)‟ (SCG SL 2006; cf. Merry 2003: 59). Although the same interviewee notes 
that notwithstanding this „clash at the level of language,‟ people can still relate to the 
idea of human rights (SCG SL 2006), other typical areas of concern on the agendas 
of liberal peace have not been so fortunate. For instance, tasks which, in 
peacebuilders‟ view, refer simply to devising technical and institutional solutions (as 
in the case of „facilitating information sharing‟), may encroach onto culturally 
„charged‟ areas: in patrimonial culture, information and knowledge are intimately 
related to power, which, in turn, structures the channels of communication and the 
hierarchy of social ties (Shaw 2002: 171; more on this below). It could be argued 
that there is little room (and want?) in the Sierra Leonean society for impersonal 
information sharing; but given the efforts of many local NGOs (such as NAG) to 
publicise different aspects of Sierra Leoneans‟ rights and responsibilities as citizens, 
it would be interesting to see whether that is changing the perception of relative 
power in this rather direct cultural correlation of power with knowledge. 
 
In a similar vein, it is easy to see how other routine terms of policy 
recommendations, such as to „increase transparency‟ of the local courts system, or to 
„depoliticise‟ the law in order to improve local dispute resolution capacity (see e.g. 
Alterman et al. s.a.), fail to take into account the reception of such „impersonal‟ and 
„technical‟ measures by rural Sierra Leoneans. In view of Ferme‟s research (1998), 
increasing transparency would unsettle the established methods of combining open 
public proceedings with clandestine negotiations dealing with highly sensitive 
matters (cf. Shaw 2000), and furthermore, would still leave unaccounted the conflict 
resolution mechanisms in the explicitly „secret‟ sphere, such as Poro or Sande, 
which some authors consider a valuable resource for peacebuilding (e.g. Richards et 
al. 2004; but see Shaw 2005 for a more sceptical view). On the other hand, any 
attempts to „de-politicise‟ law would themselves be viewed as unquestionably 
political, given the attitudinal ambiguities surrounding other bureaucratic procedures 
in the public realm (Ferme 1998). 
 
Although generally, the approach of wholesale restructuring of recipient societies 
(Duffield 2001) is discernible in the internationals‟ condemnation of patrimonialism 
and corruption in Sierra Leone (e.g. WB 2006), and (half-hearted) attempts are made 
at refashioning the established practices,
37
 on occasions, peacebuilding agents 
appear to make amends to the patrimonial logic and are not averse to exploiting its 
regulatory potential. For instance, it is recognised in a study of Sierra Leone‟s legal 
framework, The Law People See (Alterman et al. s.a.), that appeals to issues of local 
relevance can be used as aids in enforcing the judgements of various dispute 
resolution bodies and mechanisms, from chiefs to profession- or gender-specific 
„councils‟ of heads, elders etc. They also note that the „tensions emerging from the 
civil war past also play into pressures of enforcement.‟ In particular, 
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 As, for example, with the orchestrated establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission – which, 
in defiance of its stated objectives, is not independent of GoSL (NAG 2006). 
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the shame of ex-combatant status and tensions between ex-combatants and returnees can be 
used to impose pressure to comply. Simply mentioning the time of the war is scandalous, 
and nobody wants his or her name tied to it. (Alterman et al. s.a.: 31) 
 
On other occasions, however, there is more evidence of a „culture clash‟ than mutual 
accommodation between liberal peacebuilding and the patrimonial logic of meaning-
generation – something that will be explored further in relation to a particular type 
of actor on the peacebuilding scene in Sierra Leone: the NGOs. 
‘Local’ peacebuilding agency and the liberal peace: NGOs in Sierra 
Leone’s peace process 
As an interface between the liberal peace, which habitually relies on civil society 
organisations to further its objectives, and the „local‟ dimension of Sierra Leone‟s 
peace process, Sierra Leonean NGOs form a natural focus of enquiry for this part of 
the chapter. They also form a suitably contested issue, which gives rise to multiple – 
both local and otherwise – assessments and interpretations, thus offering prime 
material for an analysis of meaning-generation. With NGOs, the typical points of 
critique are more or less straightforward: the agendas of local NGOs are formed by 
the „supply‟ factor of the international donor organisations rather than the local 
„demand,‟ whether the NGO is working in tandem with an international NGO (as its 
local partner) or is simply dependent on the outside donors for funding (e.g. UN 
PBC 2007; Thompson 2006; Helander 2005). According to an interviewee 
associated with the UN Peacebuilding Commission, NGOs as a type of actor are 
very much a „Northern‟ phenomenon, with international North-based NGOs often 
standing behind their local partners in the developing countries (UN PBC 2007). 
They are also, despite widely acknowledged normative agendas, an essentially 
„unaccountable‟ type of actor (see Brown 2005), although their degree of freedom in 
fashioning objectives and priorities is, to an extent, limited by their own sources of 
funding, some of which comes from government budgets. However, dismissing 
NGOs as an „illegitimate‟ type of actor plays into the hands of „conservative‟ forces 
behind more national interest-driven agendas, which would hamper the ability of 
peacebuilding actors to consider the whole spectrum of local needs and capacities 
which may not square with various „national‟ priorities (UN PBC 2007).  
 
To this extent, the NGOs channel some of the same problematic issues which 
characterise the internationals‟ efforts in peacebuilding, such as being driven by 
„vogues‟ in development policy rather than a needs-based approach tailored to 
particular conditions on the ground (Duffield 2001). Debates and dialogue that do 
take place among the international peacebuilding actors are mostly geared towards 
other such actors, rather than being directed outside the „professional‟ peacebuilding 
circles. This is not to diminish the contentious nature of this dialogue, which is 
premised on the diversity and varying status of peacebuilding actors (evident, for 
instance, in the debates on whether NGOs should be granted a role in the UN bodies, 
or a consultative status with governments in post-conflict situations (UN PBC 2007; 
UNDP 2007); but rather to emphasise that this contention „within‟ the camp of 
peacebuilders leaves little space for possible contributions from the „outside‟ (e.g. 
critically-minded academics or local actors who are not „organised‟ into civil society 
groups according to the accepted international standards (cf. Richards et al. 2004)). 
179 
 
In order to be „heard,‟ it seems, the critics of the liberal peace need to make 
themselves understandable in its own „language‟ (Shaw 2005; Helander 2005; Kent 
2005). One implication of this, as discussed above, is that actors which do not wield 
(or refuse to engage in) the peacebuilding „speak‟ tend to remain invisible to the 
internationals who are attuned to particular types of societal organisation, and view 
only particular initiatives as worth supporting (Richards et al. 2004; Llamazares and 
Levy 2003; cf. Nega 2006; MacGinty 2007). Another implication, mentioned in 
Chapter 4, is that this also makes liberal peacebuilding extremely vulnerable to 
manipulation by actors who are sufficiently proficient in its language and have 
mastered its interpretational schemes. Examples range from „misuse‟ of 
peacebuilding on a grand scale – as with Kosovo‟s success in effectively crafting its 
independence under the veneer of international peacebuilding – to the local-level 
cases, such as NGO „middlemen‟ who „cheat‟ both the donors and their local 
recipients (e.g. Richards et al. 2004). Both these implications, as will be shown 
below, can be discerned in the case of Sierra Leone. 
Local NGOs: Between cultures? 
Shaw (2005) notes how in regard to certain issues very topical for peacebuilding 
(such as reconciliation, and methods of operation of SL TRC), the actions and 
preferences of NGOs were in stark contrast with the opinions of many Sierra 
Leoneans. While many acknowledge the role of local NGOs in fostering peace 
throughout the second half of the duration of the conflict, in actively mediating 
„between the rebels and the government‟ (CGG 2006) and going into areas where 
„UNAMSIL personnel were afraid to go‟ to secure disarmament and re-integration 
of former combatants (PRIDE 2006), the track record of NGOs in the peace process 
remains mixed. Sometimes, bureaucratic practices of aid agencies during the war 
served to compromise the security of those in their care rather than enhance it, as 
refugee camps often became sitting targets for warring parties who were after food 
supplies and other resources (Ferme 1998: 562). In addition, despite the similar 
terms of engagement grasped in the concept of „peacebuilding consensus‟ (e.g. 
Richmond and Franks 2006), 
 
there is not enough [actual] coordination between NGOs, and in some sense it is an almost 
impossible task, since priorities and objectives are formulated slightly differently and are 
based on different backgrounds, so that everyone ends up doing their own thing that does 
not, and cannot, build upon work by others. Even when a coordinating body [SLANGO] was 
created it did not seem to achieve much. As an example of badly coordinated NGO effort, 
after the war a number of NGOs decided to work with amputees, and instead of coordinating 
activities or consulting with people as to what it was they needed, they simply „descended‟ 
on them. (Thompson 2006) 
 
As evident from Jackson‟s field impressions (2004), this „descending‟ had not 
achieved much, as people were still living in amputee camps, without any definite 
prospects for the future, information about their plight or any impression that they 
were cared for, save for the erratic and arbitrary distribution of food packages. 
Partly, this patchy success rate accounts for the mistrust of NGOs and the negative 
views of their role among many „ordinary‟ Sierra Leoneans (Thompson 2006), but 
other reasons could be given as well. Paul Richards and his co-authors describe the 
environment of „opportunism‟ created by liberal peacebuilding for all sorts of local 
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actors willing to call themselves NGOs, which were subcontracted by international 
actors, on that basis, to carry out various projects, such as DDR (Richards et al. 
2004). While in some cases this seemed to work as intended by the Western donors, 
many of the local „NGOs‟ perceived the situation as an opportunity for enrichment 
(by under-delivering the materials and instruments for skills training, under-paying 
their ex-combatant trainees etc.). Intimidating the disgruntled trainees into 
compliance by the threat of withdrawing any support, these so-called local NGOs 
also hijacked the initiative from ostensibly less organised and capacious (i.e. less 
skilled in project-writing) local people, often misrepresenting the requirements and 
conditions of the donors in a way that suited the self-appointed NGOs (ibid.; PRIDE 
2006). When confronted with this problem, the internationals remark that once the 
civil society is strong and functioning, such bad „business practices‟ will be weeded 
out through self-censorship and -discipline of the civil society organisations (NP 
2007a). Yet in Sierra Leone‟s case, this may be doubtful given that such behaviour 
is ultimately compatible with certain cultural norms, and, moreover, finds 
counterparts in the practices of the internationals, whichs add external legitimation 
(see below).  
 
Given the prominence of certain themes in the liberal peace approach to the conflict 
in Sierra Leone (as discussed in the „Root causes‟ section), it is unsurprising that 
these also penetrate the discourse of local NGOs. The continued parallel existence of 
locally-motivated interpretational schemes leads to frequent situations where these 
mix in the rhetoric of local NGO activists, who are seemingly oblivious to 
contradictions between the two. In a stark illustration of this trend, my interviewee 
from P.R.I.D.E. Salone offered two different explanations for the conflict within the 
same interview. While elaborating in some detail on the historical circumstances 
which led to the „realisation that war was coming,‟ when asked to describe the 
activities of his organisation, he went on to state that many local NGOs were 
founded by educated, „enlightened‟ people – students, in the case of P.R.I.D.E. – 
who, in the course of their work, „came to understand that human rights violations 
were a root cause of war‟ (PRIDE 2006). The narratives of other NGO activists (e.g. 
CR 2006; CGG 2006) also meandered between explanations and rationalisations cast 
in local terms and those framed in the terminology of liberal peace, with the latter 
usually bearing little detail tying it to local contexts. 
 
Such variable terms of understanding the conflict and its causes should not be 
dismissed as „artificial‟ or „inconsistent.‟ Rather, they highlight the processual 
character of arriving at certain meanings that thereafter gain stability through 
repetition within a community versed in the respective interpretational schemes. In 
this respect, Sierra Leone NGOs form a distinct cultural community „validating‟ one 
another‟s recourses to the language of liberal peace. As noted by Bauman (1979: 
180-95), because the meanings are not „out there‟ to be discovered, one‟s knowledge 
of self proceeds via very much the same tracks as the understanding of the other (cf. 
Schutz 1967); therefore, „local‟ people do not have a default advantage in accessing 
the „root causes‟ of „their‟ conflict. The liberal peace language of norms and rights 
provides one of the frames of reference in which interpretational dynamics can 
unfold – just as the established interpretational schemes of local relevance provide 
another. Which of them prevails as a guide to political practice is not only a question 
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of internal consistency and persuasiveness of these frames of reference, but also of 
their currency and accessibility in the local context and the extent of the 
international influences directed at it. In view of the imbalance in resources that 
these competing frames of reference can call upon, the power connotations of one or 
another „language‟ also play a role in the preferences of local agents.38  
A local (NGO) perspective on the liberal peace 
Despite a sense of convergence in the agency of local NGOs and international 
peacebuilding actors, in many respects, local NGOs preserve a separate perspective 
on their activities. This also makes them ideally placed to see fault with the practices 
of their international „benefactors:‟ indeed, the harshest critique of the 
internationals‟ approaches to peacebuilding that I encountered (outside the academe) 
comes from Sierra Leonean peacebuilding organisations. As expressed by an 
interviewee from a local NGO Forum of Conscience, „the internationals can be 
criticised on many accounts:‟ 
 
… with donors, the imposition of very strict rules undermines the projects. For instance, 
they‟ll give you money for a cell phone, but not for a radio or a computer which may be 
more necessary for the project. In the rural areas, same thing – e.g. they‟ll put pumps in 
villages without asking the locals what it is that they need most (like a marketplace or a cool 
room to store perishable goods), which often leads to worsening of conditions instead of 
improvement (as with women losing their only „gossip time‟). This is the problem of 
„imported remedies.‟ Another problem is that the aid is very localised and it tends to go to 
those who are more accessible and on the account of that better off, than others in more 
distant inaccessible parts that have nothing and never receive any aid. (FoC 2006) 
 
Critics within the liberal peacebuilding community also note that excessive 
bureaucratisation of local development projects channels local efforts away from the 
substantive work, focusing instead on training local community representatives in 
fulfilling the intricate requirements of accountancy and reporting (WB 2007a). 
Often, this leads to a perception that the internationals are as adept at channelling 
funds out of peacebuilding activities as the trickster „NGOs‟ described by Richards 
et al. (2004). For instance, while demanding high standards of transparency from 
local aid recipients, 
 
the donors themselves are not always transparent ... More generally a problem with donors is 
that enforcing conditionality in every detail leads to lack of local ownership – for example, 
in infrastructure reconstruction. As a result, 50% of funds go back to their source: because of 
strict formal requirements local people and firms cannot subcontract, and instead 
subcontracting foreigners siphons the money away from local communities, leading at the 
same time to inferior results (substandard materials etc.). Same thing happens with „expert‟ 
salaries. (NAG 2006) 
 
                                                 
38
 The nature of NGOs as a new source of power is evident in the route opened by the appointment of 
Zainab Bangura, the former head of NGO Campaign for Good Governance, to the post of Foreign 
Minister in the President Koroma‟s government in 2007 (see BBC 2007b). The association of NGOs 
with power invokes its ambivalent connotations in the Sierra Leone society: on the one hand, NGOs 
provide an alternative route (compared to the traditional neopatrimonial party-politics) to real power 
(manifest in the access to resources and control over the channels of redistribution); but on the other, 
this may subordinate NGOs to the wider patterns of power dynamics and thus make them not all that 
different from other forms of political association in Sierra Leone. 
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At the same time, the principles of operation introduced by international NGOs also 
elicit positive responses. Demonstrating impressive achievements without resorting 
to „corruption or impunity‟ (Caritas Makeni 2006) „has changed people‟s 
expectations‟ of the government: „people have become more conscious of their 
needs and rights, and politicians are also beginning to understand that‟ (UN 2006). 
But outstripping the government in the provision of vital services also has a 
downside, given that the presence of INGOs is temporary, and once they leave, the 
government simply cannot keep up with the set standards and expectations 
(Thompson 2006; see also ICG 2004). In this regard, raising the capacity of the 
government to provide services to the population would be a better investment 
(Thompson 2006) – albeit this would run the noted risk of artificially inflating the 
government‟s internal legitimacy. 
A local/local culture clash? 
The awareness of challenges specific to Sierra Leone (at large, or its particular 
areas) also contributes to a separate agency of Sierra Leonean NGOs in their 
dealings with „local‟ beneficiaries, which may invite interesting considerations of 
what a meeting between the „local‟ and the „local liberal‟ entails for Sierra Leone‟s 
cultural dynamics. Evidence of a „culture clash‟ is detectable in the lack of 
immediate response among the people that local NGO activists tried to „sensitise‟ to 
particular issues:  
 
Peacebuilding is not easy in Sierra Leone, as it is difficult to get people together. (FAWE SL 
2006a) 
 
As regards local reception of awareness-raising and sensitisation campaigns, initially the 
response was zero. People just weren‟t interested. (NAG 2006) 
 
Although explanations offered for this was that people were somewhat inert on 
account of being „fed up with the “system” and considered it all a waste of time,‟ or 
were conditioned by the „history of marginalisation and “muteness” vis-à-vis the 
central power‟ (NAG 2006), ethnographic studies of Sierra Leone refer to 
community self-reliance as a pervasive cultural feature (see Shaw 2005) (which was 
perhaps indeed assisted by the decades of political practice (cf. Fanthorpe 1998)). 
One can also attribute the lack of initial response to the alien terms in which the 
NGO‟s agendas were phrased: while this was not explicitly stated by the 
interviewees, the suspicion is corroborated by the recognition that activities of local 
NGOs had to be extensively adapted to local preferences and conditions. Thus, one 
local NGO representative described how they had „studied the local ways of 
operating and built on that‟ in their encouragement of female rural entrepreneurs 
(GGEM 2006). Communal reconciliation practitioners also made use of established 
dispute resolution techniques: 
 
Some NGOs implemented local traditions of peacemaking, especially in the provinces, as 
that‟s where most of the war took place. Traditional methods vary from one locality to 
another. E.g. the Mende use cleansing ceremonies that involve a native doctor, washing, 
prayers, incantations, open confession and forgiveness (embrace) by all symbolic 
connections of the person (family, former friends). Other traditional approaches involve a 
court hearing where one‟s crimes are highlighted and one asks forgiveness which the chief 
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grants. Some NGOs found out about these „indigenous‟ ways of reconciliation and used 
them ... You used to hear about them on the radio. (FAWE SL 2006b) 
 
Interestingly, the reliance of local NGOs on established socio-cultural methods of 
reconciliation need not imply advanced cultural awareness; in the conditions of 
competitiveness and resource scarcity of the donor market-place, for local actors 
such „local knowledge‟ fulfils a niche of „know-how‟ that does not cost oneself 
almost anything but becomes a resource in the eyes of the Western funders who are 
happy to add support to context-sensitive home-grown solutions to their donor 
credentials. The way things were done, before exposure to the globalised 
peacebuilding environment (and before the war), seem not to have been perceived as 
particular „methods;‟ but suddenly became such once they were understood as 
deliberate and, to some extent, arbitrary. Default and unquestioned (and 
unarticulated) „ways of operating‟ (de Certeau 1984), once illuminated from 
„another‟s‟ perspective (cf. Bakhtin 1975: 427) – be it war or peacebuilding – 
became the stuff of identity: something that could define „local‟ actors and 
initiatives. Still, becoming a recognised „method‟ did not bring about full 
articulation to the point where these techniques could be, for instance, systematically 
taught to the Westerns observers and peace activists, or even described in full; as 
stated by one interviewee with reference to reconciliation of families torn apart by 
the war, „[t]here were no what one might call particular techniques of doing it‟ 
(FAWE SL 2006b). Such unarticulated state of local „ways of operating‟ dovetails 
with Ferme‟s claims regarding the centrality of ambiguity in the way things are done 
(or not done) in Sierra Leone. 
The external view of the local 
While the perspective of local NGOs both endorses, and preserves a check on, the 
discourses and practices of liberal peace, the perspective of international 
peacebuilding agents is rarely distinguished by a matching critical awareness of 
local dynamics. Given that most liberal peacebuilding actors are only able to see on 
the ground what the language of liberal peace enables them to see, they are very 
restricted in the choice of peacebuilding partners in Sierra Leone. The purpose-
grown local NGO industry provides a natural local counterpart, but little else in the 
Sierra Leone society matches the habitual criteria of „civil society organisations.‟ As 
pointed out by Rosalind Shaw, 
 
for the international community, the local voice or the voice of civil society is increasingly 
assumed to mean that of local NGOs. However good the local NGOs are ... this presumption 
effectively marginalizes and excludes the majority who do not speak the international 
language of NGOs, human rights, and humanitarian assistance. (Shaw 2005; cf. Thompson 
2006) 
 
The majority of rural Sierra Leone falls into precisely this category, as discovered by 
people carrying out „local needs assessment‟ on behalf of the UN and other 
international bodies (UN 2006). Unable to identify „civil society organisations‟ that 
would match their expectations, the assessors welcomed any semblance of 
organisation in society: as noted by Richards et al. (2004; cf. UN 2006), self-
appointed un(der)representative „Village Development Committees‟ (VDCs) were 
the main point of contact for many internationals attempting to work in the rural 
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areas. The resulting picture of local needs was skewed according to the interests of 
the more powerful, exposing the unsatisfactory nature of the internationals‟ 
expectations modelled on the forms of civil society organisations elsewhere. As 
noted by an UNDP interviewee, it is difficult for outsiders generally to „read‟ power 
relations at the local level: people who appear equally poor may occupy very 
different positions in the local hierarchy, and the poorest often cannot afford the 
time or resources necessary for „participatory‟ governance preached by some strands 
of liberal peacebuilding (UNDP 2007). By way of recognising such challenges, 
many International NGOs increasingly opt for appointing local country directors to 
run their representations in Sierra Leone: „many have gone through having foreign 
ones who did not understand the context of the country thoroughly enough, and 
made mistakes as a result‟ (Thompson 2006). This also helps avoid the basic clash of 
„organisational cultures‟ between Sierra Leoneans, who „are perceived as very laid 
back,‟ and their more business-like international counterparts (ibid.).  
 
A valid point sometimes brought to bear on the eschatological tone of peacebuilding 
critique is that because of globalisation, the process of penetration of the „local‟ by 
the Western influences and norms, including the language of liberal peace, is 
underway whether peacebuilding officially takes place or not (Large 2007; cf. 
cultural „interpenetration‟ and „amalgamation‟ arguments in Chapters 2 and 3). As 
noted by a lecturer of the Fourah Bay College I spoke to, 
 
Many students complain that the intervention [by UNAMSIL and other peacebuilding 
actors] has eroded Sierra Leonean culture. But it seems that this would have been the case 
anyway since the people are eager to accept, for instance, American influences on their way 
of life. In addition, the war had had the same effect. (Thompson 2006) 
 
Learning to speak the „language‟ of peacebuilding is therefore comparable to the 
cultural „learning‟ characteristic of the colonial times, when „local‟ people learned 
how to interact with the representatives of colonial powers, assumed new public 
social roles and acquired related skills, in many cases still preserving their „old‟ 
cultural practices in the private sphere (Large 2007). Given the immense resilience 
of the local cultures (ibid.), we should not perhaps bemoan the penetration and 
„compromising‟ of the local by the globalised peacebuilding „speak‟ on the account 
of its detrimental impact on local cultures, since the process (as usual) is two-way: 
peacebuilding (as was pointed out earlier) is not immune to „subversion‟ by the local 
actors proficient in its language. However, the situation where local culture is 
banished into the private sphere does not strike one as an ideal solution, since a lack 
of its wider acceptance invites a „power contest‟ between governmentalities of the 
dominant regime of liberal peace, and local „resistances,‟ which are likely to be 
played out as a cultural struggle for recognition. Perhaps other modes of their co-
existence, freer from connotations of subordination and resistance, such as the 
development of „hybrid‟ forms of statehood and organisation of the public sphere (as 
described by Boege (2006) for Bougainville) are worth investigating. In addition, as 
Eriksen noted with respect to preservation of minority languages, „perhaps 
paradoxically, cultural minorities may have to assimilate culturally in important 
respects in order to present their case effectively and thereby retain their minority 
identity‟ (1992: 313). It appears that a similar trade-off is required for preservation 
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of the local culture(s) if the message is to be made understandable to the agents of 
liberal peace.  
Conflict regulation and reconciliation in (view of) Sierra Leone’s 
culture  
As discussed in Chapter 3, there are grounds to doubt the applicability of 
„ethnopraxes‟ (Avruch et al. 1991) to conflict resolution on a wider scale because of 
their inherent small-scale, „in-group‟ orientation (i.e. in many cases internal 
coherence is increased through opposition to a common „other‟ which should, in the 
designs of peacebuilders, comprise part of the wider cultural „self‟). However, two 
factors make this reservation less limiting for Sierra Leone. „Generalist‟ conflict 
cultures, according to Ross (1993, 1998), differentiate little between internal and 
external others, precisely because the internal divisions are so significant. Conflict 
resolution practices devised for addressing internal disputes in generalist conflict 
cultures (and given the strength of internal divides, most Sierra Leone ethnic groups 
would fall into this category (cf. Ferme 2001, Shaw 2002)), would, therefore, stand a 
much better chance in dealing with „external‟ others. Another factor has to do with 
the character of dispute resolution mechanisms and overall patterns of intra-
communal communication. Ferme notes that the „ambiguous practices and 
discourses‟ which guide the interpretational strategies employed by Sierra Leoneans 
have developed „in the absence of ideals of transparency in the exercise of political 
and social agency in “normal” times‟ (2001: 6, 7). The use of reconciliation 
techniques is not, for this reason, associated with any „privileged‟ sites or 
conditions; delimitation of a social and political „self‟ has always proceeded in the 
conditions of high heterogeneity that certainly characterises the post-war situation in 
Sierra Leone.  
 
Ambivalent possibilities of downplaying or highlighting otherness are coded into the 
very family structure, given its historic uses for accommodating the otherness of 
invaders through, for example, the taking of wives. Women in many parts of Sierra 
Leone still preserve the connotations of potential „enemy agents‟ owing to the 
„historical connection between women‟s mobility‟ and their mediation of the 
„outside‟ (Shaw 2002: 169, 194). The war often highlighted these connotations, as 
„many families saw their daughters as a source of torture during the war, since 
abducted girls were drugged and set against their own families and communities‟ 
(FAWE SL 2006a).
39
 The ambivalence in the perception of women also extends to 
one of their traditional roles as peace-makers. While cross-dressing traditionally 
marked the end of staged „warfare‟ of Wunde/Poro initiations, where the procession 
of initiates was led by men cross-dressed as women in elaborate head attires, known 
as „kamakↄwↄesia (lit., extraordinary, marvellous eagles)‟, in the function of 
„peacemakers,‟ Ferme notes that  
 
                                                 
39
 While this is also true of abducted boys (cf. Humphreys and Weinstein 2004: 39-40), they feature 
more prominently in many moving stories of family re-unions and forgiveness I heard in Sierra 
Leone (e.g. Caritas Makeni 2006). For families of abducted girls, it seemed particularly hard to 
accept back daughters with children born during the war and conceived in (often) forced relationships 
with their abductors (FAWE SL 2006b).  
186 
 
During a 1985 Wunde initiation in Taiama, kamakↄwↄesia were also referred to as spies, 
who unnoticed like birds in the sky – or apparently harmless women – supply the 
intelligence crucial to warfare. (Ferme 1998: 560). 
 
These connotations of treachery and danger are also highlighted by the practice of 
cross-dressing to which fighters of most factions occasionally resorted during the 
war (Ferme 1998, cf. Ellis 1999). The inherent links of family structure with the 
system of domestic slavery (which persisted for many decades even after slavery 
was officially abolished) and patterns of dependency reflect the „history of violence 
… embedded in the very language of intimacy and domestic relations‟ (Ferme 2001: 
18). Thus, mediation of relations of otherness, and intimate vicinity of the 
„unknown,‟ are coded into the very constitution of „selves‟ in Sierra Leone, so that 
„secrecy and suspicion‟ form an inalienable part „of everyday Sierra Leonean life‟ 
(Jackson 2004: 192; Shaw 2000). 
 
With this in mind, Sierra Leone‟s established practices of conflict resolution and 
reconciliation are not necessarily ill-adapted to the post-civil war conditions, and 
have been used in Sierra Leone to great effect (FAWE SL 2006a, 2006b; Caritas 
Makeni 2006; see also Honwana (2005) on adaptation of existing rituals and 
cleansing ceremonies to the needs of reconciliation in Angola and Mozambique). 
Whether they prove effective for building large-scale social cohesion is more 
doubtful, given that their application nonetheless leaves in place many ambiguities 
and ambivalences that can, on occasions, (re-)fuel conflict (cf. Ferme 1998: 559-70). 
The resort to deliberate „tactics of ambiguity and deferral,‟ in place of clear 
assigning of blame, is a device traditionally employed in resolution of local disputes 
in rural Sierra Leone (ibid.: 573). The inconclusiveness of such resolutions, 
sometimes resulting „in the indefinite adjournment of hearings,‟ implies that 
„[f]uture disputes between the same parties might then bring back to light these 
previous offenses‟ (ibid.). What unites the local court setting and the domain of 
Sierra Leonean politics, in this respect, is that „the accumulation of past, everyday 
wrongs – and their re-presentation in other contexts – ... [can trigger] the danger of 
renewed disputes and violence‟ (ibid.). The constitutive relationship between the 
„hermeneutics of suspicion – valuing a whole range of cultural skills aimed at 
producing and interpreting deferred meanings,‟ and the violent history in which it 
took shape (Ferme 2001: 7; cf. Shaw 2000), works both ways: solutions reached in 
the context of such deferred interpretation can be reversible, or subject to later re-
interpretations, especially since „[t]he potential for conflict already exists in Mende 
ideas about truth as a site for contestation and public debate, in which rhetorical 
skills are critical‟ (Ferme 2001: 7). This is premised on the inherent polysemy of 
cultural codes, whose „open character makes them fundamentally appropriable for a 
variety of purposes,‟ in relating the symbols of the past to the current public events 
in Sierra Leone (Ferme 1999: 161). 
 
The importance of rhetorical performance for the prevailing of one or another 
version of „truth‟ is echoed in anthropologies of other Sierra Leone peoples, e.g. 
Temne (Shaw 2002) or Kuranko (Jackson 2004). This links with the above 
discussion of non-finality of social forgetting of violence despite the widespread 
currency of the meanings of forgiveness and reconciliation among Sierra Leoneans 
(see above). Social performances may help „rewrite‟ the terms of social relations, 
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„dramatizing‟ them as they „should ideally obtain‟ (Jackson 2004: 137), but the 
hermeneutics of concealment renders the underlying reality ultimately „unknowable‟ 
(cf. Ferme 2001; Jackson 2004). Echoing this, observers note the importance of 
rituals for reconciliation over the „discursive‟ narration in SL TRC, which on many 
occasions has very tenuous connections with the truth (Kelsall 2005; cf. Shaw 2005; 
Caritas Makeni 2006; Fetherston and Nordstrom 1995). This is hardly surprising in 
the cultural economy of patrimonialism, in which the superiors‟ authority resides in 
their prerogative of knowing „more about those in a junior position than the latter 
know about them‟ (Shaw 2002: 171).40 In this respect, even women‟s visiting of 
diviners of their own (rather than their men‟s) choice is a form of counter-power 
practice (Shaw 2002). Consequently, the power that the knowledge of one‟s secrets 
bestows on others (ibid.: 171; cf. Ferme 2001) makes truth-telling – the standard 
method of truth and reconciliation commissions – untenable in Sierra Leone‟s 
cultural context (Shaw 2005; cf. Keslall 2005).  
 
The acknowledgement of this performative orientation of Sierra Leonean culture 
adds an important dimension to the understanding of patrimonialism as a 
significational field. Hoffman (2007) notes that titles adopted by fighters on all 
sides, such as „commanders,‟ „adjutants,‟ or „generals,‟ never reflected any strict 
military hierarchy, but rather referred to the practice of apportioning „rewards‟ for 
successful performance, e.g., procuring ammunition or other essential military 
supplies, which served to demonstrate the fighters‟ inclusion in patrimonial 
networks and simultaneously improved their connectedness. On other occasions, 
such titles were adopted as an „advance,‟ allowing their bearers to capitalise on their 
patrimonial connotations and build up patronage networks of their own (ibid.). 
Hoffmans‟ examples of role-playing premised on, and reinforcing, patrimonial 
social relations pinpoint the orientation of signification to the (transient and 
practical) social plane and not the „higher‟ level of abstract Platonic „ideas,‟ which 
were for a long time presumed – and still appear to be, despite Derrida‟s critique of 
logocentrism (1976, 1978) – to govern meaning-generation in Western European 
philosophy (cf. Jackson 2004).
41
 Contrary to the rhetoric of the „crisis‟ of 
patrimonialism (Richards 1996), it can be shown that the war, far from undermining 
patrimonialism as the default significational matrix, served to reinforce its specific 
mode of meaning-generation, with its reliance on role-playing, performance, and 
rhetoric. What has been presented, in the bulk of policy and scholarly literature, as 
violent excesses of the wartime, with conspicuous destruction and sheer „undoing‟ 
of life (e.g. Bøås 2001; Gberie 2005; HRW 2003), can equally be traced to pre-war 
interpretational schemes – the idioms of consumption, and association of 
performance failures with both social and physical weakness and destruction (Ferme 
1998). On the background of such continuities, the rhetorical force of designating 
certain periods as „war‟ or „peace‟ (with the concomitant introduction of ruptures 
into this underlying continuity) becomes especially notable. 
 
                                                 
40
 Jackson (2005: 67) notes the association of knowledge with wealth, which for Sierra Leone 
completes the cycle of association of power with knowledge and of wealth (-in-people) with power 
(status). 
41
 On the succession of patterns of signification characterising European culture, see Foucault 
(2002b). 
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The differences between the interpretational regime of patrimonialism, and that 
underlying the default approach of liberal peacebuilding (as well as a significant 
share of Western academia), point to a certain „culture clash‟ evident in our 
conventional dismissal of patrimonial politics as corrupt, with its reliance on 
personalised ties as vastly inferior, on the grounds of both mores and efficiency, to 
the impersonal and transparent bureaucratic institutions of Western political culture. 
The obvious ethical failings of a regime implicated in the violence of the 11-year 
long war (as well as structural, and on occasions overt, violence of the preceding and 
following years), are reinforced by the „objectionable‟ qualities of its interpretational 
economy, evident in what appears, to an outsider, as a shallow „tokenness‟ of roles, 
titles, and commitments, whose „soundness‟ is premised not on their correlation with 
an immutable realm of higher truth, but on their momentary relevance on the social 
plane and embeddedness in the current social situation. However, the very „matter-
of-factness‟ of such ready judgements points to their origin in a Western culture as 
„common sense‟ (cf. Geertz 1973, Chabal and Daloz 2006), which can be taken as 
an invitation to question the cultural groundings of the default approach of 
peacebuilding and most conflict analysis, which sees itself as being outside, or 
„above,‟ culture (Richmond 2009b). The array of accepted remedies for the conflict 
– liberal reforms, disarmament, national reconciliation, etc. – also belie the 
understanding of conflict as an arbitrary „add-on‟ to the otherwise peaceful „norm‟ 
of social and political relations, which can just as arbitrarily be „removed‟ from the 
equation – and not something embedded in these relations and playing a role in their 
reproduction. The approach of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, according to 
Hoffman, exemplifies precisely such an understanding of the military dimension of 
the conflict: by presenting the CDF and other armed factions as organisations 
possessing a clear chain of command, peace-making is equated with disarmament 
and „beheading‟ of the military hierarchy – a task much more feasible and graspable 
in the terms of a cause-and-effect rationality, compared to any course of action that 
might be commended by recognising the problem, instead, as one of militarisation of 
the existing patrimonial social networks, with potential implications for conflict in a 
wider African context (Hoffman 2007). At the same time, the regulatory potential of 
patrimonialism for conflict is hugely underestimated. Fanthorpe, for one, notes that 
the success of rulers in this part of Africa was measured by „their skill in diplomacy 
and jurisprudence as well as in warfare‟ (1998) – a notion which resonates with 
Ferme‟s observations regarding the entwinement of public and private spheres, with 
their corresponding techniques of public performance and tactful concealment, in 
negotiation of disputes (1998, 1999). 
Conclusions 
Although this chapter, in accord with the language used here for cultural analysis, 
attempted to „make sense‟ of the war in Sierra Leone, the ambition has been less one 
of explaining – or „reasoning‟ – the war (cf. Nordstrom 1995) than of exploring how 
violence and violent experiences got inscribed in, and conveyed through, the cultural 
repertoire of meanings and strategies of meaning-generation in Sierra Leonean 
culture and its encounter with the Western peacebuilding and academic discourses. 
The argument advanced was that „peace‟ or „war‟ are by no means self-explanatory 
categories, but cultural templates totalised through putting in place and maintaining 
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certain interpretational schemes. Nonetheless, they are not mutually exclusive states 
(or types of activity affixed to separate agency), since the interpretational patterns 
characterising either template are grounded in wider significational fields, which in 
Sierra Leone‟s case could be referred to as patrimonialism. Embeddedness of the 
meanings of war, as well as those put forth by internal and external agents of peace, 
in the patrimonial interpretational economy colours the encounters between „local 
culture,‟ as perceived from a variety of perspectives, and the „liberal peace.‟ Local 
meanings of many concepts advanced by the liberal peace, such as „democracy‟ or 
„development,‟ also appear to make aspects of the liberal peace part and parcel of 
the local socio-political dynamics – an effect that has been magnified by the 
exposure of Sierra Leone to the international presence since the late 1990s. As a 
result, the question of local „preference‟ for the liberal peace vs. something else 
appears superseded by the need to negotiate different terms of interaction and 
mutual recognition between the liberal peace and local culture(s). A better 
understanding of the deep-seated cultural framing of liberal peace in the patrimonial 
interpretational economy will also shed light on the durability of the perceived „root 
causes‟ of the Sierra Leonean conflict, redirecting the current preoccupation with the 
token criteria of liberal governance towards reframing the developmental objectives 
of peacebuilding not as „preconditions‟ for peace, but in terms which would not 
make the achievement of peace contingent upon overcoming the pervasive features 
of (neo-)patrimonial polity and culture. 
 
As evident from the presented discussion of patrimonial significational structures 
underlying very different social and political strategies of actors as diverse as the 
RUF, NRPC, as well as pre- and post-war governments in Sierra Leone, a shared 
cultural repertoire or even the use of similar rhetorical „scripts‟ do not guarantee 
identical „output.‟ Yet it is this output which is at stake in the post-war political 
transformation in Sierra Leone. In accord with a conception of culture developed in 
this study, a degree of change in how things are done – whether in politics, or 
society at large – can be „orchestrated‟ without making people part with the 
established cultural assumptions and principles that bolster current practices. 
However, this also needs to be done with consideration for how such changes might 
be articulated, for it is in the rhetorical articulation and redrawing of cultural 
boundaries (external and internal) that changes get noted, axiologically evaluated, 
and where their status in the society gets „fixed.‟ The recognition of the power of 
rhetoric, in turn, presupposes attention to both the local conglomerates of actors 
(something to which peacebuilders‟ „manuals‟ are becoming increasingly attuned to) 
and the local expressions of power and power relations – the attributes and 
connotations of power (something which rarely enters the awareness of 
peacebuilding practitioners and even researchers). Scrutinising the practices and 
patterns of distribution of power in the local context can offer useful clues as to how 
the effects of peace interventions are likely to be received by the local societies and 
which alternative patterns of societal organisation are likelier to take root – although 
the potentially variable character of local conditions may require serious 
ethnographic work. (While „local‟ does not necessarily have to imply analysis at the 
smallest possible scale, identifying what, in each case, represents „the socially most 
significant context‟ (Chabal and Daloz 2006: 124) requires substantial „local 
knowledge.‟) And while the evidence of cultural variation on both synchronic and 
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diachronic scale, as well as in terms of activation of latent cultural registers, points 
to unhelpfulness of the notion of cultural determinism, the scope for cultural change 
at any given moment remains a tricky variable.  
 
The difficulty of a cultural study of „peace‟ stems from its largely unarticulated 
state. It presents the observers with no easily graspable „whole‟ – just multiple and 
varied tasks of managing the diverse aspects of everyday life on different levels, 
from family to the state. The anomaly of peacebuilding consists in that it tries to 
replicate and recreate the conditions of normalcy in a way that relies on articulating, 
isolating a set of practices that support „peace.‟ „War‟ also turns peace into a marked 
state; the increased visibility of cultural practices in the face of conflict (e.g. 
Nordstrom 1994; Duffield 2001) may be an effect of articulation of the taken-for-
granted ways of operating in changed conditions which expose these practices as a 
deliberate and, in a sense, arbitrary means to an end. Reconciliation, as it is practiced 
in Sierra Leone, heralds a return to normalcy (rather than catharsis encoded in the 
TRC message of „blowing minds‟ (Shaw 2005)), downplaying the exposure of peace 
as a marked state and de-articulating it, in order to enable people‟s return to their 
everyday pursuits. In this regard, the rhetorical association of peace with the 
concepts introduced by liberal peacebuilding (such as good governance, 
accountability, transparency, development etc.) truly takes peace out of the hands of 
Sierra Leoneans, questioning their achievement of „putting the war behind them‟ and 
„postponing‟ the arrival of „true‟ peace until the fulfilment of these – often nebulous, 
in the context of local vocabularies – perks of liberal democratic governance. While 
many local people share the fascination with opportunities brought by the 
international aid and development (cf. Kapoor 2008: 15; Storey 2000: 42), I would 
argue that these should not be discursively linked with „peace‟ and „reconciliation,‟ 
which have better chances of stabilising the template of peace if left to the care of 
local cultural dynamics. This way, the issues of democratisation and development 
can be presented as political options and not matters of sustaining the „bare life‟ of 
subject populations, which strips away their political agency (cf. Agamben 1998; 
Duffield 2007). Without the pressure of the „interpretational authority‟ of the agents 
of liberal peace, local understandings of purportedly universal concepts (such as 
democracy) will have a greater chance to develop. While this does not guard against 
error (e.g. „mis-interpretation‟ of ideas such as „the rule of law‟), neither does 
mechanistic implementation of liberal governance designs presented as „the last 
word.‟ The acknowledgement of the manifold problems besetting established 
democracies and liberal economies could bring mutual benefits through open, even-
handed debate and dialogue.  
 
191 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 
„… ninety-nine out of a hundred ideas they come up with are totally 
useless.‟ 
„Why doesn‟t anyone lock them away safely, then? They don‟t 
sound much use to me,‟ said Brutha. 
„Because the hundredth idea,‟ said Om, „is generally a humdinger.‟ 
„What?‟ 
„Look up at the highest tower on the rock.‟ 
Brutha looked up. At the top of the tower, secured by metal bands, 
was a big disk that glittered in the morning light. 
„What is it?‟ he whispered. 
„The reason why Omnia hasn‟t got much of a fleet any more,‟ said 
Om. „That‟s why it‟s always worth having a few philosophers around the 
place. One moment it‟s all Is Truth Beauty and Is Beauty Truth, and Does a 
Falling Tree in the Forest Make a Sound if There‟s No one There to Hear It, 
and then just when you think they‟re going to start dribbling one of „em 
says, Incidentally, putting a thirty-foot parabolic reflector on a high place to 
shoot the rays of the sun at an enemy‟s ships would be a very interesting 
demonstration of optical principles,‟ he added.  
 
– Terry Pratchett, Small Gods 
 
 
 
In this thesis, I have explored the perceived gap in the dominant approach to 
peacebuilding with respect to the issue of culture, probing the reasons behind it and 
investigating the possibilities and implications of reintroducing a cultural dimension 
to conflict analysis and peacebuilding. Engaging with the issue of culture has lead 
me to realise its challenging nature not only for the approaches to conflict and 
peacebuilding (in theory and practice), but also for the wider academic practice and 
methodology, particularly with respect to the problematic of knowledge situated and 
embedded within the very parameters under investigation. Reintroducing „culture‟ to 
the policies and practices of liberal peacebuilding became, accordingly, less a matter 
of straightforward discussion of policy reform and more an exercise in repositioning 
the issues of conflict and peacebuilding within the cultural problematic of meaning-
production and generation of knowledge – cultural „world-making‟ which, through 
„ordering‟ our perception of the world, creates particular senses of reality (Bauman 
1999; d‟Andrade 1984) and „common sense‟ (Geertz 1983) within which human 
agents operate and upon which they act, thus modifying and re-producing their 
culture(s). In this sense, culture provides a broader context within which the issues 
of violent conflict and peace are framed, although their cultural constitution is often 
bracketed out precisely because of its „commonsense‟ nature. It does, however, 
become more apparent in situations of encounter between different cultural 
conceptions of conflict and peace, as well as on the interfaces between the cultural 
registers of „peace‟ and „war‟ and corresponding sets of cultural norms and 
practices. 
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This concluding chapter revisits some of the more pertinent issues which arose from 
conducting an embedded cultural enquiry into liberal peacebuilding and its 
relationship with its „local‟ recipients. Rather than repeating the arguments 
developed and conclusions reached in the previous chapters at great length, 
however, the idea for the concluding chapter is to relate the findings back to the 
overall context of this study, and explore its possible wider theoretical and practical 
implications. The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections, broadly 
following the subject-matters of the three substantive chapters of the thesis (3, 4, and 
5). 
The theoretical approach of embedded cultural enquiry 
Approached from the perspective of meaning-generation, culture emerges as a 
framework of meaningfulness operating simultaneously at a variety of levels and 
scales. Making culture itself a subject of an informed reflection on the meanings to 
which it gives rise and their world-making effects removes any possibility of a 
stable „hierarchy‟ of conceptual relations in cultural analysis. Instead, it exposes 
culture itself as partaking in all the instabilities of meaning-generation for which it 
serves as a framework, including the tenet of arbitrary (and ultimately 
„disavowable‟) connections between „culture‟ as a signifier and its signified of 
complex processes of meaning-generation. One potential corollary of this for culture 
– quite in line with the general principles of significational dynamics explored in 
this work – is the hollowing out of its conceptual depth, which, as Chapter 2 has 
shown, is often noticeable in academic and policy treatments of culture. Another 
corollary is that culture is never fully available for analysis or reflection, since some 
of its significational mechanisms remain engaged in enabling their very possibility. 
As a result, the separation into the „object‟ and „instruments‟ of analysis is never 
quite superseded despite the awareness of cultural embeddedness of research and the 
researcher: it merely becomes less stable and more openly arbitrary, embracing its 
inconclusiveness instead of bracketing it out, as is the wont in the bulk of social 
research. The impossibility of superseding this fundamental methodological divide 
could, perhaps, explain the relatively conventional design of this study, despite its 
deeply anarchical methodological premises. It also strikingly reaffirms Lotman‟s 
idea regarding the reliance of meaning-generation on irreducible duality (as a 
minimum) of the media or principles of organisation – the mechanism explored 
above in connection with the trope (see Chapter 3; Lotman 1990: 36-37) that also 
bears on the organisation of cultural totalities of meaningfulness from within which 
we approach their elements. Embedded cultural enquiry, therefore, reflects in its 
methodology the proximity of culture to its (potentially de-constitutive) „other,‟ 
which allows it creatively to exploit the irreconcilable methodological differences 
implicated in the need for „certain knowledge‟ without, however, achieving this 
certainty itself. 
 
The conceptual „anarchy‟ unleashed by approaching culture from the perspective of 
meaning-generation also serves to explain why invoking „culture‟ becomes a ready 
subject to interpretational battles, uncertainties and multiple possibilities of 
delimitation, and why any institutionalised references to „culture‟ – as would, for 
example, be the case if it were to become a habitual term of peacebuilding discourse 
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– engage in the production of „culture‟ as a particular, fixed set of meanings and 
practices. Although a serious engagement with culture reveals it as a concept whose 
ultimate value lies in its openness to indeterminacy and awareness of power 
implications of any form of „totalisation‟ involved in the stabilisation of meanings, 
the concept carries no guarantee of resisting the tendency towards totalisation of its 
own meaning or referents. In this sense, culture remains a double-edged analytical 
(and political) tool, especially since the insight it provides into the power practices 
involved in the production of meanings can too readily provide an apology for 
(ab)using its mechanisms in political practice.  
 
Yet, conceptualisation of culture as meaning-generation offers more than analytical 
and ethical pitfalls: one of its advantages consists in uncovering the links between 
the processes and phenomena that are not traditionally considered as connected – by 
virtue of their shared constitution through the processes of cultural meaning-making. 
Ironically, one manifestation of such commonality consists precisely in the effects of 
cultural mechanisms of bordering and delimitation responsible for the very 
possibility of isolating phenomena as distinct and separate. In this sense, „culture‟ 
provides a conceptual and analytical tool that can be adjusted both to the scale and 
nature of the investigated phenomena, whether they concern the problematic of 
identity and difference, organisation of the social and political, clashes and 
reconciliation of views and interests, power practices and resistance, the means and 
forms of waging conflict and visions and understandings of peace, and so on. And 
although certain key elements in the functioning of cultural meaning-generation 
could be considered, to use Lotman‟s term, „invariant‟ (e.g. 1990), the multiplicity 
of ways in which these are realised and negotiated quickly dissipates their 
„formulaic‟ potential, pointing, instead to the need for an informed contextual study 
to yield cultural „data.‟ Contrary to the usual ambition of limiting and structuring the 
relevant field of enquiry, the theoretical vocabulary of embedded cultural enquiry 
aims at creating openings for an unscripted, inductive engagement with the 
empirical material. Hence the different ways of conceptual framing of the analysis of 
culture of liberal peacebuilding attempted in Chapter 4, and its interaction with the 
„local‟ culture in the case of conflict and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone (Chapter 5). 
The liberal peace – and beyond? 
The discussed implications of considering culture from the perspective of meaning-
generation profoundly affect the prospects of reintroducing the cultural problematic 
to the peacebuilding agenda. The difficulties are especially apparent in view of the 
dominant „culture‟ of liberal peacebuilding, which effectively blinds it to the 
possibility of any conceptualisations of conflict and peace other than its own, and to 
any form of inclusion of culture other than what fits within its narrow parameters. In 
addition to the world-making effects of the culture of liberal peacebuilding which 
„others‟ the very possibility of difference (thus incidentally depriving itself of the 
tools necessary for discerning it), the incompatibility that precludes its fruitful 
engagement with the cultural problematic can be cast in epistemological terms. 
Since a deep and informed engagement with culture involves a realisation of one‟s 
embedded position with regard to the issues under scrutiny and leads to the 
questioning of the terms of production of knowledge, it appears to sit more 
comfortably within the camp of critical and post-structural theory, and presents 
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certain challenges for the rationalist paradigm of knowledge and action 
underpinning liberal peacebuilding. These challenges are exacerbated by the 
tendency of liberal peacebuilding to totalise rationality into a mythological certainty, 
which obscures its fundamentally limited character and marginalises other kinds of 
knowledge. In this respect, the noted epistemological preferences of the liberal peace 
are part and parcel of its culture, as they play a defining role in its „monological‟ 
significational dynamics. The stability of the monologue of the liberal peace relies 
on a number of tropological conflations (such as the merging of peace and war and 
the unequivocal association of liberal peacebuilding with „peace‟ whatever the 
means of achieving it), but it is premised, first and foremost, on the inadmissibility 
of a different subject position, which would expose the partiality and situatedness of 
the liberal approach to peacebuilding. The monological culture of the liberal peace 
relies, in other words, on the impossibility of viewing itself as a culture, which, in 
turn, makes culture unavailable for it interpretational lens. 
 
The sentiment behind advocating a culture-sensitive peacebuilding appears to be the 
appreciation of the intrinsic value and human relevance of the cultures which liberal 
peacebuilding encounters on its way. The issue of cultural change occurring as a 
result of such encounters gives rise to ethical controversies of imposing one‟s 
culture on others, or inadvertently destroying unfamiliar cultural values. This issue 
is linked to the problem of power to effect such change (however conscientiously), 
so that the very possession and exercise of such power can be seen as inherently 
problematic and, ultimately, ethically unsupportable. Curiously, recognising the 
liberal peace as a culture also draws it into the ambit of this critical argument, and 
exposes power as a crucial factor in cultural change once the question is posed as 
one of a choice between changing the culture of liberal peacebuilding – or 
contending with the change that its operation inevitably effects in local cultures, 
which would preserve the cultural integrity of liberal peacebuilding in its current, 
monological form. Ironically, the controversy hinges on the refusal of the liberal 
peace to view itself as a cultural perspective, and unravels once such recognition has 
taken place – since the change necessary for conceding the perspective of militant 
cultural universalism will thereby have happened. Meanwhile, the need and 
pathways for such change may be advocated away from the recognisably cultural 
terms – as attempted below. 
 
As noted in Chapter 4, the monological stability of the liberal peace is not entirely 
immune to possibilities of dialogical „unclosure‟ with a view to alternative 
conceptions of peace and different terms of inclusion of culture. One of the most 
vulnerable links in the chain of its monological self-perpetuation is the reliance of 
liberal peacebuilding on a problem-solving ethos (often in defiance of evidence 
which exposes it as an unfruitful tool for resolving what liberal peacebuilding itself 
identifies as problems). Demonstrating that a „problem-solving‟ approach is 
problematic even within the confines of liberal peace‟s own take on rationality 
could, perhaps, lead to exposure of the extent to which this rationality is sustained 
ideologically and mythologically, rather than „rationally,‟ given the scope of 
dynamics which cannot be subordinated to its dictate. Additional impetus for a 
revision of its problem-solving premises can be sought in the recognition of „crisis‟ 
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of liberalism which permeates current academic (Millennium 2009 conference)
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and policy language (Chandler 2009). Admitting the circumscribed nature of 
rationality could take liberal peacebuilding towards the acknowledgement of other 
forms of knowledge, thus preparing the ground for a similar unclosure with regard to 
liberal peacebuilding‟s subject position and the admission of other actors and 
perspectives. Recognising the possibility of subject positions outside its monological 
totality would re-equip the liberal peace with instruments for the appreciation of 
difference – both the constitutive difference of its identity and that „wholly other‟ 
which very rarely enjoys recognition in „digestive‟ hegemonic discourses (cf. 
Critchley 1992). This, in turn, would create an opening for other kinds of knowledge 
unshackled by the problem-solving rationality, and alternative methods, such as 
serious contextual research into, among other things, the culture of liberal 
peacebuilding itself.  
 
For the liberal peace, the ultimate benefit of an open engagement with cultural 
problematic would consist in re-discovering itself as a limited, circumscribed 
political project. Admission of a certain set of interests behind it, of a particular 
cultural grounding of its values, and the specific historical origin of its policies 
would have a double effect of limiting its reach (thus exposing the existence of vast 
uncharted – from its current monological perspective – terrains beyond) and 
focusing that which is specific – and special – about the liberal conception of peace, 
re-energising the qualities currently submerged in its monologue, such as the 
„aspirational‟ nature of the liberal sentiment (cf. Chandler 2009; Appadurai 2004). 
De-ideologisation of the liberal peace along these lines would entail a possibility of 
re-introducing the discussion topics currently ruled out by its ideological stance (cf. 
Wuthnow et al. 1984: 226). Repositioning the liberal peacebuilding project as 
something driven by a culturally-specific sense of the politically „appropriate‟ would 
enable to place its underlying interests in the spotlight of any dialogue with its 
professed beneficiaries rather than bracketing them out. In view of the inevitability 
of irreconcilable paradoxes within any culture (stemming from the duality of the 
principles of organisation underlying the very possibility of meaning (Lotman 
1990)), the discovery of inconsistencies within the culture of liberal peacebuilding 
does not imply its automatic unravelling. Rather, it would place these paradoxical 
moments into the spotlight of reflection, allowing the practitioners and supporters of 
the liberal peace to reaffirm the fundamentals of its culture in full awareness of their 
arbitrariness. This, I believe, could lead the liberal peace towards the appreciation 
of, and respect for, the ultimately indefensible foundations of other cultures – 
recalling Connolly‟s idea of „deep respect‟ based on the acknowledgement of „the 
dignity of those who embrace different sources of respect‟ (1991: xxvi). 
 
At the present moment, a dialogical unclosure of liberal peacebuilding remains 
largely hypothetical, especially because the reality-making effects of its cultural 
constitution are not widely recognised even by its critics. Ultimately, the recognition 
of the monological nature of the culture of liberal peacebuilding offers a key to 
understanding the extremely limited impact which the appeals for greater openness 
of the liberal peace paradigm, or its critique on „principled‟ grounds, have been able 
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to achieve. For liberal peacebuilding, lacking the depth necessary to gauge the extent 
of difference has served as a device for subjugating dissidence by way of 
incorporating those elements superficially compatible with the liberal peace into its 
framework, while remaining oblivious to others. According to this logic, for the 
critique of liberal peacebuilding to have effect, it needs to be „legible‟ and 
„digestible‟ within the terms of its monological culture, so as to gain an opportunity 
to unsettle its mythological stability from within, by opening up the currently latent 
cultural horizons that are less dependent on a monological self-description. Still, the 
extent of internal difference which a monological culture can ignore remains a 
powerful unknown, especially in view of the ease with which the recommendations 
that in their essence should profoundly shake the current peacebuilding practice can 
be hollowed out and superficially employed in its service. There seem to be endless 
possibilities in which talking „at‟ or „against‟ the liberal peace can be turned into 
talking „with‟ and „for‟ it.  
   
Devising such devious clouts for the critique is further complicated by the task of 
finding the appropriate targets for its application in a liberal peacebuilding 
enterprise, carried on by many and yet perceptibly guided by no one. Here, once 
again, the obliviousness of the liberal peace towards difference can serve as both an 
aid and a hindrance. Numerous peacebuilding actors whose difference from the 
liberal peace is obscured by their apparently uniform subscription to the arguably 
incontrovertible principles of „good governance,‟ „development,‟ „human rights‟ and 
so on (cf. Kapoor 2008: 15; Storey 2000: 42), could perhaps be encouraged to 
exploit that difference, by emphasising, for example, the extent of their 
disagreement regarding the means of achieving those shared ends. Even if they are 
still perceived as vehicles of the liberal „meta-peace‟ (MacGinty 2008), returning 
debate and disagreement to the core of the liberal peace would be a definite step 
towards its dialogical unclosure. The agency of the internal „others‟ of liberal peace 
is crucial in that they have a potential to combine greater receptiveness towards 
critique with the opportunities to pursue alternative forms of peacebuilding in 
practice (cf. Large 2007). On occasions, this involves exploring „hybrid‟ governance 
solutions in areas with strong local governance traditions – however „undemocratic‟ 
or „illiberal‟ (e.g. Boege 2006; Boege et al. 2008). On others, this may take the form 
of investing in people to increase their ability to cope with the aftermath of conflicts 
while bypassing any institutional setups (e.g. MacGinty 2007; cf. Jackson 2004: 37, 
41). However, while any association with liberal peace is viewed as potentially 
susceptible to conflation with its „monologue,‟ there are also means of achieving the 
objectives of peace and development away from this association, as illustrated by 
Appadurai‟s (2004) example of Slum/Shackdwellers International.  
Peacebuilding and the ‘local’ 
The frequent failures of critique to fit within the cultural horizons of the liberal 
peace are of course replicated in the interaction of liberal peacebuilding with its 
recipients, where the possibility of capitalising upon the latent cultural possibilities 
could be crucial for the success of peacebuilding. Instead, the preconceived terms of 
enquiry into the reasons for violent conflict direct liberal peacebuilding down the 
avenues reaffirming and vindicating its policy language and recipes, while the 
rigidity of its monological vocabulary presents a formidable barrier for popularising 
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its ideas among the „subject‟ populations. This creates multiple and not always 
mutually intelligible frames of reference for „peace,‟ which is at odds with the 
popular (even within the liberal peacebuilding discourse) concept of local ownership 
of the peace process and its outcomes. In effect, the local visions and understandings 
of peace are overshadowed by the liberal ones which, through the habitual equation 
of peace with a set of liberal governance solutions (such as good governance, 
development, respect for human rights, accountability and the rule of law) often 
discredit local efforts at peace-making on the grounds of their remoteness from these 
criteria of a genuinely liberal „peace.‟  
 
At the same time, the inability of the liberal peace to frame the conflictive issues in 
any other terms than those of liberal peacebuilding rhetoric leaves the bulk of 
conflictive dynamics beyond the grasp of liberal transitions. One of the most 
contentious issues in this regard is the shared cultural repertoire, imagery, and 
agency behind the violent and non-violent means of waging and resolving conflicts. 
The deep interpenetration of violent and non-violent practices is visible in the 
ambivalent uses to which the mobilisation of social networks can be put, including 
transnational shadow economies which often provide a key to sustaining local war 
efforts at the same time as generating a sense of stability out of the apparent 
destabilisation of violent conflict. For liberal peacebuilding, this presents enormous 
difficulties, since in its haste to „stop violence‟ it is oblivious to the complex 
relations which obtain between the recurrent practices and interpretational schemes 
on the one hand, and the sense of reality and „commonsense‟ that they generate for 
the local people, on the other. Compared to the shaky realities of stability grown out 
of conflict, the rhetoric of liberal peacebuilding often lacks grounding in direct 
experience and its cultural framing, and so becomes grafted onto the available 
cultural repertoire, which serves to modify and occasionally subvert the intended 
meanings. Contrary to the liberal view of economics as the ultimate realisation of 
timeless rationalism, the realities created out of day-to-day economic interactions in 
the conflict zones betray its profoundly cultural dimension. In comparison, the 
cultural character of local politics and power relations appears positively self-
evident. 
 
Ironically, the failings of the liberal peace on the front of cultural receptiveness do 
not necessarily jeopardise the prospect of enduring peace in Sierra Leone. To claim 
such causal connection would be tantamount to reaffirming the liberal peace as the 
only possible framework and departure point for peace. Sierra Leone‟s complex 
cultural dynamics which escape the field of vision of the liberal peace are not 
necessarily violence-prone; rather, they include ambivalent cultural agency and 
processes, where the spaces for violent contestation intermingle with the spaces for 
peaceful political activism. As though in defiance of the deficit of „politics‟ in the 
liberal governance framework, these cultural dynamics become a site of „the 
political‟ away from the liberal peace, as well as a site where the relationships 
between the elements of the liberal peace and the largely „illiberal‟ local economic 
and political realities are negotiated. Because of the localised pattern of such 
negotiations and the „fragmented‟ character of local agency, it is difficult to pinpoint 
the predominant direction in which the contradictions between them are resolved. 
However, the cultural past of Sierra Leone is replete with examples where 
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subordination went hand in hand with subversion and modification of the introduced 
agendas (e.g. Shaw 2002), although often at the cost of internalising the resultant 
controversies and conflicts, which in turn made the violence all the more 
„proximate‟ as a cultural option (see Chapter 5). In this sense, the „absorption‟ of the 
culturally insensitive liberal peace into Sierra Leone‟s (neo-)patrimonial cultural 
economy does increase the latter‟s indeterminacy, taxing further its ability to 
negotiate internal contradictions. On the other hand, the very rhetorical visibility of 
„peace‟ in the discourse of liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone may contribute to 
the cementing of the cultural template of peace, providing a „performance‟ that 
unexpectedly slots into the dominant cultural understandings. However, the 
relatively „painless‟ introduction of the liberal peace in Sierra Leone (at least from 
the former‟s perspective) should not be read as an encouragement of continued 
cultural ignorance: in other instances, the direction of unexpected cultural „synergy‟ 
may be less favourable. 
 
Interpreting the processes and phenomena as „cultural‟ does not imply their timeless 
relevance, immutability or even durability in time – „culture‟, as shown in this 
research, comprises a vast array of interpretational practices and devices which 
range over a variety of time scales. While attention to culture reveals its 
entwinement with problematic power practices and its role in legitimising disparities 
in social, political and economic opportunity (as is the case, for example, with Sierra 
Leone‟s inheritance laws presumably grounded in the traditional ideas regarding the 
place of women in rural society), a careful consideration of culture can also unveil 
those „latent‟ visions of social change and ideas of societal organisation which may 
be demonstrably absent from the actualised cultural repertoire, yet widely 
compatible with the overall cultural patterns of meaning-making, practice and 
mentality. Possible directions and potential for cultural change comprise a largely 
untapped peacebuilding resource (with the exception of its use in reconciliation – 
e.g. Honwana 2005), but its use requires serious study of local cultures, not least 
because the transformative potential of culture is often constrained by the actualised 
patterns of cultural praxis. Violent conflict serves as a powerful factor in unsettling 
the cultural certainties and unleashing cultural creativity and change, but it is also a 
force which directs the transformation towards devising cultural coping strategies 
and „cultures of violence.‟ In order to countervail the emergence of such conflictive 
cultural equilibriums, „peacebuilding‟ as an activity needs to engage with people‟s 
cultural creativity at what, for them, is the most relevant social scale (family, 
locality, region, nation etc.) (cf. Chabal and Daloz 2006). Provided that adequate 
efforts are made at cultural understanding of the „local,‟ the cultural „otherness‟ of 
the peacebuilding agents need not be an obstacle to a fruitful engagement in 
peacebuilding, since for local people, the encounters with the externality of the 
peacebuilding „other‟ can prompt a creative re-articulation of narratives of their 
cultural „self‟ towards greater a inclusiveness with respect to the conflictive „others‟ 
(cf. Buckley-Zistel 2006; Viktorova Milne, forthcoming).  
 
Although no peacebuilding approach can be ultimately free from the charges of bias 
towards some cultural visions of peace over others, different approaches are not 
equivalent in terms of what they „do‟ to their subjects (cf. Mouffe 1993: 14-5; 
Connolly 1991: ix), especially in view of the centrality of cultural mechanisms of 
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meaning-making and boundary-drawing for the valorisation of one or another 
peacebuilding design or governance solution as benign, authentic, just, 
representative and so on. The instances of deploring the increased sense of 
responsibility that has grown out the burgeoning cultural awareness (Kent 2005), 
however, betray the continuing hegemonic self-positioning of organised 
peacebuilding „gone cultural.‟ The difficulties of peacebuilding agents in making 
decisions regarding which cultural vision of peace to support when faced with „too 
much‟ local knowledge may be superseded by a realisation that such decisions do 
not necessarily have to be theirs to make. In view of their increased cultural 
awareness, the role of external peacebuilding agents may be more fruitfully fulfilled 
by exploring the possibilities, advantages and pitfalls of different directions of 
cultural contestation and re-negotiation of possible peace and governance designs 
together with the local actors. Ironically, shedding the pretence of a „non-
perspective‟ (Häkli 1996) of the objective and timeless „know-how‟ of the liberal 
peace would impart peacebuilding agents with a unique perspective that could prove 
immensely valuable to local actors in addressing the complex tasks of post-violence 
recovery.  
 
A dialogical unclosure of the liberal peace would perhaps be most visible in 
forfeiting the ambition of finality of any solutions concerning the design of peaceful 
coexistence – the finality that is premised on the assumption of universality and 
timelessness of rational knowledge and that fits so poorly with the ongoing character 
of social and political life. Given the complexity of cultural processes of meaning-
making, it may not be possible to tell in advance which form of peace carries the 
best potential for inclusiveness or equitability, or to cover at once the whole 
spectrum of decisions that need making. However, it is important that the 
established political possibilities of renegotiation matched those contained in 
cultural dynamics: ultimately, if „the political‟ is what violent conflict in the Global 
South is about (Edkins 1999: 10), then it is vital that it is preserved in any movement 
towards, or imagination of, peace. Recognition of the partial, temporary nature of 
solutions and political forms they engender heightens the appreciation of the 
historical, time-bound nature of politics. In practical peacebuilding terms, this may 
imply dispensing with the present hierarchies of the relevant scales and loci of 
politics and governance (such as the default prioritisation of the state), and directing 
peacebuilding efforts towards culturally most relevant political contexts (in Sierra 
Leone‟s case, chiefdom politics and below (Fanthorpe 1998; Ferme 1998)). The 
„local‟ grounding of peace does not preclude it broader relevance: on the contrary, 
the local in this sense may be the most appropriate scale from which to examine 
both current and alternative conceptualisations of polity and the international, as 
well as the forms of power, order, regulation and control that these may necessitate. 
Such renegotiation of the relationship between the local and the international would 
not be treating a theoretically virgin terrain, given the wealth of existing debates on 
cosmopolitanism, citizenship, sovereignty, human security, democracy of the 
„international‟ and many other related issues (e.g. Linklater 2007; Tadjbakhsh 2007; 
Doyle 2000; Denov 2006a). 
 
Apart from their links to culturally relevant contexts, the „localness‟ of solutions 
depends on the willingness and ability of concrete communities to uphold them – in 
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contrast to the current practice of top-down solutions which necessitate extensive 
(and expensive) „capacity-building‟ measures to increase the local people‟s 
competences in dealing with the formats of collective action unfamiliar to them. De-
uniformalisation of liberal peace would have to involve a revision of bases and 
criteria for allocating support to local initiatives, which are currently often stymied 
by bureaucratic obstacles. (Although this may leave donor funds vulnerable to 
misuse, its possibility, as shown in Chapter 5, is not by any means eliminated in the 
current system of bureaucratic accountability.) In short, although the recognition of 
cultural processes and effects of meaning-production involves heightened awareness 
of power invested in one or another culturally-grounded vision of peace and 
possibility of its „abuse,‟ it does not preclude trusting the local people in (post-) 
conflict zones to formulate their own visions of peace and find political forms for 
their expression. The recognition of inevitability of hegemonic „closures‟ in the 
endless process of cultural meaning-generation (cf. Laclau 2000) implies, in its 
reverse, a valuable possibility of sometimes taking the „other‟ at face value (Jackson 
2004: 88).  
 
The lack of uniformity of political solutions would also enrich both policy and 
academic conceptions of knowledge, involving a greater appreciation of the unique, 
unrehearsed, and (from the perspective of rational regularity and control) ultimately 
unruly. This could be instrumental not only for imagining alternative formats of 
peace, but also in understanding the dynamics of conflict which currently defy 
rationalisation, being apparently directed against its very possibility. The admission 
of alternative pathways to knowledge such as art, the everyday, the „carnivalesque‟ 
and so on could also heighten our appreciation of „unscripted‟ ethics and praxis 
(Richmond 2007b; 2009a: 574, referring to Bauman 1993) and inspire a 
reconsideration of the possibilities implied in the human condition, broadening the 
very conceptions of cultural and the human. And although these things may appear 
„pointless‟ from the currently dominant perspective of liberal peace and its 
underlying conception of knowledge, their framework may not be the most fruitful 
one from which to judge the ultimate utility of seemingly „undirected‟ cultural 
explorations. 
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